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
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

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


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ERRATA.

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Contents, page xx., line 7, after "Germany," insert 340.

Page 32, line 1, omit "had been forwarded;" line 16 from bottom, after Allies, *comma instead of full point.*

Page 123, lines 5 and 6, for "a few ago," read *a few days ago.*

Page 141, line 8 from bottom, for "most," read *not.*

Page 153, line 10 from bottom, for "mediatif," read *mediative.*

Page 174, line 15 from bottom, before "it," insert *if;* line 13, for "protectors. If," read *protectors; and if it.*

Page 219, line 12 from bottom, for "Piedmontese," read *precedence.*

Page 312, line 15 from bottom, for "claim," read *claims.*

Page 329, line 15 from bottom, for "ne," read *me.*

Page 348, line 5 from bottom, for "Kief," read *Kiel.*

Page 358, line 10, for "Puissance," read *Puissances.*

Page 360, line 16 from bottom, for "permettre," read *permette;* line 9 from bottom, for "*seront,*" read *seroit.*

Page 376, line 16 from bottom, for "negociates," read *negociate.*

Page 393, line 4 from bottom, for "Diège," read *Liège.*

Page 414, line 12, for "actueller," read *actuelles.*

Page 418, line 22, omit "ever."

Page 435, line 14 from bottom, for "Sovereign," read *Sovereigns.*

Page 485, line 2, for "due him," read *due to him.*

Page 489, line 2 from bottom, for "not. In," read *not—in.*

Page 490, line 1, for "then to have," read *then have.*

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES

OF

LORD CASTLEREAGH.

1814 CONTINUED.

ENTRY OF THE ALLIES INTO FRANCE; CONFERENCES OF CHATILLON; DOWNFALL OF NAPOLEON, AND RESTORATION OF THE BOURBONS; GENERAL PEACE; CONGRESS OF VIENNA.

Mr. Hamilton to Lord Castlereagh.

Foreign Office, May 1, 1814.

My dear Lord—As it is material, on account of the article for the restitution of prizes, &c., that some day should be fixed for the exchange of the ratifications of the Convention with France, I send you herewith the model of receipts in blank, which you will exchange either with Talleyrand or Laforêt, and you will agree with them on the date which is to fill up the blank; and then you will have the goodness to let Planta apprise me of the same: indeed, he will, in all probability, enclose to me the receipt signed by the French Minister.

It does not seem to be necessary to give Gordon any other appointment than what he has already received from you; and all that is now wanted, is to say what addition of salary he is to receive to that of Secretary of Embassy, if he retains this last; or, in case he gives it up, whether he is not to have the £3 per diem, being the ordinary allowance of Minister Plenipotentiary: or, in case his character would be of short dura-

tion, it would be more advisable to give him a sum of money, supposed, with his Secretary's salary, to cover his expenses for his extra services as Commissary.

Yours most faithfully, WILLIAM HAMILTON.

Sir Thomas Graham to Lord Castlereagh.

S'Gravenwerd, May 1, 1814.

My Lord—The English mail has just brought me a letter from Lord Bathurst (marked confidential), desiring me, if not instructed to the contrary by your lordship, to take *Dutch* troops into Antwerp with ours, and to hoist the *Dutch* and *English* flags. But, from what Lieutenant-Colonel Cathcart reported to me of your lordship's conversation with him, I shall consider it as positively forbidding this.

General Kunigl has been in Antwerp these two days, but I have not yet heard of the arrival of General Abadie, the French Commissioner. I trust, however, he will come in time to allow of our taking possession on Tuesday, the 3rd inst.

It was my intention, after that, to have moved my head-quarters to Brussels, to have endeavoured, by the presence of British troops, to have cleared the town of the multitude of *traineurs*, &c., of the Allied armies, that oppress the inhabitants, and occasion much disorder; but the enclosed letter from General Thielemann shows that their sufferings are not to end so soon. My going there can be of no use, and I have ordered the troops to halt at Malines.

It is of consequence that our troops should, at least in part, form the garrison of Ostend; and, in case of there occurring any difficulty on that point, I would beg that your lordship would have it so settled, and orders sent accordingly to the Allies in Brabant.

I have the honour to remain, &c., THOMAS GRAHAM.

I send a copy of my answer to Thielemann.[1]

[1] Neither the one nor the other of these letters has reached the hands of the Editor.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Bathurst.

Paris, May 3, 1814.

My Lord—I have delayed transmitting the enclosed correspondence for a few days, in the hope that I might be enabled to ascertain whether the Viceroy's assertions of Murat's treachery were supported by any documents on which the Allies could justify a change of policy towards him; but none have as yet been received: I shall, however, take steps to ascertain the fact. The Austrian Government have no other reluctance on this point than what good faith imposes. As soon as I can learn anything further on this subject, your lordship shall hear from me. I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

PS. Since this despatch was closed, I have received despatches from Sir R. Wilson, which throw further light upon Murat's conduct.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Bathurst.

Paris, May 3, 1814.

My Lord—The enclosures in this despatch will explain the application received from the French Government for certain relaxations in the execution of the Convention of the 23rd, to which, I persuade myself, there can be no objection.

I request your lordship will notify to the Lords of the Admiralty the arrangement respecting the frigates at Flushing and Dunkirk, that the necessary orders may be given for its execution on our part. I have already acquainted Admiral Young with my acquiescence in the proposal of the French Government.

I have also the honour to enclose to your lordship a copy of a letter addressed to me by M. Laforêt, upon the general subject of arrangements respecting ships and their crews, in the ports to be ceded to the Allies, together with my answer, which, I trust, his Royal Highness the Prince Regent will be graciously pleased to approve.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Bathurst.

Paris, May 3, 1814.

My Lord—In answer to your despatch No. 13, relative to the captures made by the American privateer the Prince of Neufchatel, fitted out at Havre de Grace, I have the honour to inform your lordship that I directed Mr. Gordon to make an immediate application on the subject to the French Government. I now enclose to your lordship Mr. Gordon's report to me; and I request your lordship to make a communication of it to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Mr. Hamilton to Lord Castlereagh.

Foreign Office, May 3, 1814.

My dear Lord—Among the difficult matters which you must have to settle in the present state of the Continent, that of Naples is not the least intricate and delicate. You have received Prince Castelcicala's remonstrances, his volunteers, and those delivered by order of his Court. We now see announced in the papers the journey of M. Vicenzo Ancillotti, Minister from his Majesty the King of Naples to this Court, and we may expect to see him shortly arrive here; and it will be rather puzzling, without some recommendations from you, how we ought to behave to him. Prince Castelcicala will, of course, rave and storm, if he is allowed even to reside in quiet. The article seems to have been copied from the Francfort Journal of the 18th ult.

Directions are given for making out the appointments of Foster and Stratford Canning. If you would allow me, I should wish to recommend my namesake, though no relation, who has acted as Sir Charles Stuart's official and private Secretary at Lisbon for four years, during the whole of the hard work of the war in the Peninsula, for one of the

Secretaryships of Legation, either Sardinia, Denmark, or at one of the German courts.

Lucien Bonaparte is released, and is now on a visit to Herschel, the astronomer, I suppose to learn his fortune in the stars, and he leaves England *incog.* in a few days, intending to return in the autumn for his family.

Madame de Stael writes me word, that she sets out for Paris on Saturday next, the 8th.

Gordon's communications respecting the frigates at St. Maloes and the ships at Flushing have been sent to the Admiralty, and we shall soon let him know the result.

Your lordship's obedient servant,

W. HAMILTON.

Sir J. C. Hippisley to Lord Castlereagh.

Grosvenor Street, May 3, 1814.

My dear Lord—I trust your lordship will receive an authenticated printed copy of M. Quarantotti's letter to Dr. Poynter, which I forwarded a few days since, through your Office. I am not sanguine enough to anticipate its success in Ireland; for I am much deceived if the prelates there will not regard it as a matter upon which they are authorized to exercise their own *veto*, and will refuse it promulgation; and on Catholic principles I need not tell your lordship that ***Lex non est lex, nisi promulgata.***

In an article in the "Dublin Evening Post," which arrived yesterday, this *fate* of M. Quarantotti's letter appears to be predicted. "We feel satisfied that a communication should be instantly opened with the Pope, as a *temporal Prince*. In point of *doctrine*, the Catholics must doubtless be governed by his *advice, canonically* given. But in one thing we think they will *not be bound even by him*. We allude to the possibility (*a very remote and contingent* one, we are free to admit) by which he may be induced to *recommend even a qualified veto*. The reasons for adopting this line of conduct, if the *Catholics*

should find it expedient to adopt it, we shall not at present trouble the reader with recounting."

I have no doubt but that this article is sent from the Catholic Board, and probably the Catholic Bench,[1] as Dr. Troy had been for some time assured that his representations were less likely to be fortunate than those of Dr. Poynter; and then I recommended the *entremise* of Macpherson, who stands very high in the estimation of the Roman prelacy, so that they would lean much to his collateral testimony.

In the year 1809, Mr. Keogh published a tract on the veto, in which he also stated that it was much easier to *pull down a Pope than set up a veto.* But the object of my troubling your lordship with this letter, is to intimate the intention of Dr. Poynter to proceed to Paris to-morrow, and there represent to your lordship the hopes entertained by M. Quarantotti, as the depository of the Papal authority at the period when he wrote, that our Government should interest itself in procuring the restoration of the territories of which the See of Rome had been deprived since the commencement of the Revolution. This resolution was taken by Dr. Poynter, before he communicated to me this morning his intentions.

Dr. Poynter had written to Lord Bathurst, who had appointed an interview with him, before he had communicated to me the object. I therefore called on Lord Bathurst, previously to his reception of Macpherson, and stated the circumstances connected with a former application on the same subject, made through me; and the result was, that Lord Bathurst's answer

[1] Cath. Prel. of Ireland, May 27, 1813.

"We feel ourselves bound to declare that the ecclesiastical clauses, [of the Bill] or securities therein contained, are utterly incompatible with the discipline of the Roman Catholic Church, and with the free exercise of our religion.

"Resolved unanimously that, without incurring the guilt of schism, we cannot accede to such regulations, nor can we dissemble our *dismay* and *consternation* of the consequences which such regulations, if enforced, must necessarily produce."

to Dr. Poynter's application was in *unison with that given me by Lord Grenville in* 1795, namely, that "the Pope should appoint a Minister or Agent at any Congress which might be held on the subject of the different claims of the Sovereigns engaged in, or who had suffered by, the war, where the English Plenipotentiaries would be happy to pay every attention to the just claims that might be brought forward by the See of Rome."

Before I left Rome, in 1795, the Pope had *himself* written to me several letters on the subject of Avignon and the Comtat de Venaissin, and afterwards claims were set up on Corsica (as the Pope's rights had been *saved* at the negociations in Paris in 1763, and admitted to have been very tenable by the British Ambassador). But, on the recovery of Avignon and the Comtat, the principal object—in addition to which, the Pope expressed a great desire to have les Antibes ceded to him.—I did not scruple to dissuade him urging the latter of these claims, and gave him very little reason to expect a favourable result from any; but these were made, and I was authorized by Lord Grenville (and also by the Duke of Portland), who went through the whole of the documents, to give the Pope the answer which I have stated, and which in substance was given by Lord Bathurst to Dr. Poynter.

Surrounded as the Pope must be with *expectants* of all descriptions, he can have no means of gratifying them but by the accession of territory. But Austria had always manifested a strong appetite for the northern Legations, and probably your lordship will find that this appetite is not less predominant at the present hour.

I thought it my duty to state those facts to your lordship, as I was myself an actor in the scene. I also told Dr. Poynter that he must be very delicate in *avowing any powers from Rome*, for reasons I need not explain. I before had written to recommend my only son to your lordship's protection, as also Mr. Butler, Lord Cahir's son, at Paris; and I will be greatly

obliged to your lordship to permit his introduction to Lady Castlereagh.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

J. C. HIPPISLEY.

Sir Gore Ouseley to Lord Castlereagh.

Sultaniah, May 4, 1814.

My Lord—Acting as I have done, in the business of the decorations of the Order of the Lion and Sun, for your lordship, I feel it necessary to offer some apology for not waiting the knowledge of your wishes and sentiments on the subject. I think, however, that you will have the goodness to allow me credit for the best intentions, until I have the honour of seeing your lordship, and of presenting the King of Persia's letter, and the Star and Collar (which he has requested me to deliver to you, when I shall fully explain my motives). I expect to leave Teflis about the latter end of next month, and to arrive in St. Petersburg about the 10th of August, when I hope to be honoured with communications from your lordship.

I trust that, in compliance with my request of the 16th of February, your lordship has had the kindness to forward an order of the Admiralty to the Commander-in-Chief of his Majesty's ships of war in the Baltic, to furnish me with a frigate to take myself and family to England.

I have the honour to be, with truth and respect, &c.,

GORE OUSELEY.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool.

Paris, May 5, 1814.

My dear Liverpool—I am truly sorry to occasion any embarrassment at home, by being absent from my post; but I really work as hard as a man can well do, in such a town as Paris, to finish my work; and I cannot persuade myself that it would be safe to leave it incomplete.

Robinson holds himself in readiness, upon the return of the

messenger, to join you, if you still think it necessary; but, in that case, you must spare me Hamilton, as the quantity of business here is considerable. I can hardly conceive the Opposition will persevere in pressing discussion.

The Norwegian point naturally invited a skirmish. The point agitated by Freemantle is quite clear. Colonel Cooke and Colonel St. Simon, on the part of the French Government, were despatched on the night of the 30th. They were detained at Blois by the French authorities for four days, which was the occasion of their not arriving before the battle of Toulouse. The French Government sent also by Bordeaux and other great towns. The officers in command, however, were not disposed to give credence at first to the news, at least to the extent; and the Governor of Bayonne acted hostilely after the fact of the *déchéance* was notified. Buonaparte's abdication was not spoken of till some days afterwards, and was not completed till the 11th, when I reached Paris.

Lord Wellington arrived yesterday without notice, in time, in his blue coat, to see the Russian and Prussian guards defile by Louis XVIII. The Emperor of Russia visited him in the evening; and he afterwards appeared at a ball given by my brother Charles, where he was the great object of admiration. He looks perfectly well, and does not show the effects of his campaigns as much as I expected in his countenance. I have had a full conversation with him this morning. His plan is to return on Sunday to his army, to make all his arrangements for their embarkation, &c., then to go to Madrid, and to make an excursion to England before he settles here.

You will see, by Lord William's official despatches, that we shall have something to unravel in Corsica, and also at Genoa. It was inconsiderate his making a declaration in favour of the old system, at the latter place, knowing, as he must do, that there is little disposition in the Allies to re-establish it. My persuasion is, if the war had gone on much longer in

France, we should have had a most disastrous complication in Italy, and that Lord William's corps, acting separately, would have been probably the first sacrifice. He seems bent upon throwing all Italy loose: this might be well as against France, but against Austria and the King of Sardinia, with all the new constitutions which now menace the world with fresh convulsions, it is most absurd.

Campbell's letter will amuse you. General Schuwaloff, the Russian Commissary, assures me he [Bonaparte] showed little or no fortitude in his difficulties. If his taste for an asylum in England should continue, would you allow him to reside in some distant province? It would obviate much alarm on the Continent. Joseph, now in Switzerland, has expressly solicited a passport. What am I to say?

I am, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool.

Paris, Monday.

My dear Liverpool—I received your letter of the 19th to-day. I shall discuss the points to-morrow, and you shall then know the result.

I send you the remainder of the treaty in the rough. You will see I have secured the consent of France to the incorporation of the Low Countries with Holland. I felt it of the last importance not to go to a Congress without having this most essential point acquiesced in by that power. The annexed map will give you a rough idea of the proposed frontier. The black line is old France; the red, in advance, the accessions granted; the brown *enclaves* are the *réunions*—the whole does not exceed a population of 600,000, and concedes no military point. I thought it also material to secure Genoa as a free port, and to extinguish Antwerp as a naval station.

You will see, by the extent of matter comprised, that the pecuniary reclamations have been a most troublesome and difficult concern. After endless controversy, they have all, with

a good grace, come into the principle I recommended from the first, viz., clear scores in respect to State claims, France engaging to do justice to individuals whose claims rest upon contract, in contradistinction to military spoliation and warfare.

In *our* particular case, I have thought it best to word the Article so as to make the remission of the charge for prisoners contingent upon the liquidation of individual claims.

In haste, ever yours, C.

The two first Articles, being merely formal, are not yet copied.

Sir J. C. Hippisley to Lord Castlereagh.

Grosvenor Street, May 5, 1814.

My dear Lord—I before stated to your lordship my communication with Lord Bathurst, since which Dr. Poynter has departed for Paris, as he wished to communicate with his friend, the Archbishop of Rheims, on the subject. As his purpose is also to request an audience of your lordship, I thought it advisable to transmit to you the accompanying papers, &c., and also to apprise Lord Bathurst of the departure of Dr. Poynter, that his lordship might, if he thought proper, communicate to you what had passed between Dr. Poynter and himself.

As the Comte de Funchal is also at Paris, Dr. Poynter will, I suppose, renew his communications with him, and require his *entremise* with your lordship.

The extracts of the three letters of the late Pope Pius VI., addressed to me, on the subject of Avignon and the Comtat de Venaissin, will fully inform your lordship of the views of Rome at that period, and such, I understand from Macpherson, they are at present. The instructions to the late Cardinal Erskine speak also fully to the same point. There are many documents respecting Corsica, which were put in my hand at the same time, but I do not trouble your lordship with them.

I apprised Dr. Poynter of the delicacy of the ground on which he treated, as he thought he could not justify himself to Rome if he omitted *faire son possible*—however it might verge upon *l'impossibilité*—to acquit his commission.

I shall send the papers to Mr. Goulburn, that they may be forwarded with any letters Lord Bathurst may have to despatch to your lordship. I hope they will reach Paris before Dr. Poynter sees your lordship. He is not aware that I have possessed your lordship of all the circumstances of the case.

I have the honour to be, &c., J. C. HIPPISLEY.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Bathurst.

Paris, May 5, 1814.

My Lord—I have the honour to transmit to your lordship a copy of an instruction which I have thought expedient to address to General Campbell, commanding his Majesty's land forces in the Adriatic, for the regulation of his conduct, in regard to the cession of the island of Corfu by the French. I have desired Rear-Admiral Sir John Gore to give General Campbell all the naval assistance in his power, in the execution of this service; and, as your lordship's despatch of April — directed Lord William Bentinck to detach, at the close of his operations, a part of his force to the Ionian Islands, I have desired his lordship to give the necessary directions for eventually, if necessary, applying to the same object the transports on board of which he may send the troops in question into the Adriatic.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Bathurst.

Paris, May 5, 1814.

My Lord—The Allied Sovereigns having resolved to send an officer to compliment his Sardinian Majesty upon his approaching restoration to his ancient dominions, I have desired Lord William Bentinck to forward to Sardinia, by an officer

of suitable rank, the letter to the Chevalier Rossi, of which I have the honour to enclose a copy to your lordship.

I have the honour, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Bathurst.

Paris, May 5, 1814.

My Lord—I have the honour to enclose a note addressed by me to the Prince of Benevente, on the subject of American privateers, and the captures lately made by them, together with his Highness's answer. I request to be enabled to communicate to the French Minister the opinion of the British Government upon the adequacy and fitness of the proposed regulations, if effectually carried into execution.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Mr. Alexander Marsden to Lord Castlereagh.

Dublin, May 6, 1814.

My dear Lord—You will like to see what is the first impression made here by the very important rescript received from Rome, and I therefore send you a newspaper which contains the sentiments of those who are least inclined to consider it favourably. The document is of the utmost importance to these countries.

I ought to have made the first subject of my letter the expressions of the great pleasure I have felt at the share which you have had in bringing about the salvation of Europe. I was confident, on your setting out for the Continent, that your exertions would prove of the utmost value to the Confederation, as well as to your country. The results which have since occurred, and the weight which it is evident you have had in their councils, fully justify my prediction.

I am, as always, most faithfully yours,

A. MARSDEN.

May 6.

I have had conversation with a very respectable Roman Catholic Bishop, on the subject of the rescript from Rome. He thinks it will be favourably received by the clergy here. They consider that, in resisting the terms proposed, they did their duty as trustees for the Pope, and not having the means of communicating with him. He has no doubt but that the sentiments contained in the letter have the approbation of the Pope, and are of full authority. He stated the component parts of the committee as nearly the only part that he thought would require a more favourable arrangement for the Catholics. In respect to the construction of the oath, as it regarded preaching, &c., he saw no difficulty. He regretted, as others of the Bishops and Catholics have done to me, the total want of communication with their body and the Irish Government.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord William Bentinck.

Paris, May 6, 1814.

My Lord—In reply to your despatch No. 11, I have to acquaint your lordship that his Royal Highness the Prince Regent has been graciously pleased to grant to you the leave of absence for which you have applied. Mr. à Court will proceed in a few days from hence to Sicily, and will fill your lordship's situation during your absence from that residence.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord William Bentinck.

Paris, May 6, 1814.

My Lord—I have to acknowledge the receipt of your lordship's despatches, as referred to in the margin. The confirmation of the auspicious restoration of the ancient family to the throne of France, and the Convention of the 23rd ultimo, transmitted to your lordship, will, I doubt not, have determined you to regulate your conduct in Corsica accordingly.

As there is every reason to presume that the resistance of the people was levelled against the tyranny of Buonaparte alone; and, as it is impossible for Great Britain to countenance, under the present circumstances, any measure of separation, on the part of the Corsicans, from France, your lordship will use your utmost endeavours to conciliate their goodwill to their lawful Sovereign, Louis XVIII.; so that the late events may not have the effect of compromising their interests with the new Government. I have explained this event to the Prince of Benevente, and I think it probable that a Commissary, on the part of the French Government, will be sent there without delay.

With respect to the arrangement your lordship has made for the Provisional Government of Genoa, it is material that it should not be considered as prejudging the future system which it may be expedient to apply to that part of Europe. Your lordship will adopt such measures as may conciliate the feelings of the people; but you will avoid referring to the ancient form of Government in terms which may excite disappointment, should considerations arising out of the general interests induce the adoption of a different arrangement.

With respect to the measures to be adopted in regard to the Milanese, I do not wish your lordship to continue General M'Farlane there, now the Austrians have advanced. It may complicate injuriously the concerns of Italy, any interference on the part of your lordship, placed at such a distance as you are from the seat of the Allied Councils; and I am desirous that your lordship should not take any steps to encourage the fermentation which at present seems to prevail in Italy, on questions of Government.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

PS. I highly approve of the disposition your lordship has made in directing a frigate to convey his Majesty the King of Sardinia to the Continent.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Clancarty.

Paris, May 7, 1814.

My Lord—I enclose, for your lordship's information, copies of despatches, with their several enclosures, which I have addressed to General Lord Lynedoch and Mr. Johnson. I also send a copy of an instruction sent by Prince Metternich to General Vincent. I hope these instructions will satisfy the Prince of Orange that every exertion is made to protect and promote his interests.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

[Enclosures.]

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Lynedoch.[1]

Paris, May 7, 1814.

My Lord—I enclose the copy of a note which I addressed to the Chancellor Hardenberg on the point of Ostend. His Excellency informed me this morning that the King of Prussia had agreed to the arrangement, and that the necessary orders would be given this day to General Bülow to concert its execution with your lordship. As General Vincent is now installed in his functions of Governor-General of the Low Countries, every reasonable relief and indulgence will be afforded to the people. I still think your lordship's making Brussels your head-quarters, even with a mixed garrison, would give support and countenance to his authority. This you can easily manage in concert with him. If any interference is necessary from hence, you will let me know.

I enclose a copy of a note from the Count de la Forêt. You will afford the required protection, letting me know the number of French left, the general state of the fleets and arsenals, and the distribution made of the British, Dutch, Hanoverian, and Swedish troops, in the several garrisons of

[1] General Sir Thomas Graham had just been elevated to the peerage with the above title.

the Low Countries. The Danish troops you will order home; those before Juliers, if required for the garrison, you can afterwards relieve.

It is desirable that every endeavour should be made to protect the people of Brabant against undue exactions. I have transmitted to Mr. Johnson Baron Stein's explanation of the late demands. The people must, however, recollect what the German provinces generally are liable to for lodging and feeding troops.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to J. M. Johnson, Esq.

Paris, May 7, 1814.

Sir—I did not fail to make a strong representation on the exactions complained of in your letter—I send you Baron Stein's report. General Vincent being now in authority, I hope every reasonable wish of the inhabitants of Brabant will be consulted. It is impossible that the reflux of these great armies should not prove a heavy burden upon the countries through which they are to retire; and it is equally impossible to claim, on the part of the people of Brabant, that their garrisons should be specially composed of troops who pay for what they receive. I am confident, however, General Vincent will protect them from every unreasonable demand.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord William Bentinck.

Paris, May 7, 1814.

My dear Lord—Colonel à Court has explained to me the change in your wishes relative to your mission. When I have the pleasure of seeing you in England, we can converse on this subject. I have explained to Mr. à Court that his exercising the same powers as your lordship during your absence, is not to be understood as a relinquishment of the situation on your part.

I shall take care not to compromise any of the parties referred to in your secret letter. I fully approve of your giving the project no countenance; nor can I bring myself to wish that the too extensive experiment already in operation throughout Europe, in the science of government, should be at once augmented by similar creations in Italy.

It is impossible not to perceive a great moral change coming on in Europe, and that the principles of freedom are in full operation. The danger is, that the transition may be too sudden to ripen into anything likely to make the world better or happier. We have new constitutions launched in France, Spain, Holland, and Sicily. Let us see the result before we encourage farther attempts. The attempts may be made, and we must abide the consequences; but I am sure it is better to retard than accelerate the operation of this most hazardous principle which is abroad.

In Italy, it is now the more necessary to abstain, if we wish to act in concert with Austria and Sardinia. Whilst we had to drive the French out of Italy, we were justified in running all risks; but the present state of Europe requires no such expedient; and, with a view to general peace and tranquillity, I should prefer seeing the Italians await the insensible influence of what is going on elsewhere, than hazard their own internal quiet by an effort at this moment.

Mr. à Court will proceed in a few days to Sicily, so as to confer with your lordship fully before you embark for England.

The campaign having now closed, your lordship may suspend till further orders sending an officer to Murat's head-quarters.

I am, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Melville to Lord Castlereagh.

Admiralty, May 9, 1814.

Dear Castlereagh—The French Commissaries for the release of their prisoners of war arrived here last night, and I had a

visit from them to-day. We had very little discussion; but they seem to look to us for the means of conveying their people from hence to France, though the French Government make that service the ground of application for the ships at Flushing, &c., to be allowed to depart from their present ports. I see no reason why such of the ships at Brest and Cherbourg as are fitted out, and can have crews sufficient to navigate them across the Channel, should not be employed on this duty.

Our means of transport are very limited at present, and, with the requisitions for the conveyance of troops from the Garonne to England and to America, and I am afraid also the Portuguese from the south of France to Portugal, I see no prospect of our being able to send off the French prisoners as soon as is desirable.

In the sixth article of your Convention of the 23rd ult., the term of twelve days is given for the restitution of all captures in the Channel and North Sea; one month from thence to the Canaries and Equator; and five months for all other parts of the world. Does the Mediterranean come within the one month or the five months?

In our arrangements for withdrawing the fleet from the Mediterranean, a portion will be brought away forthwith; another large division on the signature of a treaty of peace; and Admiral Hallowell, with five sail of the line, will be left till everything is finally settled in regard to Murat and all other States in Italy, &c. I conclude that the French Government will proceed immediately to dismantle their fleet at Toulon.

I am glad to find, from your last letters, that you have a fair prospect of a satisfactory arrangement in regard to American privateers being admitted with their prizes into the ports of France.

It is very desirable, in order that we may not be unprepared in the naval department, that we should have the earliest intimation of any intention on the part of the Emperors of

Austria or Russia, or the King of Prussia, to visit England, and the probable time of their arrival. Boulogne is the most convenient place for their embarkation. It happened very fortunately that the yachts with the King of France were enabled to enter Calais harbour within a few minutes of the close of a spring tide; but they could not get out again for ten days. They can lie with great safety close off the mouth of Boulogne harbour, which they cannot do off Calais without some risk.

Believe me ever yours sincerely, MELVILLE.

Mr. Bruce has requested me to send you the enclosed packet; and, from his description of the contents, they may possibly be useful to you.

Lord Castlereagh to Don Miguel Forgaz.

Paris, May 9, 1814.

Sir—I have the honour to acquaint your Excellency that his Royal Highness the Prince Regent has been graciously pleased to nominate Thomas Sydenham, Esq., to succeed to Sir C. Stuart as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Court of Lisbon. Mr. Sydenham has received directions to proceed immediately to Portugal, and will deliver this letter to your Excellency; but, from my unavoidable absence at present from England, he is not yet furnished with regular credentials in the usual form: no time, however, will be lost in forwarding them from London. In the mean time, I am confident that the Prince Regent of Portugal will see in this circumstance only the anxious desire of the British Government as much as possible to prevent the friendly intercourse between the two countries from being unnecessarily interrupted or delayed; and Mr. Sydenham will, I doubt not, meet from the Government of Portugal that reception and confidence, which cannot fail to maintain that state of amity which happily subsists between Great Britain and Portugal.

In requesting your Excellency to communicate Mr. Sydenham's appointment to the Regency of Portugal, I beg you to accept the assurances of my high consideration.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Wellington to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, May 9, 1814, half-past 12 at night.

My dear Lord—I return the letters from my brother. Affairs appear certainly to be becoming critical in Spain, and it is difficult to say what to advise the King. I'll lose no time in going there; and, in the mean time, the instructions you propose to give my brother would be the best. We must prevent a civil war there.

Ever yours, my dear lord, most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, May 10, 1814.

My dear Lord—Again I have to address you upon the subject of the Belgic provinces, and in behalf of the suffering people of those countries. To obtain your assistance for their relief from a state of almost unexampled suffering, it might perhaps be sufficient to request you to cast your eye over the two papers herewith transmitted, which, from all I have heard, do not convey an unfaithful picture of the miseries experienced by that people. The state of suffering to which they have been, still are, and further likely to be exposed, from the intolerable exactions enumerated in the first part of the paper addressed to the Governor-General, is indeed horrible, and calls aloud for your compassionate interference.

It seems the Saxon Landwehr and the Swedes, including the corps at first intended to be placed under the orders of Sir Thomas Graham, (now Lord Lynedoch) are returning home; but then this noble lord acquaints me that the remainder of the force, under the Duke of Saxe-Weimar, is

still to continue in the Low Countries. Neither is this all: he had, at the desire of the Austrian Commissioner, General Kunigl, intended to have occupied Ostend, Nieuport, Brussels, &c., and with this view had pushed on British troops (whose presence is a blessing instead of a curse) towards each of these places, but found them already occupied by the Prussians; and General Bülow has since sent him the dislocation of his force, from whence it appears that some 40,000 troops under his immediate orders are already in great part, and are to be entirely, spread over the face of Flanders and into Brabant, and to occupy every town in those provinces with the exception of Antwerp. In addition to this, the corps of Kleist is also to march into the Belgic provinces, and to be followed by that of d'York!

General Vincent was extremely anxious that Lord Lynedoch should establish his head-quarters at Brussels; but the latter acquainted me that he conceives, under present circumstances, he can do no possible good, while much inconvenience might result from the shock and counteraction of military command, and irritation arise among the inhabitants, and perhaps even among the troops, from the different manner in which these are subsisted. It may be so, but I am still of opinion, and so told Lord Lynedoch, that his presence there would be advisable; and he has been so good as to say that he will again consider the subject.

In effect, what can General Vincent do for the benefit of these provinces, surrounded as he is by an overwhelming military force, over which he has no control, and the commandants of which have no interest in common with him, or any other, than to squeeze the people to their last stiver? and, though I admit the force of General Lord Lynedoch's apprehensions, yet still the realization of these might, I should think, be hazarded in favour of the probable countenance which his presence would give to the Governor-General's measures, the example his and the conduct of his troops might

give to others, and their consequent discouragement from the most wasteful and oppressive system of exaction, which cannot fail very shortly to terminate in the utter ruin of every individual in those once fine and flourishing provinces.

When I last addressed you, on the 25th of April, on this subject, I never dreamt that the Prussian troops were to be poured in such torrents, or indeed at all, upon us. The object specified in that and other letters, was merely to get rid of the Swedes, and to prevent the Saxon troops from returning into Belgium. My object, however, was, as I thought, in strict accordance with the arrangements made at Chaumont on the 12th of March, that, as the future guarantee of the interests and future fate of the Belgic provinces, Austria should, through the Governor-General named by her, possess a leading influence in the Provisional Government of those countries; while Great Britain, the other guarantee, should efficiently co-operate therein through her military force on the frontier; to effect which, it appeared to me that the immediate establishment of General Vincent, as Governor-General, and the removal of all troops over which the British Commanding Officer should have no control, were absolutely essential. In vain for any good purpose has General Vincent been appointed, if, as seems to be the case, he is deprived of all means of acting.

It is whispered, I know not, however, upon what grounds, and give it, therefore, merely as a rumour, that the Prussians have it in intention to occupy in considerable force the country between the Meuse and the Rhine. Possibly d'York's and Kleist's corps, or one of them, may be intended for this. Should this prove true, it will be a pre-judgment with a vengeance: if, as Lord Lynedoch acquaints me, there should be such a jealousy among the Allies of admitting Dutch troops into the countries on the left bank of the Meuse, how much greater the objection to the admission of a Prussian force upon the right of that river, or indeed on either of its immediate banks! The Dutch troops are scarcely yet in a situation to

give jealousy to any one, but the Prussians are of a very different description.

I should have written to you by Prince Frederick, who left the Hague some days since for Paris, but had not sufficient notice of his intentions to enable me to do so.

Mr. Johnson sent me yours and Lord Aberdeen's despatches in favour of M. de Ternois. I have made the application, of course, as you desired it should be made, but have as yet received no answer. M. de Ternois is, I dare say, a very worthy man, and I believe him to be extremely zealous: his price is, however, excessive, and, if he shall obtain his suit, he will, in fact, be most magnificently paid. His letters to me, though frequent, were scarcely ever to be depended upon.

With the exception of Delfzyl, all the towns here will be immediately given up: many of them are so already, and Delfzyl will, I doubt not, follow the general example, as soon as an officer despatched for this purpose from the garrison to Paris shall return with a confirmation of the recent facts.

We expect the Duke of Cambridge at the end of this or beginning of next week, on his way to England. The Unicorn frigate is arrived at Helvoet for his conveyance.

I had almost forgot to state, that in consequence of the Government General of the Belgic provinces having at length been placed in the hands of General Vincent, the Prince of Orange has named M. le Baron Van der Capellen, his Minister for Commerce and Colonies, to the situation of Assistant or Intendant at Brussels, under the arrangement of the 12th of March, and this gentleman went hence the day before yesterday, for the purpose of fulfilling the duties of his situation at Brussels.

Yours, my dear lord, most sincerely,

CLANCARTY.

We have not yet heard that the little intrigue which had been practised in England, to defeat the marriage of the Hereditary Prince with the Princess Charlotte, has been

entirely counteracted; but the Prince of Orange informs me the best hopes are given him that it will have no final ill consequence.

Enclosed I send you a letter from Hopner. However sorry I shall be to lose him, I really think him highly deserving of whatever you may be enabled to do for him.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir Henry Wellesley, K.B.

Paris, May 10, 1814.

Sir—Your letters of the dates referred to in the margin reached me here yesterday, and I had an opportunity of communicating them to the Duke of Wellington. His Grace proposes to visit Madrid on his return to England, and before he takes upon himself the functions of his Majesty's Ambassador at this Court.

I entirely approve of the language held by you to the King of Spain, in the present critical circumstances of his affairs. The mode in which your Excellency's advice was asked did not denote, on the part of his Catholic Majesty, any disposition to abide by it; and, if so, more especially under the extreme difficulties of the question, it would have been highly unadvisable for your Excellency to have made yourself responsible for measures over which you could have exercised little or no control.

Although the conduct of the Cortes and Regency has latterly been marked by a firm adherence to the principles of the Alliance, so far as the mere existence of the Constitution is at stake, it is impossible to conceive that any change tranquilly effected can well be for the worse. We are entitled to pronounce now, upon a certain extent of experience, that, in practice as in theory, it is amongst the worst of the modern productions of that nature.

I am glad to hear that the King is not disposed, in looking to a change, to aim at the restoration of the ancient order of

things. I am confident there is not vigour and ability enough amongst his adherents to sustain such a system against the temper of the times, and the party which exists in Spain favourable to a form of Government more or less free. If his Majesty announces to the nation his determination to give effect to the main principles of a constitutional *régime*, I think it is probable he may extinguish the existing arrangement with impunity, and re-establish one more consistent with the efficiency of the executive power, and which may restore the great landed proprietors and the clergy to a due share of authority: but, to succeed in establishing a permanent system, he must speak to the nation, and not give it the character of a military resolution; in doing which, the language of Louis XVIII. may afford him some useful hints.

I hope, if we are to encounter the hazards of a new constitutional experiment in Spain, in addition to the many others now in progress in Europe, that the persons charged with the work will not again fall into the inconceivable absurdity of banishing from the legislature the Ministers of the Crown; to which error, more perhaps than to any other, may be attributed the incapacity which has distinguished the march of every one of these systems which has placed the main authorities of the Constitution in hostility, instead of alliance, with each other.

I have every confidence in the discretion with which you will act in the impending crisis. You will not hesitate to afford your counsel and support, where you may be of opinion that the just influence of the British Government can promote the happiness of our Ally; but, where you cannot see your way clear as to the probable result, I should wish you to abstain, rather than commit your Government by any systematic, precipitate, or too ostensible interference in the internal affairs of Spain.

Your Excellency will express to the King the congratulations of the Prince Regent on his Majesty's auspicious resto-

ration to his throne and people, over whom his Royal Highness trusts he may long continue to reign, equally to his own honour and their happiness.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir Henry Wellesley.

Paris, May 11, 1814.

Sir—I have to request you will take a favourable opportunity, as early as you can, of stating to the King of Spain the earnest wish of the British Government that his Majesty would restore the district of Olivenza to Portugal. The circumstances under which this small territory was acquired can oppose no obstacle in honour to its restoration; and, from the valour displayed by the Portuguese army in assisting in the expulsion of the enemy from Spain, I am convinced his Catholic Majesty will be glad to find an occasion of evincing his friendship to the nation.

The Prince Regent is the more solicitous that the feelings of the Portuguese Government should be gratified in this instance, as they have very liberally acquiesced in the restoration of the colony of Cayenne to France.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to G. Rose, Esq.

Paris, May 11, 1814.

Sir—I have duly received the several despatches which you have addressed to me. With respect to the proposed guarantee on the part of Great Britain, of the arrangement between Austria and Bavaria, his Bavarian Majesty cannot doubt the warm interest the Prince Regent takes in every measure that can cement the union between these two Powers; but it appears to me that, as this exchange of territory must form a part of the general settlement of Europe, the guarantee for its protection will naturally be contained in the larger act

of all the Powers; but this point will better be discussed hereafter.

Have you learned any more particulars of Murat's supposed intercourse with the enemy? I should be glad if, without any formal proceeding, you could ascertain the truth of these allegations, and particularly whether they rest on parole evidence, or can be substantiated by documents.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Mr. Hamilton to Lord Castlereagh.

Foreign Office, May 12, 1814.

My dear Lord—The enclosed memoranda have been put into my hands by the Author of the Anti-Gallican. You may best know how to appreciate the information it contains.

Yours, &c., W. HAMILTON.

[Enclosure.]

M. Saint Aubyn, a celebrated writer on finances, was a member of the Tribunate during the Consular Government, but was expelled (*éliminé*) in 1802, with Chenier and others. He was to have been Minister of Finance previous to the 18th Brumaire, but, on account of Bonaparte's dislike to him, his appointment was not confirmed. M. Saint Aubyn is well known for his partiality towards England, and his admiration of our finances. He was in 1810 appointed Secrètaire dans les Archives au Ministère des Relations Extérieures.

This person has always been very anti-revolutionary, and would, I am certain, give useful information to the English Embassy. I gave Mr. Hamilton a letter to him, when Mr. Mackenzie went to Morlaix, in 1810.

M. Pillé, an employé in the Foreign Office, knows many secrets, and could be of use.

M. Tournal, an *ancien avoué*, *rue Montmartre, près l'Egout*, a man of much information, and well acquainted with all parties, and with many persons in Government offices. When

I was in Paris, he frequently expressed the strongest desire to give some information to the British Government.

M. André, or d'Arbelle—by the former name he is known at the Foreign Office, and by the latter at his own private house. He was many years the confidential person of Talleyrand; he was, literally speaking, his *âme damnée*. This person, to my knowledge, corresponded with the English and Irish editors of newspapers.

Colonel Callander, *alias* General Benneval, a Scotchman by birth, and father of Mrs. T. Sheridan. He was employed by Bonaparte since 1803, on various missions on the Continent. In 1804, he came to England incog., and went to Gibraltar in 1805—reported in the Government offices in Paris that he was sent there by Bonaparte to bribe the Governor. This man is a *mauvais sujet:* he would serve any body for money. *On pourrait utiliser ses moyens.* He is a man of talents, *et sait beaucoup.*

Lord Melville to Lord Castlereagh.

Admiralty, May 13, 1814.

Dear Castlereagh—Admiral Young, in consequence of orders from hence, is returned to the Downs, leaving two line-of-battle ships at anchor in the Scheldt, off Flushing, to remain there till every thing is finally settled in regard to the ships at Antwerp, and to take care that the Convention of the 23rd ult. is duly executed, with such exceptions as you have arranged, or may yet arrange, with the French Government.

It has been proposed, and, indeed, the Prince Regent has directed that in case the two Emperors and the King of Prussia, or any of them, shall come to this country, and not object to the same ceremonies, in being escorted across the Channel, as were performed in the instance of the King of France, the Duke of Clarence shall hoist his flag again, and take the command of the ships in the Downs for that purpose. It has been said that the Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia would rather avoid that ceremonial; and I need not

inform you that it is attended with some difficulties and inconveniences, which it is needless to detail to you, but which you may possibly guess. If you shall be authorized to state to me that it would rather be dispensed with, and that the yachts and a frigate are all that would be required or wished, his Royal Highness will not hoist his flag at present; but, if you think that the ceremonial would be acceptable, and ought to be carried into effect, it shall be done. I have not heard any surmise as to whether the Emperor of Austria would wish anything of the kind.

Believe me, dear Castlereagh, yours most sincerely,

MELVILLE.

The two yachts are in the Downs.

[By the preceding letter from Lord Melville, we see that the Board of Admiralty were, at the time it was written, seriously occupied with arrangements for the expected visit of the Allied Sovereigns to England.

The following, without date, address, or signature, on the same subject, must, I presume, have been written nearly at the same time. It is endorsed as under.—EDITOR.]

Draft respecting Mr. Werry.

My dear Sir—Lord Castlereagh desires me to acquaint you that he has appointed Mr. Werry to arrange with the persons selected for the same purpose by the Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia, the conveyance of the baggage, &c., of those Sovereigns on their journey to England, and its reception at Dover.

Mr. Werry, after having collected all the necessary information here, will proceed to Dover; and Lord Castlereagh requests either that an order may be sent by the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, directing the officers of the Customs, and other authorities at that place, to act in concert with Mr. Werry on this occasion, or that a person should be

sent down from the Treasury to Dover, (if their lordships should think it more expedient) to prepare everything, and to communicate and make arrangements with Mr. Werry.

Mr. Charles Butler to Lord Castlereagh.

Lincoln's Inn, May 13, 1814.

My Lord—The very kind interest taken by your lordship in the concerns of his Majesty's Roman Catholic subjects, makes me hope you will excuse my taking this liberty.

I send your lordship two Irish newspapers. One contains Monsignor Quarantotti's letter, the other a translation of it; and each of them expresses the grossest abuse of the letter and its writer. Dr. Milner, the worst enemy of the Roman Catholic cause in the present times, is now either at Paris, or on his way thence to Rome.

May I presume to suggest to your lordship, that it would be rendering the Roman Catholic cause essential service, and perhaps contribute much to the tranquillity of Ireland, if the Court of Rome could be guarded against Dr. Milner's misrepresentations, and the Prelates of Ireland recommended by her to acquiesce in Monsignor Quarantotti's intimations, and the arrangements mentioned by him.

I have only to repeat my request that your lordship will excuse my taking this liberty: but, permit me to add, that no one feels greater satisfaction than I do in your lordship's high elevation of character in the opinion and sentiments of all Europe.

With the greatest respect, I have the honour to be your lordship's most obliged and obedient servant,

CHARLES BUTLER.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, May 13, 1814.

My dear Lord—Your despatch and private letter of Saturday last, the 7th instant, reached me late on Tuesday night,

some hours after our despatches had been forwarded to your address at Paris, complaining of the exactions upon the people of Belgium, had been forwarded by the Prince's courier. I am not, however, sorry that they were thus suffered to proceed. One of the enclosures, the representation of the Administrators of the departement de la Dyle to the Governor-General M. le Baron Horst, contains, in my mind, a full answer to M. de Stein's note, conveyed in yours; and the facts in this representation are the less to be suspected, as they are addressed to one, who, in his supreme situation in the Government, was in a situation to detect any fallacy, as well of fact as in reasoning.

I do not understand that any objection is made by these people to bear *an equal share* in the general contribution. But, when the nature of the free quarters to which they are exposed, not only and abstractedly from all other contribution and requisition, presses more severely than four times the exactions imposed upon them by the French; while the dreadful waste which occurs has been destructive to the people, as well as most prejudicial to the Allies. M. de Stein can scarcely expect that some remonstrance on their part must not reach him. I should hope that your compassionate exertions in their favour may prevent the continuance of the evil: should it not, I may again have to address you on this subject.

Enclosed I send you a copy of a letter received this morning from General Lord Lynedoch, with its enclosure, together with the draft of my despatch thereon to your address, by which you will see the light in which I view this premature attempt to open the navigation of the Scheldt, and what I have thought it my duty immediately to do in consequence. This, I trust, will meet with your approbation; if so, your assistance to put a peremptory stop to the further progress of this unpleasant business will, I doubt not, be as prompt as it will certainly prove effectual. I have already written both to General Lord Lynedoch and to Mr. Johnson, to the effect

stated in my despatch; so that I hope no further efforts will be made to carry the project into execution, till the receipt of further instructions on this subject from Paris.

Immediately upon the receipt of your private letter, I spoke to the Prince of Orange upon the subject of a plan for constitutionally incorporating the Belgian with the Dutch provinces. He says he is well aware of the necessity of this work, but finds himself much at a loss, for the want of local knowledge, to carry it well into effect. It has, however, been agreed that he, with his most impartial advisers, shall work on their part, while I shall endeavour on mine to prepare something with the same object; and that we shall, at all times, communicate our respective ideas on the subject. In the interim, M. de Capellen, his Royal Highness's Commissary at Brussels, has been written to, to furnish answers to certain specific queries necessary for our labours.

Upon the three points which form the principal matter of the guarantee, viz., question of Religion, that of Commerce, and that of the Debt—the great difficulty will be to arrange matters respecting the latter. The affair of religion is already settled by the Dutch constitution, and practically operated upon by the appointment of several Roman Catholics to lucrative and confidential situations. To the leading matter of commerce, also, viz., the opening of the Scheldt, however unpopular the measure may be with the commercial people, and, as I think, mistakenly, the Prince has, I believe, the most sincere dispositions in its favour, and is not averse to an uniform privilege of commerce in every part of his future dominions. But here the question of debt arises: without attempting to impeach the principle of each party being only to be made liable for their ancient debt, they practically seek to overturn it by setting up another, incompatible with its existence, viz., that, after the incorporation, all persons must be equally taxed, and all the provinces equally liable to all duties; and this they draw from the constitution itself,

alleging that, if the people of Belgium are to be incorporated with them, they must be incorporated under the constitution; and, if so, the whole constitution must have its influence over all and every part, all becoming entitled to the same advantages, and all liable to the same burdens. Upon being answered that, if this should be the consequence, the constitution must be altered to meet the emergency, and that this Act contains within itself, probably with a view to this very event, ample means by which its provisions can be extended and even changed, it is then observed, first with a view of mitigating the operation of the principle, that a considerable portion of the debt incurred has been contracted for the defence and maintenance of the colonies and commercial establishments, the benefit of free trade with, and participation in which, it is now proposed to extend to the inhabitants of Belgium; and, secondly, with a view to the absolute equalization of future contribution, an argument *ab inconvenienti* is drawn, from which it is deduced that, when the two countries shall become united, the Scheldt opened, and general privileges of commerce enjoyed, the effect of a heavy contribution on the one country, and a light contribution on the other, will be the almost entire depopulation and depression of the former.

These are some of the principal objections urged in some two or three conversations that I have had with M. de Nagel, on this matter; and, in truth, the subject is not without difficulty. Although not expressed by me, there seems to be some claim for mitigation, upon the first of these grounds; and this latter observation does not appear to me to put forth apprehensions altogether to be neglected. This was felt in the case of the union of England with Scotland, but remedied by the payment of a considerable sum of money from the former to the latter country, as you well know, in order to make the debt common to the whole kingdom, when united; but the case here is widely different: that was the annexation of a poor State, with little debt, to one, whose debt also at that

time was comparatively small, and at a time too, when, from a state of almost absolute bankruptcy, arising from false speculation, Scotland was considerably benefited by the payment of the sum in question—but this is the case of a small, and, in comparison, a poor country, saddled with an immense debt, uniting with a larger and rich country, with a supposed debt of scarcely any amount.

However, though matters may meet with difficulty, we are not therefore to cut the knot before we have at least endeavoured to untie it. At present we know so little of facts, that we are scarcely able to reason upon them. The first thing will be to ascertain what the debt of the Belgian provinces is, and in this you may perhaps be able to aid us by letting us know whether it is intended to saddle that country with any or what part of the debt incurred by France during the time they were united; or whether any and what debt may be endeavoured to be imposed upon these, her former territories, by Austria, in relief of her finances.

For the present, I leave the matter of the debt here, but shall be abundantly indebted to you for any suggestions of yours to enable me the better to assist in giving form to some plan for the regulation of this at present very difficult subject. With respect to other matters, I foresee but little difficulty in principle, perhaps somewhat more in details. On the subject of representation, the Dutch Government is disposed to be very liberal, nay, even almost inclined to admit the principle of population as their guide, and proclaim such as their intention, which would have the effect of at once giving a majority to the new against the old States, and to those professing the Roman Catholic over those of the Reformed religion. They have, however, suspended the final decision of the question, till they shall know more upon the point of contribution, and what may be your opinion as to the principle, whether of population or of contribution, which ought to determine this question.

Abundant thanks for your information respecting my probable stay here! I am perfectly satisfied with this or any other arrangement which you may find it convenient to make, being very comfortable here, though not at all averse to return whenever your arrangements shall be ripe for my relief. I hold myself peculiarly fortunate, and entirely indebted to your kindness for it, in having been brought forward, at a period the most interesting of our history, to take a part in the great political events which have been and will continue for some time to be agitated.

Your choice of Wellington, as Ambassador at Paris, is perfect; though nothing can add to his well-earned honour and renown, it detracts from neither; affords an additional proof of the confidence of Government, in political as well as in military matters, towards one for whom too much cannot be done, and to whose talents too much cannot be confided; reflects great credit upon the Minister who names him; and is, in the highest degree honourable and complimentary to the Court to which he is accredited.

Affectionately yours, CLANCARTY.

Lord Castlereagh to the Officer commanding his Britannic Majesty's Forces in the Island of Corsica.

Paris, May 14, 1814.

Sir—You are probably aware that, by a Convention agreed upon between the Allies and the new Government of France, on the 23rd of April, it was stipulated that such part of the French territory as was comprehended within the limits of France, previous to January 1, 1792, should be evacuated by the Allies by the 1st of June of this year. This island of Corsica falls within this stipulation, and I am therefore to signify to you the Prince Regent's pleasure that you lose no time in taking measures for executing this part of the Convention. In the mean time, you will use your best exertions, in common with the French Commissioner, General Baron

Milet de Mureau, to reconcile the inhabitants of Corsica to the new order of things in France. I have no doubt that you will experience little difficulty in effecting this object, as the resistance of the people appears to have been levelled against Buonaparte alone. But you will impress upon the inhabitants, if necessary, that it is impossible for Great Britain to countenance, under present circumstances, any measure of separation on the part of Corsica from France.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

PS. This letter will be delivered to you by the Baron Milet; and, as it will reach you through the medium of the French Government, I have left it unsealed, in order that they may be duly apprized of its contents. You may assure the inhabitants that I have not failed to express to the French Government my persuasion that his Christian Majesty will not consider their late resistance to French authority as depriving them of a just claim to his Majesty's kindness and protection.

Lord Castlereagh to the Officer commanding any of his Britannic Majesty's Ships or Vessels on the Coast of the South of France or Italy.

Paris, May 16, 1814.

Sir—Mr. à Court, his Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Court of Sicily, who will deliver to you this letter, has been directed by me to proceed with all expedition to Sicily. I am therefore to desire that you will take him on board any vessel under your command, and convey him to his destination with as little delay as a due attention to your other public duties may permit.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Clancarty.

Paris, May 16, 1814.

My Lord—Your lordship is already apprized of the steps taken to secure to the Prince of Orange the immediate occu-

pation of his own fortresses, and, as far as possible, to relieve the country hereafter to be subjected to his sovereignty from the heavy pressure of the war. I shall neglect no occasion of following up this object; but, as that will be best effected by assimilating, as far as may be, the temporary and the permanent administration of the country, it appears to the Allied Ministers highly desirable to institute a commission, without loss of time, to prepare, for the approbation of the Sovereigns, a *projet* for the reunion of the Belgic provinces with Holland.

You will call the Prince of Orange's immediate attention to this important object—that this Commission may be assembled, according to mutual convenience, either at Brussels or the Hague, and should consist of an equal number of Dutch and Belgic members; possibly three of each might be sufficient: and it might be desirable that your lordship and Mr. Johnson should be in communication with the Commissioners, as well as the Secretary of State and the Governor-General of the Low Countries. Their duty will be to consider how Belgium can best be incorporated with Holland, preserving to the former a just share of authority in the States-General, and also guarding their interests in matters of religion, finance, and commerce. I need hardly observe that the commercial freedom of the Scheldt must be a condition *sine quâ non*. With respect to Antwerp as a naval arsenal, I trust his Royal Highness will cheerfully concur in its destitution. These two conditions are equally wise, whatever might be the destiny of the Low Countries. Upon no rational principle ought such a noble river as the Scheldt to be shut to the blessings of commerce; nor can it be for the peace of Europe that a naval armament should be placed so near the frontier either of France or Holland, as an object constantly to be fought for.

So much will depend on the selection of the persons charged with this Commission, that I cannot too strongly recommend

that the choice should fall not only upon individuals possessed of competent knowledge, but whose judgment and character are likely to command the public confidence.

I shall transmit a copy of this despatch to Mr. Johnson; and it is the intention of Prince Metternich to instruct General Vincent to take the necessary steps for carrying this arrangement into effect, on the part of his Government, in concert with that of Holland.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Mr. Cooke to Lord Castlereagh.

Foreign Office, May 16, 1814.

My dear Lord—You see there is not much danger of trouble on the Norway question, nor much disposition in opposition to collect. Anker is still here, and unwilling to go: he has no information from Norway, nor have we any that we can rely upon. There are two floating accounts still; one, that Prince Christian is proclaimed King, the other, that he has left Norway: Rehausen believes the latter.

I send you a memorandum. I am sure the point requires much consideration.

Yours truly, E. COOKE.

The Duke of Wellington to Lord Castlereagh.

Robartins, [?] May 17, 1814, 6, A.M.

My dear Lord—I received a letter this morning from the Duke de San Carlos, dated at Valencia, the 4th, but despatched the 11th, in which he enclosed me a decree, of which the enclosed is a copy, dissolving the Cortes; a second, abolishing the liberty of the press, and others nominating himself to be the Minister of State; Lardizabal, the late Regent, to the Colonial department; Salazar to the Treasury; and Macanaz to the department of law and justice.

I have not time to make any observations on these mea-

sures, but [will] communicate them to you immediately, as they may be interesting to you.

Ever yours, my dear lord, most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, May 19, 1814.

My dear Lord—I have little to send to you by the present opportunity. It seems, by a letter received yesterday from Mr. Johnson, that the project of opening the Escaut was a mistake of General Künigl's; and that means would be taken immediately to prevent its being carried into effect by General Baron de Vincent, the Governor-General.

The Duke of Cambridge arrived here late last night, on his way to England, and will depart the day after to-morrow, in a frigate, which waits his orders at Schevening.

The accompanying letter from General Lord Lynedoch reached me this morning. I have shown it to the Duke of Cambridge, who will give directions that the Hanoverian troops, 15,000 strong, should be placed under his lordship's orders, to be moved forward into the Low Countries, whenever he shall acquaint General Decken, at Hanover, with his wishes for this purpose. Lord Lynedoch will be made acquainted with this arrangement.

Upon the subject of the plan for uniting the Belgic with the Dutch provinces under one head and one Government, I hope to address you at length, in some days hence. The principle of this plan will, I should think, be perfectly satisfactory to the guaranteeing powers, on all other points, and not objectionable in respect to that of the debt. With respect to this, it is apparent that a considerable expense, from their share in which the Dutch will not seek exemption, must be incurred in erecting strong fortifications against the inroads of France upon the frontiers of Flanders, Hainault, and Brabant; in consideration of which it should seem fair that a proportion of

the debt of the Dutch should be borne by the Belgic provinces, and the more so, if a considerably greater advance is made by Holland than by the annexed provinces, arising from the indemnification of Great Britain for a ceded colony, to which the latter would have no pretension. Again, as separated, the Dutch have the entire command of the Scheldt, to close or open it as they shall think fit: this is an advantage which Nature has given them, and for the relinquishment of which, I do not think unreasonably, they will doubtless be inclined to seek for indemnity; and such indemnity can nowhere be better found than in the participation, on the annexation of the Belgic provinces, in the debt of Holland.

But this is not all. The Belgic provinces have no claim upon the colonies of the Dutch, for the preservation or maintenance of which a considerable portion of the debt was incurred. If then the Dutch shall be willing to give a full participation to the Belgic provinces in all the advantages which the former may derive from these, it should seem but just that the last should bear their full portion of the burdens incurred by those colonies. In short, the reasoning goes to this, that each party, after the annexation, shall enjoy equal benefits, and each share their proportion of all the incumbrances The inconvenience, nay, almost impossibility, of any system of inland Custom-houses, to place the trade of the Dutch in security against the inland passage of goods into their provinces paying less duty than those imported direct by sea, is strongly felt; the ruin which would attend emigration from the poorer and more heavily encumbered provinces to those far richer and much more lightly taxed, does not seem to me to be an apprehension altogether void of foundation.

It is hard, knowing how much your time is engrossed, to request you to consider the subject in this light; and, if you should approve of it, to sound the dispositions of Austria, the other guaranteeing Power, upon it: nevertheless I must request you to interest yourself in it. In the mean time, through

M. de Capellen and Mr. Johnson, at Brussels, I am endeavouring to ascertain the amount of the Belgic debt, and have already written to you to know whether this is likely to be increased by the demands of France and Austria. On the other hand, M. Six, the Minister of Finance here, is making out for me an account of the Dutch debt. When this knowledge shall be acquired, I shall be enabled to close the details of the plan of junction, of which the above is a summary.

Yours, my dear lord, most affectionately,

CLANCARTY.

PS. Lord Lynedoch may send for 15,000 Hanoverians, whenever he wants them. The Duke of Cambridge, now here on his way to England, has given the necessary directions for this purpose.

[Enclosure.]

Lord Lynedoch to Lord Clancarty.

Copy. Head-quarters, Brussels, May 16, 1814.

My dear Lord—I have now got my head-quarters established here, and at present there ought to be no other than British troops here. I am told that there still remains an immense number of officers of different nations; when I was here last, they were estimated at 2,000; they are said now not to exceed 800. The whole country from the Rhine to the sea, on this side of the old frontier of France, is, or will be soon, occupied by the Allied troops—three Prussian corps, Bülow's, Yorck's, and Kleist's, the Duke of Saxe-Weimar's Saxon corps, and, I am told, Witgenstein's Russian corps. How long they are to stay, nobody seems to know.

They have given me the command of the second corps of the North of Germany, composed of the Brunswick, Hanoverian, Mecklenburg troops, &c., in consequence of which, I have sent an officer to arrange their cantonments, so as not to interfere with the march of the Swedes. I have just directed the last division of these (General Boyé's) left under my

orders, to move from Tirlemont towards Stralsund, to make way for Yorck's corps, already at Namur.

But, should all these Prussian troops be withdrawn, as General Vincent seems to expect, and should the Russian German Legion, which is likely to pass into the Prussian service, likewise go, what troops will occupy these provinces? I have certainly not near enough of English troops, and I am sure there are not Dutch troops either, to spare for such a frontier, especially in the state of ruin in which the dismantled places remain.

These are serious considerations, if the accounts of the ill-humour and dissatisfaction of the French army at the termination of the war, be true. I wished to draw your lordship's attention to the exposed state of this frontier, in the contemplation of possible contingencies.

The German troops of the second corps above-mentioned seem most naturally to be depended upon; but, from the anxiety shown at the Hague to get rid of the small part of General Lyons' corps sent into cantonments in Holland, I should doubt much if a just estimate of the situation of this country has been formed.

I regret much that it will be impossible for me to have the honour of meeting his Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge at the Hague. There are so many things daily occurring which require immediate attention, that at present I could not be absent.

I am, &c., LYNEDOCH.

Mr. A. St. John Baker to Lord Castlereagh.

London, May 23, 1814.

My Lord—Mr. Hamilton has informed me that your lordship has been pleased to nominate me to be his Majesty's Secretary to the mission appointed to treat with the United States. Although fearful of trespassing upon your lordship's time, I cannot refrain from taking this early opportunity of

expressing my most grateful sense of your lordship's goodness, and of entreating that I may be permitted to offer my sincerest acknowledgments for the favourable attention which you have done me the honour to pay to my application, as well as for the very obliging manner in which the appointment has taken place.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ANTHONY ST. JOHN BAKER.

The Duke of Wellington to Lord Castlereagh.

Madrid, May 25, 1814.

My dear Lord—I arrived here yesterday. Sir C. Stuart will let you know what I think of the revolution lately effected, &c.

It occurs to me that there are modes in which we could get the cession of Olivenza for Portugal: first, to come to a clear understanding ourselves with Spain, respecting her colonies, and to engage secretly that, in consideration of certain commercial advantages, or in the event of the trade to America being laid open, as to any province in Spain, Great Britain should be admitted the most favoured nation, we would discourage and discountenance by every means in our power the rebellion in the Spanish colonies. Secondly, to promise to bind North America, by a secret article in our treaty of peace, to give no encouragement, or countenance, or assistance, to the Spanish colonies.

These arrangements would probably induce the Spanish Government to give up Olivenza.

Ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Lynedoch.

Copy. Paris, May 26, 1814.

My Lord — I am so entirely of your lordship's opinion that much inconvenience might result to the public service

from the reduction of the British force in the Low Countries, that I have to request your lordship will take no step either for withdrawing or countenancing the idea of their early departure, without hearing further from me.

I will explain to Lord Bathurst the steps I have taken. I should also wish to receive from your lordship a statement of the amount and distribution of force in the Netherlands and adjacent positions, before you take any measures for parting with the Russian German Legion and troops under General Walmoden's orders.

I beg your lordship will understand that this opinion is not the result of any sort of disquietude about the present state of things, but arises from a persuasion that the presence of a British force is calculated to give confidence, and to facilitate the future views of the Allied Sovereigns.

I am, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir Henry Wellesley.

Paris, May 27, 1814.

Sir—The enclosed correspondence will explain to you the circumstances under which the instructions of his Government have been received by the Count de Fernan-Nuñez. In order that the just pretensions of Spain to concur in the pending negociations for peace might be properly consulted, I took upon myself to encourage his Excellency, knowing that he was in possession of the necessary powers, to repair to Paris. In consequence of this step on my part, his Excellency is still here; and I deem it of so much importance to the recognition by France and all the other Powers of his Majesty Ferdinand VII. that a Plenipotentiary on his behalf should sign the peace, that I have not hesitated to charge myself with the responsibility of encouraging the Comte de Fernan-Nuñez to act in the absence of his intended successor—all which your Excellency will represent in the most favourable light to the Duke of San Carlos.

Your Excellency will take this occasion of assuring the Spanish Government that, throughout the late eventful period, I have had every reason to approve, and even to applaud, the zeal, discretion, and firmness, with which the duties of this mission have been conducted, both by the Comte de Fernan-Nuñez and also by M. de Pizarro.

Your Excellency's despatches to the [blank] have been received, and your conduct fully approved.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Mr. Quintin Craufurd to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, May 27, 1814.

My Lord—In order to fix the mode of payment to the subjects of his Majesty who have claims on the Government here, it has occurred to me that something, in the sense of what is contained in the note which I now take the liberty to submit to your lordship's consideration, might either be added to what your lordship had the goodness to communicate to me, or introduced as a supplementary article. I have ventured to suggest it from the belief I am obliged to entertain of the necessity of taking means for preventing those the creditors will probably have to treat with from *creating* difficulties in settling their claims. Taking stocks, or *des effets publics*, at the price they may bear in the market the day after that on which peace may be proclaimed, when stocks may be supposed to rise, appears to me a fair proposal for both parties.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

QN. CRAUFURD.

Note.

Et dans le cas où la situation des finances et du Trésor Royal ne permettroit pas de payer aux différents Créanciers rentiers Anglais le montant accumulé de tous les arriérages de rente perpetuelle ou des rentes viagères qui leur sont dûs, à *compter* du dernier payement qui leur a été fait jusqu'au semestre

courant, la somme à laquelle s'élevera le montant des dits arriérages antérieurs au semestre courant pourra leur être payée en Inscriptions sur le Grand Livre de la dette publique évaluées au cours le plus haut à la Bourse du jour qui suivra la publication de la paix, lequel cours deviendra la base de toutes les évaluations et de tous les calculs relatifs à ce genre de payement, de manière qu'en négociant les dites Inscriptions les Créanciers Anglais puisse retrouver, sans perte aucune, la somme en francs, à laquelle monteront les dits arriérages arrierés et accumulés, à moins que le Gouvernement Français ne préfère faire les dits payements en monnoye réelle, et non en Inscriptions.

Mr. Zachary Macaulay to Lord Castlereagh.

Rue et Hotel Coquillière, May 29, 1814.

My Lord—Having had the honour of calling several times, without being so fortunate as to find your lordship disengaged, I take this method of communicating to your lordship the result of the inquiries I undertook to make on the subject of the French slave trade.

The general feeling of those with whom I have conversed upon it seems to be, that the decision of the question of the abolition of the slave trade rests so entirely with his Majesty's Government, that it would be useless, especially in the present stage of the negociations, to have recourse to other means of influencing its decision than Great Britain herself possesses. If it required any expression of the public feeling to induce the French Ministers to forego their objections to the proposed measure of abolishing the slave trade, that feeling could only be excited by means of the press, and a long time would be necessary, in order to produce such an effect. On the other hand, all the persons interested in the French colonies, together with their numerous connexions in this country, are so impressed with the importance and even necessity of the slave trade to the prosperity of their colonies, that it cannot be doubted that the

voluntary abandonment of this trade on the part of the French Government would be an unpopular act. That Government, however, it is believed, would escape all blame, if it were understood that the abolition of the French slave trade was exacted by Great Britain, as the indispensable condition of the restoration of her colonies to France.

In what I have said above, I have confined myself to a simple exposition of the result of the communications I have had with several intelligent persons in this place. Your lordship is far better able than I am to judge how far it is entitled to any attention. I will only add, what is probably well known to your lordship, that in England a very sanguine and general wish, and even expectation, prevail that the treaty about to be concluded will contain an explicit renunciation of the slave trade on the part of France. And this wish and expectation are by no means confined to those who on general grounds are adverse to the slave trade, but extend to almost every individual connected with our colonial possessions. The former apprehend, from the renewal of the slave trade by France, among a great variety of other evils, the extinction of all their hopes respecting Africa; while the latter anticipate from it the eventual ruin of the British colonies.

I have the honour to be, with profound respect, &c.,

ZACHARY MACAULAY.

Mr. Zachary Macaulay to Lord Castlereagh.

Rue et Hotel Coquilliere, May 30, 1814.

My Lord—Since I had the honour of writing to your lordship yesterday, I have had an opportunity of learning the sentiments of some respectable mercantile men on the subject of the abolition of the French slave trade, which, as they seem to vary in one material respect from those I had before collected, I feel it to be my duty to communicate to your lordship.

These gentlemen admitted that the colonists and their connexions in this country greatly desired the revival of the slave

trade; but then they affirmed that there did not exist any hope among them that England would restore her colonies to France on any other terms than its abolition. They even went so far as to say that it was considered by the intelligent part of the trading community in this country as altogether impossible that England, by giving back to France both her colonies and her slave trade, should not only render unavailing all the progress already made in the cause of humanity, by the concurrent abolition of that trade by herself, the United States, Denmark, and Sweden, but should seriously compromise, without any countervailing advantage, her own colonial interests; and that it would produce a general surprise throughout France and Europe, to find that the treaty of peace did not stipulate for the universal renunciation of the slave trade by the contracting Powers.

How far this statement is a correct representation of the expectations which are entertained on this subject by those in France who are most deeply interested in the question, I have not the means of judging. If it be, it would seem a fair presumption that the abolition of the trade by France, being looked for as a necessary condition of obtaining their colonies, would not create that kind or degree of sensation in this country which would tend at all to affect the stability, or materially even the popularity, of the new Government.

I have the honour to be, with the greatest respect, &c.,

ZACHARY MACAULAY.

Mr. Quintin Craufurd to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, May 30, 1814.

My Lord—In the course of my inquiries on the subject of my claims on the Government here, I have learnt a circumstance which I am disposed to believe your lordship will think to require being provided for. I already knew that, by an order, or, as it was termed, *law*, of the Republican Government, dated 23rd Floreal, An 2, or 12th May, 1794, those who

held contracts of rents, and those with whom contracts belonging to others were deposited, were obliged to deliver them into an office named *Bureau de Liquidation;* and as, in order to provide for the loss of bonds and other contracts, it is an established law that the minutes preserved by the Notaries with or by whom bonds or contracts are executed are equally valid as the original documents themselves; therefore, with the view, undoubtedly, of depriving the rent-holders of proofs of their property, a second law, or ordinance, commanded the Notaries to deliver the minutes of the contracts also; and Bonaparte, to complete the atrocity of his predecessors, caused, I am assured, all the contracts as well as minutes to be destroyed. Many of the Notaries, however, preserved their minutes, whilst others, from terror, delivered them up. Happily, the minutes of the contracts I held exist with the Notary, and I have likewise taken from Messrs. Peregaux and Lafitte a declaration of their having been obliged to deliver up the originals, in consequence of the above-mentioned *law*, or order, of Government.

To prevent difficulties, I presume to suggest to your lordship some stipulation in the nature of the note I take the liberty to enclose herewith.

I request your lordship to excuse my frequent applications to you, and have the honour to be, &c.,

QN. CRAUFURD.

PS. I believe an order of Government, issued by the Minister of Finance, will be wanted, in order to authorize the Notaries to deliver extracts, or what is called *expédition*, of their minutes, as the ordinance prohibiting their doing so still exists.

Note.

Et comme par une loi du 23 Floreal, An 2, [12 May, 1794] les dépositaires des titres rélatifs aux Rentes viagères et perpetuelles ont été obligés de les déposer au Bureau de Liquidation de la Tresorerie Nationale, il est convenu et arrêté qu'une expédition des minutes des Notaires, par lesquels les

contrats des Rentes ont été passés, sera reçue comme preuve suffisante de l'existence des dits titres et de la propriété du Rentier; ou à defaut de l'existence de ces minutes, la déclaration solennelle des dits Notaires ou des Banquiers et autres dépositaires des contrats.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir Robert Wilson.

Paris, May 30, 1814.

Sir—Before I received your despatch of the [blank] I was on the point of writing to you, to inform you that, all military operations having ceased, it was no longer necessary for his Majesty's service that you should continue to reside at the head-quarters of the army in Italy. I am therefore happy to comply with your request, and you are at liberty to return to England as soon as it may suit your convenience.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Clancarty.

Paris, May 30, 1814.

My Lord—I have the honour to enclose to your lordship the copy of a treaty of peace and amity which was yesterday signed by his Majesty's Plenipotentiaries with the Plenipotentiary of his most Christian Majesty. You will communicate confidentially a copy of this treaty to the Government of the Prince of Orange, and invite his Royal Highness to nominate a Plenipotentiary to represent him in the approaching Congress.

I trust that the views entertained by the principal Powers of Europe, with respect to the interests of his Royal Highness's illustrious house, will be received as a pledge of their confidence and regard, and that the house of Orange may hereafter, as heretofore, be looked up to in Europe as the effectual guardian of its liberties in one of its most interesting frontiers.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, June 7, 1814.

My dear Lord—We returned to the Hague yesterday morning at three o'clock; by an accident which detained me for several hours at Mons, I was prevented from arriving at Brussels till so late a time of night as to render it impossible for me to see the Governor-General, Lord Lynedoch, or Mr. Johnson. I have, however, written fully to the latter, enclosing him confidentially all the papers which have lately been composed on the subject of the incorporation of the Belgic with the Dutch provinces, authorizing him confidentially to communicate them to the Governor-General and M. de Capellen, his Royal Highness's resident there, and recommending him generally to hold language in conformity with the reasoning contained in the *Memoire raisonnée*, corrected by the observation thereon of the Prince of Orange.

After you left Paris, I saw Count Münster at Charles's house, and mentioned to him your desire that, notwithstanding the treaty whereby the Russian German Legion was transferred to the King of Prussia, General Lord Lynedoch should be enabled, if necessary, to avail himself of the services of this corps by retaining them in Belgium. Count Münster stated that the transfer would take place on the last of this month; that, after that period, the Legion would be at the disposition of Prussia; that he would endeavour to obtain the consent of that Power to your wishes; but that, to do this *formally*, a treaty would be requisite. As the Prussian Ministry are now in England, and as Lord Lynedoch will be there also in a day or two, on a short leave of absence, I should hope you will be able at once to arrange this matter in sufficient time to prevent inconvenience.

Lord Lynedoch, in a letter dated the 5th, complains that no time is yet fixed for the evacuation of the Belgic provinces by the Prussians. I had understood from you, and had so

acquainted his lordship, that this evacuation was immediately to take place. M. de Capellen, whom I saw for a moment at Brussels, apprehends that it will not take place till some 4,000,000, lately imposed as an additional requisition, have been realized. I should hope measures will be taken to prevent this; for, in truth, these countries have already been sufficiently pillaged.

My public despatch will acquaint you with the compliance of this Government with the requisition to permit the passage of two French ships from Antwerp to Brest: this compliance has not been without reluctance; neither has it been sought in the most formal manner—neither the date, the authority, nor the force of the vessels, being specified in the request. The Dutch Government apprehends that either in number or quality, or both, France may derive some advantage over them by thus withdrawing particular vessels, in the future execution of the 15th Article of the general Treaty of Peace.

His Royal Highness the Prince is in great spirits, and highly pleased with the result of his trip to Paris; like a young bridegroom, he is, however, extremely impatient for the actual possession of his future bride; and as the arrangements for the union of Belgium with his Dutch provinces are to be effected in England, he seems extremely anxious to set out for London. Nagel and I have, however, endeavoured to keep him quiet till we hear in what state of progress another union, in which he is also much interested, at present is.

The Duke of Brunswick, as Lord Lynedoch writes me word, has returned from Paris to the Low Countries, and gives out that he has the consent of the Allies to remain in those provinces with his force as long as he shall think fit. The alleged permission of the Allies I however conceive to be an invention of his Serene Highness's own brain. It seems, however, that he now wishes to come into Holland, and has written to the Prince of Orange his intention of passing through his Royal Highness's territory. If it is a mere passage through that he

seeks, *passe;* but I rather think that he wishes to dwell here, and subsist his army at the expense of the Dutch. The Prince of Orange is, however, aware that this may possibly be his intention, and is about to despatch an officer to him, to regulate his march, and to prevent his remaining longer than necessary at any one place. Adieu: I have nothing more to tire you with at present.

Yours ever affectionately, CLANCARTY.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, June 17, 1814.

My dear Lord—I have nothing official with which to trouble you to-day, and little of any other nature.

The resolution for the abolition of the slave trade was adopted in Council on Wednesday; it has not yet been formally notified to me, but, M. de Nagel tells me, will be found complete and satisfactory. He was the person who proposed it in Council: he states that he was impressed with the feeling of something absurd in the form, as well as substance, of a resolution, the object of which might have been to prohibit the West Indian colonies from a trade in slaves, at a time when they were not in theirs, but in the possession of another Power; and that, therefore, his proposition, as offered to the Council and subsequently adopted, was of a double nature: first, to prohibit the trade in slaves by Dutch subjects upon the coast of Africa; and, secondly, that, in the treaty by which we should make over to them such of their colonies as it may be in contemplation to restore, an Article, by way of condition, should be inserted effectually to abolish all trade in slaves. Although not avowed, I strongly suspect that the object of proposing this to be placed in the treaty as a *conditional* Article, is to relieve the Government here from the unpopularity which they apprehend as a consequence of the measure, and throw it upon us; to which, however, I see no objection.

As I suppose you will soon, either with M. Fagel in London,

or by instructions to me here, negociate with this Government for the restoration of their colonies, it is fit you should know that, in conversing with M. de Nagel upon this subject, he has professed to me his inclination to advise the utmost liberality respecting it; nay, that he was not very tenacious of colonial acquisition; and that, with respect to those in the West Indies, would be willing even to forego their re-acquisition, upon an adequate indemnity. With respect to the nature of the indemnity, I could not get him to be quite explicit, but understood him to mean their sale for money. In my mind, however, except perhaps the colony of Demerary, in which so much British capital is engaged, the purchase would be but a bad one.

I have sounded M. de Nagel also upon a suggestion made long since by Lord Liverpool, respecting his feelings upon the subject of throwing open the Dutch colonies, or some of them, to British trade, and, though I could not touch upon this matter otherwise than in a very cursory manner, lest it should be suspected that I was not speaking entirely off book, I think that, if any view of this nature should be entertained by our Government, it will not be difficult to have it accomplished—more especially if we should be prepared to admit the Dutch to trade with all or any of our West Indian islands.

I shall add nothing to what I have heretofore said with respect to the expediency of immediately proceeding to perfect the secret Article of the treaty respecting Belgium, or the anxiety of us all for the absence of the Prussian troops. Upon both these points, if my opinions are of any value, they will, before this time, have been acted upon; if not, they will very properly be left unnoticed. Adieu—the packet of Tuesday last has not yet arrived.

Yours most affectionately, CLANCARTY.

10 o'clock, P.M.

Since I wrote the foregoing letter, M. de Nagel has sent me his note in answer to mine of the 7th, upon the slave trade, a

copy of which, with its enclosure, goes by this post officially. The packet has just arrived, and brought me only a private letter from Cooke, which he has been so truly careful as to put into cipher, although it was to come to me in a sealed bag, by our own expresses, without fear of an enemy—nay, has added to his assurance of secrecy by making use of a cipher of which he might have known that we are not in possession of the key. Don't, however, tell him this, as, by way of retort, I send him by this post a letter, also in cipher, of which I defy the very devil himself to find the solution.

The Hon. Frederick Lamb to Lord Castlereagh.

Vienna, June 18, 1814.

My dear Lord—I take the opportunity of an Austrian courier to write a few lines to your lordship. The two most important objects which will immediately engage the attention of this Government will be the mode of governing the newly-acquired provinces in Italy, and the re-establishment of the finances. This presents considerable difficulties; but the resources of this great and rich empire are much more than adequate to meet them. It remains to be seen whether these resources will be made available. As soon as any measures are decided upon, I shall not fail to make your lordship acquainted with them.

The magnificence of the Emperor's entry far surpassed any thing of the sort which I have ever seen. Among the illuminations, there were some inscriptions rather remarkable and amusing; for instance, the two following: "Cinq ont consommé le grand ouvrage—Deux en première Ligne, Alexandre et François—Deux en seconde, Georges et Frederic Guillaume—if you wish to know the fifth, look to the left:" and on the left, in large letters, was written, "DIEU."

The other was: "Glory to the Father and the Son: to redeem mankind, God gave his only son: to save Europe,

Francis gave his daughter. Glory to the Father and the Daughter!"

The disposition of the people, through every class, is excellent; and their attachment to the Emperor resembles more the affection of a family to its father, than the feelings of subjects for their sovereign.

Baron Wessenberg is gone upon a mission into Italy to find money for the army of Marshal Bellegarde, which is much in want of it. This is the great difficulty, and the one which I am afraid no adequate measures will be taken to remove.

There are reports that your lordship may be expected here for the Congress. I sincerely hope these may prove true, and, at all events, hope to receive your lordship's commands, directing my attention to those points upon which you may more particularly wish me to obtain information. I am in hopes of having an opportunity of writing by an English gentleman in the course of the next week, and have the honour to be, &c.,

F. LAMB.

The Hon. Frederick Lamb to Lord Castlereagh.

Vienna, June 25, 1814.

My dear Lord—The Austrian courier who quitted London on the 14th arrived last night, and brings the intelligence that your lordship will certainly arrive for the Congress. A house is already provided for you, and I hope to receive your orders about every other preparation which you may wish to be made. Let it be understood that there is not one drop of good wine to be had in the whole town, nor can any be got from Frankfort under two months.

It may appear superfluous in me to write intelligence to your lordship, while everything of any importance is transacted in London; but I had rather run the risk of this than of appearing negligent.

The Prince Metternich will find, upon his return, that some of the Ministers have been actively employed to hurt his credit with the Emperor. At the head of this party are the Count Wallis, ex-minister of Finance, and Baldacci, who is very much in the Emperor's confidence—even the Count de Wrbna has taken part against him. They can do him no essential harm; but they have so far prevailed as to have destroyed every chance of his being named Chancellor, or even Vice-Chancellor, which were the principal objects of his ambition.

The Emperor has always declared that he would never renew the title of "Ministre principal pour des Affaires extérieures et intérieures," which has not been bestowed upon any man since the Prince Kaunitz; but even the title of Chancellor would have given M. de Metternich a very considerable influence over his colleagues, and, what many of them dislike much more, a superior rank and precedence. The consequence has been, that even those who are esteemed his friends have united in opposition to his pretensions to it, and I regard their success as a great misfortune in this Government, one of the great evils of which lies in the independence and jealousy of the separate departments, and in the consequent want of *ensemble* and celerity in the movements of the whole.

This said Count Baldacci is at present employed in the department of the finances, and has prepared two plans of finance, both of which are esteemed impossible to be executed.

Nothing is yet settled with respect to the government of Italy. The wish of the Italians is for an Archduke or some person of rank, as Governor, with large powers, as was the case in the time of the Empress's father. The wish of the Emperor is to divide the various branches of the Italian administration among the different departments already existing, and to leave a resident Governor, nearly null, and with very limited powers. The military affairs would be given to the Bureau de la Guerre, the interior administration to the Chan-

cellerie de la Bohème, with which it has about as much affinity as the affairs of the East Indies with those of Ireland. Fortunately, the Ministers are so unanimous in their opposition to this measure, that it is probable a separate department will be created for the affairs of Italy, with a Minister at the head of it. The Emperor's plan is said to be founded upon his wish for economy—a singular feeling at a moment when the question is the government of a great and newly-acquired kingdom, the whole of which has never been possessed united by Austria at any former period.

Mixed with the feelings of love towards the Emperor which exist here, there is also a very general feeling that he is mean in his rewards to those who have served him; and the town is much revolted at the Prince Schwarzenberg's having been suffered to return without any mark of distinction having been conferred upon him at his entry. This had been anticipated as certain; and the precedents of the reception of her successful Generals by Marie Therese had been generally looked to, in the idea that similar honours would be paid to the Prince Schwarzenberg: but nothing of the sort has been done. The Emperor has hereby lost an opportunity both of flattering and increasing the military feeling of the nation, and of doing himself honour, and augmenting his popularity.

The Russian Minister, the Comte de Stackelberg has taken all the Poles here under his protection, and Madame de Stackelberg presented several Polish ladies at the last Court. He makes no secret, I believe, that he acts by the orders of his Court; and he pays the most marked civilities even to the inhabitants of the old Gallicia. The Poles, in general, are pleased at the idea of becoming a kingdom attached to Russia, for the present, in the idea that it will lead to their future independence. Some of the more reasonable look upon this as illusory, and flatter themselves that the day will come when Austria will espouse their cause, in order to wrest Poland from Russia: but it is remarkable that, among all the Poles whom

I see, and I see a great many, there is not one individual who is attached either to Russia or to any other Power, but as they think that that Power may ultimately favour their views for the independence of Poland. This is as true with respect to the inhabitants of Gallicia, which has belonged to Austria for thirty years, as it is with respect to the rest of the Polish nation.

The Empress Marie Louise leaves Vienna on the 29th for Aix, in Savoy. She leaves her son here.

Should your lordship wish for any information about getting servants or horses here, you cannot apply better than to Mr. Griffiths, the bearer of this letter. He has been attached to several of the missions here, and is a very intelligent man.

I have the honour to be, &c., F. LAMB.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Clancarty.

Copy. St. James's Square, June 26, 1814.

My dear Clancarty—I am afraid you will complain of my silence on the important and painful events of the few latter days: the fact is, I thought it best to leave *Bathurst and Fagel*, who had hitherto charged themselves in my absence with the conduct of the marriage, to superintend the *denouement*. I knew the Prince Sovereign would receive the fullest as well as the earliest details through his own Minister, as well as from his son, and I am still unwilling to give the stamp of official authority to a fact upon which one would wish to doubt till the latest moment. All this, however, must have its bounds; and, whilst you will say every thing most kind and respectful, on the part of the Prince Regent and his Government, to the Prince of Orange, to explain the suspense which they have, in the hope of some favourable change, been induced to throw into their *démarche* on this much to be lamented issue, you will, at the same time, acquaint his Royal Highness that the Regent proposes to send without delay a special mission to the Hague, with a letter from himself, to

express all his regret and feelings upon the disappointment of their common hopes.

The circumstances attending the rupture of the marriage are yet mysterious: there can be no doubt that faction had been busy to work upon the Princess Charlotte's mind, and to add another complication to the family embarrassments. What may be the result of reflection remains to be seen. I think nothing ought to be done to close this door; yet it would be unwise to hope too much. I never desired to keep it open at the expense of the Hereditary Prince's personal dignity or feelings.

We all feel the deepest grief and disappointment at this event, but it will abate in no respect our attachment to the alliance, and ardour to sustain and serve the Prince of Orange's interest. In this view I have not been idle, under all the difficulties of the late perplexing period, in the furtherance of his wishes. I have prevailed upon the Ministers of the Powers to give him forthwith the provisional administration of Belgium. This has been sent down for the approval of the Emperor. The course we propose is to declare, on the part of the four Powers, the intended reunion on the principles drawn up by you; to invite the Prince of Orange to appoint a Minister to conclude a Convention with us at Vienna, to be submitted to Congress as the pact to be guaranteed; in the mean time, to give him the administration *in the name* of the Allies, so that his Royal Highness may prepare the public mind, and suggest, upon this species of intercourse, any further modifications of the plans.

The Prussian troops are ordered off, upon a fair principle as to money, in which they take only as one of the Powers. My letter to Johnson, a copy of which is enclosed, will give you the outline. You will receive the whole officially, as soon as Count Nesselrode obtains the Emperor's sanction.

Yours, my dear Clancarty, very faithfully,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, June 28, 1814.

My dear Lord—In conversation yesterday with M. de Nagel, he mentioned to me that the Prince of Orange (whom he had just left) still entertained hopes of its being possible to accomplish the match between the Hereditary Prince and the Princess Charlotte; that, whatever interruption, or apparent rupture, their projected union had encountered, the reigning Prince had no direct knowledge of this from his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, and could not, therefore, relinquish the consideration that the negociation was still in being, or refrain from the sanguine expectation that the Prince Regent, notwithstanding what had passed between the parties, had postponed conveying to him any direct notification thereof, in the hope that matters might still be brought to bear; and added, that so great was the Prince of Orange's anxiety to continue the negociation, that, if there should appear a possibility of its being brought to a successful termination, there was scarcely any sacrifice which he might not be induced to make for the satisfaction of the Princess Charlotte. In short, though not directly, he gave me perfectly to understand, and this with the apparent view of its going further, that, if the objection of her Royal Highness really consisted in her reluctance to leave England, on any account or under any circumstances, however strong the contract already was upon this subject, the Prince of Orange might be led to have it rendered still stronger by the addition of an article absolutely stipulating her constant and uninterrupted residence in her own country.

I have thought it right to mention the result of this conversation to you, in order that, if any concession of this nature should be conceived adequate to remove the Princess Charlotte's objections to the further progress of a match so anxiously desired by both countries, I may receive your directions at the earliest possible period, to endeavour to obtain it.

For myself, not conceiving that the motive alleged has been the real ground upon which the negociation has been broken off, I am not sanguine enough to hope that this, or any other concession which could be made on this side, will have the desired effect. It may, however, happen, and most sincerely shall I rejoice if it does, that I may be mistaken in this; and it may also happen that more mature reflection, the advice of true friends, some disappointment, perhaps, in finding that public applause had not attended the recent ruptures, or the cause assigned for it, and some tenderness for one of the best and finest young men in Europe, may lead her Royal Highness to wish to retrace her steps, and to revive a negociation, the successful termination of which is so well calculated to promote her happiness, and to afford general satisfaction. In this event, the proposed concession will offer to her Royal Highness a valid excuse for proceeding, without incurring the charge of inconsistency, to the happy completion of this most desirable marriage.

You will observe that, in my conversation with M. de Nagel, there was no question of what the Hereditary Prince's feelings might be with respect to this or any other concession. He had arrived only the evening before. M. de Nagel had, as I understood, had little conversation with him upon the rupture of the negociation—none upon its renewal; of what his sentiments, therefore, may be, M. de Nagel is ignorant. His Royal Highness's attachment to his father, and deference to, are, however, such, and such, I really believe, his affection to the Princess Charlotte, that, although naturally and severely wounded by what has lately passed, I should hope he would not oppose himself to the views of his family, of his country, and of ours, if these can be accomplished in the manner proposed. This, however, I speak merely from myself: but I can with confidence assert that I have not overstated the result of M. de Nagel's conference with me.

The Hereditary Prince was so good as to pass an hour

yesterday evening at my Monday assembly: we were much struck with his pale and thin appearance, but charmed with the good taste with which he conducted himself, as far removed from the affectation of braving his situation, on the one hand, as replete with that affectionate and gentle attention to all for which he is so conspicuous. He appeared low, it is true, but, at the same time, bore himself with the steady manliness of one who, though he suffered, suffered from the conduct of others, not from his own.

I shall be truly gratified if you will consider what I have written upon this interesting subject, and will send me your sentiments and directions upon it at the earliest moment; and much more, if it shall have the effect of contributing to the accomplishment of an alliance which both countries have so much at heart.

Most affectionately yours, CLANCARTY.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, Tuesday night, June 28, 1814.

My dear Lord—the Messenger Walsh is just arrived with your letters of the 26th, for which I much thank you, and shall take measures for seeing the Prince of Orange to-morrow, for the purpose of acquitting myself of the messages I am therein directed to deliver respecting the recent rupture, and also respecting the provisional government of Belgium. On the former of these subjects, I had already written and made up to go by this mail, to your address, a confidential communication of a conversation held yesterday by me with M. de Nagel, the proposition (for I may almost call it by that name) conveyed in which may, in the event of reflection aiding us in a certain quarter, prove of some service in bringing matters again to bear. My hopes, however, are still very feeble, though in some degree fortified by finding that all hope had not yet been relinquished on your side of the water.

With respect to Belgium, as a provisional government must

be interposed prior to the period of absolute sovereignty, I do not know of any arrangement under which it could have been formed in a more satisfactory manner. The revenue arrangements will, however, deprive the Prince of any supply for a considerable period of time; as, after the manner in which the Prussian troops have exercised free quarters in that country, it is scarcely to be expected that the people will be able to pay the arrears placed upon them, prior to the termination of the year.

Upon the subject of your secret letter, I have always suspected the existence of the fact (though not the motive by which it is supposed to be excited) alluded to by you. You may depend upon my using my utmost vigilance upon this point. As long as there shall be any ground of hope maintained of the renewal of matters with England, I should think it possible that efforts in other quarters will meet with little success.

Zernicheff is not here: the only Russian that I can hear of who has lately made his appearance at the Hague, is a Russian Consul, who arrived here about the same time, though not with the Hereditary Prince.

We have been expecting the Emperor for some days: when he shall arrive, after remaining here one entire day, *all* the Court purpose accompanying him to Amsterdam.

Farewell, my dear lord; I do not despair, since you have not lost all hope.

Yours most affectionately, CLANCARTY.

The Rev. Dr. Poynter to Lord Castlereagh.

4, Castle Street, Holborn, July 2, 1814.

My Lord—In my own name, and in the name of the other Vicars Apostolic in England, and of the Vicars Apostolic in Scotland, I presume to request your lordship's attention to a matter which we all humbly conceive to be of no small importance.

We are possessed of colleges in the city of Rome, and estates in and about that city attached to those colleges. These comprise foundations for the education of the English and Scottish youth for the Catholic priesthood. It is our joint desire that all youths who are educated to officiate as clergymen in Great Britain be impressed as much as possible with the feelings of British subjects. And in order to this, we conceive that your lordship will think with us that the Superiors of these our colleges ought themselves to be British subjects.

We are also of opinion, and we trust that your lordship will agree with us, that, for the enlargement of the minds of our youth, it may be material that they should not be ignorant of the customs of other nations, and receive instructions in various branches of science, particularly of the canon law in foreign universities. Our wish, therefore, would be to send to our colleges in Rome youths considerably advanced in their studies, and in the habits and feelings of British subjects; and, for the last purpose particularly, we beg leave to repeat that it is our own decided opinion that the Superiors of these colleges should be British.

There are not at present any youths in these colleges, nor have there been any since the French took possession of Rome, in the year 1797. Before the French Revolution, they had been for many years under the government of Italian Superiors; and as, in the present happy state of affairs, these colleges and estates will surely be restored to their pristine purposes, we have petitioned the Cardinal Prefect of the Propaganda that they may be governed by British Superiors; and we think that this petition would be most effectually strengthened, were the British Governmeut to signify that it is also their wish that these colleges should have British Superiors. Should your lordship's opinion coincide with ours, perhaps your lordship would have the goodness to cause a wish to this effect to be expressed at Rome, either through the

medium of the British Minister at the Court of Sicily, or in such other way as to your lordship's wisdom may appear most conducive to produce the desired effect.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

WILLIAM POYNTER, Vicar Apostolic, London.

Lord Castlereagh to his Majesty's Commissioners appointed to negociate at Ghent.[1]

Foreign Office, July 28, 1814.

My Lord and Gentlemen—The Government of the United States of America having appointed Commissioners to treat directly for peace with Great Britain, the Prince Regent has thought fit to appoint Commissioners on the part of his Britannic Majesty for the like purpose, and I have the satistion to acquaint you that his Royal Highness has been pleased to entrust to you the service in question. It has been agreed that these discussions shall take place at Ghent, to which town you will repair with the least practicable delay. I enclose the necessary full powers; and am commanded by the Prince Regent to convey to you the following instructions for the direction of your conduct.

The enclosed Treaties will put you in possession of the relations, as far as they have been reduced into positive stipulations, which have existed between the two States since the independence of America was recognised by this country. You will observe that these instruments have ceased to be binding in consequence of the war. The state of possession, as thereby settled, must however be considered as the territorial arrangement which would revive upon a peace, except so far as the same may be modified by any new Treaty.

You may assure the American Commissioners that the British Government, whatever sense it may entertain of the causes of the rupture, is sincerely desirous of a permanent adjustment of all differences, and that this desire is not abated

[1] Lord Gambier, Henry Goulburn, Esq., and Dr. Adams.

by the successful termination of the war in Europe; and that, with this view, you are authorized to meet with frankness and conciliation whatever propositions the American negociators may be prepared to offer, for terminating the war which has been declared by their Government.

So far as the Prince Regent's Ministers can anticipate the nature of the approaching discussions, they appear to class themselves under the four following heads:—1st, the questions mainly affecting our maritime rights and strength, and especially the undoubted right of the Sovereign of these realms to claim and enforce in war the allegiance and service of his subjects; 2ndly, the protection which the Indians, as allies, are entitled to claim at our hands; 3rdly, the regulation of the frontier, to prevent hereafter, as far as possible, jealousy or collision; and 4thly, the question of the Fishery.

You will lose no time in ascertaining whether the American negociators are prepared to enter upon a final arrangement on all these respective topics. Should they declare their instructions not to be so comprehensive, you will call upon them to state what are the points on which they are alone enabled to treat; and you will forthwith communicate the same to his Majesty's Government. In executing this part of your duty, it will be desirable that you should ascertain, as far as possible, the views of the American Commissioners, without committing your Government. In doing this, you will, in the early stage of the negociation, confine yourselves to such verbal communication as may appear to you best calculated to bring the negociation to its true bearing.

That you may be the better enabled to *sound* the views of the American Commissioners, I deem it proper to furnish you with some general observations on the points at issue; and, first, with respect to the maritime question, you will endeavour to ascertain whether the American negociators have any specific measure to propose for obviating hereafter the alleged abuses of which they complain, in the practice of impressing

British seamen from on board American merchant ships. The enclosed proclamations will demonstrate that the British Government can never recede from the principle of holding their own subjects to their duty of allegiance.

You will endeavour to ascertain whether the American Government is disposed prospectively to desist from their extravagant pretensions under this head, in which case something might possibly be devised to relieve their difficulties as to the past, by adopting a reasonable system of indulgence towards individuals who may have actually and *bonâ fide* entered amongst them, under the faith of their acts of naturalization. This might be effected by stipulation, without bringing the question of right to issue on either side.

The right of search and of withdrawing our seamen from on board American merchant ships can never be given up, even for a time, in exchange for any municipal regulation whatsoever; but, if the American negociators have any regulations to propose tending to check abuse, the British Government will weigh them dispassionately, and with a desire to conciliate. The difficulties, however, of finding a satisfactory expedient may render it desirable to wave this discussion altogether, if other points can be adjusted. To this the British Government will have no objection, considering the question to be practically set at rest by the return of peace. They are equally prepared to leave the rule of war of 1756 to rest upon its own clear and well established authority. Should the American Commissioners abstain from stirring this question, you will remain silent upon it. Should they think fit to advert to it, you will assert the principles upon which the British Government has uniformly maintained the legality, as well as the justice, of this rule. Should any specific proposition be laid before you on this subject, you will declare that you have no authority to enter into discussion on this question, and that you can only receive such a communication for the purpose of simply transmitting it to your Court.

Upon the subject of the Indians, you will represent that an adequate arrangement of their interests is considered by your Government as a *sine quâ non* of peace; and that they will, under this head, require not only that a full and express recognition of their limits shall take place: you will also throw out the importance of the two States entering into arrangements, which may hereafter place their mutual relations with each other, as well as with the several Indian nations, upon a footing of less jealousy and irritation. This may be best effected by a mutual guarantee of the Indian possessions, as they shall be established upon the peace, against encroachment on the part of either State. Much of the disquietude to both Governments, as connected with Indian affairs, has been produced by that regular and progressive system of encroachment which renders the Indians resentful and discontented, and which, by gradually approximating the American and British settlements, gives both States a motive for interference in Indian affairs which would not otherwise exist. The best prospect of future peace appears to be that the two Governments should regard the Indian territory as a useful barrier between both States, to prevent collision; and that, having agreed mutually to respect the integrity of their territory, they have a common interest to render these people, as far as possible, peaceful neighbours to both States.

You may open to the American Commission that the British Government is desirous of revising the frontier between the two States, not in the spirit of conquest or dominion, but upon principles which they consider to be strictly defensive, and, in this point of view, conducive to the well understood interests of both Powers. It has become the more necessary to reconsider the Treaty of 1783, which was very hastily and improvidently framed in this respect, from the intention so publicly and recently avowed in the Acts and Proclamations issued by the American Government of annexing by conquest the Canadas to their dominions. This plan becomes the more

alarming, as a part only of a more general system of aggrandizement, in the execution of which they have possessed themselves of Louisiana and a part of both the Floridas, in the midst of peace, and whilst Spain was bravely contending for her existence.

But the point, upon which you must be quite explicit, from the outset of the negociation, is the construction of the Treaty of 1783, with relation to the Fisheries. You will observe that the third Article of that Treaty consists of two distinct branches:—the first, which relates to the open sea Fishery, we consider of permanent obligation, being a recognition of the general right which all nations have to frequent and take fish in the high seas.

The latter branch is, on the contrary, considered as a mere conventional arrangement between the two States, and, as such, to have been annulled by the war. This part of the Treaty has been found to be productive of so much inconvenience, as to determine his Majesty's Government not to renew the provisions of it in their present form; nor do they feel themselves called upon to concede to the Americans any accommodation within the British Sovereignty, except upon the principle of a reasonable equivalent in frontier, or otherwise; it being quite clear that, by the law of nations, the subjects of a foreign State have no right to fish within the *maritime jurisdiction*, much less to land on the coasts belonging to his Britannic Majesty, without an express permission to that effect.

In the present state of the discussions, I abstain from entering upon the commercial relations between the two States, not wishing to clog the question of peace with arrangements which might protract your discussions. It may be proper that you should keep in mind, in the wording of any article for the termination of hostilities, so to frame it as to make them cease and determine, not upon the signature of the Treaty, but upon its actual acceptance and ratification, without alteration, by

the American Government. The difficulties which have arisen with that Government on former occasions will sufficiently explain the necessity of this precaution.

As soon as you have ascertained the extent and nature of the powers with which the American Commissioners are furnished, and have reported to me the spirit in which they appear to you disposed to conduct the negociation, you shall be furnished, without loss of time, with more precise instructions for the direction of your conduct.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to the Commissioners at Ghent.

Foreign Office, July 28, 1814.

My Lord and Gentlemen—I have the honour to transmit for your information the enclosed copy of a letter from a Committee of British claimants of lands in West Florida, now called the Mississippi territory, together with the several papers therein contained, which will put you in full possession of all the circumstances connected with the proceedings that have already been had with the Government of the United States upon the subject, and of the present state of the transaction.

I am commanded by his Royal Highness the Prince Regent to desire that, in the course of your discussions with the American Commissioners, who may be duly authorized to negociate with you for the adjustment of the present differences between Great Britain and the United States, you will represent to them, in the strongest manner, the liberal consideration to which these claimants are justly entitled at their hands; and you will use your utmost endeavours to prevail upon them to consent to the insertion of an article in the proposed Treaty, stipulating either for the appointment of Commissioners on both sides, for the investigation of the claims in London, in order that they may forthwith be arranged to the satisfaction of the parties; or that, if this proposal cannot be acceded to,

an equitable sum of money should be remitted by the Government of the United States to the Committee in this country, as a full and definitive compensation, in lieu of the claims, which alternative the claimants are willing to accept.

I am, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir H. Wellesley.

Copy. St. James's Square, August 1, 1814.

My dear Sir—I have sent you your official leave of absence, and we can talk of other matters when I have the pleasure of seeing you. You must really press the Spanish Government to give us some more facilities on the subject of the Slave Trade, else we can do nothing for them, however well inclined: the nation is bent upon this object. I believe there is hardly a village that has not met and petitioned upon it; both Houses of Parliament are pledged to press it; and the Ministers must make it the basis of their policy. It is particularly important that Spain and Portugal should not separate from all Europe upon it, else prohibitions against the import of their colonial produce will be the probable result. Urge, therefore, the French engagement for five years, and prevail upon them to instruct Labrador accordingly.

With respect to the immediate abolition north of the Line, if you cannot confine them to the southward of Cape Lopez, or Lope Gonsalves, press Cape Formoso, or even three points a little to the westward of Cape Coast Castle; but Lopez is the best, as ships having cargoes may from thence keep at once free of the coast.

You will recollect that Spain had no Slave Trade of her own, previous to our abolition; and it now appears that she imports few really for her own colonies. The greatest proportion of those carried in the first instance to Cuba and Porto Rico, are re-shipped on American account, and smuggled into the United States, principally up the Mississippi, in defiance

of the American laws of abolition. A mutual right of search is of great importance to check abuse.

You will observe the surrender of three Spaniards by the Lieutenant-Governor of Gibraltar has made some sensation here. I am glad to find, from Mr. Kilbee, you declined interfering. It may be very proper to refuse permission to Spanish refugees to remain at Gibraltar; but, as we never deliver up criminals, except under treaty and for specified crimes, the best course would be to order them to leave the garrison by the first vessel proceeding either to a foreign port or to England.

I am, dear sir, yours very faithfully,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Walpole to Lord Castlereagh.

August 2, 1814.

My Lord—No changes have as yet taken place in the Administration, though some are confidently spoken of; but I am inclined to think that the Emperor will not do any business till after his return from the Congress. He promises loudly to place commerce on a liberal footing.

Poland is become a subject of the most lively interest, and, in whichever way it turns, will produce the most important ultimate effects upon this country. I am afraid that the Emperor has not the mind and firmness equal to play this delicate card.

I hope your lordship will have the goodness to permit my return to England, though even for a few days, should Lord Cathcart's return not be likely to take place for some months; but, as it is impossible for me to remain as Secretary of Embassy, I should much prefer my recall, though I am quite at your lordship's disposition, to stay here, or not, till the return of Lord Cathcart.

Will you have the kindness to let Lady Walpole know the result of my request?

I have the honour to be, &c., WALPOLE.

Mr. à Court to Lord Castlereagh.

Copy. Palermo, August 6, 1814.

My Lord—Having understood that applications are to be made to your lordship, through the Prince Castelcicala, to request that positive orders may be sent to me to recommence the payment of the subsidy, I beg leave to suggest how extremely necessary it will be that a discretionary power should be vested in me to suspend or diminish the payments, according to circumstances. Perhaps your lordship may be of opinion that no future payments should be made (and I confess that my own opinions are in favour of such a determination); but if, on the contrary, your lordship should decide on their being continued, nothing but the certainty of my being authorized to suspend them, if necessary, will enable me to maintain that influence so desirable at the present moment.

The King and his Ministers continue to make a great parade of their Constitutional sentiments; but not a day passes without some flagrant violation of the very fundamental articles of the Constitution. In all this they are aided and abetted by the Count Mocenigo, the Russian Minister, an intriguant of the first class, and a decided enemy of Great Britain. This gentleman has already received an order from his Sovereign to abstain from all interference in the affairs of Sicily; and it would not be amiss if your lordship could procure a repetition of this order.

I am sorry to inform your lordship that a considerable alarm has been excited here, by the appearance of a violent fever among the soldiers of the 20th Light Dragoons. The medical people have pledged themselves that it is nothing but the common *malaria* fever of the country; and this assurance has in some measure calmed the public agitation.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

WILLIAM À COURT.

Lord Castlereagh to the Duke of Wellington.

Copy. Downing Street, August 7, 1814.

My Lord—I enclose, for your Grace's private information, an extract of a letter received from the Prince of Benevent, together with my answer; and I have to request that you will, as early as possible after your arrival at Paris, endeavour to learn his Highness's views upon the subjects that are likely to occupy the attention of Congress, and especially upon the points of Poland and Naples. It is desirable that I should be as fully informed of the sentiments of the French Government as possible, before I meet the Allied Ministers at Vienna, where I have promised to be about the 10th of September.

Your Grace will observe that I have explained to the Prince of Benevent the object of these preliminary conferences. So far as you can regulate the Prince's arrival, I should wish him to be there about the 25th. The Emperor comes on the 27th, and we should then have time to discuss the more difficult matters previous to the assembly of Congress on the 1st of October, having previously methodized the less complicated parts of the arrangement. You will, I hope, be able to obviate any jealousy of these previous deliberations: they are the necessary result of our former relations, which must throw upon the four principal Allied Powers the initiative in most of the arrangements.

It is material your Grace should endeavour to ascertain how far France is prepared, under any and what circumstances, to support her views on these two leading questions by arms. It is particularly desirable to learn whether the French and Spanish Governments limit their hostile views against Murat to a refusal to acknowledge him; or whether, in the event of other Powers (Austria included) declining to give him aid, they would be disposed to employ their arms to replace the King of Sicily on the throne of Naples.

I should also wish to know whether the French Government

has opened itself at all to the Prussian Government on the subject of Poland, as well as on the jealousy they appear, from the enclosed letter from Sir Charles Stuart, to entertain of the views of Russia in the north of Europe. If not, I should recommend their doing so without loss of time. The position and strength of Benningsen's army justify an apprehension that the Norwegian question may be made, both by Russia and Sweden, a pretext for dismembering Denmark. It is equally important to Prussia, Holland, and Hanover, that a Russian dependency should not be established in that quarter. I feel the more anxious upon this subject, not only because the language of the Prince Royal continues to be extremely menacing towards Denmark, notwithstanding the king, in the judgment of the Allied Commissioners, has done what depended on him to transfer Norway; but also from perceiving that the Emperor of Russia, before he left this country, was prone to hostile measures towards Denmark.

There is one other measure, upon which I wish you to confer confidentially with M. de Talleyrand, before I take any official measure upon it—I mean the improvement of the commercial relations between the two countries. I am of opinion that fruitless attempts to extend our commercial intercourse with other States generally defeat and retard the object; and that many States would, ere now, have been made alive to the benefits of dealing freely with us, if we had not always been urging the object, as if it was one of exclusive advantage to ourselves. We must not, however, neglect any prudent means to give to our relations with France this natural and almost indispensable character of peace.

You may converse with M. de Talleyrand with the less reserve, as his ideas are very sound and liberal upon these subjects. You will also find the Abbé de Montesquieu and M. Louis, whose departments of the Interior and Finance give them a leading influence on such subjects, both favourable, as far as their own opinions are concerned, distinct from the manu-

facturing clamour of France, to an unqualified intercourse in all produce and manufactures upon reasonable duties (say from 10 to 20 per cent.)

Your Grace will inform yourself of the sentiments of these three Ministers, whether the French Government is now prepared to do anything on the subject of commerce, and what; whether they are prepared to negociate a commercial treaty for a limited number of years; or whether they would prefer acting by an annual tariff, to be confidentially settled between the two Governments, in which liberal principles might be made to predominate, without exciting the national alarm, which commercial treaties, binding up for a number of years the discretion of the respective States, often occasion. In short, I should wish to know, before I take a step, how they would wish this matter to be originated. At present, I believe our intercourse with France, except in colonial produce, is inconsiderable, and that British manufactures are wholly excluded. I presume it cannot be intended to establish this as a permanent system for the advantage of either country.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

PS. I wish your Grace would ascertain in what state the treaty of marriage between the Duke de Berri and the Grand-Duchess Anne now stands. Count Nesselrode informed me, when here, that it was likely to succeed.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

Brussels, August 8, 1814.

My dear Lord—I have nothing of any consequence to report; yet I do not like to let the post pass hence without saying that matters appear to me to be going on well. From the general conversation of the principal people here, they seem to be coming round fast to our wishes.

The principal difficulties which are likely to present themselves in settling this country will be with the clergy and the

noblesse. Happily, as to the former, although the individuals composing that body may generally be supposed to look for the entire restoration of their former privileges and possessions, yet there seems, among the laity, at least, a contrariety of opinion, if not a decided sentiment against that measure. As it would be utterly impossible to accede to the wishes of the clergy to anything like their full extent, the Prince will find aid, in opposing them, from the sentiments entertained by some of the principal nobility and the other classes.

For the clergy, however, something must be done. As a body, they are, in general, hostile to the union with France, and their stipends are, in fact, too low to render them either easy or respectable. The Prince is fully impressed with the propriety of increasing their stipends, as soon as means can be found for this purpose; and I have recommended that he should form a *projet* upon this subject, to be by his Minister at Rome (a Protestant) communicated to and finally arranged with the Pope, with whom he will find it easier to deal than with the priesthood of this country, in the first instance; and afterwards will be able, with greater prospect of acquiescence, to propose his plans for the amelioration of the condition of the clergy to the States, when backed by the approbation of the head of the Church. The present stipend paid by Government to a bishop is only 10,000 florins, to an archbishop, 15,000, per annum.

With regard to the nobility, the great effort seems to be, on their part, to press for the re-establishment of the former constitution under the *joyeuse entrée*. This is not surprising; under it their privileges were great; and if those (as many of them seem to wish) of the clergy were lessened, the nobles would expect to obtain to themselves much of the influence possessed by the ecclesiastical body, which perhaps is the principal reason for which many of them are desirous of diminishing that formerly enjoyed by the clergy. The adoption of their views would leave the Prince with as little power as was for-

merly permitted to be enjoyed by the Emperor in these provinces; much too little to enable him to act with the energy required.

The Dutch constitution will, however, require considerable modification, with respect to the noblesse, in order to adapt it to the reasonable gratification of the nobility of this country. By the *joyeuse entrée*, the nobility enjoyed a third of the legislative power: by the Dutch constitution, they are to participate in the States General, in the proportion of at least one-fourth part. This proportion it might, perhaps, be wise to increase.

In the Dutch constitution, no method is assigned for the nomination or election of the noblesse. A future law, not yet presented, was to be proposed by the Sovereign for this purpose. A law to designate the mode of selection, either by the nomination of the Prince for life, or by the election of the Corps de Nobles, without any interference therein by the other classes, either for life, or for a limited period, will be necessary; and this should be well considered before it shall be proposed.

The Prince threw out this morning a suggestion to Lord Harrowby and me of two Chambers. Upon this something may be said on both sides. It would probably be acceptable to the noblesse, and it would give the Prince a facility, if he should wish to avail himself of it, of proposing to nominate those who should sit in the Upper House from the Corps de Nobles, for life; which would produce a source of influence, not, according to my view, unsalutary—on the other hand, if the noblesse shall hereafter, as it may be their interest to do, rally round the Prince, and conceive their advantage best consulted when the legitimate power of the Sovereign is well maintained, the legislative body, being composed of one assembly only, could not fail to be much influenced by the sentiments of those who should represent the highest and most powerful body of the State. The only doubt here is, whether the nobility, who hold their titles neither from the Prince nor

from those whom he represents, will ever be brought to think their interests so intimately connected with his as to work the desired effect.

I have thrown these things out, in order that you may, if you should think fit, converse with the Prince upon them on your arrival. Your opinion would, I am sure, be acceptable to him, and would greatly, if not altogether, influence his decision upon points of much present delicacy and considerable future importance. Lord Harrowby is greatly against the two Chambers; as I had, however, very little time to converse with him after we left the Prince, I do not know the grounds of his objection.

The Prussians have made such peremptory demands on the Prince of Orange to evacuate the ancient Dutch territory on the right bank of the Meuse, that he has sent one of his chamberlains, M. d'Ahlen, to General Sacken, to request to know by what title this demand is made; and M. de Falk, his Royal Highness's Secretary of State, has just been with me to state that he has received orders from the Prince to send me an official note upon this subject, requiring to know on what title the demand is made, and whether it appeared to me (as representing one of the Allies) that he should comply with it. I told M. de Falk that I should not be able to give him an opinion thereon; but that I would acknowledge the receipt of his note, and transmit a copy of it to my Government.

The Prussians claim the occupation of Liege, on the left of the river, till Maestricht and the other ancient territories on the right shall have been delivered up to them.

We are inundated with English here. Lord Harrowby, who arrived last night, stays only for the Prince's *levée* to-morrow, and goes on in the evening to Antwerp.

Yours, my dear Lord, most affectionately,

CLANCARTY.

Sir Charles Stuart to Mr. Hamilton.

Paris, August 8, 1814.

My dear Hamilton—As the accounts I receive from every quarter very much confirm my suspicions that the Princess of Wales meditates a journey to this capital, it is necessary Lord Castlereagh should send me precise instructions how to conduct myself in the very delicate situation in which her Royal Highness's arrival will place me; and I beg you will particularly specify whether I am to wait upon her, or to take any measure respecting her introduction at the Tuilleries.

I have reduced the price of the Borghese house to 825,000 francs, and the stables to 63,000 francs, which is about the sum you offer to give for it, or rather less, at the present rate of exchange. I believe, however, that, in consequence of so material a reduction, the proprietors are unwilling to receive this money in so many or such distant instalments as you propose, and that they will require the whole in two or three payments.

It is necessary you should send me a copy of Talleyrand's letter to Lord Castlereagh, dated the 20th of May, respecting the prizes sent into French ports by the Americans; since, owing to some accident, Lord Castlereagh did not leave a single paper here, and I have never seen this letter.

As upwards of sixty persons are already under examination respecting the forgery on the Bank, and the plates have been found, and will be broken, it is rather desirable that the Directors should *not* send any one here now, to follow up an affair which is in train to be concluded with greater advantage without their interference than otherwise.

I have not sent home my reply to the several observations in Talleyrand's conversation with me on the subject of the Congress. The reason of his selecting Spain and Portugal as the intermediate Powers to be employed by either, must be so obvious to Government, that I conceived it unnecessary to put

him out of humour by any comment in a letter which was submitted to his perusal before it was sent. Do me the favour to explain this to Lord Castlereagh, in case, by any unaccountable mistake, I might be suspected of adherence to such a proposal.

Ever yours, faithfully,

CHARLES STUART.

Lord Walpole to Lord Castlereagh.

St. Petersburgh, August 9, 1814.

My Lord—Count Nesselrode has received the portefeuille des affaires étrangères. I understand that the rescript announcing this appointment mentions it as necessary, during the illness of the Chancellor, Count Romanzow. It would seem from this to be a temporary measure; but there appears little chance of any man of talents or reputation being appointed to the office of Minister for Foreign Affairs: the present, as a permanent appointment, would be highly disapproved of. Count Nesselrode enjoys no consideration whatever, but is merely considered as the Emperor's *Secretary*. No further change is likely to be made before the Emperor's return from Vienna. He does no business whatever. Count Nesselrode's influence has efficaciously protected his father-in-law, M. Gourieff, who was on the point of being dismissed from the office of Minister of Finance.

I shall be obliged to send your lordship a messenger very soon, for the conveyance of an important paper, which I have obtained here, and of the principles of which you are likely to hear something at Vienna. It is impossible for me to have it ready for Niobe.

The Emperor seems determined about a Polish kingdom and constitution: the *projet* given him for the latter I have not yet seen, but shall be enabled to let you know something of it in a few days, through my old Polish friends, many of whom are now here.

The intimacy which has so long subsisted between the Emperor and the celebrated Madam Narychkin is about to be broken off, and she will leave this country for some years. I believe her true reason is the fear of what she foresees likely to happen, from the great oddness of the Emperor. This was suspected in very early age, and medical men now here were brought over on that account. Upon her expressing an intention of settling for some time in France, he earnestly begged her not to make acquaintance with any part of the royal family, *mais de la fronder autant qu'elle pourroit;* but if the Queen of Holland showed her any attention, to cultivate her acquaintance and that of her friends. She excused her resolution to the Emperor, by remarking the strong feeling of affection manifested by the public for the young Empress upon her leaving St. Petersburgh; her dread of being at some time the victim of that sentiment; and that, by going away, she would at least show that she was not the obstacle to a reconciliation, which she advised, between them. Should any change ever take place, the Empress would be the popular choice.

Upon being asked who would be sent ambassador from Paris, the Emperor said that, if Caulaincourt was not sent, he hoped, at least, that Lauriston would come. I believe he has even asked for the former. This is *chit-chat* from the best sources in this place, but will serve to show your lordship how little confidence is to be placed on the common sense and *tact* of the Emperor.

Yours, &c., WALPOLE.

The Finances and Interior are in a dreadful state: the exchange falls every post day; yesterday it was below 11*d.* the rouble.

Lord Walpole to Mr. Edward Cooke.

August 10, 1814.

Dear Cooke—Thanks for yours of the 19th June. I agree with you as to the *advantage* accruing to Russia from her pre-

sent code: her products are lowering in price, and exchange falling below 11*d.*—her folly is not yet complete. I am said to be in high favour with Gourieff, &c., for having foretold to him, months back, all that has lately passed in Finance, &c. Let me know something about the Dutch debt from this country, if you are acquainted with it.

J'ai tâté Nesselrode about Persia, but without entering at all upon the subject: I know nothing of Ouseley Gore since Teflis, July 3. Nesselrode told me they expect a Persian embassy here: I will do all I can to soften things, and prevent harm from our ambassador's promises.

I enclose a description[1] of a Russian ship, which, I am assured, is bound for Yankee-land: look after her, and let me hear something from England. Does Cathcart return? I hear Burghersh goes to Berlin—I am sorry for it. I hope to see you early in November, at latest, and shall do so, without positive orders to the contrary.—What do you intend to do, or wish, about Poland?

Yours very truly,

WALPOLE.

Pray send me a vessel for the poor Spaniards at Cronstadt: the Emperor wants to get rid of them, and has communicated this to me, through Count Nesselrode.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Clancarty.

Draft. London, August 14, 1814.

My dear Clancarty—I hope to move towards you on Tuesday. Fagel is quite satisfied—I should rather say gratified—by the shape I have given to the Convention, as you will see by the enclosed copy of his private letter to the Prince. We must keep Nagel, notwithstanding his contracted notions.

[1] This description has been enclosed to Mr. Croker, in a private note. [Remark, no doubt, attached in our Foreign Office. Mr. Croker was then Secretary to the Admiralty.—EDITOR.]

It would be unpleasant to have any break-up on such questions.

I have written to Prince Hardenberg upon the line of the Meuse, and desired him to send his answer to meet me at Brussels. You may, in the mean time, intimate, both to the Prince of Orange and to the Prussian authorities, my opinion that the Dutch and British troops should occupy Liege, as being on the left of the Meuse, and should not evacuate the ancient Dutch territory on the right bank, including Maestricht.

Long before the line of the Meuse was taken up as a line of demarcation, namely, when we were at Paris, the Prince of Orange entered, as of right, into all the territories and places belonging to Holland, as it stood previous to 1792. This was fully considered and expressly decided. The Protocol assigning the right bank of the Meuse was never meant to derogate from this principle, or to affect his Royal Highness's ancient dominions. It was only to mark the occupation of the respective armies in the ceded territories. This is so obviously the justice of the case, that I cannot suppose that the Prussians will hesitate to accede to it.

I am, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to the Commissioners at Ghent.

Foreign Office, August 14, 1814.

My Lord and Gentlemen—Your despatch, with its enclosures, of the 9th, from Ghent, has been received and laid before the Prince Regent. It appears from the communications you have had with the American Commissioners, that, upon two out of the four points referred to in your instructions, namely, upon the second and fourth, the American negociators have received no instructions from their Government, and that they have, on their part, suggested three additional topics for discussion. Upon the point of the Fisheries, it does not clearly appear

whether, in the absence of instructions, they consider themselves authorized, supposing all other questions arranged, to sign a treaty of peace, upon the distinct understanding that the right of fishing and drying within the British jurisdiction does not thereby of right revive. Their mode of receiving your remarks on this head seems to countenance such an interpretation of their meaning; but you will feel the importance of not leaving the matter in doubt.

Upon the question of the Indians, there is also room for further explanation. You will observe that this subject, in your instructions, divides itself into two propositions—1st, the Indians being included in the peace; 2ndly, such an arrangement of limits as, whilst it secures to the Indians the benefit of the peace, may tend the better to preserve hereafter the relations of amity between the British and American Governments.

On both these points it would seem that the American Commissioners are equally unauthorized to conclude; and, although the second point might possibly not have been foreseen, yet it appears unaccountable, upon the first, that the American Government should have left the negociators without instructions, inasmuch as they could have had no reason to suppose that the British Government would for a moment listen to a separate peace, to the exclusion of the Indians, who have acted with them as allies during the war.

But upon the practicability of prosecuting the negociation with any utility, in the present imperfect state of the instructions, of which the American negociators avow themselves to be in possession, the whole seems to turn upon the point you have so properly suggested; viz., whether the Commissioners will or will not take upon themselves to sign a Provisional Agreement upon the points on which they have no instructions. If they decline this, the British Government sees no advantage in prosecuting the discussion further, until the American negociators shall have received instructions upon these points. If,

on the contrary, upon a candid explanation of the principles upon which Great Britain is prepared to treat on these subjects, they are willing, upon their own responsibility, to sign a Provisional Agreement, the negociation may proceed, and the Treaty, when concluded, may be sent, with the British ratification, to America, to be at once exchanged, if the American Government shall think fit to confirm the act of their Commissioners. The British Government cannot better evince their cordial desire for peace than by placing the negociation upon this issue. You will, with this view, again call the attention of the American Commissioners to the Indian question; and, as connected with it, the question of boundary.

I am desirous of particularly directing your attention to these points, as the others suggested on either side for deliberation, if you have rightly interpreted the meaning of the American Commissioners as to the Fisheries, do not appear necessarily calculated to create an insurmountable obstacle to the immediate restoration of peace. In illustration of this, you may remark that, upon the first of the British points, we are not disposed to insist upon any express stipulation, and are willing to leave the questions therein involved, to rest, as heretofore, upon the principles of general law.

We see as little necessity for any stipulation upon the first of the American points. Whatever difference may have existed upon the retaliatory measures to which the British Government was obliged to have recourse in the late war against France, we are not aware of any difference that exists upon the ordinary law of blockade, or any other branch of belligerent or neutral rights. If the American Commissioners shall bring forward anything specific on this or any other subject, it will be the duty of the British Government to consider it: but there seems no adequate motive on either side for encouraging abstract discussions of this nature, which, if gone into, all must be gone into generally, and not partially, with a view of arriving at express stipulations upon the points of sove-

reignty and impressment, as well as upon the points of blockade, &c.

With respect to the second of the American points, you cannot be too peremptory in discouraging, at the outset, the smallest expectation of any restitution of captures made under the Orders in Council. There may be claims on both sides of an ordinary description, involving no principles to which his Majesty's Government would have to object, and upon which mutual satisfaction might be given; but these cases are probably of a very limited extent, and of nearly equal amount, on each side. It seems better not to entangle the question of peace with their discussion. And, with respect to the third point—although the British Government will be prepared to enter into it, with every desire to come to an understanding, they do not conceive that the war ought to be protracted on this ground alone.

The main question, then, seems to be, upon what general principles is the British Government ready to terminate the contest, as far as relates to boundaries and the Indians—I state upon what general principles—for, until the American Commissioners are prepared to agree to certain fixed principles as the basis of a Provisional Article, the discussion of details can be productive of no possible advantage.

Upon the point of frontier, you may state that the views of the British Government are strictly defensive. They consider the course of the lakes, from Lake Ontario to Lake Superior, both inclusive, to be the natural military frontier of the British possessions in North America; as the weaker power on the North American continent, the least capable of acting offensively, and the most exposed to sudden invasion, Great Britain considers itself entitled to claim the use of those lakes as a military barrier. It is quite obvious that a boundary-line, equally dividing these waters, with a right in each State to arm, both upon the lakes and upon their shores, must be calculated hereafter to create a perpetual contest for naval ascen-

dency, in peace as well as in war—a species of conflict which is likely to be productive of an extent of expense and jealousy, equally to be deprecated by both Governments. It becomes, therefore, necessary, for the sake of peace, to decide to which Power these waters shall, in a military sense, exclusively belong; and, for the reasons above stated, Great Britain considers that she is entitled to lay claim to them.

To give practical operation to this principle, it seems necessary that the Power to whom the lakes belong shall have the military command of both shores, to effect which a scope of territory, with a suitable frontier, is important. The British Government is prepared to assign, for deliberation, a boundary in execution of this object; but, as this would necessarily extend their possessions to the southward of the lakes, and as territory, as such, is by no means the object they have in view, they will be disposed to leave the sovereignty of the soil undisturbed, and, as incident to it, the free commercial navigation of the lakes, as at present enjoyed by the United States, provided the American Government will stipulate not to preserve or to construct any fortifications upon or within a limited distance of the shores, or maintain or construct any armed vessels upon the lakes in question, or upon the rivers which empty themselves into the same.

If this can be regulated, there will then remain for discussion the arrangement of the north-western boundary between Lake Superior and the Mississippi, and, on the side of Lower Canada, such a line of demarcation as may establish a direct communication between Quebec and Halifax. The free navigation of the Mississippi must also be provided for in the arrangements to be made.

With respect to the Indians, you will repeat that their being expressly included in the peace is considered to be a *sine quâ non;* and that, with respect to their limits, the British Government is prepared, as the least objectionable arrangement to the United States, to take the Treaty of Greenville, subject

to certain modifications, as a basis for negociation; and, having agreed as to the general boundaries, to stipulate, mutually with the American Government, against any acquisition, by purchase, on the part of either State.

I trust that this outline will enable you, without further delay, to ascertain whether the negociation can now be prosecuted with a prospect of advantage, or whether the conferences must not be suspended until the American negociators can receive further instructions from their Government. In the latter case, you will, however, declare to them, that the British Government, upon the resumption of the conferences, will not consider themselves bound by anything which has hitherto passed, or precluded from regulating its conduct by the then state of the war—the causes which obstruct an immediate adjustment originating exclusively with the negociators on the part of the United States.

I trust the American Commissioners will continue to do justice to the frank and explicit conduct which your instructions have enabled you to adopt, and to the desire manifested by the British Government to bring forward nothing which can either be deemed derogatory to the honour of the American Government, or which can tend unnecessarily to delay the restoration of peace.

I am, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

PS. Care must be taken, in any settlement to be made, to remove all doubt as to the islands in Passamaquoddy Bay being considered as falling within the British boundary there.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir Charles Stuart.

Draft. London, August 14, 1814.

My dear Sir—The disposition evinced by the French Government is highly important and satisfactory, and we shall be most desirous of turning it to the best account; but the Prince of Benevente, if he wishes us to do good, must not

expect us to separate from our old connexions, in the midst of our concert. We have no partialities that he need be jealous of; and, if he desires to render our influence a salutary check upon improvident schemes and undue pretensions, in whatever quarter they may be found to exist, he must allow me to work this out without doing violence to habits established under circumstances to which we owe the blessings of having a Government in France, to which we can feel ourselves associated in common views of policy and interest.

If it is thought desirable, I shall be perfectly ready to confer with him on my way to Vienna, and to look without reserve at the difficulties we shall have to deal with at the Congress; but he must not expect me to depart from any engagements to meet my former colleagues at Vienna about the 10th of September: nor must he interpret unfavourably our previously conferring upon the system which has grown out of engagements which subsisted long before we could reckon France amongst the number of our friends, and which the Prince himself proposed should be taken as the basis of our discussions at Vienna.

Believe me, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to the Duke of Wellington.

Copy. London, August 14, 1814.

My dear Lord—You will see, by the enclosed, Talleyrand has opened himself considerably to Sir C. Stuart on the views of his Court. You can best judge, on your arrival, how far my passing a day or two at Paris, on my way to Vienna, is likely to be well taken. It may possibly be desired to remove any impression of counsels *to the exclusion of France*. If you deem it advisable, I can easily separate from Lady C. at Brussels, pass by Paris, and meet her at Dijon, on the route of Switzerland; forty-eight hours is the utmost I should think it advisable to remain at Paris, under present circumstances.

Send me your opinion without delay to Brussels, where I shall be about the 20th.

I am, my dear lord, ever most sincerely yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

PS. I shall send a copy of this letter to Sir C. Stuart, that he may send us his opinion to Brussels, in the event of business having detained you in the Low Countries.

Lord Castlereagh to the Duke of Wellington.

St. James's Square, August 14, at night, 1814.

My dear Lord—I have seen the Duc de Berri this morning. His visit is intended to remove any impression of alienation, and to second Talleyrand's overture. As he professed not to be charged with any diplomatic business, our conversation was general, full of professions on his Royal Highness's part, that the King of France considered the interests of the two Courts as one and the same. When I touched upon my intended arrival at Vienna, I thought he seemed a little disturbed at the idea of preliminary communications.

I mention this, as it may render a short visit to Paris possibly the more advisable; and, if inexpedient to open to the French Government at present the impressions and views of the British Government, I had rather do it in a short discussion, than commit myself upon them in a despatch.

Ever, my dear lord, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

The Duke of Wellington to Lord Castlereagh.

Mons, August 18, 1814.

My dear Lord—I received last night your letters and despatch of the 14th.

The situation of affairs in the world will naturally constitute England and France as arbitrators at the Congress, if those Powers *understand* each other; and such an understanding

may preserve the general peace. But I think your object would be defeated, and England would lose her high character and station, if the line of Monsieur Talleyrand is adopted, which appears to me to be tantamount to the declaration by the two Powers that they will be arbitrators of all the differences which may arise.

We must not forget that only a few months ago it was wished to exclude the interference and influence of France from the Congress entirely. I believe that your view and mine are precisely the same; but, however well Stuart and I may understand you, I am convinced that neither of us will explain so satisfactorily as yourself to Monsieur Talleyrand the necessity of your previous interview with the Ministers of the Allies, and the nature of your concert and mediation; and it is desirable on this ground that you should come to Paris.

Your coming there, and your departure so long previous to his, may occasion the same unpleasant sensation in the public mind at Paris which you observed that the information of your previous conferences at Vienna had occasioned to the Duc de Berri. It must also be recollected that the Allies will be aware of your journey to Paris, and may be jealous of your intimacy with Talleyrand. But I conceive that these considerations are nothing, when balanced with the great object of your establishing a perfect understanding with Talleyrand on your measures, and on the mode in which you will carry them into execution, which, in my opinion, nobody can do for you as well as you can for yourself.

I shall not be at Paris till the 21st, as I think I shall not get away from Courtrai till late on the 20th, and hope to hear from you as soon as you will have determined what you will do.

Ever yours, my dear lord, most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

Mr. George Jackson to Lord Castlereagh.

Berlin, August 19, 1814.

My Lord—Though I can hardly hope to offer your lordship any remarks on the present state of the politics of this Court, which your own more immediate acquaintance with them will not render superfluous, I nevertheless think it my duty to possess your lordship with the result of my observations, and of the best information I have been able to obtain in the prosecution of them.

Notwithstanding the universal joy occasioned by the triumphant termination of the war, and the return of his Prussian Majesty to his dominions, it is certain that it is coupled with no inconsiderable degree of dissatisfaction and ferment.

The various causes of discontent, so prevalent last year against the Chancellor Hardenberg, and which were suspended and might have been altogether effaced, with a little more attention and management on his part, by the auspicious turn of affairs, are beginning to revive and acquire additional strength from the fulsome praise which, in the presence of their Sovereign, he has suffered Prince Blücher to bestow at the late public dinners, on the manner in which the affairs of the nation have been conducted. At first the King seemed disposed, in compliment to the occasion, to tolerate so novel a departure from the usages of this country, but latterly his impatience became very manifest; for not a dinner passed without long declamations, in which, intermixed with reciprocal personal allusions, the politics of Prussia were introduced.

The newly appointed Ministers, being denied any communication with the King but through Prince Hardenberg, have not the means, if they had the requisite character and firmness, of pursuing a different system to that hitherto followed. Hence the same supineness, the same irregularity in business; and at a moment requiring the exertion of each nerve to repair the injury every branch of the State has suffered, the

Chancellor retains the exclusive direction of the several departments—a task that, even with the closest application, would exceed the powers of any one individual, but to which his habits of indolence and pleasure render him wholly unequal.

These are circumstances apparent to the eyes of all: those who have a nearer insight into what is passing accuse him also of having neglected the interests of Prussia, last year, at Kalisch and in the negociations with Austria and Bavaria.

To the abandonment of the basis first agreed upon by Russia, and which, your lordship will recollect, stipulated the *unqualified* re-integration of Prussia in her territories of 1806, with the sole exception of Bialystock, and to the confirmation at Paris of the cession of Anspach and Bareuth to Bavaria, is ascribed the disgraceful alternative in which this country is now (they say) placed, either of committing upon Saxony an act of crying injustice, or of seeing themselves reduced, after so many sacrifices, to a worse situation than they were in at the first mentioned period.

The language of the Russians is not of a nature to lessen this state of uneasiness; they are the first to condole with the Saxons, to cry out against the atrocity of the act, and to throw the odium of it on this country; while, on the other hand, one of their leading generals, speaking of the probable difficulties which might occur at the approaching Congress, replied, "*Oh! pour cela, avec* 600,000 *hommes, on ne négocie beaucoup.*"

Prince Hardenberg, aware of these circumstances, despairing of Russia being induced to forego any of her pretensions on the side of Poland, and anxious to allay the jealousy which is very generally felt among the Prussians, at seeing their neighbours already in possession of their respective allotments, is very strenuous in his endeavours to accelerate the occupation of Saxony—a measure believed to be so repugnant to the personal feelings of the King his master, that, at a Council held last week, in which the Chancellor, supported by Prince

Blücher and Count Tauenzien, strongly urged its necessity, his Majesty could not be induced to consent to its immediate execution, and broke up the assembly with evident marks of displeasure.

Preliminary steps, however, begin to be talked of. Prince William of Prussia is mentioned as the probable Viceroy. General Kleist is generally understood to have been sent for to be placed at the head of the military department of the country; and M. Beyme, formerly one of the Cabinet Secretaries, and late civil Governor of Pomerania, is to assist in its new civil organization.

This, my lord, is, I believe, a faithful picture of the present state of things; but the King's dislike to business, and the weakness of the Chancellor's political opponents, among the principal of whom is Count Goltz, render any change very improbable.

The latter considers himself much aggrieved, and some very warm remonstrances and altercations have passed between them; but, as the Count has neither the firmness to support, nor the talents to give effect to them, they serve only to fix his rival still more securely in his seat.

Your lordship is doubtless informed of the very marked and studied attention paid by the Emperor Alexander, on his return from England, to the Sovereign Prince of the Netherlands and to the Dutch people at large. This has excited more than ordinary remark; especially since it has been followed by the report that a union is in contemplation between the Hereditary Prince of Orange and the Grand-Duchess Helen.

Connected with this is the expectation affected to be entertained of Russia procuring East Friesland for the Duke of Oldenburgh; and there are not wanting vague surmises of ulterior views of that Power, in conjunction with Sweden, in the Baltic.

Your lordship will be the best judge how far these ideas

may be deserving of attention. The Chancellor, I know, professes to consider them as unfounded; this may be attributed to a carefulness to discredit the unbounded confidence which his Prussian Majesty places in the Emperor; and which, it is rumoured, is likely to be still more closely cemented by an alliance between the Princess Royal of Prussia and a younger brother of his Imperial Majesty. His Highness may also be sincere in his language; but, be this as it may, it is impossible to reflect on the conduct of the Baltic Powers on former occasions, and on the situation in which this country would be placed, did any such supposed design really exist, without looking with a very jealous eye at anything like an indication of it.

I must entreat, my lord, your indulgence for venturing to touch upon these topics. If I have erred, I can only plead my zeal for the public service, and my anxious wish to merit the trust your lordship has placed in me.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect, &c.,

GEORGE JACKSON.

The Duke of Wellington to Lord Clancarty.

Copy. Courtray, August 20, 1814.

My dear Lord—I have finished my business as far as I can, and am proceeding this day on my journey to Paris.

I have spoken to the Prince about his journey to Petersburgh, and he assures me that he does not think of it; and that, while he holds the command, it is out of the question. He says that he has never thought decidedly of it, and that he was only asked to go there.

He has been remarkably well received throughout the country, which, from what I have seen, I should say, is very well inclined to the House of Orange.

Ever yours, my dear lord, most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

Pray let me hear from you at Paris.

Mr. H. Goulburn to Lord Castlereagh.

Ghent, August 26, 1814.

My dear Lord—I have already apprized you privately of the expected rupture of our negociations. That rupture, in effect, has taken place, by the answer of the American Commissioners, received yesterday afternoon, a copy of which is enclosed.

It rather appears to me, and those associated with me, that some reply should be given to this document; and the *projet* of such a reply is herewith sent. Our public despatch of this day's date, carries the account of our proceedings down to the receipt of the American answer, and encloses a copy of it. We have not thought it right to state, in the despatch, anything connected with a reply, not knowing whether the Government would choose to issue a public declaration, or, upon other grounds, would wish a reply to be dispensed with. Time will hardly allow of sending to London for any direction as to what such a reply, if sent at all, ought, or ought not, to contain. Should that which we enclose, or any other approved by your lordship, be sent, our next public despatch will, of course, contain a copy.

I will write to Lord Bathurst to-day, to apprize him that we shall take the benefit of communicating with you, concerning our reply; otherwise, he may feel some surprise that we should have made no statement of our intentions with respect to it. You will much oblige us by sending us as early an answer as possible, as the reply will come with better grace, if sent promptly.

We have been not a little embarrassed in a most material part of this reply, by finding that the words "perfect reciprocity," said to be contained in your letter to Mr. Monroe of the 4th of November, 1813, do not actually occur in the document from the Foreign Office, dated the 30th of October, 1813, with which we were furnished, as containing a copy of

that letter. If the Americans have quoted fairly, we can only account for the omission, by supposing that the words were added subsequently to the 30th of October. If you can recollect how this matter was, we should be obliged to you to state it, as, if the words were not contained in the letter, a statement to that effect in our reply would be obviously better than any arguments, to apply the words to the general scope, and not to the particular clauses of the treaty. We have written this morning to the Foreign Office for a correct copy of the letter of the 4th of November, but think that we ought to send the reply before an answer from the Foreign Office can be expected to arrive.

Believe me, my dear lord, yours most faithfully,

HENRY GOULBURN.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool.

Draft. Paris, August 28, 1814.

My dear Liverpool—I send you a despatch and two private letters received from Ghent; also my reply to Goulburn, and some observations upon the documents referred to.

During my stay of the greater part of two days at Ghent, I did not see any of the American Commissioners; they did not call upon or desire to see me; and I thought my originating an interview would have been objectionable and awkward by our own Commissioners. When I left them, they inferred, from the manner in which their verbal explanations had been received, that the American Commissioners were disposed to treat and sign upon the frontier and Indian arrangements. No surprise or repugnance was at the moment disclosed to any of our suggestions.

If I had been to prepare the note given in on our part, I should have been inclined to state the proposition as to Indian limits less peremptorily; but the Commissioners appeared to attach so much importance to the not weakening, in this stage of their discussions, the ground which they had previously

taken up upon this point, that I acquiesced in the expression, "it is equally necessary," &c., which is very strong. I cautioned them, in reasoning on the words "purchase or otherwise," not to commit themselves, without further authority, to mean thereby to negative the possibility of conquest in a war justifiably declared, however open such a principle might be to evasion—the absence of any such right of acquiring territory being, at this moment, the state in which Great Britain and America stand mutually, with respect to each other's Indians.

Each Power would repel an attack, and follow the Indian enemy within the lines of the other State, would extinguish the tribe, if possible, and destroy their towns; but their right of war would not extend to the acquisition of territory beyond their own boundary. It is a right of reprisal, rather than a perfect right of war.

The whole seems a question of expediency and not of principle, as the American Commissioners have endeavoured to make it. There is nothing demanded which is not, or may not be made, consistent with reciprocity; nor does it follow, because, in the year 1783, the two States, not perhaps very justly, took a common boundary, thereby assuming a sort of sovereignty over the Indians, that they may not mutually recede from that boundary, if a frontier conterminous with that of the Indians is preferable to one with each other: and special exceptions might be introduced in favour of existing settlements on either side, which had given birth to rights of property.

It is extremely material to answer fully the American note, as it is evidently intended to rouse the people upon the question of their independence. As I leave Paris in a few hours, I have not time to suggest a sketch for your consideration, and can only send a few rough materials for you and my colleagues to work upon.

The substance of the question is, are we prepared to continue the war for territorial arrangements; and, if not, is this

the best time to make our peace, saving all our rights, and claiming the fisheries, which they do not appear to question (in which case, the territorial questions might be reserved for ulterior discussion); or is it desirable to take the chance of the campaign, and then to be governed by circumstances? If the latter is advisable, we have the means of doing so, as the American Commission gives us no room to expect any pacific stipulation whatever in favour of what they call *their Indians*, without now putting the war solely and avowedly on a territorial principle, which I think it would be imprudent to do. On the other hand, if we thought an immediate peace desirable, as they are ready to wave *all* the abstract questions, perhaps they might be prepared to sign a Provisional Article of Indian peace, as distinct from limits, and relinquish their pretensions to the islands in Passamaquoddy Bay, and possibly to admit minor adjustments of frontier, including a right of communication from Quebec to Halifax, across their territory. But whilst I state this, I feel the difficulty of so much letting down the question, under present circumstances, upon the chance of such a body, containing all the varieties of American party, agreeing amongst themselves to any measure of responsibility; and, further, upon the imperfect security that, if they did, it would be approved at home.

Whilst I have been otherwise engaged, Cooke has thrown together, in the shape of a note, such hints as have occurred, for your consideration. I shall reserve for a future letter the report of my visits to Brussels and Paris. They will be, upon the whole, favourable.

Very sincerely yours, CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Mr. Goulburn.

Copy. Paris, August 28, 1814.

My dear Goulburn—Considering the note to be given in by the British Commissioners, in answer to that of the Americans, as the only manifesto (though not immediately to be made

public) which it would be advisable to put forward under existing circumstances, I deem it of importance that your reply should be made under the instructions of Cabinet, and that you should await at Ghent their directions.

I have, therefore, to request that you will simply acquaint the American Commissioners verbally that you mean to reply to their note; but that, before you do so on a communication of such importance, you have thought it your duty to refer it for the previous consideration of your Government.

You will feel that your answer will acquire rather than lose weight from this interval, and from your being enabled to speak under the special sanction of your Court; and that no time will, in fact, be lost, as you could not break up the conferences and return home without express authority.

That no unnecessary delay may take place, I shall send your despatch, private letters, and projected answer, direct to London, with such remarks as occur to myself, and you may expect shortly to receive from your Government directions for your guidance.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

The Duke of Wellington to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, September 2, 1814.

My dear Lord—I send you some despatches from Spain. Mr. Clarkson told me, this morning, that he understood from some persons connected with the Government that, if Great Britain would give such a proof of disinterestedness in desiring the abolition of the Slave Trade, as to sacrifice a colony in the West Indies as a compensation to France for what she might gain by carrying on the Slave Trade for the next five years, the French Government would consent to the immediate abolition.

Connecting the mode in which St. Lucia came to be in our possession, I don't believe the King and Talleyrand can enter-

tain such a notion; and I confide in what they have said to you and to me. However, I'll inquire into the matter, and let you know the result. In the mean time, I have informed Lord Liverpool of this notion, and have desired him to let me know what he feels about such a sacrifice, to obtain immediate abolition by France.

The Government were beat, last night, by a majority of 76 against 55, in the House of Peers, on the preamble of the Press law. The majority admitted the necessity of the law, but contended that, although necessary, it was contrary to the constitution; and that the declaration of the preamble was contrary to the truth. On one of the clauses the Government had a majority of one only—66 to 65.

It is expected that the financial scheme will be thrown out of the Lower House.

Count Münster goes on this evening to Vienna. He is perfectly satisfied with the communication he has had with the Government here.

Ever, my dear lord, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

Brussels, September 3, 1814.

My dear Lord—I take advantage of the despatch of a courier to you, with the product of the mail from England, arrived this morning, to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of Saturday last from Paris.

I think I can perceive the reason, and, if so, most sincerely thank you for the motive, which has induced your arrangement with Sir Charles Stuart to remain in England *till called for:* as he had always intended to remain with his friends from six weeks to two months, I should hope he will experience no real inconvenience from the arrangement.

I have no news to send you from hence. The Prince continues to make progress in public estimation, and, I have little

doubt, will succeed in satisfying the people, as far as they can be satisfied, with his future Government. He has announced to me his intention of remaining at Brussels till my departure, and afterwards making excursions thence to the several towns in these provinces. This is a plan which he had it in intention to have executed early after his first arrival, but which I strenuously advised him against, till he had well fixed his foundations at Brussels. Having now done this, I think the execution of his intentions will have the best effect.

We have arranged to set out on Saturday, the 10th. Such a journey, with such a family, will probably require fifteen days, and this will bring us to Vienna by the 25th, the day you have indicated. I have written to Gordon to come here, and hope he will be at Brussels before I set out; he has also been requested to leave one of the two *attachés* at the Hague.

I have sent nothing to England since you left us, excepting despatches respecting the monthly payment of £25,000 on account of the Hanoverian subsidies. These payments are to be made to the Commissary-General; and I have written to Government that instructions should be sent respecting the mode in which these sums should be disbursed and accounted for.

The courier who was despatched by me, with your letter to Jackson at Berlin, so far back as the 12th of August, only returned this morning. I have ventured to open the despatches, in order that, the originals being to be conveyed to England by the next mail, copies may be made and sent to you by this occasion. Among them is a letter from Prince Hardenberg to you, which, though we here are probably much interested in, as it may relate to the occupation of Liege, I have not ventured to open. It is, therefore, in its orignal state forwarded to you at Vienna by this courier.

Yours, my dear lord, most affectionately,

CLANCARTY.

Mr. Brook Taylor to Lord Castlereagh.

Stuttgard, September 3, 1814.

My Lord—The King of Wurtemberg having appointed Baron Linden to be his Minister Plenipotentiary at the Congress at Vienna, I have received an application to recommend him to your lordship; and I think it but due to him to state that, since my arrival here, this gentleman has shown me every civility and attention in his power. He now holds the situation here of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in the room of Count Zeppelin, who is appointed the King of Wurtemberg's Minister at Paris.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

BROOK TAYLOR.

Mr. Foster to Lord Castlereagh.

Copenhagen, September 5, 1814.

My dear Lord—M. de Rosenkrantz desires from me a letter of introduction to your lordship; and, although he is sufficiently known to you already from the general character he has always borne as an upright and honourable man as well as wise Minister, I cannot refrain from profiting by the opportunity to assure you of what I have every reason to be convinced, namely, that no man in Denmark has been more anxiously desirous to promote the restoration of amity with England, and that, had it depended upon him, we should have been at peace with this country long ago. It would be superfluous for me to add more, as there are so many Ministers of different countries now at Vienna who have known M. de Rosenkrantz, and who must be happy to serve as his introductors.

I am, &c., AUG. FOSTER.

PS. Should you wish to converse with M. de Rosenkrantz about the internal concerns of Denmark, I am sure you will find in him the most unbounded frankness. He will tell you

how very unsettled are people's minds in the German part of the King of Denmark's dominions. I cannot but think an alteration in the Danish constitution would be the best remedy to counteract the disposition of the people of Holstein to withdraw from their allegiance to this Crown. They have been severely injured by the war measures of Denmark, and by the want of protection from a strong Government; but, should a prospect be now held out to them of a free constitution, in imitation of that of Great Britain or of France, I cannot but think that they would prefer such a state of things to any other. I have hazarded this opinion to M. de Rosenkrantz, and he, belonging to one of the oldest families here, is by no means indisposed to listen to any suggestions in favour of the aristocracy, which has been almost extinguished in this country.

Should your lordship think proper to give him any hints upon the matter, I am convinced they would have great effect, particularly as the King of Denmark will be upon the spot, and might possibly lead to a complete reform in this Government, which, as far as I can understand, seems to have been, at least lately, nearly the worst in practice of any in Christendom. His Danish Majesty, I should add, is very ready to receive advice, and, if he once conceives a project to be good, he generally clings to it with most unceasing perseverance. Unfortunately, it has too often happened, however, that he has been deceived as to what was advantageous to his kingdom.

M. de Rosenkrantz is so good as to take charge of my despatches from No. 5 to No. 10, both inclusive, being duplicates.

Lord Walpole to Mr. Edward Cooke.

Petersburg, September 5, 1814.

Dear Cooke—You will see my public letter. I am now better enabled to answer your postscript of June 23, relative to Persia. Sir G. Ouseley certainly obtained the ratification of the treaty of peace, under a promise to attempt to procure for

Persia some favour from this country, but rather in his individual than public character; though the consequences of his failure or success will much influence our national interests; and I own I think he ought to be supported.

We were engaged by treaty to pay an annual subsidy to Persia; and, to exonerate Russia from the burden of a distant and expensive war, while engaged in hostilities against France, he was directed to mediate a peace between them. To the terms offered by Russia the other could not consent; and her repugnance was only overcome by a kind of Secret Article, promising Ritischew's good offices with the Emperor, to engage him generously to satisfy the Court of Persia. To second these good offices, Sir Gore undertook his journey to Petersburg, as the sole means of obtaining the ratification of Persia. In treating this subject, he has never appeared but as a private individual. The name of England has never been brought into the discussion; and in speaking to Count Nesselrode, I have mentioned his opinion in the same way.

In case of the renewal of the war, I am afraid our subsidy would become payable; and I cannot doubt that the slightest interference on Lord Castlereagh's part would amicably terminate this business. *Au reste*, the Emperor has hinted that he should like Sir Gore to stay till after his return, when Mirza Hassan Khàn will be arrived.

Cathcart has written for a house; pray let him have a letter of recall if necessary, and inform me if Lord Castlereagh wishes me to stay till Lord C.'s arrival. Who goes to Berlin? May you succeed at the Congress—it will be no easy task.

If any changes take place here, they will not happen before the Emperor sets off, that he may escape remonstrances and long faces—till then he is all kindness and flattery.

Can I be of any service to you here? Tell Lord Stewart I will pay Löwenhjelm, and draw on Drummond for the amount.

Yours very truly, WALPOLE.

Mr. à Court to Mr. Hamilton.

Copy. Palermo, September 7, 1814.

My dear Sir—I think it would be as well if you were to give a little check to our Consul, Mr. Fagan, who has been running about Italy, giving himself the airs of a Minister, and has latterly been absurd enough to demand a formal audience of Murat, presenting himself to him as British Consul-General at Naples. This is officially announced in the Neapolitan Moniteur of the 25th of August.

Now, I do not believe that England has acknowledged Murat, neither do I believe that Mr. Fagan is anything more than a self-appointed Consul at Naples; for the Consulships of Naples and Sicily have always, in all times, been distinct appointments. This, however, you will know best; but if he is not Consul at Naples, he has acted most absurdly in attending Murat's Court, inasmuch as it has occasioned very great disquietude here.

I am not acquainted with Mr. Fagan, but I understand that he is a very foolish, intriguing sort of gentleman. He ought to be particularly cautious in his conduct; for, being a Catholic, it is a nice point whether he is or he is not entitled to hold even his present situation. I believe that the oaths which he is obliged to administer officially to Protestant captains, merchants, &c., are, in point of law, of no validity whatever.

My despatches will give you all the information that I have to communicate, which is little enough. We await the decision of the Congress of Vienna with great impatience.

Believe me, &c., WILLIAM À COURT.

Mr. Stratford Canning to Lord Castlereagh.

Zuric, September 8, 1814.

My Lord—It is with great satisfaction I hasten to inform your lordship that, after two or three days more of discussion and dispute, the Cantons assembled in Diet have ratified their

Constitution by a very large majority. Schwytz and Vaud are the only Cantons that still withhold their consent, and it is thought that neither of them will withhold it much longer. It cannot be their interest to be excluded from the Confederation; and such would be the consequence of their obstinacy. I will not fail to send your lordship a more ample account of this event, and of other points connected with it, as soon as I possibly can.

A report has reached Geneva that the Austrian troops in the provinces of Savoy are to be immediately superseded by those of the King of Sardinia.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

STRATFORD CANNING.

Lord Castlereagh to the Duke of Wellington.

Munich, September 9, 1814.

My dear Lord—I enclose, under a flying seal, a private letter for your brother Henry, which I shall be obliged to you to forward by the first opportunity, apprizing him of your progress on the same question.

In all my discussions on the question of the Slave Trade, nothing ever dropped from either the King or M. de Talleyrand to countenance Mr. Clarkson's suggestion. I suspect the notion is picked up in some of those conversations which he provokes with the Philanthropists at Paris, and is thrown out, if not *insidiously*, to force us into some offer of this description, in the vain hope of its being accepted. Mr. C. is not, as I believe, partial to the Government, and extremely likely to impute to them the having fallen short in their exertions upon this point.

I am sorry to find the Government has received a check in the Upper House. It was a foolish thing to hazard this idly upon a preamble, which is always of secondary importance.

I am going on to-night.

Ever, my dear lord, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir Henry Wellesley.

Munich, September 9, 1814.

My dear Sir—Your despatches of the 26th have overtaken me here, on my way to Vienna. I have only a moment to express my approbation of your official note, as well as my concurrence in all the steps you have taken in execution of my instructions.

My motive for putting the Spanish Ambassador in London in possession of the outline of our offer was, that you might have the support of his representation as to the temper of the British Parliament and of the nation upon this question. I relied for success not so much upon the *mode* in which the measure was presented for the decision of the Spanish Government, as upon the graduated scale of temptation which the proposition itself contained.

I observe, from your private letter, that the Duke of San Carlos has attempted to disturb this scale, and to claim the higher reward for the inferior arrangement; but we must undeceive him in his expectations of thus securing his object. I own I never was very sanguine, even with the aid of the loan, of securing an immediate abolition: but it is necessary to make the Spanish Minister understand that, without this effort on their part, (which perhaps is more than the public mind of Spain is prepared for) our relief cannot go beyond the remainder of the subsidy for the year, and that only on the conditions you have stated. You may represent to him how little value Parliament attached in the late debates to the French stipulation of abolishing at the end of five years. This, and the *continuing to abstain* from looking for their slaves to the north of the Line, might furnish us with a case to give them the residue of the subsidy, (probably amounting to £800,000) but we could not bring it before Parliament as a concession sufficiently substantive in itself to justify a call upon Parliament to interpose its credit in favour of the Go-

vernment of Spain, under circumstances perfectly without precedent in our financial history.

I am confident the persons deputed to London, as you suppose, on this subject, will find such to be the unshaken opinion of the British Government. You will no doubt learn the result from Lord Liverpool; but I have thought it right to apprize you without delay of my sentiments, in order that you may lose no opportunity, if the entire abolition appears to you unattainable, of bringing the minor arrangement to a conclusion, upon the conditions which you have been authorized to propose.

I am, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool.

Copy. Munich, September 9, 1814.

My dear Liverpool—I conclude you have already received the originals of Wellesley's despatches of the 26th. I send you copies of what I have written upon them. I am convinced we cannot afford to become purchasers on such extravagant terms of indulgences for Africa. If we do, we shall get nothing without paying for it ten prices; and, what is worse, they will break faith with us, in order to have the same thing to dispose of a second time in some new form.

My opinion is, that we cannot vary our offer to Spain, without turning the whole into a money question at the Congress, to the prejudice even of the object itself, which may become impracticable, from our supposed excess of zeal to carry it through.

I have also received à Court's despatches here. I hardly know how to answer his alternative. If he means, are we to support the Constitution by force of arms, or by making it cause of war with the King, for his committing violations of it? the answer seems clear—that we cannot think of it. We must let the King now administer his own Government; and our Minister, I conceive, must try to withdraw himself from

the character he has latterly filled, of being the head of a party.

Whatever efforts we can rationally make in the exercise of our legitimate influence to preserve to the Sicilians a more liberal system of Government, and to protect those who have acted with us, so far we are bound to go, even to the extent of breaking off our relations with that court; but we are not called upon to commit our own character by assuming a control which cannot belong to us, and which could not, if attempted, be persevered in.

I should be glad to receive the opinion of Cabinet on this subject. Perhaps it may be most advisable to send it to me in a despatch, and leave me to instruct à Court, according to circumstances, from Vienna.

I am, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool.

Draft. Munich, September 9, 1814.

My dear Liverpool—As I have collected nothing on my route which would lead me to hope for a *short issue* to our discussions at Vienna, I am induced to express my opinion in favour of as early an opinion as you can *well manage* before Christmas. I think it highly material that you should call Parliament at such a period as will give you the means of avoiding discussion, especially on the American question, which I hope you may contrive to leave sufficiently open for this purpose; but as the Commissioners will have written without loss of time to their Government, and as we must expect they will make a communication immediately to Congress, it will be difficult for us not to be exposed to a question before Christmas on the line taken. The earlier, however, the meeting takes place, the less chance of an attendance, or of any attempt to bring the correspondence before the House previous to the recess. I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

The Duke of Wellington to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, September 12, 1814.

My dear Lord—Palmella will, I believe, carry this letter to you, and I just beg leave to mention of him that I know he has no instructions, and I believe he has no powers to attend the Congress. Your knowledge of this fact may facilitate your forming the Commission of Congress without him. His objects are Olivenza, and a boundary with the French in South America. I told him that the latter was a very good subject for discussion at the time of negociating the treaty of peace, but that the Congress was to settle all kinds of questions among the Allies themselves, and particularly those which each power might have with France.

He told me, in regard to Olivenza, that he knew that Labrador had no power to cede that territory, and he wished me to write to my brother upon that subject. Killbee is here, and I'll desire him to speak to my brother about it. But I doubt that the Spanish Government will give a previous instruction to Labrador to make any cession, even though they should get what they want, or compensation for it.

You will see, by my despatch, what has passed here respecting the Spanish treaty. I have nothing to add to that despatch, excepting that, in proportion as I see that they are displeased here with the Spanish treaty, I am delighted that we succeeded in making it. I am certain that they looked to a renewal of their Spanish alliance, and that the best way of keeping them quiet, against their inclinations, is to be upon good terms with Spain.

I have turned over in my mind a good deal the mode of executing our plans against Murat. I should think the Austrians will not interfere themselves, and will not like to see the French in Italy; and the operation must be performed by the King of Sicily, the King of Spain, and their Allies, and possibly a few French troops sent by sea into Sicily. I think we might get 10,000 men from Spain, 10,000 from Sicily, 12,000

from Portugal, and 12 or 15,000, including cavalry, from England, or the English garrisons in the Mediterranean. England would be obliged to furnish transports for the whole, and a train of field ordnance of 60 pieces, equipped, and a battering train. With such a force, we ought to be able to effect our object.

I have not said anything to Lord Liverpool on this subject, nor shall I, till I shall hear from you; but, if you wish it, I will write a detailed memorandum of all that will be required to carry on this operation successfully.

I enclose you the copy of a curious letter from Mr. Clarkson, about the Slave Trade, and send you some books he has left for you. You'll hear from Lord Liverpool of the proposal to cede an island in order to procure immediate abolition, and I send you the copy of my letter to Lord Liverpool on that subject. I'll write to you again to-morrow, after I shall have seen Talleyrand upon it this night.

Ever, my dear lord, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

[Four Enclosures with the preceding Letter.]

Mr. Thomas Clarkson to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, September 10, 1814.

My Lord—I beg leave respectfully to inform you that I thought it my duty, before I left England, to draw up an address to the different potentates of Christendom, or their representatives at Vienna at this particular crisis, on the subject of the Slave Trade. The address is designed to show those who may be ignorant what the Slave Trade is. This I have shown entirely *from the evidence delivered before the House of Commons*, which I have cited on each point. The address, though it contains only thirty-two pages altogether, (which may be read in thirty-five minutes) will give the reader a considerable, and, I may add, a distinct knowledge of the subject.

Having premised thus much, I may now observe that, when I had written the address, I had it translated into the French and German languages, and printed, and that I have sent several to Vienna, as well as taken several with me to France. Since I have been in Paris, I have reprinted the little work *at the express desire of the Duke of Wellington*, and circulated it not only among the chief Ministers of the French Cabinet, but among the two branches of the Legislature.

Now, my lord, as this little work has made *a very deep impression* wherever it *has been read*, it cannot but be a *great support* to your lordship, in your earnest endeavours at Congress to answer (while you gratify your own feelings) the wishes of the English on the subject of the Slave Trade. I have therefore sent your lordship fifty copies of this little work, which the Duke of Wellington has permitted me to send in his own despatches; and, if your lordship should be of opinion that, by the distribution of them with your own hand (which would give additional weight to them) among the Emperors, Kings, and Ambassadors, who compose the Congress, you would be assisted in your endeavours, you will of course distribute them in that or in any other way which you may think preferable; and if, on the other hand, you should be of opinion that the distribution of them would not answer the end proposed, then your lordship will suppress them altogether. As the present is a corrected edition, I chose rather to send your lordship copies of it than of the former, which was very badly translated; and this is the reason why probably you will not have received copies so early as some others at Vienna.

Your lordship will, I trust, excuse the liberty I have taken in sending you the enclosed packet, when I repeat that the books have been distributed, as before mentioned, in Paris, by the Duke of Wellington's approbation. But, my lord, there is another circumstance which renders it proper that they should be put into your hands. It would, indeed, have been

an unpardonable neglect in me—it would have been an insult to your lordship—if these books had been seen in the hands of Members of Congress generally, and none in those of the British Ambassador. It would have been like trusting all others, and distrusting your lordship. I could not, therefore, though the book was written entirely for the information of those who were ignorant of the subject, be guilty of such gross indelicacy as to overlook your lordship on this occasion, and particularly as you had honoured me by a very flattering reception at your own house in St. James's Square.

Your lordship will perhaps allow me, before I close my letter, to state that an opinion prevails here, (however erroneous it may be) among the friends of our cause, that, if some colony or island were offered by Great Britain to France, (say Tobago, St. Lucia, or any other) the latter would give up the additional article in the treaty, and join in the *immediate* abolition of the Slave Trade. Without an exchange, it is said that the present Government of France dare not do it; for, without something to show, as gained on the one hand, by giving up on the other, the French people would think their Monarch degraded, and *at the command of England and her Allies;* the consequences of which might be serious: but, if the French Government were to gain something in the manner spoken of, it is certainly believed here that England *may have the abolition to-morrow.* I have taken the liberty to mention this opinion, because I know that two members of Parliament in the Opposition, the one in the Lords and the other in the Commons, have adopted it in consequence of a conversation with some of the French Ministers of State, and I believe they will act upon it in Parliament.

Wishing your lordship the most ample success in the great cause you have undertaken of humanity, justice, and religion, I have the honour to subscribe myself with respect, your lordship's obedient and obliged servant,

THOMAS CLARKSON.

Mr. Clarkson to the Duke of Wellington.

I write to your Grace to say, before I leave Paris, that, as it is probable that the Members of Congress may amount to seventy, and as Lord Castlereagh's packet, now in your grace's hotel, consists but of fifty, I have thought it right to send him twenty more of the corrected French copies, which will accompany this letter, and beg the favour of you to desire Lieutenant-Colonel Burgh, when he sends off the first packet, to send off the second also. I have also sent your lordship thirty corrected French copies, all that remain of the 1,000, for your own private use.

When the "Essay on the Impolicy" comes out, which will be in nine days, I have ordered forty copies to be sent for your use also, and the rest to the two Houses of Assembly, the present Officers of State, the literary men of Paris, and all the journals. I paid this day not only for the first pamphlet, the Address, but also for the "Essay on the Impolicy," which is to come out, so that your grace will have no further trouble about them.

May I venture now to say what I would do, were I a Member of the Congress? I would first try, with *all my might*, to get rid of the *article* in the treaty *entirely* and *immediately*, so that the abolition might be immediate and universal; and I would, if the French would accept it, even give up a colony in exchange; that is, I would leave no stone unturned to secure *immediate abolition*, if possible. But if, after all my exertions, I could not get it, then I would aim at two things—first, to reduce the five years to two or to three years at most, and I would be strenuous on that point—secondly, to have all the coast north of the Line freed from the ravages of the Slave Trade, not only from French, but from Spanish and Portuguese ravages, and indeed the ravages of all nations whatever.

After this, I would conclude in the following manner: I would get a decree from the Congress that, after the two, three,

or four years were expired, no nation whatever should be permitted to carry on the Slave Trade *at all*. After this period, it should be declared contrary to the law of nations, and put upon the same footing as piracy. This declaration should be guaranteed by all the contracting parties as eternal, whatever wars they might afterwards be engaged in against one another. The same seals which guaranteed the Government of France to the Bourbons, and the restoration of territory and government to the Spaniards and Portuguese, should guarantee liberty, or freedom from the Slave Trade, to Africa. A day then should be fixed, after which any slave vessel found to be such should be liable to capture, and to be treated as a pirate. This latter clause is essentially necessary. All the contracting Powers, or four or five of the most powerful, should give in their names in combination for the execution of the Act.

These, my lord, are my own sentiments, and I trust you will excuse me for mentioning them. I dare not mention them to Lord Castlereagh, lest he should think me assuming or dictating; but, if your grace should approve of them, they would come with great weight in a letter from you to his lordship. May I ask of you earnestly to recommend them?

I wish your grace health and every earthly happiness, and I am, &c.,

THOMAS CLARKSON.

The Duke of Wellington to Lord Liverpool.

Paris, September 12, 1814.

My dear Lord—I have received your letter of the 7th, regarding a cession of some kind or other, in order to obtain the immediate abolition of the Slave Trade. I have inquired upon the subject, and have not found any such idea here, and so I told Mr. Clarkson yesterday; but as I find Talleyrand's name mentioned, I will see him to-night, and will talk to him on the subject.

I did not tell Mr. Clarkson that it was a question of national

vanity. It is one of profit; and those interested in carrying on the trade, who are the only persons who have any information on the subject, with very few exceptions, operate upon the national vanity by representing the question not only as one purely English, but as one of English profit and monopoly.

Money might do a great deal with this class of people, certainly more than the island of Trinidad; and I concur entirely in opinion with your lordship, on the impolicy of offering to make any territorial cession, with a view to obtain this object, which you should not be quite sure would be accepted.

Ever, &c., WELLINGTON.

The Duke of Wellington to Lord Liverpool.

Copy. Paris, September 13, 1814.

My dear Lord—I spoke last night to M. de Talleyrand, regarding the supposed inclination of the French Government to agree to an immediate abolition of the Slave Trade, if Great Britain would make some concession to obtain it; and I told him fairly that the notion that such an inclination existed was founded on a conversation which he had had with Lord Holland while his lordship was here. He replied that no such inclination existed, and that both the King and he had explained themselves fully on the subject to Lord Castlereagh and myself—that the King was determined to fulfil his engagements, and, in the mean time, to restrict the trade of his subjects, as far as possible, on those parts of the coast of Africa which we had pointed out; and to co-operate, by every means in his power, in Congress and elsewhere, with the British Government, to put an end to the trade in slaves altogether.

In regard to the conversation he had had with Lord Holland, the Prince of Benevente said that it was of a very desultory description, and that, as well as he recollected, what he intended to express was, that it would have been more easy, at the period of the negociation of the treaty of peace, to

obtain the immediate abolition by a concession made for that object, than it was at the present moment, when preparations had been made to carry on the trade.

In the course of the conversation, finding that no inclination existed to abolish the trade immediately, I did not think it necessary or proper to describe what concession the British Government were disposed to make, any farther than as one to compensate the persons interested in carrying on the Slave Trade for the losses they might be supposed to incur by its immediate abolition.

Ever my dear lord, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

Mr. Clarkson is gone, but it would probably be worth while to let him know how this matter stands.

Mr. Brook Taylor to Lord Castlereagh.

Stuttgard, September 13, 1814.

My Lord—I have been honoured with your lordship's letter of the 9th, from Munich, and I beg to acquaint you that I have not failed to convey to their Majesties the King and Queen of Wurtemberg the expression of your lordship's regret that your time has been so limited, as to be unable to proceed to this place, according to your first intention.

The King's departure remains fixed for Friday next, the 16th instant. His Majesty will be attended by the Austrian Minister, Baron de Schall, besides the persons named in my despatch to your lordship of the 4th.

I have had the pleasure of making the acquaintance of Mr. Ward, as he passed through this place, and I heartily congratulate him upon the advantage he must derive from your lordship's kindness in employing him immediately under you, at this interesting period, at Vienna.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

BROOK TAYLOR.

Mr. Thornton to Lord Castlereagh.

Stockholm, September 16, 1814.

My Lord—I have no other means of conveying the accompanying duplicates of my despatches to your lordship than by sending them to the Earl of Clancarty, at Brussels, who may find many occasions to transmit them to Vienna. They are not important enough for a special messenger, nor of sufficient interest to render it absolutely essential to secure them from the inspection of the foreign post-offices; yet I cannot help feeling a repugnance to exposing them to the eyes of other than those to whom they are addressed. I am, indeed, answerable for the accompanying letter of the Danish Minister here to M. de Rosenkrantz, as he has earnestly entreated me to let it go through no other hands than those of your lordship.

The Prince Royal left this place for Gottenburg the day after the date of my despatches. No other motive for his journey hither has yet transpired, than the very general one which I have there mentioned; and perhaps there was no other. I am told, however, that the deliberations of the Council of State which he held here, were conducted with so much secrecy, that the ordinary secretaries were excluded, and Baron Rosenblad, one of the Ministers, performed their functions. Your lordship will see, from this circumstance, that this country begins to feel a distinct interest from that of Great Britain, or at least one which there is some motive for concealing.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

EDWARD THORNTON.

Mr. Stratford Canning to Lord Castlereagh.

Zuric, September 17, 1814.

My Lord—The several papers which accompany this letter would have been sent to your lordship much sooner, had I not detained my courier, in order to send at the same time the latest information of the proceedings of the Diet, before the departure of M. Reinhard and his colleagues. In the course

of three or four days, that assembly will most probably be adjourned for as many weeks.

I take this opportunity to return M. La Harpe's pamphlet, which your lordship had the goodness to lend me at Brügg. It is but fair to send with it a paper which I received a few ago: I know not from whom. This paper war has done, and still does, much mischief; but, if ever there were a provocation that could justify such puerile hostilities, it is the conduct of La Harpe, who arrives here with a wanton and mischievous libel against the Government of Berne, just as matters are beginning to wear an appearance of conciliation, and, in the very teeth of the Ministers sent here to promote that conciliation, acts and talks in a manner calculated to thwart their proceedings. He has since gone on to Vienna with a person named Rengger, as a sort of deputation from the counter-Bernese party. As it is probable that he will endeavour to confirm the Emperor Alexander in his former declaration respecting the integrity of the Nineteen Cantons, and thereby take away what really seems the only means of giving a permanent repose to this country, it is fit that I should apprize your lordship of the following circumstance:—

I believe I mentioned, on a former occasion, that M. de Schraut, Count Capo d'Istrias, and myself, had agreed that the restitution of a part of Bernese Argovy to Berne, together with a compensation, as before offered, on the side of Porentrui, was necessary for the common interest of the Confederacy; and that Count Capo d'Istrias had shown me part of a despatch strongly and decidedly in that sense, which he had addressed to his Master. A few days ago Count Capo d'Istrias informed me that he had shown that despatch to La Harpe, who, on reading it, far from making any objection, confessed in so many words the truth of the statement—so true, indeed, that, in our joint note of the 12th ultimo, we found it necessary to give a sort of engagement on this head—not a very clear one, as your lordship will see by the enclosed extract—in order to

produce an agreement upon the Federal Constitution; and, had it not been for the Emperor of Russia's declaration, if it may be so called, a direct promise would have been given in plain and unequivocal terms.

With respect to that declaration, allow me to remind your lordship that it never has been made officially to the Diet; and, as I mentioned to your lordship the other day, I have reason to think that it owes its birth to a feeling of petulance produced by the imprudent conduct of Austria in the beginning of the business In the first *projet* of Constitution, the mutual guaranty of territory was accompanied with an exception for any *rectifications de limites* that the cantons might choose to agree upon. The envoys to the Congress are instructed to abstain from any leaning to either side of the question; but, if I am not mistaken, the language of M. Reinhard will be to be received with caution—first, as an inhabitant of Zuric, the ancient rival of Berne; and secondly, for reasons connected with the early proceedings here.

In case the territorial claims of the several cantons, particularly the minor ones, should be found, upon examination, too expensive and complicated, could not a line be drawn between those districts which were formerly possessed by a single canton, and those which were held by several in common?

From the language of the French Minister here, there seems to be some intention on the part of his Government to propose the renewal of the old alliance which subsisted between France and the Confederacy before the Revolution. I suppose the present system will be considered as not admitting of any *alliances* between this country and foreign powers—especially the French: but I should be glad to be put in possession of your lordship's views on the subject.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

STRATFORD CANNING.

PS. I take the liberty to enclose, for your lordship's perusal, an extract of a letter which I received a few days

ago from Brussels, respecting the state of affairs in that neighbourhood.

[Enclosures.]

Extract of a Note to the Diet from the Allied Ministers.

Zuric, 13 Août, 1814.

After urging the completion of the Federal Constitution—C'est à cette condition que les sous-signés prennent ici l'engagement non seulement de faire tout ce qui dépend d'eux pour trouver et faire agréer des modes de compensation équitables et suffisantes aux démandes du second et troisième ordre, mais encore de solliciter sur celles du Canton de Berne qui sont au premier rang, des pouvoirs et instructions telles qu'il en faudra pour rétablir la concorde en la Suisse, et concilier les intérêts de tous les Cantons.

(Signé) SCHRAUT. Comte de CAPO D'ISTRIAS.
STRATFORD CANNING.

Extract of a Letter from Brussels.

Copy.

Il a été établi par décret du 14 du courant, quatre Commissaires généraux: le premier, chargé de l'administration intérieure, est le Duc d'Ursel, chef du parti François, Maire de Bruxelles, destitué par la force de l'opinion prononcée contre lui, arrêté par les Alliés, envoyé en Allemagne, et sorti de prison sans avoir osé exiger de réparation formelle, ou l'instruction d'un procès juridique; lié d'ailleurs d'intérêt, d'inclination, et de raison de famille aux d'Aremberg, dont le dévouement à Bonaparte ne s'est jamais démenti. M. Apdius, qui, en Avril, 1814, étoit encore Conseiller d'État au service de Bonaparte est Commissaire Général pour les finances. Celui de la justice est le Comte de Lombeze; et l'Adjutant du Prince, Baron Fagel est nommé provisoirement pour la guerre.

Ces Messieurs travaillent chaque en particulier avec le Prince: ils s'assemblent une fois la semaine pour délibérer sur les matières d'un intérêt général, de manière que nous voilà

gouvernés par quatre Bachas absolus dans leurs départemens respectifs, et ne rendant compte de leurs faits et gestes qu'au Grand Seigneur, qui, quand bon lui semble, et autrement pas, consultera son Conseil Privé composé de sept Conseillers et d'un Président. Les séances du Conseil auront lieu trois fois la semaine: il délibérera sur toutes les matières sur lesquelles le Prince trouvera bon d'avoir son avis. On lui soumettra aussi les rapports et les propositions des Commissaires généraux toutes les fois que le Prince ne jugera pas à propos d'y statuer immédiatement.

V. E. voit par ces dispositions préliminaires combien l'autorité de S. A. R. est peu circonscrite dans nos provinces; elle s'exempte même des délibérations; sa volonté fait loi, et quand il plaira à notre Souverain provisoire de lever une contribution de six millions sur ses nouveaux sujets, il ne lui en coûtera la peine d'écrire aux intendans des six départemens à l'effet qu'ils aient à répartir une imposition d'un million sur leurs administrés respectifs; et les Belges délivrés devront payer sans réclamation aucune, ce qu'il conviendra à leurs libérateurs d'arracher de leur économie.

Je ne me suis pas étendu sur le chapitre des membres du Conseil Privé, qui sont tous de fort honnêtes gens; mais suffit-il d'être honnêtes pour sauver la patrie, quand elle est entourée de tant de dangers divers? ne faut-il pas que les talens et les lumières, réunies à la probité, concourent à inspirer au peuple la confiance en Gouvernement et l'amour pour les gouvernans, afin qu'il se range autour d'eux dans les momens difficiles, et qu'il lui prête son énergie pour repousser les attaques du dehors et les menées des malveillans, qui agitent sourdement la masse de la nation? Ne serait-il pas tems enfin que le système François, contre lequel l'Europe s'est levée, cessât dans les provinces limitrophes de la France, où la réaction de celle-ci est rendue plus sensible par une certaine conformité d'usages et de langage, née d'une longue habitude et par l'intérêt des individus, où l'indignation de se voir trompé

dans ses espérances ajoute au sentiment des maux présens et efface l'impression de ceux qu'on a soufferts? Cependant, au lieu de prendre des mesures sages, et d'employer des hommes probes et éclairés, on s'endort sur le volcan. Son explosion peut être terrible. La Hollande n'est pas satisfaite; la France convoite ce pays-ci, et ce pays-ci, sans regretter la France, qu'il déteste généralement, regrette ses anciens maîtres, ses anciennes loix, son ancienne liberté. La force des évènemens et de Bonaparte avoient comprimé l'élan des Belges vers un autre ordre des choses: les Alliés sont venus les arracher au joug de la France, et dès-lors toutes les prétentions des Belges au bonheur et à la liberté sont réveillées avec véhémence. Ils comptaient sur les Puissances pour le rétablissement de leur antique splendeur: déçus dans leur espoir, ils ne compteront plus que sur eux-mêmes pour le créer et le réaliser; et si le succès ne répond pas à leurs efforts, ils se familiariseront avec l'idée de voir dans les François des vengeurs, s'il ne leur est pas permis d'y voir les restaurateurs de leur liberté; et le désir de vengeance les jettera dans les bras de cette même France contre laquelle une politique sage et un gouvernement équitable pourroient leur faire servir de barrières insurmontables. La probabilité d'un rapprochement des Belges envers la France n'est malheureusement pas fondée sur des faits généraux, ou sur les résultats éventuels des passions des hommes. L'expérience des tems passés est sa base. Nous avons vu, et l'Europe entière a vu avec nous une partie de la jeunesse Belge chercher, dans les années 1791 et 1792, un asile en France contre les vexations du gouvernement Autrichien; et quoique la partie de la nation émigrée à cette époque fût d'accord avec toute la Belgique, pour exécrer les principes de la Révolution Françoise, elle n'en combattit pas moins, et n'en fut pas moins le premier instrument de la victoire remportée par Dumouriez sur les Autrichiens à Gemappe.

Indépendamment des sujets de mécontentement qui éloig-

nent nos Provinces du gouvernement Hollandois, il existe encore d'autres causes de troubles dans notre intérieur. La cession des quatre arrondissemens du Hainaut, qui nous prive d'une partie de nos houillères, de nos marbrières, de nos meilleures mines de fer, et presque tout notre bois de charpente, a mis les habitans du Hainaut au désespoir; et le séjour des Prussiens sur la rive droite de la Meuse nous a séparé de nos fabriques de draps, de casimirs, de cloux, &c. Les mines de Luxembourg sont entre les mains de la Prusse; et cette puissance, maîtresse de la ville de Luxembourg, est aussi dangereuse pour la Hollande et pour nous que la France même. Il est parlé dans les lettres de Wyndham, publiées et adressées sous le nom de Cobbet au Lord Hawkesbury, du danger de laisser le pays d'entre Meuse et Rhin entre les mains d'une puissance qui ne fût pas intimement liée au systême politique de l'Angleterre. Sommes nous bien certain de cette liaison intime entre la Prusse et votre glorieuse patrie? pouvons nous croire avec prudence que l'astuce Prussienne épouse avec ferveur la loyauté Angloise? Je le voudrois pour le bien du monde moral et politique; mais je n'ose pas l'espérer.

Mr. Stratford Canning to Lord Castlereagh.

Zuric, September 18, 1814.

My Lord—Since I had the honour of writing to your lordship yesterday, some circumstances have come to my knowledge, which a delay in the departure of M. Reinhard and his colleagues, who intend to set out to-morrow morning, affords me an opportunity of communicating.

The affairs of Tessin have assumed a more serious and unpleasing aspect. No official accounts have yet been received, but it appears from private letters that, in consequence of some imprudent severity on the part of the officer sent thither by the Diet, the people again assembled in a state of insurrection, released the persons in confinement, and obliged the Govern-

ment lately reinstated to decamp. The commander of the confederate troops had not force enough, it seems, to resist, and was therefore obliged to enter into a sort of capitulation with the insurgents. A considerable reinforcement must have joined him since; and the Diet has sent one of its members, with authority, to the spot.

Among the troops called out, in the first instance, was a company belonging to St. Gall, which, on being required to take the customary oath of obedience, expressed some desire to be previously informed of the service in question, as a preliminary to its compliance. I am told that it was thought expedient to let this company proceed on its march, without insisting further upon the oath.

The canton of Schwitz and Lower Unterwalden have again declined to join the confederacy, as established by the new Constitution, and have sworn to the renewal of the ancient alliance formed in 1315. This they did in presence of the deputies sent by the Diet to persuade them into a more prudent line of conduct; and it is understood that they are endeavouring to inveigle the rest of the little cantons, notwithstanding their acceptance of the Constitution, into this extraordinary scheme. Under these circumstances, the Diet seems disposed to abandon, at least for the present, its intention of adjournment.

M. Reinhard will be able to give your lordship any information that you may desire, respecting the causes of what I have mentioned above. It cannot be necessary for me to point out to your lordship how much these additional indications of unquietness increase the expediency of settling the affairs of this country in a decisive manner. The completion of the Federal Constitution, and the mission to Vienna, naturally tend to diminish the influence of myself and my colleagues, and to render our interference more difficult.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

STRATFORD CANNING.

Mr. George Jackson to Mr. Edward Cooke.

Berlin, September 22, 1814.

Sir—I have the honour of forwarding to you herewith a letter which Count Einsiedel, the Saxon Minister, has sent me, by order of his Master, for his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, together with the correspondence that has passed between us on the subject. If I give it an importance it does not merit, I trust you will excuse me; but, ignorant of the state of our present relations with that Sovereign, I was anxious in no case to commit his Majesty's Government; the more so, as it should seem the Count has purposely delayed this communication, which, addressed not to the Sovereign but to his Minister, was made to the other members of the diplomatic body some time back, till the moment when Lord Castlereagh's absence from England might favour perhaps its immediate transmission.

I had written thus far, when I was informed that General Wrede has written word here, that Lord Castlereagh had expressed himself to him strongly in favour of Saxony; and that, in consequence, the Saxon Minister reckons much on the intervention of Great Britain.

I have the honour to be &c.,

GEORGE JACKSON.

[Enclosures.]

Count Einsiedel to Mr. Jackson.

Friedrichsfelde, le 19 Septembre, 1814.

Monsieur—Le Roi, mon Maître, désirant faire parvenir par une voye sûre à Son Altesse Royale le Prince Régent de la Grande Bretagne une lettre que Sa Majesté vient de lui écrire, je prends la liberté de m'adresser à vous, Monsieur en vous priant de vouloir bien vous charger de sa transmission à sa destination par le premier courier, à quel effet je la joins ici.

Veuillez avoir la complaisance, Monsieur, de m'en accuser la

réception et agréer l'assurance de la haute considération avec laquelle j'ai l'honneur d'être, Monsieur,

Votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur,
Le Comte Detlev Einsiedel.

Mr. Jackson to Count Einsiedel.

Copie. Berlin, le 20 Septembre, 1814.

Monsieur le Comte—Je m'empresse d'accuser la réception de la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'adresser, en date d'hier. Je me serais fait un plaisir, Monsieur, de me charger de son incluse, pour S. A. R. le Prince Régent mon Maître, mais ma correspondance directe avec l'Angleterre étant suspendue pendant le séjour de Milord Castlereagh sur le Continent, je ne peux vous offrir que la voye de Vienne, où j'adresse tous mes rapports; pour sa transmission.

Le délai que pourroit causer cette entremise est plus apparent que réel, parceque il part des couriers de cette capitale à tout moment pour Londres. Si elle peut vous convenir, Monsieur, vous pouvez compter sur mon exactitude à y faire passer la lettre que vous avez bien voulu me confier, par une voye sûre et promte. En attendant votre décision, Monsieur, je vous prie d'agréer l'assurance de la haute considération, &c.,

George Jackson.

Count Einsiedel to Mr. Jackson.

Friedrichsfelde, le 21 Septembre, 1814.

Monsieur—Ce n'est que cet après-midi que j'ai reçu la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'adresser, en date d'hier, au sujet de celle du Roi mon Maître à S. A. R. le Prince Régent de la Grande Bretagne. Comme vous me marquez, Monsieur, que votre correspondence directe avec l'Angleterre est suspendue pendant le séjour de Milord Castlereagh sur le Continent, vous m'obligerez en faisant passer cette lettre à Sa Seigneurie à Vienne, et en priant ce Ministre de ma part de vouloir bien la transmettre à

S. A. R. le Prince Régent par le premier courier qui sera envoyé à Londres.

Agréez, Monsieur, l'expression de la considération distinguée avec laquelle j'ai l'honneur d'etre, &c.,

Le Comte Detlev Einsiedel.

Lord Liverpool to the Duke of Wellington.

Copy. Fife House, September 23, 1814.

My dear Duke—I have received your letter of the 13th instant, with the account of your conversation with Monsieur de Talleyrand on the subject of the Slave Trade. The result of it is very much what I expected, though I cannot avoid saying that it was very unfair in Talleyrand (knowing, as he did, all our embarrassments on this question) to say even as much as he admits himself to have said to Lord Holland upon it; and though I have no doubt that Lord Holland, in his zeal, exaggerated what passed on the occasion, yet I think it very probable that Talleyrand said more than he now avows.

Upon considering the matter thoroughly, I do think, however, that, especially after what has passed, it would be desirable to have some producible record that we had offered to France a pecuniary compensation, or an island, for the immediate abolition of the Slave Trade. Some such proposition is certainly expected by the Abolitionists. These expectations have been encouraged by the report of the disposition of the French Government to listen to it; and, unless the attempt is made in some shape in which it can be shown it has been made and rejected, I am apprehensive we shall not stand well with many of our friends.

I have the less disinclination to the offer of an island for this object, since it has been determined to retain Demerary, Essequibo, and Berbice. These settlements are most valuable to us, not only as they are occupied almost exclusively by British proprietors, but likewise as they contain the principal cotton establishments in America, for the use of our manufac-

tures. The retention of them will, however, add in some degree to the colonial jealousy which exists on the Continent of Great Britain; and I have reason to believe that the planters and merchants interested in the settlements in question did not expect that we should keep them.

Under these circumstances, I think we can afford to offer a West India colony, for the accomplishment of an object which the nation has certainly so much at heart. I would offer none but a West India colony; and I have already stated to you my reasons for preferring to offer Trinidad. I think it a question, however, whether, in the first instance, it would be necessary to state either the amount of money or the particular colony we were prepared to give up. The proposition might be confined to the principle, in the first instance; and, if that was formally rejected, we could not be called upon to go into details.

I should only wish, for the reasons already stated, that, if the offer of a colony is made, it should be described as a West India colony. It is likewise worth considering whether, under present circumstances, such a proposition would better be made at Paris or at Vienna; and I wish, upon this point, that you would communicate with Lord Castlereagh. I am strongly inclined to the opinion, that any attempt on the part of the French Government to recover the colony of St. Domingo by force or intimidation will prove abortive. I do not believe that the parties in the island will come even to any compromise with the French Government which is not founded upon the independence of the colony, and its right to trade with other countries as well as with France.

I should be sorry, on many accounts, to see the French Government embark in the undertaking of acquiring St. Domingo by force, as I am persuaded they would lose character and credit by it. If the Government and West India planters could once be brought to the conclusion that it was necessary to give up the recovery of St. Domingo as desperate, they

might perhaps be led to think that they could not do better than renounce the Slave Trade for a new colony, or even for a pecuniary compensation.

Believe me to be, &c., LIVERPOOL.

Mr. Robert Liston (Ambassador to the Porte) to Lord Castlereagh.

Constantinople, September 26, 1814.

My Lord—I begin to feel the want of positive instructions from your lordship.

On a late occasion, when, by appealing to the professions and the conduct of the Cabinet of Vienna, and to the known interests and dispositions of Great Britain, I attempted to prove to the Minister for Foreign Affairs here, the non-existence of the hostile plans with respect to this country, attributed to the Allies by the vague reports that are in circulation, and especially those which derive their source from Aly Pasha, the Reïs Effendi seemed to acquiesce in my reasoning, and to take in good part the advice I ventured to offer. But I have positive grounds for believing that some of the leading members of the Administration have since said that they were convinced of my friendly sentiments towards the country, but that they did not believe that I was acquainted with the real intentions of my own Government.

Your lordship will therefore gratify me much, by informing me in a few words, whether there is any prospect of the adoption of a new system with regard to the Ottoman empire, and how far you approve of the suggestion thrown out in my despatch No. 20, of the 4th of this month, of making the future support of Turkey by the Allied Powers depend upon the return of the Porte to a more punctual observance of her treaties, and upon her showing greater respect to the individuals who are employed in the inferior departments of the public service.

What would the most effectually restore to me the confi-

dence of these people, and what would above all be pleasing to myself, would be that I should have leave to come and spend a week or two at Vienna, and receive your directions in person. But this is perhaps asking too much; and, indeed, before your eventual leave could reach me, it may possibly be too late to undertake the journey, though I am by no means a tardy traveller.

I shall, at all events, wait with impatience for the honour of a few lines from your lordship, calculated to remove that ignorance and uncertainty, which, in spite of my best efforts, I feel to be attended with embarrassment and disadvantage.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ROBERT LISTON.

Mr. George Jackson to Mr. Edward Cooke.

Berlin, September 26, 1814.

My dear Sir—I beg to offer my best thanks for your letter of the 20th inst., received yesterday, and for the gratifying assurance it contains of the confidence Lord Castlereagh and yourself are good enough to place in my conduct and discretion. It shall be my study ever to merit it; and I can assure you that, however I may have thought it my duty—having the advantage of an English messenger—to advert to the topics which formed the subject of my private despatch, I have never suffered them to influence, in any degree, my behaviour or language, nor allowed myself to deviate in any one instance from the strictest observance of the line of duty you now point out to me.

This instruction makes me the more readily indulge the hope that my reception of the Count Einsiedel's late overture will be approved of by Lord Castlereagh; and I am the rather confirmed in its propriety from the publicity which the Saxon Ministers have affected to give to the communication of General Wrede, and from the tone which they have of late

assumed. Their Master's determination to return to Berlin has been proclaimed; and, upon some objections being made to it, General Waltersdorf replied, "Que le Roi son Maître avoit assez déféré aux désirs du Roi, et que ce seroit trop que de vouloir pousser plus loin la condescendance."

I should not omit to mention the complacency with which Count Caraman, the new French Minister, publishes the good understanding which, he says, reigns between the British and French Cabinets, and the great satisfaction which the latter derived particularly from Lord Castlereagh's last visit to Paris. M. de Caraman has not at all opened himself to me in this sense, nor, indeed, has he shown any particular *empressement* towards me in the customary civilities on his arrival; but I have had this language reported to me from more quarters than one.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

GEORGE JACKSON.

The Duke of Wellington to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, September 27, 1814.

My dear Lord—I before sent you the copy of my letter to Lord Liverpool, giving an account of my conversation with Monsieur de Talleyrand, regarding the offer to make a cession to France, in order to obtain the immediate abolition of the Slave Trade, and I now send you the copy of his answer, with some other papers on the Slave Trade just now received.

As the conversation on this subject commenced with Monsieur de Talleyrand, I conceive that you had better make the official offer, and receive from him the official refusal. I propose, however, to speak to the Ministers here upon it, and even to the King, if I can see him, in order that no time may be lost in Monsieur de Talleyrand's referring here for authority to decline the offer; as, if it is desirable to have something to produce, to show that the offer was made and refused, it will

be desirable to have it before the commencement of the session of Parliament, and there would scarcely be time, if Monsieur de Talleyrand was obliged to refer here for authority after you should have spoken to him.

This circumstance has originated, in my opinion, in the loose way that people here have of talking upon public affairs. Monsieur de Talleyrand certainly gave something like ground for a belief that they would abolish, if a concession were made to them, but I don't think he went farther than he stated himself free; and the usual exaggeration of party has brought what he said to an inclination to abolish immediately. I don't know whether turning my private letter to Lord Liverpool into a despatch would not answer the purpose expected from making the offer and refusal official; but at all events there is no harm in trying the latter, and I will do so in the manner above stated.

There is nothing new here of any description.

Ever yours most sincerely, WELLINGTON.

I have given in a second note, to beg to have an official answer to my note of the 26th of August.

The Duke of Wellington to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, September 27, 1814.

My dear Lord—Since I closed my letter to you of this morning, I have seen a person, who has seen a letter from La Bernardière to one of his friends, in which La Bernardière states his opinion, that all that can be done at Vienna is to keep the Ministers now at Congress assembled and in discussion a sufficient length of time to enable France to prepare for the war, which must be the result of the Congress.[1]

I mention this circumstance, as it may throw some light on the conversation with Blacas, reported in my despatch of the 25th.

Ever yours, my dear lord, most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

[1] Strange and mistaken foresight: Lord Castlereagh knew better.

Lord Bathurst to the Commissioners at Ghent.

Foreign Office, September 27, 1814.

My Lord and Gentlemen—I have to congratulate you on the signal success of his Majesty's forces, under the command of Vice-Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane and Major-General Ross. The particulars I have the honour to enclose to you. In making the communication of this important intelligence to the American Commissioners, you will not fail to accompany it with the strongest assurance, on the part of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, that he continues to be animated with the most anxious wish to terminate the present unfortunate contest on principles honourable to both parties, and that he has nothing so much at heart as to manifest to the whole world his anxious desire for a general pacification, for the attainment of which he is ready to make any sacrifices not inconsistent with the honour and vital interests of his Majesty's dominions.

You will assure them that this success will make no difference in the terms which his Royal Highness had instructed you to propose with regard to the Canadian frontier—as soon as the Commissioners shall have declared themselves ready to accede to the proposition which you were authorized to make respecting the Indian nations, viz., that the Indian nations should be included in the peace, and restored to all the rights, privileges, and territories, which they enjoyed in the year 1811, previous to the commencement of the war, by virtue of the Treaty of Greenville and the Treaties subsequently concluded between them and the United States.

If the American Commissioners shall have declined acceding to the proposition respecting the Indian nations, his Royal Highness can only attribute it to the American Government not having made any alteration in the instructions which were given to the Commissioners in January last, at a period when, there is too much reason to believe, there existed no serious

disposition in the American Government to renew the relations of peace and amity with this country.

In the event of your having received an unfavourable answer to the proposition respecting the Indian nations, you will take this opportunity of again submitting it for their re-consideration, and you are instructed to add, that the Prince Regent is willing to accept a Provisional Article on this subject, if their instructions are deficient in this particular.

If the American Commissioners shall state either that they are not authorized by their instructions to include the Indian nations in the treaty of peace, or to enter into any negociation with respect to the future boundaries of Canada, however equitable the proposition might be, which you are entrusted to propose, and that the spirit of their instructions will not enable them even to sign Provisional Articles on this subject, his Royal Highness is willing to consent that the negociation shall be suspended until the American Commissioners shall have time to send for further instructions, which may authorize them to proceed in the negociation with a fairer prospect of bringing it to a favourable conclusion.

I have, &c., BATHURST.

The Duke of Wellington to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, September 30, 1814.

My dear Lord—The copy of my letter to Lord Liverpool of yesterday's date, will show you how matters stand respecting the official offer of a cession for the immediate abolition of the Slave Trade. Monsieur de Jaucourt did not see the King yesterday; and I have not seen him since the hour at which he was to see him this day. I won't detain the courier, however, as I conceive it but little important what may have been his communication with his Majesty.

The conversation with Waltersdorf, reported in my despatch, is more important, particularly connected with the alarm which the Emperor's Ministers at the Hague and in London have

endeavoured to create, regarding the designs of the French in the Low Countries. I don't know whether Pozzo di Borgo was acquainted with, and mentioned to the Emperor, the jealousy felt here upon the Emperor's designs on the North of Germany; but I'll endeavour to discover.

There is nothing new here. I think we are getting a little unpopular in the town, but I don't think that circumstance is of much importance.

Ever yours, most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

[Enclosure.]

The Duke of Wellington to Lord Liverpool.

Copy. Paris, September 29, 1814.

My dear Lord—I have received your letter of the 23rd, regarding the cession to the French Government, in order to obtain an immediate abolition of the Slave Trade; and, after considering what is your object, it appears to me that I shall best fulfil it by leaving the matter to be settled between Lord Castlereagh and Monsieur de Talleyrand. I am inclined to doubt, from what passed between Monsieur de Jaucourt and me this day, whether Monsieur de Talleyrand ever mentioned to the King what I had before said to him on this subject. I think it most probable he did not. He certainly did not to Monsieur de Jaucourt. At all events, the King would not like to authorize that an official answer should be given to meet an offer from us without referring to Monsieur de Talleyrand; and, if there should be more than one reference to Vienna, your object would not be accomplished before the Parliament would meet.

As the notion of this cession originated with Monsieur de Talleyrand, in his conversation with Lord Holland, and I spoke to him alone on the subject, it appears to me that it is best that the official proposal should be made to him, and that he should give the answer.

Monsieur de Jaucourt told me that he would inform the King this day of the proposal, and would take his Majesty's orders either to accept or decline the offer, and would transmit them, by the courier of to-morrow, to Monsieur de Talleyrand. I will endeavour to see him after he will have seen the King, and will let Lord Castlereagh know what the King may determine.

Monsieur de Jaucourt, to whom I explained that the intention of your lordship had been to make a cession which should compensate to the party interested in the trade for its immediate abolition, and that it should be either a sum of money, or one of the colonies in the West Indies, observed, that the purchase or sale of any political object for a sum of money was unpopular in France, as affecting the dignity of the Government; and that those interested in the Slave Trade, and the proprietors in the old colonies, would feel that the cession of an island, to obtain the immediate abolition of the trade, would be no compensation to them, and that they would contend it would be none to the country, as the continuance of the trade would bring as much new land into cultivation and produce in the old colonies, as the State would acquire in the newly ceded colony.

The conversation then turned upon St. Domingo, and it is quite clear to me that no plan regarding that island has yet been determined upon. The letter received by Peltier had occasioned a good deal of astonishment and disappointment, and Monsieur de Jaucourt told me that the Government were inclined to believe that it was most genuine. I had luckily seen a person in the morning, who had had the letter in his hands, and who had assured me it was genuine, which I told Monsieur de Jaucourt; and he then went into a discussion to show that a plan which had been proposed of sending 20,000 men to St. Domingo, to aid one of the parties against the other, would have no effect, excepting to induce the two to join, to keep out the French. He told me that the Govern-

ment were overwhelmed with demands and schemes for the recovery of this colony; but he said that, as the individuals who proposed these schemes had everything to gain and nothing to lose in their execution, it was not astonishing that they were extravagant, and that the King received them with suspicion.

Let me know whether you don't think it would answer your purpose in some degree, if I were to put the whole that has passed on this subject in a separate despatch.

Ever yours, &c., WELLINGTON.

Lord Castlereagh to the Duke of Wellington.

Draft. Vienna, October 1, 1814.

My dear Lord—I send enclosed Hardenberg's Memoir, which, I believe, has been drawn up by General Knesebeck, with a map, for your consideration; also a paper of Lord Clancarty's, with an explanatory map: I add also an extract from a general scheme of European arrangement, suggested by Prince Hardenberg at Paris in May last, in which he brings forward another version of the Prince of Orange's interests.

These several documents will give you the adverse views of the question, that is, what the Prince of Orange desires, and what the Allies offer. I have declined giving my opinion on the principle of this proposition till I hear from you, and also from home; and a final assent cannot reasonably be expected, till I can see the bearings of this arrangement in relation to the other proposed allocations of territory on the Continent.

My letters home, which you have seen, will have explained the points most in dispute, and the mode in which the respective Powers attempt to solve these difficulties. Austria and Prussia, in proportion as they are excluded from Poland, become pressing in other directions. The complication in which the present proposition originates is principally to be traced to the difficulty of arranging the line of the Maine, and

especially the possession of Mayence, between the northern and southern States of Germany. In Hardenberg's Paris *projet*, Bavaria was indemnified for the Tyrol, Salzburg, &c., partly on the right of the Maine; Prussia being placed behind the Rhine, with a *lisière* only on the left bank, her flanks supported by Wesel and Mayence. To this arrangement Bavaria and Austria positively refuse their concurrence, as giving to Prussia the entire command of their only great river, in addition to the Rhine, the Elbe, the Oder, and the Vistula. They also object to cede to the northern interests the only great fortress towards the south of Germany, which bears, they say, as much, if not more, on their security.

This resistance has induced Prussia to endeavour to find an expedient; tempting Bavaria to place herself in the more exposed positions on the left bank of the Rhine. To make this plan succeed, some extension of territory must be found for her, and some *place d'armes* to cover and protect her frontier. To effect this, it is suggested that the King of Bavaria should reassume his ancient subjects in the Palatinate, strengthened by the territory and fortress of Luxemburg, by which concession Prussia expects to keep Bavaria to the southward of the Maine, and to arrange that Mayence shall be an imperial fortress, instead of being given to Bavaria, with regulations which shall secure the free navigation of the river to the southern States.

The general reasoning brought forward in support of this plan you will find in the Memoir No. 1—the inability of the provinces on the left bank of the Rhine, by any combination of their own means permanently to secure themselves against France—the necessity of interesting other States in their defence—and the impossibility of doing so effectually, except by giving them a substantive footing beyond the Rhine. It is further alleged that, to give a decided German character to the politics of Bavaria, now closely united with Austria, she ought to be liberally treated, and have her territorial interests

rendered incompatible with the French scheme of extending themselves to the Rhine.

If this reasoning is solid, there can be no doubt that the support of so highly military a power as Bavaria on the left flank, with Prussia in second line to Holland, and Bavaria as proposed in the present plan, presents a much more imposing front to France than Holland spread out to the Moselle, as suggested in the former plan, with Prussia behind the Rhine, and the territories between the Moselle and the Rhine *morcellés*, as mere indemnities, between the Grand Duke of Baden and other petty princes.

The arrangement, as suggested, is less liberal, in a territorial point of view, to the House of Orange than could be wished: perhaps, in this respect, some modification may be effected, but the great question for them, as well as for us, is to weigh what is the best security for peace, and for keeping the Low Countries out of the hands of France. In this view of the subject, beyond all others the most essential for Great Britain to look to, I doubt the policy of building our system of defence exclusively upon the Prince of Orange's power, enfeebled as it must be for great military exertions by the genius of his people, and by the principles of his Government.

You will weigh this in deciding on the alternatives into which the question resolves itself. We should both wish to press what was most acceptable to the Prince of Orange, but the point ought to be ruled upon larger principles, and, in examining them, I am always led to revert with considerable favour to a policy which Mr. Pitt, in the year 1806, had strongly at heart, which was to tempt Prussia to put herself forward on the left bank of the Rhine, more in military contact with France. I know there may be objections to this, as placing a Power peculiarly military, and consequently somewhat encroaching, so extensively in contact with Holland and the Low Countries. But, as this is only a secondary danger, we should not sacrifice to it our first object, which is to pro-

vide effectually against the systematic views of France to possess herself of the Low Countries and the territories on the left bank of the Rhine—a plan which, however discountenanced by the present French Government, will infallibly revive, whenever circumstances favour its execution.

Lord Castlereagh to William à Court, Esq.

Vienna, October 2, 1814.

My dear Sir—Since I closed my former letter, I have had a visit from the Duc de Campo Chiaro, who had arrived in London the day after my departure, with the view either of keeping up the appearance of an intercourse, or of preparing for some explanation of the views of our court. The Duc I had known during the campaign, and always found him to be intelligent and more forbearing than persons usually are, when conducting such relations.

I of course had nothing to tell him but that the line of the Prince Regent must be governed by the considerations of what he owed an ally, combined with what he found to be the prevailing sentiment of the Powers of Europe on this most complicated question; that my wish was, that some means could be found out for arriving at a suitable compromise which might avoid any interruption to the peace, and might obviate the possible horrors of a civil war in Naples. He insinuated that Murat would not oppose the evacuation of the territories occupied by his troops beyond the Neapolitan frontier, including the three Legations and the part of the Roman States promised him by the Austrian Treaty; but that he would contend to the last for Naples. He spoke of his having 80,000 under arms, exclusive of the Militia, and that, if driven to appeal to the Italian spirit, his means of resistance would be very formidable.

He was of course prodigal in his professions towards Great Britain. I repeated to him that I had stated in London to

Prince Cariati, if Murat had acted a decisive part, he would have imposed on Great Britain and the other Allies not engaged by treaty, to press the acceptance of indemnities upon the King of the Two Sicilies; but that all his delays and vacillations destroyed any such claim, and left the question open, as one to be decided upon a principle of general policy.

I thought it right, however, to add that, whatever should be the ulterior decision, as the relations of peace could not, by the terms of the armistice, be terminated, except upon a three months' notice, there was the less room for any irritation in the mean time. I also desired him to recollect that any hostility against Sicily, which was guaranteed by us, would at once bring down upon him a war, in which the whole strength of Great Britain would, if requisite, be brought forward. I had on this, as on former occasions, every reason to be satisfied with the propriety of the Duc de Campo Chiaro's conduct.

I should be glad you would procure correct information as to the internal state of the kingdom of Naples; the extent of force capable of being brought forward, and the presumable disposition of the nation to be replaced under the old family, if solemnly secured by the Allies against a vindictive system.

CASTLEREAGH.

The Honourable R. Gordon to Lord Castlereagh.

Brussels, October 5, 1814.

My dear Lord—The business which it has fallen to my lot to transact with the Dutch Government, since the departure of Lord Clancarty from Brussels, has been so little important, that I have not judged it necessary to send a messenger, or to trouble you before now with duplicates of the few despatches, which I have nevertheless sent regularly to England, to your lordship's address.

His Royal Highness the Prince Sovereign left this place on the 2nd instant, to return to Holland; but, as the tour which

he makes through the whole of that country, previous to his arrival at the Hague, will not be terminated before the 17th of this month, I have remained here a few days longer, waiting an answer from home to my despatch of the 30th of September, and proposing to reach the Hague upon the 10th.

In my despatch, No. 4, I have mentioned the Prince's conviction of the necessity which exists for him speedily to return to his post as Governor-General of this country. At the same time, it gives me great satisfaction to have to inform your lordship that success has generally crowned his efforts, which have been unremitted in conciliating the minds of the people, and in disposing them to consider his accession to the sovereignty as most conducive to their future happiness. In the province of Hainault, which he visited in his second tour, and which, from its proximity to France, it might have been supposed would have most wished to identify its interests with the Government of that country, his Royal Highness has been hailed with a most cordial reception; and there, as he informed me himself, the spirit is even more pronounced in his favour, than in the most distant province of Flanders.

His Royal Highness has encountered some difficulty in resisting the exorbitant demands of the clergy, and in endeavouring to counteract the influence of that body upon the mass of the people, wherever he has found it prejudicial to his interest. Before he left Brussels, he assigned a considerable sum of money out of the Government funds, to be placed at the disposition of a committee of inquiry, for the purpose of ameliorating the condition of those curates and other members of the Church, who suffer most from the effects of poverty; and there is little doubt but that such a measure will manifestly tend to increase his popularity.

The recruiting for the Belgic army does not proceed with quite that rapidity which is to be desired, in consequence probably of speculations which never cease to circulate upon the results of the Congress at Vienna, and which may have the

natural effect of retarding the decision with regard to the adopting of any new profession, of those people who indulge them. This, and every other circumstance connected with the actual state of Belgium, clearly proves the advantages which are to be derived from its fate being definitively pronounced at the earliest possible period. In the mean while, the departure of his Royal Highness for Holland has caused no change in the administration of the government here. Everything is to be referred for his sanction, and he will continue to exercise in every respect the functions which he held whilst present at the head of it.

Subsequently to the partition of the ships and stores at Antwerp, much inconvenience had arisen from the number of French troops and artisans left in the dock-yards, for the purpose of guarding and constructing the unfinished ships, &c., which had fallen to the lot of France. This, I am happy to inform your lordship, no longer exists; for the Prince of Orange, wishing to obviate an inconvenience which infected to so great a degree the spirit of the inhabitants of Antwerp, has lately purchased of the French Government the whole of the timber, and such vessels as were not fit to put to sea, (the rest having already sailed) at a very moderate price.

I shall continue, after rejoining the Prince of Orange at the Hague, to send your lordship information of such facts relating to his Royal Highness's government there, and over this country, as may come under my observation, or as it may be of importance for your lordship to be made acquainted with. In the mean time, believe me to be, &c.,

R. GORDON.

Lord Bathurst to the Commissioners at Ghent.

Foreign Office, October 5, 1814.

My Lord and Gentlemen—I have the honour to enclose to you a *projet* of an Article respecting the Indian pacification. You will consider yourselves at liberty to alter any word, or

even phrase, if, by so doing, you can make it more acceptable to the American Plenipotentiaries, provided that such modification do not alter the substance or spirit of the Article.

If the American Plenipotentiaries shall propose that there shall be inserted in the same Article, or contemporaneously in another, an amnesty to the disaffected subjects of the two contracting parties, you will answer that you are instructed to confine yourselves entirely to the question of Indian pacification; and that, until an Article providing for this important object be settled, you are not authorized to enter on any other subject.

If the American Plenipotentiaries shall propose to sign the Article *sub spe rati*, you will consent so to accept it, although the Government of the Prince Regent do not disguise from themselves that the Article becomes, in that case, a unilateral engagement. If they shall propose to suspend the negociation, either to apply for, or in expectation of, receiving further instructions, you will consent to do so. If neither of those propositions shall be made by the American Plenipotentiaries, you will make them, separately, yourselves, in order to have on record that no expedient was omitted in order to prevent the breaking off of the negociation.

If, after trying every means in your power to induce the American Plenipotentiaries to accept the Article, or to suspend the negociation for the purpose above mentioned, it shall appear that they are determined to refuse the acceptance of it, you will announce to them that the negociation is closed, and you will return home.

I am, &c., BATHURST.

Mr. Stratford Canning to Mr. Edward Cooke.

Zuric, October 7, 1814.

Dear Sir—Although the enclosed letter is addressed to Lord Castlereagh, I take the liberty of directing it to you, that you may take an opportunity to submit it to his lordship,

without breaking in upon the most important matters to which the greater part of his attention must be devoted. I have had occasion of late to trouble him so often with the affairs of this *ant-hill*, that, on this occasion, I scarcely dare to present myself before him. I only hope he will do me the justice to believe that I might have sent despatches twice as long, and twice as numerous, and twice as full of enclosures, had I not had a most dutiful consideration for his time and patience.

Believe me, dear Sir, &c.,

STRATFORD CANNING.

[Enclosure.]

Mr. Stratford Canning to Lord Castlereagh.

Zuric, October 7, 1814.

My Lord—A circumstance of a very unpleasant nature has just occurred at Berne, of which I think it necessary to give your lordship a correct account, without delay, as it is likely to be conveyed to Vienna in an exaggerated shape.

Three persons of Fribourg, having a safe-conduct from the Austrian minister, were arrested, on the 3rd instant, in the canton of Berne, and, notwithstanding an immediate and formal demand from M. de Schraut, were escorted to the limits of Fribourg, and delivered up to the Government of that canton.

This, my lord, is the principal fact; but, in order to explain it, as far as it is capable of explanation, I must go back to some anterior circumstances, before I mention the steps subsequently taken by M. de Schraut. The persons above mentioned, who are gentlemen of respectability and consideration in their canton, arrived here about three weeks ago, and presented to Count Capodistrias and myself some remarks upon their new Constitution. Before their return, they claimed from us an assurance of protection, in case their Government, as they had reason to apprehend, should take any rigorous measures against them. Count Capodistrias promised them his protection, and wrote a letter in their favour to the chief

magistrate of Fribourg. I gave them an assurance of mine also, provided it should appear that their conduct had been really confined to what they stated. And, as they were to pass through Berne on their way home, we charged them with letters for our colleague, the Austrian Minister, apprizing him of what we had done, and requesting his opinion upon the remarks which they intended to submit to him, as they had done to us.

Upon their arrival at Aarau, these gentlemen sent forward a person of confidence to request a safe-conduct from M. de Schraut, as, without such protection, they expected to be arrested on the frontier of Berne. M. de Schraut acceded to their request; upon the faith of which they advanced, but were arrested at the frontier, and, in spite of the Austrian protection, hurried up to Berne, and thence to the opposite limit of Fribourg, where they were at once handed over to their Government. Immediately on being informed of the arrest, M. de Schraut despatched an official note to the Secret Council of Berne, demanding their release. The Secret Council stated, in answer, that the persons in question were disturbers of the public peace, and, as such, had been sent forward, under an escort, at the demand of the Government of Fribourg. In reply to this, the Austrian Minister declared, also by note, that, unless they were delivered up to him by the 8th instant, he should take down the Emperor's arms from before his gate, and quit a canton with which he could no longer entertain the relations of amity.

The only answer returned to this was an expression of regret at the resolution announced by M. de Schraut, and of perseverance—grounded upon a conviction of right—in what had been done; no attempt at apology or explanation of any kind. On the 5th instant, M. de Schraut sent me word of these events by express, and informed me of his fixed determination to set out for Zuric as soon as the preparations incidental to the infirmities of an old man would permit.

Yesterday, on receiving his despatch, I sent for M. de Mulinen, the second magistrate of Berne, and deputy to the Diet. I must do him the justice to say that he seemed really sensible of the imprudence committed at Berne, and anxious to repair the mischief. At my representation, he sent an express last night to his colleagues, in the hope of producing a change of conduct on their part; and this morning I wrote myself to the avoyer Watteville, who was absent from Berne during the interchange of notes. I enclose herewith a copy of the confidential letter which I have addressed to that magistrate, and I shall really consider myself as most fortunate if these steps—though I scarcely know how to hope it—succeed in bringing the Government of Berne to its senses. Notwithstanding a conduct which may be considered as insulting to all the Allied Powers, it would grieve me to see the permanent interests of that State, so respectable in many points of view, influenced, perhaps even decided—not only to its own peculiar prejudice, but to that of the whole confederacy—by an incident of this nature.

I mentioned to your lordship, on a former occasion, that the new constitution of Fribourg is one of those which call most loudly for amendment. But the oligarchy of that canton is by no means disposed to submit its merits to inspection, and the steps hitherto taken for that purpose have led to nothing but a bare communication of the constitutional act, although the last public declaration of the abdicated Government, upon which rests the authority of the provisional one, stipulates for the establishment of a Constitution "adaptée aux vues libérales qui sont manifestées, et *pourraient l'être encore* dans les notes officielles des Ministres des Souverains Alliés."

As I have no means of forwarding this letter, but by the common post, I abstain, for the present, from touching upon any other subject, and have the honour to be, &c.,

STRATFORD CANNING.

[Enclosure.]

Mr. Stratford Canning to M. Watteville, Avoyer of Berne.

Copy. Zuric, le 6 Octobre, 1814.

Monsieur l'Avoyer—Le Ministre d'Autriche, M. le Baron de Schraut, vient de me communiquer par estafette ce qui s'est passé dans ces derniers jours entre son Excellence et le Conseil Secret de Berne à l'égard de trois individus Fribourgeois, Messrs. de Praroma, Blanc, et Chappuis, qui se rendoient auprès d'elle, munis de son sauf-conduit.

Je ne saurois vous exprimer, Monsieur, combien je suis étonné des procédés et du ton que le Conseil Secret s'est permis dans cette occasion. J'aurois cru qu'un sauf-conduit donné par le représentant d'une Puissance amie méritoit dans tous les cas quelque peu d'égard et de considération; mais quand je pense à la position actuelle de ce pays-ci, à celle des Ministres des Puissances Alliées, et aux intérêts majeurs qui en dépendent, il m'est impossible de concevoir comment on a pu se hazarder d'une pareille manière. Il ne faut pas vous le cacher, Monsieur, si je me livrois aux sentimens que les démarches du Conseil Secret sont propres à exciter, je n'aurois qu'à me ranger officiellement à côté de mon collègue, pour réclamer hautement et au nom de mon Souverain la satisfaction qui lui est due; mais j'aime à chercher la cause d'une conduite aussi peu conséquente dans l'absence momentanée de votre Excellence et à espérer que cette rémontrance confidentielle et mediatif de ma part suffira pour prévenir la nécessité d'un devoir plus pénible.

Mettant même de côté la question de droit, j'invite votre Excellence à peser sérieusement toutes les considérations que présente ce cas extraordinaire. Il y a vraiment de quoi frapper l'esprit le plus insouciant. Les Puissances Alliées n'ont elles rien fait pour mériter le respect et la reconnoissance? n'a-t-on rien à attendre de leur bienviellance; rien à craindre de leur dignité offensée? Faut-on supposer que leurs Ministres travaillent à compromettre la tranquillité publique; fruit de leurs

travaux, et l'objet unique de leurs soins? Est-ce que le canton, dont votre Excellence est le premier magistrat, n'a rien de commun avec ses confédérés; ou plutôt n'est il pas vrai que Berne seul a plus de motifs pour se conduire avec calme et ménagement que toutes les autres parties de la Suisse ensemble?

Je me flatte, Monsieur, qu'il ne sera pas nécessaire de m'ouvrir plus sur ce chapitre, et que vous reconnoîtrez dans ce que je viens de vous écrire, les sentimens d'un homme qui aime la paix, et qui porte à votre État une véritable affection.

Je dois avertir votre Excellence que M. le Baron de Krudener partage entièrement mes opinions sur cette affaire, et que nous ne la porterons pas à la connoissance formelle de nos souverains respectifs avant que vous n'ayez le temps de répondre à cette communication amicale.

Je prie votre Excellence, &c.,

STRATFORD CANNING.

Mr. à Court to Lord Castlereagh.

Palermo, October 8, 1814.

My dear Lord—I trust your lordship will approve of what I have done, with respect to Mr. Fagan. If we are to acknowledge Murat, the absence of this gentleman from Naples will be of no consequence whatever; but if, on the contrary, it be intended to dispossess the usurper, it was a step of absolute necessity; for his unguarded conduct might eventually have involved us in very considerable embarrassment. His representation at Court, where no consul has any right to appear, and his official note to the Duke of Gallo, "expressing his desire to consolidate the *good understanding* existing between the British Government and that of his Neapolitan Majesty," were rather alarming specimens of what other follies he might commit.

The commercial interests of the country will in no way

suffer from Mr. Fagan's departure from Naples, as Mr. Irving, the Vice-Consul, is fully equal to the charge.

Mr. Fagan having informed me that he was desired to go to Naples by Lord William Bentinck, I did not deem it right *to order* his return to Palermo. A passage was offered him in a frigate, which he thought proper to accept.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

WILLIAM À COURT.

Christian Müller to Lord Castlereagh.

Translation. Vienna, October 8, 1814.

May it please your Excellency—The Undersigned, after professing his profound respect towards your Excellency, begs leave to call to your remembrance a period which he will ever consider as the happiest of his life, since, through the powerful recommendations of Prince Stahremberg, the Austrian Ambassador, and through the influence of my Lord Bathurst, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, he was enabled to be useful to his countrymen in the Tyrol and in Vorarlberg.

Towards the close of 1809, the Undersigned, after the unfortunate issue of the war against France, was sent by the Emperor of Austria, then at Totis, in Hungary, in the capacity of deputy from the Tyrol and Vorarlberg, to London, charged with despatches both from the Austrian Minister and the English Ambassador. The confidence reposed in him by his gracious monarch and by his countrymen was probably the cause of his being selected for that mission.

Having, not without danger, made his way through the very heart of the enemy's army, he at length succeeded in reaching the English coast. In pursuance of his instructions, he had to apply to the generosity of the renowned British nation in behalf of his devastated country, some of whose inhabitants had been compelled to emigrate. By his zealous and indefatigable efforts, he succeeded in obtaining an aid of thirty thousand pounds sterling, a very ample sum, for which the

Tyroleans and Vorarlbergers were chiefly indebted to my Lord Bathurst and the other Ministers.

It will be in the recollection of Lord Bathurst, and may be known by referring to Prince Stahremberg, that this sum was not given to the Undersigned, but was remitted in bills of exchange on Steiner and Co., at Vienna, by Messrs. Baring and Co., of London.

The Undersigned intended also to have solicited a subscription; indeed, it had actually commenced, when the untoward news arrived from Vienna that the above sum had been distributed with marked partiality, and against the views of the donors, and that it was impossible to procure vouchers as to its application. Thus the subscription miscarried.

From the well-known character of your Excellency for justice, I trust that you will be pleased to refer to Count Münster and Prince Stahremberg, whether he has stated the truth. Your Excellency will permit him also to add a few particulars relative to the reception he unexpectedly met with on his return.

By assuming the name of Meyer, and by pretending to be engaged in mercantile concerns, he had escaped the vigilance of his pursuers, and had safely arrived at Vienna. To his great surprise, the police of that city ordered him to continue his feigned name, and to take no notice whatever of his official character. Thus he was obliged to look upon himself as a person proscribed, who could entertain no hopes of an amnesty on the part of Bavaria. But a circumstance far more mortifying was the importunity of his countrymen, who, incited by his co-deputy, Schönacher, expected to have found in his possession treasures, the supposed proceeds of the subscription which had been in contemplation.

On the tenth day of his residence in the metropolis, all his effects, money and papers, which he had carefully arranged, were, like those of a felon, searched, taken from him, and conveyed to the chief Custom-House, whence he could not get

them returned till three months after, and on paying a douceur of 360 florins.

After passing several months in the most painful anxiety, the Undersigned, in recompense for his faithful services during many years, received a decree, pursuant to which four hundred florins were allowed him per annum; while his companions, who had far less exerted themselves in behalf of their prince, their country, and their nation, were gratified with a yearly pension of fifteen hundred florins each.

The Undersigned made representations to, and memorialised, the Emperor, but to no purpose. Under the pretext of being obnoxious to the Bavarian and French Ambassadors, he was even directed not to approach the Court. Importuned by several of the Tyrolese chiefs to account for the money received in England, or at least to endeavour that what was called the English Committee (who, by the direction of a Mr. Horne, then residing at Prague in a private capacity, had artfully contrived to make Schönacher part with the money to them) might give an account of it, the Undersigned addressed petitions both to the Emperor and to Count Ugarte, who was at the head of the Court commission appointed to manage the affairs of the Tyroleans. However, in spite of his repeated applications, the answer which he received amounted only to this, that the papers in question were preserved in the archives, and that his Imperial Majesty, in the present situation of political affairs, was not disposed to interfere in the distribution of the moneys alluded to. These endeavours to clear himself were followed by a more cruel persecution of the English Committee at Vienna, who found no difficulty in procuring an order, by which the Undersigned was directed to quit the metropolis, and remove to the New Town, where, by particular favour, and under the rigorous observance of the police, he resided from July, 1811, while those of his countrymen who were members of the Committee, and who, of their own authority, distributed the sums of money, so generously given by the English

Government, gave out that he was the agent of England, with a view of injuring him in the opinion of the Emperor and his Majesty's Government.

Thus reduced to want, persecuted, oppressed, injured in character, and without pay, he spent two years of the greatest misery, until the auspicious moment arrived when Austria, joining the good cause, declared war against France.

The first step which he took was to address to your Excellency and Lord Aberdeen (to whom he was recommended by Count Hardenberg, late Hanoverian Envoy) a plan for the expected campaign in the Tyrol. He next applied to the Emperor for a commission equal to his former rank, either in the newly-created corps of Tyrol Yägers, or in the German Legion, but received for answer that the staff of both had already been appointed by his Imperial Majesty. A second opportunity offered, by M. de Roschmann, whom he had known in the former campaign of 1809, being despatched as Commissary to the Tyrol. This gentleman having called upon all loyal Tyrolese and Vorarlbergers at Vienna to take up arms in favour of Austria, and to march to the Tyrol, he offered his services, which M. de Roschmann accepted, the Undersigned being especially recommended to him by his Imperial Highness the Archduke John. M. de Roschmann urging him to use despatch, as he intended appointing him to a command in Vorarlberg, the Undersigned equipped himself and his aide-de-camp, for which purpose he was obliged to run into debt, without being able to pay. When he arrived in his country, the negociation with Bavaria had already commenced and terminated, after six weeks, in a treaty, by virtue of which both the Tyrol and Vorarlberg remained with Bavaria. By this means his hopes were again disappointed, and, notwithstanding the efforts of M. de Roschmann, neither the Undersigned nor his aide-de-camp have ever received any pay or compensation. On the reunion of the Tyrol with Austria, he presented a memorial respecting the ameliorations of the mili-

tary system in that province, but has never received any reply.

However, having been treated with such distinguished generosity, both in London and Windsor, by all the English Ministers, he presumes to apply to your Excellency—1. To assist him in establishing his innocence with the Emperor, and to favour him with a certificate of his having obtained the promise of a remittance to Vienna, amounting to no more than £30,000.

2. To grant him another certificate as to his conduct in London, and the way in which he discharged his trust.

3. To employ your Excellency's all-powerful intercession with his Imperial Majesty that he may be restored to his military rank and pay in the army, and be put on a footing with his late brother officers.

He will ever most gratefully remember this favour, and has the honour to be, &c.,

CHRISTIAN MULLER.

Mr. Brook Taylor to Edward Cooke, Esq.

Stuttgard, October 9, 1814.

My dear Sir—I regret very much that I am not yet enabled to send you the detailed and correct statement which has been promised me upon the several questions contained in your private letter of the 20th September. In the mean time, however, I think it right to acquaint you that the territories and population of Wurtemberg have nearly doubled since the reign of the present sovereign. In 1802, he received, in exchange for the country of Mompelgard, [Montbeillard] which was ceded to France, the imperial towns of Weil, Reutlingen, Esslingen, Rothweil, Aalen, Hall, Gmünd, Heilbronn, and the principality of Elwangen. By the Treaty of Presburg, in 1805, Wurtemberg acquired some of the Austrian possessions in Suabia, consisting principally of part of Brisgau, the county of Hohenberg, Nellenburg, Altdorf, and several small towns

...e the Danube. Since the elevation of the Elector to r... dignity, his Majesty has also acquired the principality ... Mergentheim and all other possessions belonging to the ... same order within his dominions, besides Ulm, Oettingen, ... Hohenlohe-Kirchberg. The estates of Prince Metternich ... Count Stadion have been restored to them.

The several independent nobility complain that they ... not only lost nearly all their privileges, but that the ... which are raised in the most arbitrary and vexatious ... are so enormous that their estates are reduced to about a ... of their former value.

In the grand-duchy of Baden the complaints of all cl... are even louder than in Wurtemberg; the Government of ... country being extremely weak, and all the oppressive ... which are adopted from hence become more so from ... allowed to be exercised without any order or principle ... ever.

I will not detain this messenger any longer, but beg ... have it in my power to send you the pages above ... honoured by the royal and new consul with great regard ... dear Sir, &c.

BARON TAYLO...

The Queen of Wurtemberg has sent me a letter fo... King, which I beg to enclose to your care. Count Mandel... who has the portefeuille of the Foreign Department in th... absence of Baron Linden, mentioned to me this morning tha... King of Wurtemberg was very well pleased at his mee... with the state of his own affairs at the Congress.

The Duke of Wellington to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, October 8, 18...

My dear Lord,—I went to Monsieur de Rayneval yeste... morning, respecting the Hamburg claims, which he gave ... me to bring before the King, and the conversation then to...

upon the Congress at Vienna, from whence he told me had received letters. He said that he found the Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia were closely united, and determined to carry all their objects both in Poland and Saxony; and he manifested more warmth upon the latter point than I have yet seen him betray upon any subject. After discussing it with him for some time, and pointing out how the disposal of Saxony was necessarily influenced by the Emperor's arrangements in Poland, and that as Saxony had, for the last thirty years, been in the Russian system, the arrangement for that kingdom was not so very contrary to good policy as he supposed, he exclaimed that he was certain the King would never sign the treaty giving Saxony to the King of Prussia; and he went into a long reasoning to show that that was the only point by which either Great Britain or France could exercise any influence in the North of Europe.

He seemed to imagine that we had engagements with Austria which ought to induce us to oppose both the arrangements in Poland and the disposal of Saxony; and upon the whole of his conversation I was induced to be of opinion that this Court would not be indisposed to go to war for Saxony, if it were certain either that we would take part with them, or would not take part against them.

I suggested to him the dangers of war to the Bourbon family; but he replied that, if we were not against them, there was no danger; and that, in some cases, to remain at peace was more dangerous even than the most unsuccessful war.

I have thought it proper to give you this intelligence. It is quite certain that the internal state of France must give the King most uneasiness; but this very state may drive him to war, if he has a prospect of carrying it on successfully, and that the war will not be protracted to any great length of time.

Ever, my dear lord, yours sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

on the Danube. Since the elevation of the Elector to royal dignity, his Majesty has also acquired the principality of Mergentheim and all other possessions belonging to the Teutonic order within his dominions, besides Ulm, Octtingen, and Hohenlohe-Kichberg. The estates of Prince Metternich and Count Stadion have been restored to them.

The ancient independent nobility complain that they have not only lost nearly all their privileges, but that the taxes, which are raised in the most arbitrary and vexatious manner, are so numerous, that their estates are reduced to about a third of their former value.

In the grand-duchy of Baden, the complaints of all classes are even louder than in Wurtemberg, the Government of that country being extremely weak, and all the oppressive measures which are adopted from hence become more so from being allowed to be executed without any order or principle whatever.

I will not detain this messenger any longer, but hope to have it in my power to send you the paper above mentioned by the next, and now remain, with great regard, my dear Sir, &c.,

BROOK TAYLOR.

The Queen of W[urtemberg] has sent me a letter for the King, which I beg to enclose to your care. Count Mandelsloh, who has the portefeuille of the Foreign Department, in the absence of Baron Linden, mentioned to me this morning that the King of Wurtemberg was very well pleased at this moment with the state of his own affairs at the Congress.

The Duke of Wellington to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, October 9, 1814.

My dear Lord—I went to Monsieur de Blacas yesterday morning, respecting the Hamburg claims, which he promised me to bring before the King, and the conversation then turned

upon the Congress at Vienna, from whence he told me had received letters. He said that he found the Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia were closely united, and determined to carry all their objects both in Poland and Saxony; and he manifested more warmth upon the latter point than I have yet seen him betray upon any subject. After discussing it with him for some time, and pointing out how the disposal of Saxony was necessarily influenced by the Emperor's arrangements in Poland, and that as Saxony had, for the last thirty years, been in the Russian system, the arrangement for that kingdom was not so very contrary to good policy as he supposed, he exclaimed that he was certain the King would never sign the treaty giving Saxony to the King of Prussia; and he went into a long reasoning to show that that was the only point by which either Great Britain or France could exercise any influence in the North of Europe.

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Ever, my dear lord, yours sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Castlereagh to the Duke of Wellington.

Copy. Vienna, October 9, 1814.

My dear Lord—Many thanks for your military memoir, which gives all the sense and substance of the question.

I can add nothing to the observations you will find in my despatches, sent open. You will see we are at sea, and have only to pray for favourable winds and currents.

I have presented the Slave Trade Note to Talleyrand, but he does not yet appear to have heard from Paris.

Labrador is a true Spaniard. He burlesques Talleyrand's incongruities.

Yours, my dear lord, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Stratford Canning, Esq.

Copy. Vienna, October 9, 1814.

My dear Sir—I am sorry I cannot send you more precise suggestions, in return to your last communications; but, in proportion as Swiss affairs are entangled, I am unwilling to attempt their solution, except in concert with the other Ministers; and as yet the complications of Europe have left us no time for a meeting on the affairs of Switzerland. I shall not, however, I can assure you, lose sight of this object; and you may rely on my pressing the consideration of your embarrassments upon their early attention.

Believe me, dear Sir, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

The Duke of Wellington to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, October 10, 1814.

My dear Lord—I have not been able to see Blacas since I wrote to you, on the 8th, and I have heard no more from any quarter of the warlike notions which he appeared to entertain. I must also mention that I have not been able to discover the

adoption of any measure to put the army on a better footing. The desertion is immense, and the recruiting very slow indeed. There is nothing new.

Ever yours most sincerely, WELLINGTON.

Mr. G. Rose to Mr. Cooke.

Munich, October 10, 1814.

My dear Sir—You may be quite sure that I did not do Lord Castlereagh the abominable injustice of supposing him the advocate of the plans of Russia, exorbitant and mischievous in themselves, and most unfairly brought forward. I had not then received your first letter; and having at that time no information whatever on the subject, or the certainty of obtaining it, I put the matter as I did, so as to produce that gentle degree of excitement which should obtain for me authority to contradict the report I sent you. I gave M. de Montgelas, at the time he told it me, to understand that I wholly disbelieved it. I give you the best answer I can, in No. 76, which, with this, is forwarded to you by Mr. Hope (son of the late Williams Hope) Secretary to Baron Admiral Kinckel, Dutch Envoy here, who goes to Vienna.

There are details in various former despatches of mine as to the army and revenue. If the present on the revenue are unsatisfactory, I have at best this to say, that there is no foreign Minister here who has better to furnish. I have taken all the pains I could to get at the truth, without making too avowed and ostensible a hunt.

I am, my dear Sir, most faithfully yours,

G. H. ROSE.

Is the King of Prussia's natural fairness, and is his moderation, strong enough to break the spell the Emperor of Russia seems to have laid upon his mind?

G. H. R.

Sir Henry Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.

Madrid, October 11, 1814.

My dear Lord—The conferences continue between the Duke of San Carlos and M. de Tatischeff, and the latter sends his Secretary of Legation to-night to Paris with his despatches. As these conferences probably relate to some union of interests at the Congress, I have endeavoured to ascertain the Duke of San Carlos's sentiments as to the future destination of Poland. Upon my questioning him upon this subject, he said, that, in his opinion, Poland should be re-established as an independent kingdom, under the Archduke Constantine. This, however, is not the opinion of M. de Tatischeff, for he lately told me that, so far from its being the desire of the Emperor's advisers that the Archduke Constantine, or even the Emperor himself, shall take the title of King of Poland, it was their wish, as well as that of the Russians in general, that that country should be annexed to the empire, as a province. I am unable to say how far M. de Tatischeff may have prevailed upon the Duke of San Carlos to enter into these views, or whether or not these repeated conferences have arisen from an overture made to the Spanish Government by the Emperor, through M. Labrador, from whom a courier arrived a few days ago, who was despatched on the following night to Vienna, with the utmost secrecy. After he had been despatched, the Duke of San Carlos mentioned his arrival to me, and said that your lordship had had some conversation with M. Labrador relative to the Slave Trade, but that all that he could instruct M. Labrador to say in reply was, that the King had every desire to meet the wishes of the British Government, but that the question of the abolition was one which presented the most serious difficulties.

Another object, which I understand the Duke of San Carlos has much at heart, is to effect a marriage between the King and one of the sisters of the Emperor of Russia; but in this

he will meet with great opposition from those who are supposed to have most influence with the King, and who are desirous that he should connect himself, by marriage, with the Court of Portugal. After your lordship's departure from London, not knowing exactly where to address you, I wrote to Lord Liverpool, for the purpose of ascertaining the sentiments of his Majesty's Government as to the connexion which it would be most desirable for the King to form, but I have not as yet received an answer to that letter.

The Portuguese Minister is still confined by illness, but I yesterday saw the Secretary of Legation, who assured me that there was not the least probability of the question relative to the restoration of Olivença being brought to a satisfactory conclusion here. He likewise told me that there was no foundation for the report that the Prince Regent of Portugal meant to assist the Government of Spain with a body of troops, to act against the insurgents of Buenos Ayres. I have of late observed a degree of indifference in the Portuguese Mission, on the subject of the restoration of Olivença, which I can only account for by supposing that they have a more important object in view, viz., the marriage of the King with one of the Princesses of Portugal, and that they are unwilling at present to press the Spanish Government upon a subject which may be disagreeable to them.

I wish I could inform your lordship that there was likely to be any improvement in the administration of affairs here. A circumstance which has excited universal disgust, has been the arrest of Major-General Alava, for a circumstance which occurred in his province during the absence of the King, but for which not the slightest blame can attach to him. General Alava is merely confined to his house, and there is not a person of any consideration at Madrid who does not visit him daily. No doubt that his arrest (which is strongly disapproved by all the King's Ministers) has been occasioned by the intrigues of his enemies here. But the effect of it has

been to show the general esteem in which this deserving officer is held.

Mina is still in the valley of the Ronçal, accompanied by a few troops, but the Duke of San Carlos thinks that he will be taken.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

H. WELLESLEY.

The Duke of Wellington to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, October 17, 1814.

My dear Lord—I have nothing particular to communicate to you from hence. There is certainly a good deal of uneasiness in the public mind at Paris; but I cannot discover any ground for it, excepting the numbers of ruined and discontented persons there are in the town, who are certainly not discouraged from the execution of any scheme of mischief they may have in contemplation, by the advice and example of their superiors. Even the marshals and those in favour with the King do not scruple to express their dislike of the present system, and the shame they feel at finding themselves in the situation in which they are.

Blacas is inclined to make light of the danger, which, I conceive, consists, for the present, only in the chances of a sudden movement by a part of this body of discontented officers and *employés*, and its consequences. Hereafter, the King will have some difficulties with his Legislature; but, by that time, he will have gained the army, it may be hoped.

I have heard no more from Blacas about Saxony. Jaucourt does not appear to entertain at all the same sentiments.

Lord Harrowby is here, and has got your papers upon the Netherlands, and I cannot reply to them by this messenger. I agree so far in principle with you, that I think it would be desirable that, if possible, all the territories on the left of the Rhine should belong to one Power only, besides the Sovereign of the Netherlands, and that that Power should be Prussia.

If all this territory cannot be given to Prussia, it is better that a part should be given to Bavaria, than that it should be parcelled out among several Powers. It must be observed, however, of Bavaria, that that Power has generally been in the opposite system to ours; and that any distant territory, in the hands of so weak a Power as Bavaria must still continue to be, is seldom well defended. There will arise the question of Luxemburg. It is essential to the defence of the Netherlands to keep that fortress out of the hands of the French: at the same time, I see the military inconvenience of extending so far the system of the Sovereign of the Netherlands. I should rely upon Prussia keeping that fortress, but not upon Bavaria.

There is another view, in which the disposal of Luxemburg is important, and that is the standing connexion between that duchy and the provinces on the left of the Meuse. The inconvenience of the separation of a few cantons ceded to France has been felt and complained of by the Netherlanders; and I fear they will feel more severely the separation of the provinces on the right of the Meuse, with which they have been so long connected, and in which so many of them must have properties. This point deserves consideration. Upon the whole, what I should prefer for the Netherlands would be, that Prussia should have the territory on the left of the Rhine, to a line drawn from Huy to that river; and that the Prince of Orange should, from that line, have both banks of the Meuse to the left bank of the Rhine. If this arrangement could be made, Luxemburg would be more secure in the hands of the Sovereign of the Netherlands than in those of the King of Bavaria, and should be given to the former.

This is what occurs to me, upon reading your Papers over once; but I'll write to you again more in detail, when I shall get them from Lord Harrowby.

Ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Bathurst to the Commissioners at Ghent.

Foreign Office, October 18, 1814.

My Lord and Gentlemen—I have had the honour of receiving your despatch, No. 9, transmitting a copy of a note from the American Plenipotentiaries. The American Plenipotentiaries having, in that note, consented to accept, provisionally, the Article which you proposed, relating to the pacification of the Indian tribes or nations, and having expressed a wish that the British Plenipotentiaries should now communicate the *projet* of a treaty embracing all the points deemed material to Great Britain, the American Plenipotentiaries engaging, on their part, to deliver in a *counter-projet*, in respect to all the Articles to which they may not agree—you are instructed to state, that the three material points which remain for consideration are the following:

First, with respect to the right of naturalization and the question of impressment, and others relating to maritime laws. It seems agreed, by both parties, that the pacification of Europe renders any arrangement on these points unnecessary; and you are authorized to state that none will be required by Great Britain; but that, if it shall be insisted that these points shall be in any way named in the Treaty, they must, in that case, be definitively stated; and the British Government have already stated that they never can recede from what they have repeatedly declared to be the established law in these respects.

Secondly, the fisheries. You are to state that Great Britain admits the right of the United States to fish on the high seas without the maritime jurisdiction of the territorial possessions of Great Britain in North America; that the extent of the maritime jurisdiction of the two contracting parties must be reciprocal; that Great Britain is ready to enter into an arrangement on that point; and that, until any arrangement shall be made to the contrary, the usual maritime jurisdiction

of one league shall be common to both the contracting parties. But they cannot agree to renew the privilege, granted in the Treaty of 1783, of allowing the Americans to land and dry their fish on the unsettled shores belonging to his Britannic Majesty, such privilege having been annulled by the war, and it being the undoubted right of the British Government to refuse to renew it.

The third point is the future boundaries of the two contracting parties. The boundaries to the north-west may be considered as already settled, by the admission of the American Plenipotentiaries that the British Government is willing to treat on the basis of *uti possidetis*, subject to the modifications for mutual accommodation. Considering the relative situation of the two countries, the moderation evinced by his Majesty's Government in admitting this principle, in the present state of the contest, must be manifest; and you will not fail to impress this strongly on the minds of the American Plenipotentiaries. In their note of the [blank], they, in fact, admit that this is a fair principle of negociation. I cannot expect any serious objection to it. On their admitting this to be the basis on which they are ready to negociate, but not before they have admitted it, you will proceed to state the mutual accommodations which may be entered into in conformity with this basis.

The British occupy Fort Michilimakinac, Fort Niagara, and all the country to the east of the river Penobscot. On the other hand, the forces of the United States occupy Fort Erie and Fort Amherstberg. On the Government of the United States consenting to restore these two forts, Great Britain is ready to restore the forts of Custine and Mahias, retaining Fort Niagara and Fort Michilimakinac, leaving the boundary, on the side of the Province of Main, running thus: From the river St. Croix, including Moose Island, which was always a part of New Brunswick, along the line established by the Commissioners in 1798, running astronomically north, until it is

intersected by the river Ristook, up to its source; and then along the high ridge of mountains, and running a westerly course, until they abut upon the heights which formed the present boundary.

In the note which you will present to the American Plenipotentiaries, you will not recur to former topics, the discussions of which, in the preceding note, have given rise to so much occasional irritation. It may, however, be necessary to remark the satisfaction you have in not deeming a renewal of these discussions any longer necessary.

In delivering your note, you will also state that you have not reduced the propositions into the shape of Articles, as that may be easily done when the substance is agreed upon.

I have, &c., BATHURST.

Lord Castlereagh to the Duke of Wellington.

Draft. Vienna, October 20, 1814.

My dear Lord—There are two points in your grace's letter upon which I wish to remark; though I doubt not you will receive satisfactory instructions upon this from London.

The first regards the claim set forward by the French Government, that debts incurred and outstanding for the third share of the vessels and stores which fall to Holland, are to be defrayed by Holland. Such a construction of the Treaty of Paris would suppose that it had been stipulated, not that Holland should have a share of the ships and stores, but that she should be allowed to purchase a third. If such an idea had been in contemplation at the time the Treaty with France was made, the Treaty would have been worded accordingly, and arrangements made with respect to the debts supposed to be incurred or outstanding at the time. No such words were introduced, and it necessarily follows that no supplementary demand can be admitted, which the treaty does not warrant, and the admission of which would entirely change its substance and value.

The second point is the demand made by France for the arrears of contributions levied upon Hamburg during war, and not paid. Such a demand is contrary to the principles upon which contributions are levied and justified. The right of levying contributions arises from a state of war, and is determined by it. Directly as peace is made, all rights of belligerents cease, except as they are reserved by treaties, and the natural rights of territorial independence revive. No engagements made by a conqueror in war, for the purposes of war, are binding on the return of peace, unless formally revived and renewed by specific articles, in a treaty of peace.

This reasoning, however apparently conclusive in general, is subject to so many difficulties and exceptions, that some writers admit that contributions imposed and not paid, are due even after a peace; and it is for this reason that special provision is usually made in treaties on the subject. Accordingly, the 18th Article of the French Treaty is express on the point. By the former part of it, the Allies renounce all claim on account of contracts and supplies, &c., on France, from 1792; and by the latter, France renounces every claim which might be brought forward on the same principles against the Allies.

It is to be observed that Hamburg had rescued herself from the dominion of France, had joined the Allies, and become a party with them; that she fought with the Allies, and, in defence of herself, aided by the Allies, was taken by the arms of France.

Your grace will further observe, that the stipulations in favour of the Bank of Hamburg are special exceptions to the argument made by the 18th Article, and confirm the reasoning that debts incurred and unpaid, under war contributions or confiscations, cannot be regularly and unquestionably demanded after a peace, unless provisions are made for that purpose respecting them in a treaty of peace.

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Bathurst to the Commissioners at Ghent.

Foreign Office, October 20, 1814.

My Lord and Gentlemen—Adverting to that part of my despatch No. 8, in which you are instructed not to detail the modifications you are authorized to propose for mutual accommodation, on the principle of *uti possidetis*, until the American Plenipotentiaries shall have admitted that principle as the basis of the Treaty, so far as it may relate to the future boundaries of the two contending parties, it may be advantageous to the favourable issue of the negociation, not to withhold these explanations, if the American Commissioners shall make a qualified or provisional admission of that principle.

Considering the superior comparative value of the district which we propose to restore to them, in return for what they have to restore to us, and the disposition which the American Plenipotentiaries manifest to resist every proposition that is made, in the hopes of improving it, it may not be expedient to state at once the proposition which you are authorized by my despatch No. 8 to make.

Instead of taking the river St. Croix, you will take the river Passamaquoddy for the boundary, until that river strikes on the 46th latitude, which latitude must be the boundary until it strikes upon the present boundary of Lower Canada. You will add, that in consideration of the very superior comparative value of the country which we propose to restore, you will require the cession of the island of Carleton, near Lake Ontario, which island is at present in dispute.

In specifying Michilimakinac, you will take care to name the island, as well as the fort of Michilimakinac. In specifying Fort Niagara, you will require a cession of territory round it not less than five miles in any part.

I am, &c., BATHURST.

Lord Castlereagh to the Duke of Wellington.

Vienna, October 25, 1814.

My dear Lord—The events of the few last days, coupled with your letter of the 8th, have rendered me apprehensive that any decisive effort to abate the Russian demands may be defeated by the counteracting exertions of France on the Saxon point. It has occurred to me that you might keep down any rising temper at the Tuileries by throwing before M. de Blacas the possible consequences to which a hostile interference, such as he appears to countenance on the part of France, might lead.

You will perceive, from my several despatches, that the difference in principle between M. Talleyrand and me is chiefly that I wish to direct my main efforts to secure an equilibrium in Europe; to which object, as far as principle will permit, I wish to make all local points subordinate. M. Talleyrand appears to me, on the contrary, more intent upon particular points of influence than upon the general balance to be established; and his efforts upon the Neapolitan and Saxon questions are frequently made at the expense of the more important question of Poland, without essentially serving either of those interests upon which he is most intent.

I was, from the outset, aware of the extreme difficulty of making Prussia a useful ally in the present discussions, connected closely as she has been with Russia; but it appeared to me that, notwithstanding the King's *liaison* with the Emperor, it ought not to be despaired of, under the known sentiments of the Prussian Cabinet, more especially as it was difficult to found a satisfactory system of balance in Europe, unless Prussia could be induced to take a part.

Two alternatives alone presented themselves for consideration—a union of the two great German Powers, supported by Great Britain, and thus combining the minor States of Ger-

many, together with Holland, in an intermediary system between Russia and France—or a union of Austria, France, and the southern States against the northern Powers, with Russia and Prussia in close alliance.

It would have been to be wished that the arrangements upon a peace could have been effected in Europe without giving rise to any combination whatever of this nature, and that, at the end of so long a struggle, the several Powers might have enjoyed some repose, without forming calculations that always augment the risks of war; but the tone and conduct of Russia have disappointed this hope, and forced upon us fresh considerations.

In weighing the conveniences and inconveniences of the latter of these alternatives, the objections appeared to me strongly to preponderate, and especially as affecting *our* interests. Necessity might dictate such a system, but not choice. It appeared, in the first instance, difficult to cement, on account of the fundamental jealousy existing between Austria and France, especially upon the point of Italian preponderance. If adopted in order to control Russian power, and, with this view, should it be supported by Great Britain, it rendered Holland and the Low Countries dependant on France for their support, instead of having Prussia and the northern States of Germany as their natural protectors. It presented the further inconvenience, in case of war, of exposing all the recent cessions by France to re-occupation by French armies, as the seat of war might happen to present itself.

These considerations were sufficiently weighty to induce me to be of opinion that, however pure the intentions of the King of France were, and however friendly, we ought not to risk so much upon French connexion, and that it was wiser to preserve, as far as possible, the good-will of France, whilst we laboured to unite Germany for its own preservation against Russia.

I was induced to prefer this course, first, as affording the best chance, if Prussia could be brought forward, of averting

the Polish danger without a war; and, secondly, if we failed in this object, as opposing the best barrier to further encroachments on the part of Russia, whilst it afforded that natural cover to our interests on the side of Flanders, without leaving them at the mercy of a combination formed somewhat out of the natural course of political interest.

I have troubled you with this outline of the policy upon which I have been acting here, that you may use your own discretion, as occasions arise, of preparing and reconciling the mind of the French Government to a concert between the two limitrophe Powers against Russian encroachment and dictation. You will find their minds (at least Prince Talleyrand's is) very averse to Russia, and impatient of the notion of any union between Austria and Prussia; yet, while they most inconsistently object to such a union, they admit that it is the only mode in which Prussia can be kept within due bounds.

If France were a feeble and menaced Power, she might well feel jealous of such a German alliance; but, as her direct interests are out of all danger, it is unreasonable that she should impede the sole means that remain to Germany of preserving its independence, in order either to indulge a sentiment towards the King of Saxony, or to create a French party amongst the minor States. France need never dread a German league: it is in its nature inoffensive, and there is no reason to fear that the union between Austria and Prussia will be such as to endanger the liberties of other States. Until the determination of Austria and Prussia is more fully established, I have to beg your grace will make your reasoning general, and not admit that any negociation is in progress.

CASTLEREAGH.

Mr. à Court to Lord Castlereagh.

Palermo, October 26, 1814.

My dear Lord—I trust that I shall have met your lordship's wishes in the memorandum which I have drawn up. It was

no easy matter to word it so as to satisfy all parties, and yet maintain the dignity and consistency of the British character. I hope, however, from the manner in which my paper has been received, that I have not gone very wide from the mark.

My despatch No. 23 contains the most accurate account I can obtain of the state of Murat's force, and the disposition of the Neapolitan nation. The members of this Government affirm that they can with difficulty restrain the breaking out of a general insurrection in favour of King Ferdinand. I believe that this is asserting a little too much.

I fear we shall have a stormy session in the Sicilian Parliament. Your lordship may be assured that I shall constantly bear in mind the instructions I have received, and regulate my conduct accordingly. It has been a great relief to me to have been put into possession of the sentiments of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent's Government with respect to this country.

M. de Mocenigo, the Russian Minister, is conducting himself with more moderation and propriety than his early proceedings gave reason to expect.

I have the honour, &c.,

WILLIAM À COURT.

The Duke of Wellington to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, October 27, 1814.

My dear Lord—Although I wrote the despatch which accompanies this the night before last, I have delayed to transmit it till now, that I might have an opportunity of talking to Lord Harrowby, who is still here, regarding its contents, and might make farther inquiry whether the impression I received from my conversation with Blacas was correct or not. I have not since been able to see Blacas, and have not heard of the subject of our conversation from any other quarter. But I think it better to send you the despatch, with the information that I have heard no more upon the subject.

I have not written to you since the 17th, respecting the countries on the left of the Rhine, as, in fact, the substance of what I had to say to you is in that letter. The Prince of Orange will have a bad frontier if Luxemburg is in the hands of Bavaria, for the reasons therein stated: he will not have a very good one if he has Luxemburg himself, because it will be too extended, and he will, in fact, have only a *lisière* along the French frontier, and between that and the Prussian dominions. He will have a very good one if Prussia is brought forward to Luxemburg, and his frontier goes along the Meuse, to Huy or even Liege, and runs thence to the Rhine by any convenient line. This is, I believe, what he would himself prefer.

These are the only military points in the case; the others are for political consideration. First, the cession of the territories of the House of Orange in Germany, in exchange for Liege, which I always understood the Prince of Orange was to have, at all events. I don't think the Prince will agree to this exchange. In fact, if he does not get the course of the Meuse from the Powers of Europe, on the principle of the necessity of forming a great Power on the north frontier of France, without a sacrifice on his part; or, if Liege is to be kept back, as belonging to Germany, he had better not take the other provinces of the Netherlands, as he will be placed in the advanced post, to cover others, without the means of defending either them or himself; whereas, by remaining within his old frontier, he must be protected by others. I think the same reasoning might almost be applied with fairness to throwing him back from the Meuse to the left bank of the Rhine; and here, secondly, would arise the question whether, considering the interest which all the Powers of Europe have in keeping the French out of Germany, and therefore away from the Rhine, it would not suit the interest of the Powers of the South of Germany to put Prussia in possession of Mayence, with a view to induce that Power first to come for-

ward to the French frontier, and next to make such cessions to the Prince of Orange between the Meuse and the Rhine as would make him a real bulwark.

These are not the points on which you wished to have my opinion, but I throw them out for your better consideration, and merely to show you what I think would be the best military arrangement of the countries on the left bank of the Rhine.

I'll send a copy of this letter, and of mine of the 17th, to England.

Ever yours most sincerely, WELLINGTON.

Sir Henry Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.

Madrid, October [blank], 1814.

My dear Lord—I have received your lordship's private letter dated Munich, the 9th of September, and I am much gratified at finding that my official note to the Spanish Government, relative to the Slave Trade, and the steps which I had taken, in execution of your lordship's instructions upon that subject, had met with your approbation. I hope that the treaty, as it now stands, will likewise be approved by your lordship. The ratifications of it have been exchanged, and will be forwarded to England by this messenger.

I have not yet given up the question of the Slave Trade altogether, although I have no very sanguine expectation that the Spanish Government will be brought to consent to such conditions as will satisfy his Majesty's Government, and enable Spain to reap the pecuniary advantages held out to her. I am not quite easy at the frequent conferences which pass between the Duke of San Carlos and M. de Tatischeff. Your lordship is probably aware of the talent of the latter gentleman for political intrigue, and of his propensity to intermeddle in affairs in which his court has no concern; and the Duke of San Carlos is exactly the kind of person to be dazzled by his exaggerated representations of the power and resources of the

Russian empire, and of the favourable disposition of the Emperor towards Spain. His principal object is to effect a marriage between one of the Emperor's sisters and the King of Spain. This was originally proposed by M. de Bardodi, even before the King's return from France, and the subject has since been renewed by M. Labrador; and I am assured that M. de Tatischeff was sent from Paris in great haste, for the purpose of negociating the affair on the spot. I have great doubts, however, of his succeeding, although he has the Duke of San Carlos and some of the other Ministers on his side. The Emperor, it seems, has offered that his sister should accompany the King to mass, and should to all outward appearance conform herself to the ceremonies of the Catholic religion; but he has stipulated that she should be allowed a private chapel in the palace for the performance of her devotions according to the tenets of the Greek Church. If this should be insisted upon, it is not likely that the marriage will take place, and even if the Emperor should give way upon this suit, there are persons about the King who will make every effort to prevent a connexion which would be injurious to their interests, and probably unpopular throughout the country.

Upon political grounds, a connexion of this kind between Russia and Spain would certainly not be advantageous to the latter Power, and would be objectionable in many points of view; and I was glad to learn, by a letter from Lord Liverpool, that his lordship was of this opinion. I have therefore endeavoured so far as I could, without committing his Majesty's Government, to counteract M. de Tatischeff's proceedings, and I have taken care that it should be known that a connexion by marriage with Portugal or with Austria would be preferred by the British Government, as being more advantageous to the interests of Spain, and more suitable to her in every respect.

I know not whether M. de Tatischeff acts upon instructions from his court, but, if he does, it seems to be the object of the

Emperor of Russia to establish a predominant influence throughout Europe, and particularly in those courts where Great Britain, by the assistance which she afforded to them during the war, has acquired a just influence. I am led to this observation not only by the general conduct of the Russian Minister here, but by his frequent conferences with the Prince of Canosa, who arrived lately from Sicily, charged with a particular mission to the Court of Spain. The object of his mission is probably to engage the Spanish Government to support the interests of the King of Sicily at the Congress; but, whatever it may be, he is arrived with no favourable disposition towards Great Britain, and indeed he is known to have been one of the most violent opposers of the English influence, during the period of Lord William Bentinck's residence at Palermo. He has not disclosed the object of his mission to the Sicilian *Chargé des Affaires*, who was sent to Madrid by the late Government, at the recommendation of Lord William Bentinck, and is on this account treated with marked neglect by the Prince of Canosa.

I have nothing further to communicate to your lordship which is worthy your attention, excepting that General Mina is supposed still to be in the valley of Ronçal, at the head of a small force. It is likewise reported that his nephew has been taken.

The King upon his birthday promoted several officers, and conferred marks of distinction upon some of the grandees. The only Golden Fleece which has been given away, since his Majesty's return, has been conferred upon Count Fernan Nuñez. Among the officers promoted are Generals Roche, O'Lawlor, and Carrol, and Colonel Macdonnell to the rank of Brigadier.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

HENRY WELLESLEY.

Since I began this letter, a variety of circumstances have come to my knowledge, which leave no room to doubt that

M. de Tatischeff has been exceedingly lavish in his promises to the Duke of San Carlos, and I believe he has held out to him that the Emperor would not only be willing to support the claims of Spain to the Duchies of Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla, but to Tuscany likewise. But he has not stopped here; for, upon comparing the reports which have reached me from different quarters, I have scarcely a doubt that he has likewise held out to the Spanish Government that through the powerful aid of the Emperor of Russia, the kingdom of Portugal might be made over to Spain. It is scarcely credible that the Duke of San Carlos could have allowed himself to be deceived into a belief of the practicability of such a measure; and yet it appears that this extravagant idea has not only passed through his mind, but that he has discussed it with some of his colleagues.

The Duke of Wellington to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, November 1, 1814.

My dear Lord—I have just received your letter of the 25th, with your despatches No. 12, 13, and 14, to Lord Liverpool, which I forward immediately to England.

I have nothing further to tell you relating to the subject of my despatch No. 48. I have not heard any thing upon that to which it relates, since the day I sent it off; and Monsieur de Blacas has been so taken up with the discussions on the Emigrants' Estate Bill and the Civil List Bill, in addition to his ordinary attendance upon the King, since that time, that I have not been able to talk to him.

I am inclined to believe, however, from an accidental conversation I had this day with M. de Jaucourt, on the Emigrant Estate Bill, and the effect its provisions would have upon the finances, that the Ministers are not prepared, and positively object, to make any addition whatever to the expenses, of which the estimates have been presented to the Legislature.

There is a good deal to be done here, upon the ground of finance; and I will endeavour to take advantage of it.

Your lordship will have observed that all my conversations with Monsieur de Blacas have been of the most friendly and confidential description, and he, and indeed the other Ministers, talk to me now on their general affairs nearly in the same manner they would when I was Commander-in-Chief of the army in Gascony.

I have taken the steps on the questions of Poland and Saxony which you have desired. I think I have gone nearer the wind on the latter than your lordship; that is to say, that I have urged M. de Blacas much to take the chance of hereafter settling the Saxon question well, by giving up that point at first, in order to obtain the co-operation of the King of Prussia for the settlement of Poland.

You will see what my brother says of the marriage of the Archduchess Anne, in Spain. I don't hear anything of the marriage here. The Duke de Berry said, some time ago, it was to take place on his return to Paris; but that I found not to be true, and I imagine Talleyrand proposes to use that as an instrument at Vienna. In the mean time, you see that the Russians are trying what they can do elsewhere.

I had, this day, another conversation with Monsieur de Jaucourt, upon the Slave Trade among other subjects, and I pointed out to him the injury which the delay in their coming to any decision upon any point connected with that subject would do to the Prince's Government on the opening of the session of Parliament. I pointed out that probably the British Government had refrained from pressing this subject at first, from a desire to avoid to force the King to adopt a measure, upon his accession to the throne, which might be disagreeable to his people; and that the Prince's Government ought not to be exposed to difficulties by those who had benefited by their moderation.

He again promised me an early answer, which, he told me,

depended entirely on Monsieur Ferrand; but, having been so often deceived, I cannot now believe him.

I have the honour to be, my dear lord, yours very sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

The Duke of Wellington to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, November 5, 1814.

My dear Lord—General Fagel has just sent to inform me that he is going to send to Vienna a person in whom confidence can be placed, and I take the opportunity of sending you the enclosed letter from Lord Liverpool and two or three despatches, and of writing you a few lines, which you will receive before the courier will arrive, who will leave this on Monday night.

I have this instant had an interview with Monsieur de Blacas. I found him much displeased at the continued obstinacy of the Emperor of Russia respecting Poland, on which he says that he understands that his Imperial Majesty declared, before he quitted Vienna, to go into Hungary, that he considered all matters settled; that he was to be King of Poland, and the King of Prussia King of Saxony; and that he had given Monsieur de Talleyrand to understand that he would not depart from his plan on either of those countries. Monsieur de Blacas said that the result would be that the King, and most probably the Prince Regent, would withdraw their Ministers from the Congress, declaring they could not acknowledge these arrangements, and that Europe would remain in a feverish state, which, sooner or later, must end in war.

I again urged him in the strongest manner to have instructions sent to Monsieur de Talleyrand to lay aside all considerations upon small points, and to unite cordially with you in a great effort to produce the union of all the Powers in Europe against the projected aggrandizement of Russia. Monsieur de Blacas then said that he considered that these were three great objects for arrangement—Poland, Naples, and Saxony—upon which the King felt an almost equal interest, and that he did

not think your lordship was inclined to act so directly to affect the views which the Government of both countries professed to have, as he had expected, and that he wished that you should receive farther instructions on the subject from home. I told him that he was quite mistaken; that I had not the papers to show him, but could assure him that language could not be stronger than that which you had used, both verbally and in writing, to the Emperor of Russia, to dissuade him from his Polish scheme, which was the foundation of all the mischief, and that you were directing all your efforts to connect the Ministers of the other Powers of Europe in the same views and measures with you, on this point; that you considered other points as comparatively unimportant; and that, moreover, the ultimate decision of them depended more or less on the decision as to the Polish question, which went to whether there should or not be in Europe any system whatever of equilibrium.

I reminded him that I had already apprized him that Monsieur de Talleyrand was running after these small objects, instead of looking to that principal one; and he admitted that he was not himself satisfied with his conduct. He then proposed that Great Britain, France, Spain, and Holland, should agree by treaty not to recognise the Polish arrangement; and he pressed this point strongly and repeatedly, as being the best mode of drawing with us Austria and Prussia. I told him that all combinations of this description created jealousy, and that the first and immediate effect of such an arrangement would be to separate us from our old Allies.

He gave up this idea, and he went away at last, as he said, convinced that the best method to be adopted was all to unite for the object of opposing the Emperor's views in Poland, laying all minor points aside, and promising to endeavour to remove from the King's mind the impression that you were not decided in your measures on this point.

In the course of the conversation, he again adverted to the

notion of increasing their army; but it is quite obvious that this measure is not determined upon, and that I before did not understand him as he intended I should. Or is it possible that he intended to augment the army, if I had encouraged this notion?

Ever yours, my dear lord, most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

The Duke of Wellington to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, November 7, 1814.

My dear Lord—Fagel had no courier to send on Saturday, and therefore you will get my letter of the 5th only by that which will pass from London this evening.

I saw M. de Blacas again last night. He told me that he had repeated to the King what I had mentioned to him on Saturday, and that his Majesty had received it with the greatest satisfaction, and gave entire credit to the assurances which I had given him of your determination to give every opposition in your power to the views of Russia, and to endeavour to unite all the great Powers in Europe against those views. He told me that orders were to go this day to M. de Talleyrand, to direct him to co-operate with you in every way to produce an effectual opposition to the Emperor's Polish schemes, which the King concurred with us in thinking the foundation of all the evil which was likely to result from the Congress at Vienna.

They are quite convinced, not only that M. de Talleyrand has acted foolishly himself, but that he has led them into error by encouraging representations of your conduct and views. M. de Blacas desired me to apprize you that you might depend upon the King's concurrence in your views, and upon his support; and said that, if I was not satisfied with what he had said to me, I might see the King, who would give me the same assurances himself.

Both the palace and I are so much observed, that I thought it better to decline this offer, with which Blacas appeared

pleased; but he told me that he could let me see the King whenever I wished it, without its being known.

There is a report in circulation here of Murat's movements in Italy, which are the objects of the speculations of the envious and ill-intentioned with which this town abounds. I take the truth to be that Murat has made no movements, but that he has written a kind of threatening letter to an agent he has here, which has been circulated amongst the disaffected; and the intended movement had, as usual, been exaggerated with one that has actually taken place.

You may depend upon it, however, that it will be necessary for the Emperor to watch very closely the conduct of Murat, and to take great care of the tranquillity of Italy.

Ever, my dear lord, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

The Duke of Wellington to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, November 7, 1814.

My dear Lord—Lord Liverpool will have sent you the copy of the letter he wrote me on the 4th, to which I have written the answer, of which I enclose the copy. I will make you acquainted with anything further I may hear.

Ever yours, my dear lord, most sincerely

WELLINGTON.

[Enclosure.]

The Duke of Wellington to Lord Liverpool.

Paris, November 9, 1814.

My dear Lord—The messenger for England was despatched so immediately after I received your letter of the 4th, that I had not time to write to you upon many of the points which occurred to me upon it.

My safety depends upon the King's; and, although I hear every day of the discontents, and of their probable results, and I have reason to believe, from a communication I have had with the Duc d'Orleans, that Blacas is inclined to give more

credit to both than he has ever acknowledged to me, and I do not see what means the King has of resisting the brisk attack of a few hundred officers, determined to risk every thing; yet I can scarcely bring my mind to give credit to so infamous a design. It is impossible, however, to conceive the distress in which individuals of all descriptions are.

The only remedy is the revival of Buonaparte's system of war and plunder; and it is evident that that remedy cannot be adopted during the reign of the Bourbons. I am quite certain that the population of the country, and even of Paris, is favourable to the Bourbons: the discontented and dangerous classes are the reduced officers and *employés civiles*, particularly those returned from being prisoners of war; and of those the worst, particularly in hatred of the English, are those who have been prisoners in England.

I am quite clear, however, that, if you remove me from hence, it must be to employ me elsewhere. You cannot, in my opinion, at this moment decide upon sending me to America. In case of the occurrence of anything in Europe, there is nobody but myself in whom either yourselves, or the country, or your Allies, would feel any confidence: and yet, for a great length of time, he would have to operate upon a system which would be approved only because he who should carry it on would possess the public confidence.

If, therefore, you persist in thinking you ought to remove me from hence, you had better avail yourself of the pretence of the court-martial, leaving all my establishments, &c., here, and the period of my absence might easily be drawn on till the period at which you might see whether you could or not send me to America.

I have already told you and Lord Bathurst that I feel no objection to going to America, though I don't promise to myself much success there. I believe there are troops enough there for the defence of Canada for ever, and even for the accomplishment of any reasonable offensive plan that could be

formed from the Canadian frontier. I am quite sure that all the American armies of which I have ever read would not beat out of a field of battle the troops that went from Bourdeaux last summer, if common precautions and care were taken of them.

That which appears to me to be wanting in America is not a general, or general officers and troops, but a naval superiority on the lakes: till that superiority is acquired, it is impossible, according to my notion, to maintain an army in such a situation as to keep the enemy out of the whole frontier, much less to make any conquest from the enemy, which, with those superior means, might, with reasonable hopes of success, be undertaken. I may be wrong in this opinion, but I think the whole history of the war proves its truth; and I suspect that you will find that Prevost will justify his misfortunes (which, by the by, I am quite certain are not what the Americans have represented them to be) by stating that the navy were defeated; and, even if he had taken Fort Moreau, he must have retired.

The question is, whether we can obtain this naval superiority on the lakes. If we cannot, I shall do you but little good in America; and I shall go there only to prove the truth of Prevost's defence, and to sign a peace which might as well be signed now. There will always, however, remain this advantage, that the confidence which I have acquired will reconcile both the army and people in England to terms of which they would not now approve.

In regard to your present negociations, I confess that I think you have no right, from the state of the war, to demand any concession of territory from America. Considering every thing, it is my opinion that the war has been a most successful one, and highly honourable to the British arms; but, from particular circumstances, such as the want of naval superiority on the lakes, you have not been able to carry it into the enemy's territory, notwithstanding your military success and

now undoubted military superiority, and have not even cleared your own territory of the enemy on the point of attack. You cannot, on any principle of equality in negociation, claim a cession of territory, excepting in exchange for other advantages which you have in your power.

I put out of the question the possession taken by Sir John Sherbrooke, between the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy Bay. It is evidently only temporary, and till a larger force will drive away the few companies he has left there; and an officer might as well claim the sovereignty of the ground on which his picquets stand, or over which his patroles pass.

Then, if this reasoning be true, why stipulate for the *uti possidetis?* You can get no territory; indeed, the state of your military operations, however creditable, does not entitle you to demand any: and you only afford the Americans a popular and creditable ground, which I believe their Government are looking for, not to break off the negociations, but to avoid to make peace.

If you had territory, as I hope you soon will have New Orleans, I should prefer to insist upon the cession of that province as a separate article, than upon the *uti possidetis* as a principle of negociation.

I am sure that you will excuse the liberty I take in giving you my opinion on this subject, on which Government intends to employ me; but I do so only that we may thoroughly understand each other before I undertake the concern.

WELLINGTON.

The Duke of Wellington to the Earl of Liverpool.

Paris, November 7, 1814.

My dear Lord—I have received your letter of the 4th, and you will have seen, by that which I wrote Lord Bathurst on the same day, that I feel no disinclination to undertake the American concern. But, to tell you the truth, I think that, under existing circumstances, you cannot, at this moment,

allow me to quit Europe. You might do so possibly in March next, but now it appears impossible.

You already know my opinion of the danger at Paris. There are so many discontented people, and there is so little to prevent mischief, that the event may occur any night, and, if it should occur, I don't think I should be allowed to depart. I have heard so frequently, and I am inclined to believe it.

But, I must confess, I don't like to depart from Paris; and I wish the Government would leave the time and the mode at my own discretion. To go to Vienna is a bad pretence; there is no good reason for going; and it would be better to be called to England for a few days to attend the court-martial, and afterwards to be detained. It must likewise be observed that, to go at all at the present moment is, in the opinion of the King's friends, to allow him and ourselves to suffer a defeat, and we must not do that. I would likewise observe, that I flatter myself I am daily becoming of more use to Lord Castlereagh here, and am acquiring more real influence over the Government: and it would not answer all at once to deprive him of this advantage. All these considerations induce me to defer to perform a promise which I made to Lord Harrowby to write to you and Lord Castlereagh upon this subject; and I confess that, although I entertain a strong opinion that I *must* not be lost, Government ought to take care that, in withdrawing me, they do not afford ground for suspicion that they do so because they apprehend the consequences of leaving me: they must not withdraw me in a hurry, and must not sacrifice the advantages which they would derive from leaving me here a little longer.

I send Lord Castlereagh a copy of this letter with those you have written him.

Ever, my dear Lord, &c., WELLINGTON.

I shall expect to hear from you by the return of the messenger.

Sir J. C. Hippisley to Lord Castlereagh.

Ston Easton House, November 10, 1814.

My dear Lord—When the Cardinal Secretary of State left London, I requested him to be the bearer of a letter to the Pope, in which I stated, without reserve, my opinions of the misconduct of the leaders of the *Irish* Catholics, subsequent to the discussions of 1808, and the tergiversation of their prelates. I requested also the Cardinal to communicate to the Pope the opinions I had stated, in the last and preceding sessions of Parliament, respecting the restoration of the Order of Jesuits, which was known to be then in contemplation. The answer[1] of his Holiness, which I enclose, evinces at least that he has received my representations with temper, though he has not adverted to the particular subject of the Jesuits.

On receiving a copy of the Papal Bull of the 7th of August last, reviving the Order generally, in every State, and confirming the Russian General of the Order, in the plenitude of the original institute, I transmitted to your lordship, through your Office, a copy of the journal which contained the Bull, with the further intelligence that an Act was also read in the Consistory concerning the restitution of the Jesuit funds, still in existence, and also a notification that the Jesuits had assembled at Rome to the amount of two hundred, and were there put in possession of the houses they had occupied at the time of their suppression. I sent to your lordship, at the same time, a copy of "*L'Histoire Générale de la Naissance et des Progrés de la Compagnie de Jesus*," printed in 4 vols., in 1761, a publication now very scarce, but unquestionably the *most accurate* and *compendious statement* that has appeared upon that subject. Your lordship may therein trace, from the best sources, the progress of a society which, from its cradle, has been estimated to be dangerous to the civil power, till at

[1] Annexed to this letter.

length the Sovereigns of Europe, compelled by a common instinct, united in the abolition of the Order.

Notwithstanding every effort was made to induce the late Pope to revive the Order, he strenuously resisted it, and in the letters I had the honour to address to your lordship on the 20th of February last, I adverted to the notification of Pius VI. to that effect, as stated in an authorized publication at Rome. As this question has now forced itself into notoriety, and must naturally become the subject of some discussion, even at the Congress, I will beg to transmit a copy of my letter of that date, including the printed report, as they both contain references of some moment connected with these interesting proceedings.

In the ultimate settlement of the States of Germany, however great the departure may be from that system and balance which was fixed, by the Treaty of Westphalia, as a fundamental constitution of the Empire, and in which so much attention was directed to *religious distinctions*, as, in fact, dividing the States into two bodies, with contrasted interests, it should nevertheless seem scarcely possible to exclude the consideration of principles of so dominant a character in the important arrangements at which your lordship is now assisting.

The marked influence of those principles, at the present hour, upon the conduct of the Sovereigns of France and Spain, combined with the recent proceedings of the See of Rome, must, in themselves, sufficiently supply a motive to advert to those causes which were the sources of so many wars, and the great feature of so many treaties among the members of the Germanic body. It is in this persuasion that I am induced to transmit to your lordship the several papers enclosed. Your lordship will find in the Catholic Journal for September, 1814, (before transmitted) an address to the body of Jesuits, by Dr. Combes, who has the superintendence of a convent (of St. Francis de Sales) in my neighbourhood, of which a sister

of Mr. Weld, of Lulworth Castle, is the prioress. Dr. Combes ascribes the suppression of the Jesuits, in the last century, to the ascendency of Pombal, D'Aranda, Tanucci, Kaunitz, and Choiseul, in the Cabinets of their respective Sovereigns. These Ministers were unquestionably assisting at the *dénouement* of the drama, the first act and *ordonnance* of which may be contemplated in the constitution of the Order itself. The principal framers of the constitution, the Generals Layuez and Aquaviva, with all their subtility, could not infuse sufficient forbearance in their disciples to avert the catastrophe which befel them in the last century. Your lordship has only to glance over the *titles* of the chapters of the publication of 1761, to be assured of this fact, and to trace their systematic march, till they became the instruments of their temporary downfal. Your lordship will also find a very interesting pleading of M. Arnaud, in the last volume (xxii.) of the "*Causes Célèbres*," which I presume is to be met with in most collections upon the Continent. M. Arnaud gives a sort of *précis* of the history of the Order, highly interesting and instructive, nor is it necessary to look beyond the authorities which he adduces for the justification of those Governments which united in the suppression of the Order, nor for a motive in the See of Rome to manifest an equal interest in its restoration, without indeed imputing it to a less allowable motive than a natural desire to avail itself of the most powerful instruments to effect the extension of the Papal supremacy.

Your lordship will recollect that Mr. Canning, in replying to the observations made by me in Parliament, admitted that the "establishment of the Jesuits in this country, after having been abolished in every Popish country of Europe, is a fact of a very alarming nature." My apprehensions were then considered as visionary. I have now only to refer to the Papal Bull of the 7th of August for my justification, confirming the Order, not only "in the Russian empire and in the two Sicilies," but extending it "to all other States," and con-

cluding with the interdiction, "that no one be permitted to infringe, or by an audacious temerity to oppose any part of this *ordonnance*."

The advocates of the Order assume much on the countenance given to its restoration by the successive Sovereigns of Russia. Mr. Plowden's address (which I noticed in a former letter to your lordship) is again quoted by the editor of the "Orthodox (Catholic) Journal." "Russia," (Mr. Plowden exclaims) "is the chosen spot on which this *plante si rare* has been effectually preserved." If the Sovereigns of Russia have been anxious to avail themselves of the services of the Jesuits in those regions which they annexed to their empire, and wherein the Jesuits were found as the only efficient preceptors of youth, your lordship will observe that those Princes were no less anxious to designate their course by such limits as assured only a proper direction. Until we shall experience the necessity of having recourse to such a body of instructors, beyond the means afforded by our establishment, we may dispense with the example of Russia to guide us; and were we really driven to that extremity, we should, I apprehend, find the advocates for unrestricted freedom of communion and equal franchises not less ready to censure the actual restrictions of the Russian *ordonnances*, than they are forward to uphold the principle which they erroneously imagine to have actuated those Sovereigns, in opposition to the qualified measures dictated by a more cautious policy.

But these advocates have much to learn. That Catherine, and Paul, and Alexander, have successively patronised the Order of Jesuits within their empire is incontrovertible; but under what regulations? Pupils of all religions, gratuitously, are educated in the Jesuit colleges, but the course of education is subject to the control of the Ministry of Public Instruction. No lessons can be taught but what are confirmed by that Ministry. The Jesuits are interdicted all instruction in religion. Priests of the National Church are selected by the

Synod, to instruct the youth (thus consigned to the Jesuits) in the principles of the Greek religion. Deputies of the Ministry are chosen to inspect the Jesuit colleges, as well as all other establishments of public instruction, at periods, not fixed, but *unexpectedly*, that they may be apprized whether the regulations of Government be invariably enforced; and, twice a year, *public examinations* are held in the presence of the most distinguished members of the Greek Church.

It is also confidently maintained, that there is *no instance* of any of the pupils of the Jesuits *who have changed from the Greek to the Roman communion*. The See of Rome, it is well known, is not permitted to exercise any influence upon the jurisdiction of the Catholic churches in Russia. The bishops of the Roman communion are presented to the Emperor for approval by the *Ministre de Culte*, subsequent to an election of the Catholic consistory, which consistory is composed of bishops of the *united* Greek Church and of the Roman prelacy. Your lordship will recollect that there is a *subdivision* of the Greek Church, which holds communion with, or is "united," to that of Rome. The consistory, agreeably to the original *ukase* of Catherine, can hold no communication with Rome; all cases of appeal are provided for in the Metropolitan National Court, under the cognizance and control of the Government. Your lordship will have the ready means, where, I trust, this statement will find you, to correct me, if in error, but I am not speaking on light information, and I have been induced to enter into this detail, as so *alluring a gloss* has been given to the establishment of the Jesuits in the Russian empire.

Dr. Combes, in the letter to which I have referred, makes a partial quotation from Dr. Robertson's "Charles V.," but if your lordship adverts to the *context*, you will find it in strict unison with the history of the Order, which I have sent to your lordship, and with the opinions and decisions so frequently recorded by the French Parliaments, in opposition to the inferences which Dr. Combes attempts to establish. I cannot

but remark the imprudence of Dr. Combes, as he knows that great prejudices had been excited against the conventual establishment at Shepton Mallet, where he resides, and that I have had great difficulties myself to check their progress.

I will only add, that it is now for the Sovereigns of Europe to regard the *promulgation*, and consequent operation of this Pontifical Bull. We know that that part of the Treaty of Westphalia which was concluded at Osnaburg, was protested against by the *Nuncio Chigi*, and followed by a Bull of Innocent X., annulling it, as injurious to the Catholic religion and the rights of the See of Rome. We nevertheless see that the treaty was subsequently ratified by all the Sovereigns of the *Roman communion*, in common with those of the Lutheran and Reformed Churches. As it may be convenient to your lordship to refer to the Bull of Innocent X., I have enclosed it, with the treaty which it condemns. In reference to discussions of this description which may possibly occur in the course of the proceedings of the Congress, it occurred to me that the Appendix to the Summary of my Correspondence with your lordship and other Ministers, anterior to the union with Ireland, (of which I privately printed a few copies) might offer a convenient index to the different regulations affecting the external discipline of the Catholics upon the Continent, particularly the ordinance of Joseph II. and Leopold II., in their German and Italian States. I therefore shall enclose a copy with my present address. I can scarcely imagine but that some reference must be had to those regulations which we know were fully sanctioned, at the Congress of Ems, by all the ecclesiastical electors and the Archbishop of Salzburg; and I need not observe to your lordship, that the maintenance of public liberty must, in a great measure, be dependent upon the force of religious obligation. The proceedings of the Congress of Ems are very interesting, and were printed at Ratisbon.

In the report of the debate on the Address, I have just observed that Mr. Whitbread is *himself* become an alarmist

at the resurrection of the Jesuits. My apprehensions will probably therefore be no longer treated as visionary by that gentleman, as your lordship must recollect they were, when I anticipated those events of which there is no longer a question. I think I mentioned to your lordship, in a former letter, that Mr. Canning urged me again to give notice of the *same motion* which he so strongly opposed in the preceding session, as he was convinced of its utility, and his *motive* of opposition no longer existed.

I understand that two of the papers I moved for on the 6th of July, with your lordship's concurrence, and which were ordered by the House, have not been presented, which I must consider an accidental omission, as I know they were in your lordship's possession, properly verified. I mean the resolutions of the Roman Catholic Prelates of 1799, and the letter of M. Quarantotti, transmitted to your lordship by Dr. Poynter, to whom it was addressed. As those papers are material documents connected with the general question, I will revive my motion, that the order may also be revived. Two numbers of very interesting papers have already been printed, and which I now forward; as, possibly, in your lordship's communications with the Cardinal-Secretary at Vienna, they may have their use. His opinions have been much warped, but he will have difficulty to repel the force of those authorities to which your lordship may readily advert in the accompanying papers.

Dr. Milner is still at Rome, and the Pope has expressed a desire to see also his opponent, Dr. Poynter, who is on the eve of departure, and whose moderation may possibly constitute some counterpoise to the ardent temperament of this "Modern Becket," as your lordship will see Dr. Milner *now* designated in the journal he patronises.

These counter appeals to a *foreign jurisdiction* present a wretched picture of our municipal policy, as affects so large a proportion of our fellow-subjects, and I can only repeat what, your lordship must recollect I so early observed in the com-

mencement of our correspondence—and in which I am persuaded we shall not differ in opinion—that, whether the views of Parliament may be directed to *extend* the political privileges of the Catholics, or to confine them within their present limited toleration, it is scarcely possible that the laws affecting them can be permitted to remain in their present state of anomaly and inefficiency.

I have so far availed myself of the assistance of a confidential person whom I had an opportunity of serving, and who feels the obligation so far, that I can confide in his discretion. I have but little use of my arm, and none without pain.

The chance of some of the papers being of useful reference has tempted me to transmit them.

I enclose the heads of the chapters of the *Histoire Générale des Jésuites*, that your lordship may see at a glance the importance of the collection, at *such a crisis;* and, as it is not probable that your lordship should have my letter and enclosures of February 20 on hand, I send a copy, to which I have prefixed the Bull of restoration of the Jesuits.

Wishing your lordship may soon experience the successful termination of your arduous labours, I have the honour to remain, &c.,

J. C. HIPPISLEY.

Grosvenor Street, November 20.

PS. I came to town a few days since, and found Dr. Poynter leaves town for Rome next week; Mr. Branston, who was bred an English lawyer, accompanying Dr. Poynter, at the instance of Cardinal Pacca, who serves his interests at Lisbon. Mr. Macpherson has made good way.

[Enclosure.]

Pius PP. VII. to Sir J. C. Hippisley, Bart.

Copy.

Abbiamo ricevuto con piacere la di Lei lettera, ci rammentiamo benissimo della di Lei persona, e dell' obbligante foglio, che ci scrisse a Venezia. Benchè oppressi dalla moltiplicità

degli affari le rispondiamo noi stessi per esprimerle direttamente quanto siamo grati alla parte presa nelle nostre passate vicende, e dell' interesse, che mostra per la tranquillità del clero d'Inghilterra e d'Irlanda. Noi vi contribuiremo dal canto Nostro per quanto è possibile, niente piu essendoci a cuore, che l'unione, e la concordia fra l'uno e l'altro Clero. A Lei, che come Membro del Parlamento può tanto influire nei vantaggi dei Cattolici li raccomandiamo con tutto il fervor dello spirito assicurandola, che non può farci più accetta, e che non può meglio impegnare la gratitudine nostra. Intanto preghiamo il Padre de' lumi, che versi sopra di Lei li celesti suoi doni, e la ricolmi della maggiore felicità.

Datum Romæ apud S. Mariam Majorem die 19 Septembris, 1814.

Pontificatus Nostri Anno XV.

(Sign.) PIUS PP. VII.

Lord Castlereagh to William Wilberforce, Esq.

Draft. Vienna, November 11, 1814.

My dear Sir—I have received your letter to Prince Talleyrand, and have obeyed your commands in laying copies before the Sovereigns here.

In return, I beg your acceptance of a publication which I have effected here, with a short explanatory preface. The text, as you know, is a translation; the first chapters differ little from a publication of Mr. Clarkson's, which he was so obliging as to send me lately from Paris: I did not, however, wish to rest our case upon this, without adding the proofs contained in the latter chapters, which go to show that *abolition* is not ruinous; a conclusion which many will listen to, who might be deaf to a moral appeal.

I have not yet been able to enter upon this object in form here, for reasons that may probably occur to you, but I will seize the first favourable opportunity for doing so.

Believe me, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to the Right Hon. N. Vansittart.

Draft. Vienna, November 11, 1814.

My dear Vansittart—Many thanks for your very clear and interesting statement. The progress of our revenue is highly satisfactory, but we shall have occasion for all our resources, and you may rely on my desire to economise them as much as possible. The great question in my hands is the Dutch loan, which connects itself, however, with our claim to retain Demerary, Berbice, and Essequibo.

If the Emperor of Russia shall persist in refusing to acknowledge his treaties, or to treat, in pursuance of them, *à l'aimable,* I shall have no difficulty in stopping that demand, provided that I can secure the Low Countries against his arms and his intrigues; but, if his Imperial Majesty shall change his tone, and make a reasonable arrangement of frontier on the side of Poland, if he shall allow the other European arrangements to be equitably settled, including those of Holland, and alter his tariff besides, then, my dear Vansittart, I must come upon you for my pound of flesh—or, if I cannot stop his power upon the Vistula, and it breaks loose, and shall carry everything before it to the Meuse, I cannot answer for the consequences: I only beg you will believe I shall do my best to save your purse. The engagement with Holland shall be no obstacle to this, as I had rather give the Prince of Orange something more to defend and fortify the Low Countries, than assist the credit of a Calmuck Prince to overturn Europe.

Yours ever, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Thomas Clarkson, Esq.

Draft. Vienna, November 11, 1814.

Sir—I have delayed thanking you for your obliging communication, in the hope of being enabled from day to day to send you a more extended translation of the same interesting work, which you condensed, and which I have deemed it

desirable to circulate here with a short preface, the object of which you will perceive.

I should have been most entirely satisfied to rest our case upon your short analysis, had I been arguing only with persons influenced by humane and moral considerations; but, as Ministers are often hard-hearted persons when they consider themselves the guardians of public interests, I was very desirous of bringing before them the latter chapters of the same work, which go to prove, I think unanswerably, that abolition is not incompatible with the prosperity of colonies and with the interest of the planters. I shall be most happy should the truths we shall have to impress upon them produce the desired result.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Sir Henry Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.

Madrid, November 11, 1814.

My dear Lord—Since my last private letter to you, the conferences between the Duke of San Carlos and M. de Tatischeff have been less frequent, and I think that each has begun to discover that he has been deceived by the other. I hear nothing farther relative to the marriage; and the Duke (even if he is now so inclined) has certainly not influence enough to bring it about, in opposition to the wishes of the clergy. It is said that some proposals have been made to the Emperor for a Treaty of Commerce between Russia and Spain.

I have nothing farther to trouble your lordship with upon the present occasion, and have the honour to be, &c.,

H. WELLESLEY.

The Duke of Wellington to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, November 13, 1814.

My dear Lord—You will see from the letters sent to Cooke, the cause of our sending forward this messenger immediately.

I take the opportunity of his going to inform you that I saw Monsieur de Blacas last night, who told me that, since he had seen me, they had received despatches to the 21st, which contained a confirmation of everything I had told him as contained in those I had seen of the 25th, and that he had, by the King's orders, written to Monsieur de Talleyrand what had passed in conversation with me, and had given him directions for his conduct, in conformity with what he had assured me he should give him.

Monsieur de Blacas likewise told me that, on the 31st, expectations were entertained at Vienna, that the Emperor of Russia would give way.

Ever, my dear lord, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

The Duke of Wellington to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, November 19, 1814.

My dear Lord—I enclose copies of two letters which I have written to Lord Liverpool, from which you will see how the matter stands regarding my departure. I think Government are rather in a hurry; and, though I feel no particular wish to remain here, I don't like to be frightened away.

There is nothing new. Blacas told me, last night, that, according to the last accounts from Vienna, matters appeared improved. He said that he did not think you had yet reason to be quite satisfied with M. de Talleyrand; but he hoped that his recent letters would produce an improvement.

You'll see that matters look a little angry in Parliament.

Ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

[Enclosures.]

The Duke of Wellington to Lord Liverpool.

Paris, November 16, 1814.

My dear Lord—I received this morning your letter of the 13th, and will make immediate arrangements for quitting

Paris. These will take some days, and I shall not announce to the King, or of course to anybody else, my intention, till I shall be quite prepared to put it into execution. I shall be obliged to you, therefore, if you will say nothing upon the subject till you will learn farther from me.

No man is a judge in his own case. But I confess that I don't see the necessity for being in a hurry to remove me from hence,

There is nothing new of any description. They have news here from Vienna to the 7th. I have not seen M. de Blacas, but M. de Jaucourt told me yesterday that he understood that the Emperor of Russia was willing to restrict himself in Poland to the line of the Vistula, and that the King of Prussia was disposed to depart from his pretensions in Saxony.

The King and the royal family have been this night at the Comedie Française, and were remarkably well received.

WELLINGTON.

The Duke of Wellington to Lord Liverpool.

Paris, November 18, 1814.

My dear Lord—The report that I am about to quit my situation has been published in the English, and copied into the French, newspapers, and has created so much anxiety here, that I think it worth sending you another messenger. Those who know the state of affairs consider my departure as a defeat. Those who do not, and the public in general, consider it a sign that the two countries are not on such good terms as they ought to be, or as they really are. Those who do not believe the report consider it as fabricated by the disaffected.

I really do not like the way in which I am going away. To take me away eventually is quite right, as I entertain no doubt, from many circumstances which have come to my knowledge, that my presence here is disagreeable to many; and there is in Paris such a confusion of ideas regarding right

and wrong, so many enormous crimes have been committed in the last twenty years, and are either passed unnoticed, or are considered as services and virtues, that I entertain no doubt that, if I was deprived of the King's protection, I should be detained, and that this measure would be justified by some sophistry or other, and approved by the nation at large. But we must not disgrace ourselves by the manner in which we get ourselves out of the situation in which we are placed. We must not act with precipitation. There is really no evidence of danger, excepting general discontent; and you are going to get yourselves and your friends into difficulties before there is any necessity for it.

I have already told you that I have no objection to going to America, and I will go whenever I may be ordered. But, does it not occur to your lordship that, by appointing me to go to America at this moment, you give ground for belief, all over Europe, that your affairs there are in a much worse situation than they really are? and will not my nomination at this moment be a triumph to the Americans and their friends here and elsewhere? It will give satisfaction, and that only momentary, in England, and it may have the effect of raising hopes and expectations there which we know cannot be realized. Then I beg to observe that, if once appointed to go to America, your lordship will not find it so easy to take me from that employment for any other on which you might prefer to employ me.

I declare it appears to me that we are proceeding on this occasion with a precipitation which circumstances do not at all justify, and that we shall get into disgrace and difficulties, which a little patience would enable us to avoid.

Sir John Murray is now here, and he might be ordered to continue his journey to England, and, as soon as arrived, the court-martial might be ordered to assemble, and I might be ordered to attend it. My establishment, &c., might remain here. The Government and their friends would soon find that

they could go on without me, and would be under no alarm on my first departure, as they would expect my early return. But, to be called away at an hour's notice to go to America, and then not to go for four months, does betray so clearly the motive for withdrawing me, and my departure will be so much felt, that I cannot avoid to make this one more effort to persuade the Government to alter the mode of their proceeding.

I must say that I feel my own character a little concerned in this transaction, and I hope, therefore, that the Government will allow their object to be accomplished in the way with which I shall be the least dissatisfied.

WELLINGTON.

Lord Castlereagh to the Duke of Wellington.

Draft. Vienna, November 21, 1814.

My dear Lord—I send you, under a flying seal, my diplomatic budget since I last wrote. You will trace some indications of light on the horizon, but we must not too sanguinely calculate upon a change of substance, because our intercourse has assumed a more becoming exterior. However, it is something to find that we are allowed to treat, and not bound to receive the Emperor's pleasure as law.

I cannot sufficiently express to you my thanks for your most useful and seasonable co-operation. You have succeeded in rendering the French influence here much more accommodating; and, if I have not been able to bring the Prince de Talleyrand to the point of common exertion, his highness has been to me personally most obliging and conciliatory, and has ceased to thwart me as he did, possibly unintentionally, at first.

The day after I received your letter of the 7th, Prince Talleyrand called on me when I was from home. I happened to dine with him that day, and we fixed an interview for the following morning. As my hopes of Prussia had considerably abated, I could not give him much assurance of the progress I was making. I gave him a general outline of the state in

which things were, and endeavoured to draw from him his ideas upon the future conduct of the negociation. He spoke, apparently with openness, his mind, always returning to the old notion of urging Austria to finish the Polish question as well as she could, and then to turn the whole combination upon Saxony.

In judging of the correctness of Talleyrand's reports to his Government of my conduct, it is but fair to observe that I have not deemed it prudent to disclose to him my operations in detail, finding that he was not always discreet, and that I should lose useful influence in other quarters, if I was understood to be in too close confidence with the French Minister. I have endeavoured, however, to treat him with all possible regard, and to keep him generally informed of my endeavours to promote our common objects. He is become infinitely more accommodating in our general conferences than at the outset.

It sounds incredible, if it is not a proof of Talleyrand's systematic reserve, that he should treat the notion of any agitation at Paris as wholly unfounded. Happening to hear of General Dufourge's arrest from Prince Hardenberg, I inquired what the fact was, upon the authority of the Prussian report, without quoting yours. He said the Emperor of Russia had been circulating such a story at a ball the night before, but he gave it no credit; at least, he assured me that he had letters from the King, from M. de Blacas, and M. de Jaucourt, from the 4th to the 9th, inclusive, none of which mentioned the subject. His highness did not, however, succeed in quieting my apprehensions on this point, however silent I was on the subject of them to him.

I need not express to you how deeply I enter into them, and how anxious I must feel that the decision, with relation to them, may be for the best. Your devotion to the public service does you the greatest honour.

Ever yours, my dear lord, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Robert Liston, Esq., to Lord Castlereagh.

Constantinople, November 23, 1814.

My Lord—It would gratify me much to be able to make a short tour, in the course of the ensuing summer, to the islands and coasts of this eastern part of the Mediterranean; and I hope your lordship will permit me to request your obliging interference to obtain for me, of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, a short leave of absence for that purpose. I mean, of course, that the permission should not be used, should any circumstances occur that may render it necessary for me to remain at my post.

It is now near three years since I arrived at Constantinople, during which time Mrs. Liston and I have been almost constantly confined by the prevalence of the plague. Exercise and a change of scene may be regarded as essential to the preservation of our health. And, as I receive numerous complaints respecting the situation and conduct of our consular agents in several of the outports, it is not impossible that the opportunity of examining into the particulars on the spot may be attended with some degree of advantage to the public service. Your lordship is aware, too, that I have it in my power to leave here a person perfectly qualified to take the charge of his Majesty's affairs.

I have been accustomed to hear it maintained that a foreign Minister is at liberty to use his discretion in making excursions within the limits of the country where he happens to be employed, without troubling his constituents with petitions for leave of absence. But, not to mention that this rule, applied to the Turkish empire, would offer too great a latitude, I am too little informed of the intentions that may exist, with regard to this Government, to think of moving to any distance from my immediate station without your lordship's express approbation. I have the honour to be, &c.,

ROBERT LISTON.

Sir Henry Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.

Madrid, November 24, 1814.

My dear Lord—My despatches of this day's date will apprize your lordship of the Duke of San Carlos having resigned his office. It is extremely difficult to form a just opinion of the King's character, but certainly, in his conduct to the Duke of San Carlos and to M. Macanaz, he has betrayed great want of feeling. Upon his return from the arrest of the latter, instead of manifesting any concern at the disgrace of one who for many years had enjoyed a principal share of his friendship and confidence, he seemed pleased with the compliments which were lavished upon him by his attendants for the firmness which he had displayed, and exulted openly at the applause with which he was greeted by the people upon retiring from Macanaz's house. His conduct towards the Duke of San Carlos has been equally marked by want of feeling; but that which forms the worst feature in his character, is his severity towards the State prisoners. In no instance has he mitigated the punishment awarded by the judges appointed to try these prisoners, but there are several instances of his having increased it. In the case of General Alava, neither his services during the war, nor the strong representations of the Duke of Wellington by letter, nor my personal representations, nor those in proof of his innocence of the Ayuntamiento of Vittoria, where the charge against him was instituted, have produced the slightest effect upon the King. General Alava continues in confinement, and his health is beginning to suffer severely.

It is said, likewise, that the King is jealous and suspicious of his brother and his uncle, and that he has shown it in a manner which has given them great uneasiness. Since the appointment of M. de Cevallos to be Minister of State, two of his friends (M. Romanillos and M. Alonzo) have been arrested, and last night sentries were placed at the door of the house of the Marchioness of Alcanices, a grandee of Spain, and no one

is suffered to enter or to leave the house. This has occasioned considerable alarm among the higher classes of the nobility, whose persons and whose houses have hitherto been respected. An order was actually issued, directing General Castaños to repair to Badajoz; but, by a timely application to the Infant Don Carlos, he obtained an interview with the King, who consented to withdraw the order, but would not explain his motives for having issued it.

I have felt it to be my duty to mention these circumstances to your lordship in this private manner. They exhibit the King's character in no very amiable light, and it is impossible not to contemplate with anxiety the fate of a nation governed by such a system of oppression, injustice, and severity. It is said that great discontent prevails in the provinces; but, with the exception of the re-establishment of the Inquisition, which I believe to be popular in Spain, the mass of the people has not yet been affected by the measures of the Government, and the affection of the people for their sovereign, and their joy at his return from captivity and at their own delivery from the French, absorb every other sentiment.

I doubt much whether we shall gain anything by the appointment of M. de Cevallos. In the first place, it appears that he has not influence enough to save his own friends from imprisonment, and that the system which destroyed the Duke of San Carlos still prevails; and it may be doubted (even admitting that he were so disposed) whether M. de Cevallos would be enabled to convey any hint which he might consider to be advantageous to the alliance. I mentioned in my despatch my apprehension that we should be involved in unpleasant discussions with the Spanish Government relative to our intercourse with the insurgents of America. I have several times been asked, but not officially, whether the British Government would so far espouse the cause of the mother country as to lend ships for the conveyance of troops to America. I have never encouraged any such idea, but it would not surprise

me if an offer of opening the trade were made to us, upon condition of our affording this kind of assistance. It would certainly be very desirable that some plan should be adopted which should put an end to the jealousies existing here, on account of our intercourse with the insurgents.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

H. WELLESLEY.

It seems that it was a French Abbé, who lived in Madame Alcanices's house as tutor to her children, who was arrested; it is not known on what account. The guards have been taken off the house.

Lord Castlereagh to the Duke of Wellington.

Draft. Vienna, November 25, 1814.

My dear Lord—I send you my report home of such events as have passed since I last wrote. I add a copy of my correspondence with the Emperor of Russia, to remain with you, in case you should wish, through M. de Blacas, to afford to the King this proof that, whatever may be the issue, I have not failed to do my best.

I have allowed Prince Talleyrand to peruse these papers, and he may probably have spoken of them to his Government. I should be glad his Majesty, if he sees them, were informed in what manner the correspondence arose, and that it was the close, and not the commencement, of a long intercourse upon the subject to which it has reference.

I am, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

The Chevalier T.....[1] *to Lord Castlereagh.*

29 Novembre, 1814.

Mylord—Je ne fais que vous transcrire, mylord, que ce que j'ai l'honneur d'écrire à Monseigneur le Prince de Metternich, c'est-à-dire, les renseignements que j'ai recueillis dans mes

[1] Probably Tinseau.

voyages, et dans les nombreux entretiens que j'ai eu avec les individus d'une famille malheureusement trop célèbre.

Napoléon Bonaparte n'a pas abdiqué de bonne foi: il a abdiqué avec l'idée de remonter un jour sur le trône d'Italie, et le roi de Naples, Murat, doit l'aider à y rémonter. "Quand vous verrez mes affaires désespérées," disoit Napoléon à Murat, "arrangez-vous comme vous pourrez: seulement tâchez de conserver le Royaume que vous tenez de moi, car quelque jour vous pourrez m'aider à chasser les Autrichiens et me résaisir de la couronne d'Italie."

La conduite que tient actuellement le roi de Naples ne prouve que trop la réalité des paroles que je viens de transcrire, c'est-a-dire que Murat fait ses préparatifs pour aider Napoléon à troubler encore l'Italie.

Si cette Peninsule retombe dans les mains de la famille Bonaparte, le commerce Anglois va à être gêné de nouveau dans cette Peninsule, et certainement elle y tombera, si des mesures vigoureuses et l'expulsion de Murat de l'Italie ne préviennent ce malheur.

Mylord, il y a un plan concerté entre Bonaparte et Murat, j'en ai la certitude. Ce plan consiste dans les trois articles suivans:—

1. Le roi de Naples secondera les Alliés en Italie jusqu'à tant que le gros de leur armée ne soit retirée; mais en conservant pour lui de bonnes positions militaires.

2. Il fera alliance avec la puissance qui dominera en Italie, et, ou par ruse, ou par force, il tâchera dans la suite de l'expulser de ce pays, et l'Empereur s'engage de l'aider.

3. Il tâchera surtout de s'emparer des ports de l'Italie pour pouvoir donner la loi aux Anglois, et les faire accéder au nouvel ordre de choses.

Je suis, mylord, de votre Excellence le très humble et très obéissant,

Le Chevalier T.....

The Duke of Wellington to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, November 30, 1814.

My dear Lord—Your despatches and letters of the 21st arrived here in the night, and I now forward them to England, and send you on a despatch which came for you this morning. I am happy to find that prospects are improving at Vienna. I hope that we shall come to a creditable settlement at least, if not to that one which we should all wish.

I have prevailed upon Lord Liverpool to allow me to remain here till I shall be of opinion that there is a fair opportunity for my going away. I can't say positively that there is any danger. The examination of the papers taken from Lord Oxford and from a person by the name of Andal, from whom papers were likewise taken, has not disclosed any. Their object is principally to encourage Murat to resistance, and to promise him the support and assistance of *les braves* here.

At all events, it would be very discreditable to the Government and to me to be frightened away by vague reports and anonymous letters, and we might possibly with justice be accused of hastening the catastrophe from which it would be our object to withdraw me.

There is nothing new here of any description.

[Ever, my dear lord, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.]

You'll see by the enclosed Madrid Gazette that San Carlos has resigned. There is no Madrid despatch, nor have I any letter, but I understand he retains the office of Major-Domo Mayor, and it is said is to be employed on an embassy.

I'll desire my brother to make another effort to have powers sent to Labrador, to cede Olivenza, in case of getting Parma, &c.

Lord Bathurst to the Commissioners at Ghent.

Foreign Office, December 2, 1814.

My Lord and Gentlemen—The American Government having declared that some of his Majesty's naval officers have taken slaves from the American coast, and sold them as slaves in the West Indies; and having further stated that they have furnished the American Commissioners at Ghent with proofs of the guilt of these British officers, you are instructed to demand of the American Commissioners the proofs in question, in order that the persons so charged may be brought to trial, and the truth or falsehood of the accusation ascertained in the most satisfactory manner.

I am, &c., BATHURST.

Mr. Hamilton to Mr. Edward Cooke.

Foreign Office, December 5, 1814.

My dear Sir—The certificates requested by Major Müller, (whose real name is Von Zech) in his letter to Lord Castlereagh at Vienna, which was forwarded to Mr. Morier by Mr. Planta, are sent herewith. They would have been transmitted before, but for a question which had arisen by the perusal of his papers respecting the payment of a pension to him of £250 per annum, which it appeared was in contemplation at the time of his residence in England in 1810.

Upon inquiry, it is found that a pension to that amount has been in course of payment by the house of Steiner and Co., at Vienna, from the beginning of 1811, and Messrs. Baring and Brothers' account for the same has only been received this day; it amounts, including interest, to £1,096.

From the above particulars Lord Castlereagh will be enabled to judge whether the existence of such an allowance from the British Government would render the unqualified declaration in the certificate respecting money proper to be given, and

whether it would be consistent with the fact which it is wished by Major Müller to establish.

I remain, &c., W. HAMILTON.

Lord Bathurst to the Commissioners at Ghent.

Foreign Office, December 6, 1814.

My Lord and Gentlemen—It is with great satisfaction that his Royal Highness observes so great a progress has been made towards bringing the negociation to a favourable conclusion. There appear but two points on which there exists any material difference, and upon which it is necessary, therefore, to furnish you with instructions:—First, with respect to the alteration made in the first Article; secondly, the discussions which have grown out of the amended *projet* of the 8th Article.

With respect to the alteration in the 1st Article, you will insist on the retention of the words in question. You will not fail to impress upon the American Commissioners that the alteration is in no way inconsistent with the principle of *status quo ante bellum*, upon which we have agreed to treat, as there is a manifest difference between the restitution of territory which unquestionably belonged to either party, previous to the war, and the restitution of that of which either party may have had temporary possession, with a disputed right, immediately preceding the war.

As, however, inconvenience might arise from the act of restoring territory situated in many different places becoming dependent on the opinion which the party in possession might hold of his right to retain it, you will readily consent to the limit, as the Commissioners have proposed the application of the Article to such possessions only as are, by the tenour of the Treaty itself, liable to dispute; or, as a more specific limitation, to such possessions as are by the Treaty to be referred to the Commissioners by whom the questions of boundaries are to be finally decided. Provided the object for which the alter-

ation was proposed be obtained, viz., the retention of the islands in Passamaquoddy Bay, during the time of reference to the Commissioners above mentioned, you will show every facility in wording the limitations.

The discussions which have grown out of the amended *projet* of the 8th Article are of a more extensive nature. They relate to a question of boundary; to the privilege which we enjoyed, under the Treaty of 1783, to have free access to the Mississippi, as well as the free navigation thereof; and to the liberty which the United States enjoyed, under the same Treaty, of taking, drying, and curing, fish within the exclusive jurisdiction of the possessions belonging to his Majesty in North America.

You did perfectly right in at once admitting that the free access to and navigation of the Mississippi, provided in the amended *projet* of the 8th Article, was that to which we were no longer entitled, under the Treaty of 1783, and that it was to be considered, therefore, as a stipulation in our favour, given by the American Government in return for the favourable arrangement of this boundary consented to by us in the preceding part of the same Article. This must indeed be manifest, by our having proposed the two stipulations reciprocally beneficial, to form but one Article.

With respect to the proposition of considering the free access to and the free navigation of the Mississippi, as an equivalent to their liberty of taking, curing, and drying, fish on our coasts, and the memorandum of amendment which the American Commissioners delivered in at the close of the Conference, you will remark to them that, even if we were to admit that the privilege and liberty in question ought to be considered as equivalents, the manner in which they have, in that memorandum, proposed to renew respectively the privilege and liberty heretofore enjoyed under the Treaty of 1783, confounds all principles of reciprocity: for the American Commissioners propose a limited and restricted renewal of our former privileges,

in return for an unlimited and unrestricted renewal of their former liberty.

As the conditions on which the American Commissioners may be inclined to consent to a renewal of our former privilege, and the conditions on which we may be inclined to renew the liberty the United States enjoyed of taking, drying, and curing, fish on our coasts may lead into long discussions, which would retard the conclusion of the negociation, and as it is very desirable that not only the conclusion of the Treaty should not be delayed, but also that it should include in it an adjustment of all questions likely otherwise to create misunderstandings, you will propose the two Articles contained in the Enclosure A. By the first of these Articles, the boundary is defined as already proposed; by the second, the conditions on which we shall be ready to renew the liberty heretofore given to the United States of taking, drying, and curing, fish, and the conditions on which the liberty heretofore enjoyed by us of a free access to and navigation of the Mississippi shall be restored to us, are left for future negociation.

After the declaration made by the American Commissioners that they were willing to receive the liberty of taking, drying, and curing, fish on our coasts, as an equivalent to some concession on their part, it cannot be expected that they will refuse this proposition. If the American Commissioners decline these propositions, you will not consider yourselves as authorized to sign the Treaty with the omission of the amended *projet* of the 8th Article, and still less with the omission of the latter part of it.

Although the American Commissioners have, in their conferences, admitted the fact that the liberty which the United States heretofore enjoyed of taking, drying, and curing, fish, on our coasts, has ceased with the commencement of the war, by making the renewal of that liberty the subject of negociation, yet it is very desirable that any point so calculated to produce altercation (unless previously understood by the two

contracting parties) should not be left in the state in which the signing of the Treaty, with the omission of the 8th Article, would still unavoidably leave it. If, therefore, you shall not be able to bring the point to a satisfactory conclusion, either by acceding to this proposition, or by otherwise making it clear by some written document that they consider the stipulations of 1783, with respect to the liberty given them of taking, drying, and curing, fish on our coasts, as no longer in force, you will refer home for further instructions.

I am, &c., BATHURST.

Mr. E. Cooke to Lieutenant-General Campbell.

Vienna, December 9, 1814.

Sir—Reports have been circulated here, that you have adopted measures in Corfu, which tend to alienate the inhabitants from the British Government, such as erecting pillories upon the public walk of the town. I think it right privately to give you this hint, as you are sensible that nothing is so contrary to the principles of the British Government as anything like a system of terror. You will, of course, have the goodness properly to interpret the motive on which I have ventured to give you this intimation.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

E. COOKE.

PS. Perhaps you might think it right to transmit a statement, by which it can be shown that the policy of terror, said to have been assumed by you, never existed, and that the measures alleged to be offensive to the inhabitants have been misrepresented.

Lord Castlereagh to the Duke of Wellington.

Draft. Vienna, December 17, 1814.

My dear Lord—By my last letter from Lord Liverpool, I find that the Parliament has been adjourned to the 9th of February, as the latest day to which the recess can be ex-

tended; it being necessary, before the 25th of March, to renew the Bank Restriction Bill and the Property Tax; upon the latter of which measures they expect to encounter very considerable opposition.

You will perceive, from the course of the debates, that the Opposition are harassing especially upon points of foreign politics. Lord Liverpool expects that this game will be pushed with increased vigour after the holidays, if our business here should then be unterminated, in which case, it is his opinion, and that of the Government, that my return is of importance; and he suggests, for my consideration, the expediency of my being in England the middle of February, if I see no prospect of closing the whole here within that time.

In order that I may have it in my power to comply with the wishes of my colleagues, I must look to some arrangement without delay, to take charge of the conduct of the business here, in the event of its being protracted, and of my departure; and I take the liberty of consulting you thus early, and without reserve, on this subject; as the time will admit of my hearing from you before it is necessary for me to take a final decision upon my movements.

Would you feel a disinclination, in this case, to replace me here? There is no person in whom the Government, the public, or myself, could feel the same confidence; and, as we have hitherto been in a great measure conducting the negociation together, the business would be more familiar to you than to any other person. Should you accept, it would nevertheless be desirable that we should pass a week or ten days here together before my departure.

There is a case, however, that may arise, and upon which I should wish beforehand to know your feeling, viz., that the negociation, on all important points, may be terminated before my departure; but the Treaty, in all its details, may not be perfected, or, if perfected, it may not have been submitted in form to Congress, which will be more a formality, when ap-

proved by the eight Powers, than a substantial proceeding. I can well conceive that, although otherwise disposed to lend your assistance, you might not wish to engage in the concern under these circumstances. Pray tell me your feelings without reserve, under this supposition. In the event of your preferring not to come to Vienna in such a late stage of the business, I should leave Clancarty and the two other plenipotentiaries to bring it to a close. In short, if your decision would depend *upon these remaining points of substance* still in discussion, I will endeavour, as the period approaches, to keep you more precisely informed of the probability of this than I can now attempt to do.

It may, however, be desirable to give you some sketch of the state of our business at present. I consider the Polish question as settled, Prussia never contended it in earnest, and Austria consequently has yielded. The Saxon question is now the only one that is of much difficulty. The point of Naples being one of principle, and not of detail, cannot lead to delay. I should think, if the Prussian possessions were settled, that there would not be much difficulty in the Prince of Orange's arrangements, or in the other territorial questions. The Swiss Commission will report this week, and that for the north of Italy is in progress. There is another nominated to settle Piedmontese, &c., amongst ambassadors; a second to arrange the navigation on the Rhine and other rivers; a third to be charged with the business of the Slave Trade, as soon as I receive instructions from home on the Portuguese demands. The Genoese arrangement is completed. This will give you a sort of idea of the extent of our concerns. What time they will require, it is impossible yet to calculate. The Saxon point is apparently the only one of much difficulty, or that can lead to serious consequences.

If you should come here, you would, of course, be entrusted with the same latitude of discretion that I now exercise, and the whole conduct of the negociation be exclusively in your

hands, as the chief plenipotentiary. You would find the others useful in matters referred to subordinate commissions to report upon, but they take no part in transactions between cabinet and cabinet. I can venture to assure you they will all work most cordially under your orders, and we find that without such means of getting rid of details, Swiss deputations, &c., the time of the chief Minister would be wholly thrown away. All the other Powers, except Spain, have more than one Minister, and France the same number as Great Britain.

I trouble you with this hasty letter, and shall write further as soon as I can judge of the turn things are likely to take here.

Ever, my dear lord, yours most sincerely,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool.

Vienna, December 18 [1814].

Dear Liverpool—I entirely agree with you in opinion that, if I cannot either actually close, or enable you to say, when Parliament meets, that the arrangements here are *upon the point* of closing, and that I may be expected within the month to be in my place, I must transfer to other hands the conduct of matters; and I also agree with you, all things considered, that the public will be best satisfied with their being entrusted to Wellington, whose personal weight and natural ability will compensate for the inconvenience of transferring a transaction of this nature into new hands, however capable.

I enclose a copy of my letter to the Duke, which I hope you will approve; and I shall endeavour to regulate myself on this subject in the manner which I conceive you and my colleagues will most approve.

I am, my dear Liverpool, yours very sincerely,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord William Bentinck.

Draft. Vienna, December 18, 1814.

My dear Lord—As our relations with Sicily and Naples are likely to become a subject of important consideration both here and in England, I am anxious to obtain every information that can throw light upon the conduct of Murat, under the engagements he had contracted. I shall be very thankful to your lordship if you will assist me in this object, both as far as your own observation goes, and by recurring to any other sources you can avail yourself of, without attracting attention.

The messenger who carries this letter to your lordship is also the bearer of my order to General Sir John Dalrymple to transfer, as far as depends on him, the provisional government of Genoa to the King of Sardinia, and to act with the troops under his command as an auxiliary corps in his Majesty's service till further orders. I hope your lordship will be satisfied that, if we have not felt it possible to preserve to Genoa her separate existence, we have acted up to the spirit of the assurances of protection which you gave the people. I trust you will approve the safeguards obtained for the rights and interests of the Genoese, and that you will employ your personal influence to bring them and their future Sovereign together, under the most conciliatory auspices.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

PS. The paper of remarks I send to you is from General Count Nugent.

Lord Bathurst to the Commissioners at Ghent.

Foreign Office, December 19, 1814.

My Lord and Gentlemen—I had this morning the honour of receiving your despatch of the 14th, enclosing the note presented on that day by the Commissioners of the United States, and desiring instructions thereupon.

With regard to the alteration proposed in the 1st Article,

whereby the occupation of the islands in Passamaquoddy Bay may be reserved to us, there is no objection to the proposition contained in the American Note, except so far as relates to the surrender of such islands to the United States, if no decision shall have been agreed upon, within a given number of years. This stipulation might give to the United States an interest to postpone any discussion on the subject. There would be no objection to a stipulation, by which it should be provided that the right to the islands in Passamaquoddy Bay should be that point of reference on which the Commissioners should be required first to consider and decide.

With respect to the discussion which has grown out of the latter part of the 8th Article, the Prince Regent regrets to find that there does not appear any prospect of being able to arrive at such an arrangement with regard to the fisheries as would have the effect of coming to a full and satisfactory explanation on that subject.

As this appears, however, now to be the only remaining point on which any difficulty exists, he is unwilling to protract, by a prolongation of the discussion, the period when the war between his Majesty and the United States may be happily terminated. You will therefore present a note, in which, after referring to the language held by you on this subject from the very commencement of the negociation, in which you stated explicitly that the British Commissioners did not intend to grant gratuitously to the United States the privileges formerly granted by treaty to them of fishing within the limits of the British sovereignty, and of using the shores of the British territories for purposes connected with fisheries, you will state that, as there does not appear any prospect of agreeing upon an Article wherein that question may be satisfactorily adjusted, you are authorized to accept the proposition which the Commissioners of the United States proposed in the Protocol of the 1st of December, wherein they expressed their readiness to omit the 8th Article altogether.

It will not be necessary for you to insist on the Article entitled, "An Article relative to the Right of Prosecuting Suits in the Courts of Justice," as we rely upon the Courts of Justice being open in the United States, by which the just claims of British subjects may be fairly prosecuted.

I am, &c., BATHURST.

The Duke of Wellington to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, December 20, 1814.

My dear Lord—The mails due for the last week having arrived from England, I send off your messenger, and I enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Lord Gambier, regarding the state of his negociations, in case he should not have written to you.

There is nothing new here, excepting what you will see in my despatch. I am afraid, from all I hear, that the French Government have mismanaged Excelman's affair, and that it is growing into importance. I understand that Ney and some others have delivered opinions that he has commited no military offence, and that the army are becoming warm about the question of domiciliation of half-pay officers. The King chose to send the Prince de Laval to Madrid, contrary to my advice and opinion; and I see, in a letter which Monsieur de Jaucourt showed me yesterday from Cevallos to their chargé d'affaires, at Madrid, that, at the same time that he congratulates him, in the warmest and most affectionate terms, on the expected arrival of the Ambassador, he expresses the King's expectations that the Ambassador would be able to satisfy his Majesty for the insult offered him in sending away from Paris his chargé d'affaires thus *à l'Espagnole*, taking no notice of all that was written on the subject from hence.

I have discovered that M. de Talleyrand is excessively desirous of being created a grandee of Spain, of which promotion he had the promise *as soon as the Congress should be concluded*. It is not impossible that this little dispute about the

Ambassador, and the removal of San Carlos from the ministry, and the displeasure which Cevallos has expressed with the conduct of Labrador, may cool Talleyand upon Italian affairs, more particularly as these circumstances render more distant the accomplishment of this favourite object.

After settling that there should be no Slave Trade as far as Cape Fornano, they want now to limit the prohibition to Cape Palmas, or at farthest to Cape Three Points; but I insist upon Cape Fornano, and I think I shall carry the whole.

Ever, my dear lord, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool.

Draft. Vienna, December 24, 1814.

My dear Lord—Although no overture has yet been made to me by any of the Powers with respect to the Ionian Isles, and as my object has been to keep this possession in our hands to the last, as a security for the due observance of all engagements in which we are interested, I am desirous of throwing before you some ideas upon this point, in order that I may learn, if possible before I am called to explain myself, the general view the Cabinet now take of the question. We have hitherto never laid claim to retain those islands as a British possession. On the contrary, at Chatillon and Paris, there was a sort of understanding that they were to be given to the King of Sicily as a part of his indemnity. So long as he is excluded from Naples, to this appropriation, if not declined by him, I think we might hold, to the exclusion of any other project; and so long as Ferdinand IV. does not occupy the continent of Italy, Austria will not object to his having the Ionian Isles; but she would object, and justly, to both shores of the entrance to the Adriatic being in the hands of the same Power. The events that have passed since the Peace of Paris, and especially the conduct of Russia with respect to the Duchy of Warsaw, might afford some ground for

a new claim on our part to further advantages; but, if our policy is to try the chance of peace, I doubt the prudence of directly hazarding a new demand of this description on our own part.

In disposing of these islands there are, as it appears to me, two paramount objects to be attended to; the one to provide adequately for the protection of the people who have so long confided themselves to our care: the other, not to suffer Russia to acquire any establishment in those islands, to the hazard of the internal tranquillity both of Greece and Hungary, which latter kingdom is full of Greeks.

With respect to the first of these objects, it might be secured by some arrangement like that lately framed for Genoa; but, in order to steer clear of the old republican form of Government, which might afford a pretext for the renewal of Russian protection, it appears to me desirable to give a direct sovereignty over these islands, under whatever conditions may be thought right, to some acknowledged European Power, and if this Power cannot be Great Britain, in order to exclude Russia, we may insist that the sovereign authority shall belong to a local power, that is, to the King of Sicily, or to the Emperor of Austria, according as the kingdom of Naples may remain with Murat, or return under the dominion of the ancient family. In the latter case, the sovereignty to belong to Austria.

The principal utility of the Seven Islands being the convenience of their harbours for purposes of refreshment and commerce, especially in war, might not they be neutralized, as was intended with respect to Malta in 1801, and their ports rendered free, on very moderate duties, to all nations? If this was the object, perhaps the works at Corfu should be demolished, and the system guaranteed by all the great Powers—a sovereign authority nevertheless to be confided to some neighbouring State, to guard against local cabals, and to give unity and weight to the executive government; but this sovereignty,

I apprehend, by a special capitulation, might be rendered consistent with such a system.

There is a native of these islands, M. Capo d'Istrias, now here; he is a man of ability, has for some time acted as Russian Plenipotentiary in Switzerland, and is at present much employed by the Emperor: in speaking of these islands one day to Mr. Cooke, he said that, as a Russian Minister, he must promote whatever objects his court might give him in charge, but that, as a native, his opinion was that these islands, for their own happiness and prosperity, should remain under the protection of Great Britain, as the greatest maritime power, the best able to secure to them the advantages of their flag, and the freedom of their commerce.

I shall be glad you would ask Lord Bathurst whether any reports have reached him of General Campbell having taken up an unusual system of terror, if not of severity, to the people of Corfu since his arrival there. Such a report was communicated to me some time after my arrival here, and, upon inquiry, I have reason to believe there is some foundation for it. He is represented as an honourable, just, and well-meaning man, but as having shocked the prejudices of the people, and rendered us unpopular by hanging culprits in chains, and erecting the gallows and other engines of punishment in the public walk of the town.

I desired Cooke to apprize him, in a private letter, of these stories, that he might enable us to correct misrepresentations.

CASTLEREAGH.

The Duke of Wellington to Lord Liverpool.

Paris, December 25, 1814.

My dear Lord—You will see my despatch to Lord Castlereagh about Murat, the duplicate of which I send to Vienna, with a request to Lord Castlereagh to say nothing upon the subject till he hears from you.

I concur very much in opinion with the King, that the

chances of disturbance, particularly in this country, are very much increased by leaving Murat on the throne of Naples. If he were gone, Bonaparte in Elba would not be an object of great dread. You must be the best judge whether you ought or can come forward on this occasion. If you should determine to do so, what follows will show you the means which are requisite, which are in your power, and my opinion of the probable expense.

If the British Government should undertake this operation, it should be performed by the armies of the Allies of the Peninsula, which might be got in the following proportions, viz., 10,000 infantry from Spain; 12,000 infantry from Portugal; 20,000 of all arms from Great Britain; and 10,000 of all arms from Sicily; with sixty pieces of field artillery and a battering-train from Great Britain; the whole to assemble in Sicily, in transports to be found by Great Britain. This force, with 40,000 men, which might be sent from the southern ports of France, by sea, into the Roman States, would be more than sufficient to ensure the object almost without striking a blow.

I conceive that there must now be disposable in Sicily and other parts of the Mediterranean and Gibraltar, of British troops, 10,000 infantry; the remainder would come from Flanders, when relieved from the occupation of that country, and from England, including 1,500 or 1,600 dragoons, and ten companies of artillery. This operation would probably last four months from the time the troops would embark in the Peninsula till their return, and calculating all their expenses at the round sum of a dollar a day for each man, which is a large allowance, as the calculation is founded upon the Peninsula prices, the expense would be £1,200,000, to which would be to be added about £300,000 for transports, which I suppose would be in the service for six months. From this sum would be to be subtracted the pay and ordinary expense of the British troops for the four months.

WELLINGTON.

The Duke of Wellington to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, December 26, 1814.

My dear Lord—I send you the copy of a letter which I have written to Lord Liverpool, with my despatch regarding Murat. The King is anxious that nothing should be said upon the subject at Vienna, until I shall receive an answer from England.

Blacas explained to me, last night, how it happens that the King can give only 40,000 men. He says that they cannot venture to employ upon this service either generals, officers, or troops, who have served immediately under the command of Murat, and that they must therefore select them.

Adverting to the temper prevailing in England, and to the state of the finances, I think it most probable the Government will not enter into this scheme, and that Murat will escape. After all, our coming forward as principals is rather a delicate matter, under all the circumstances of the Austrian Treaty, and the suspension of hostilities; and the Austrians being so far satisfied with Murat's performance of his engagements as not to join in an attack upon him. However, of this I am very certain, that Murat's continuance at Naples increases the chances of disturbance in France, which would again disturb all Europe.

Ever, my dear lord, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

Lord Bathurst to the Commissioners at Ghent.

Foreign Office, December 26, 1814.

My Lord and Gentlemen—Mr. Baker arrived at this Office at half-past two this afternoon, with the Treaty of Peace between his Majesty and the United States of America, signed by you and the American Plenipotentiaries on the 24th instant. I have the satisfaction to acquaint you that this Treaty of Peace, so concluded, has received the approbation of

the Prince Regent, and I have received his Royal Highness's commands to signify to you his most gracious approbation of the conduct you have pursued throughout the course of the negociation.

You may assure the American Plenipotentiaries that his Majesty's naval officers will receive instructions to give every facility to forward the measures which may be adopted by the Plenipotentiaries to communicate to their Government this intelligence, and that Mr. Carrol will be allowed to proceed to the United States in the same ship in which Mr. Baker will embark, with his Royal Highness's Act of Ratification of the Treaty, provided he arrives in England in time. Mr. Baker will be despatched as soon as the instruments can be prepared, and a duplicate of ratification will also be forwarded to America by another opportunity.

I have further to acquaint you that you are at liberty to return to England, as soon as it may suit your convenience. An order from Mr. Goulburn to the agent for packets at Dover will be sufficient authority for directing one or more packets to await your arrival, either at Calais or Ostend, according as you may prefer.

I am, &c., BATHURST.

The Duke of Wellington to Lord Liverpool.

Copy. Paris, December 27, 1814.

My dear Lord—I send Lord Castlereagh's despatches of the 18th, and the copy of a letter which I have received from him of the same date,[1] proposing to me to relieve him at Vienna, and the copy of my answer. Understanding from Pole that you had the same arrangement in your contemplation, I have not hesitated to comply with his desire.

The question is, whether it is the wish of the King's servants in England that I should go there before I proceed to Vienna, which appears to be very much a question of time. I

[1] Dated the 17th in MS.

might receive your answer on Sunday or Monday next, the 2nd; leaving Paris on the 3rd, I should reach London on the 5th or 6th, and setting out again on the 10th, I should be at Vienna on the 23rd or 24th, even passing through Paris. This course would have some advantages, as I should be able to discuss with you the question of Naples, which is the only one of importance remaining unsettled; and, if you determine upon it, pray lose no time in sending off your messenger with the answer to this letter.

I have read your three letters of the 23rd to Lord Castlereagh, and have considered yours to me of the same date. I doubt the expediency of making any direct communication to the King of the sentiments contained in these letters. I shall say only that there exists every disposition in England to act in everything in concert with the King; and that only if I should find, in conversation here, that there is any disposition to take up the Emperor of Russia, or any other Power. We must not suppose, however, that the King can, or will, enter into any concert with us, only to give way upon every point, and to look only for present tranquillity. I don't mean to say that that policy is erroneous in us; but we cannot expect that it should likewise suit the circumstances of the King.

Ever, my dear lord, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

The Duke of Wellington to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, December 27, 1814.

My dear Lord—I have just received your letter sent with your despatches of the 18th, in which you have proposed to me to relieve you at Vienna; and, as I understand from Pole, who is here, that the King's Government had the same arrangement in contemplation, I don't hesitate to comply with your desire. As I mean to serve the King's Government in any situation which may be thought desirable, it is a matter of indifference to me in what stage I find your proceedings.

It may be desirable to the King's Government to communicate with me personally before I shall go to Vienna; and I have offered to go to London. I can receive their answer, and go there and be back here by the 12th; and I shall not receive your answer to this letter till the 14th or 15th. You will see, by my letters and despatches of yesterday, that I have had communications with the King's Government here regarding Naples, upon which it might be desirable that I should have a personal communication with the King's Ministers in England before I should go to Vienna; as that appears to be the only question of importance remaining.

Ever, my dear lord, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

I enclose a copy of my letter of this day to Lord Liverpool, as it relates to other points.

Lord Bathurst to Anthony St. John Baker, Esq., his Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in the United States.

Foreign Office, December 31, 1814.

Sir—I am to signify to you the Prince Regent's commands that you embark on board one of his Majesty's ships ordered for your conveyance to the port of Annapolis, in the United States, for the purpose of proceeding, with the least possible delay, to Washington, with his Royal Highness's Act of Ratification of the Treaty of Peace and Amity concluded at Ghent on the 24th instant.

On your arrival at Washington, you will present to the American Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs the enclosed letter, in which I have announced to that Minister that you are commanded by his Royal Highness to exchange the Prince Regent's Act of Ratification of that Treaty against a ratified copy of the same, on the part of the President of the United States. You will, however, not consider yourself as authorized to exchange these ratifications unless that of the President of the United States shall be without *alteration,* in

conformity with the provisions of the last article of the Treaty; and you are aware that, by that article, it was distinctly understood between the respective Commissioners at Ghent, that any addition or *exclusion*, in any form whatsoever, was comprehended in that term.

You will likewise decline receiving any note of explanation on the subject of the Treaty, stating that your instructions did not authorize you to do any diplomatic act connected with the ratification of the Treaty, except that of exchanging the simple and unconditional ratification of the Prince Regent against the simple and unconditional ratification of the American Government.

In the event of the President of the United States declining to ratify the Treaty, or of any condition being annexed to the Treaty, or its being insisted upon that you should receive some note of explanation or qualification in conjunction with the ratification of the American Government, you will, in the first case, immediately repair to Halifax; and you will lose no time in adopting every means within your power of making the terms of the Treaty known throughout the American States. In these two other cases, you will wait at Washington so long as you may judge reasonable; in order that the American Government may have an opportunity of retracting such conditional ratification, and of exchanging the ratifications according to the stipulations of the Treaty: but, if they should neglect to do this within a given time, you will repair to Halifax, and, transmitting home a full detail of all that has passed, you will wait there for further orders.

The ship in which you will embark for America will wait at the port where you land, for the purpose of conveying your first despatches to England. Upon the exchange of the ratified copies of the Treaty, as described in the former part of this despatch, you will adopt immediate measures for forwarding to his Majesty's naval and military commanders the despatches, marked as per margin, according to the instruc-

tions in this paper, marked A B, accompanying this despatch. You will, at the same time, consult with the American Secretary of State as to the most effectual means of conveying this communication, in the most expeditious manner, to all other persons whom it may in any way concern.

When this service shall have been effected, in pursuance of your instructions, you will acquaint the American Secretary of State that you have been named by his Majesty's Government to reside at the seat of the American Government, as his Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, until the restoration of the usual diplomatic relations between the two countries; and you will deliver to the Secretary of State the enclosed letter from me, inviting him to transact business with you in that capacity.

I am, &c., BATHURST.

1815.

ESCAPE OF NAPOLEON FROM ELBA; HIS RETURN TO PARIS; FLIGHT OF THE ROYAL FAMILY —BATTLE OF WATERLOO — FINAL DOWNFALL OF BONAPARTE—OCCUPATION OF FRANCE BY THE ALLIES—PEACE OF PARIS — REASSEMBLY OF CONGRESS AT VIENNA.

Sir John Dalrymple to Lord Castlereagh.

Genoa, January 1, 1814 [indorsed 1815].

My Lord—I trust that the statement which I have made in my official letter of this date to your lordship may have sufficiently justified in your eyes the motives of my conduct, and that it may meet your approbation. It is my duty, however, to inform your lordship in this separate manner that, upon taking possession of the archives here, I found the secret deliberations of the late Provisional Government. In them I ascertained that copies of their Protest to the Congress in October last, and of their last Protest, had been sent in a most official way to Mr. Whitbread, with a letter calling upon him to advocate their cause with the British Parliament.

I have thought it no less than my duty to send copies of this communication to England by a special messenger, thinking it may be desirable that his Royal Highness's Ministers should be acquainted with the circumstance; and I trust your lordship will not consider it improper that I have permitted this occurrence to join with the literal interpretation of your instructions to me, in protesting against the terms of the Count de la Vallaisi's communication.

Major Andrews, who will deliver this and my other despatch to your lordship, has, I believe, already had the honour of being presented to you. I trust it may suit your convenience to honour me with your further orders by him soon, as I shall pass a most anxious time of suspense until I receive them. Major Andrews has received the sum necessary to carry him to Vienna. I hope your lordship will direct his wants for his return to be supplied.

I have the honour to be, my lord, with every sentiment of respect, &c., JOHN DALRYMPLE.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool.

Draft. Vienna, January 4, 1815.

My dear Liverpool—I send you enclosed a copy of my letter to the Duke of Wellington. In the present state of the negociation, I feel myself bound to urge that I should not be withdrawn from hence at least till the important discussions now pending are closed.

With every deference to the Duke of Wellington's ability and great personal authority, he cannot at once replace me in the habits of confidential intercourse which a long residence with the principal actors has established, and which gives facilities to my intervention to bring them together, which could not attach to another for a length of time: whereas the fate of Europe may depend on the conclusions of the ensuing month.

I must naturally have a strong desire to conduct to their close measures for which I stand so deeply responsible; but, independent of all personal considerations, I feel that the conduct of the negociation ought not to pass, as things now stand, into other hands, except upon some necessity, upon which the Prince Regent's Government can alone decide; and which, under the new circumstances that have arisen both at home and abroad, I cannot myself consider to exist, since our peace with America being secured.

I think it is probable that I shall be enabled, in the course of four or five weeks, to bring all the territorial arrangements of Europe to a close. The constitutional system of Germany may run into more length; but this I have no doubt we shall separate and refer to a special inquiry. The point of Naples *here*, at least, will be a short one, after I receive an answer to my letter of the [blank], as the object, whether it is to be pursued by arms or negociation, cannot occupy more time at Vienna than belongs to the decision of the principle.

[Enclosure.]

Lord Castlereagh to the Duke of Wellington.

Draft. Vienna, January 4, 1815.

My dear Lord—I am much obliged to you for your letter of the 27th, and for your kind compliance with my wishes. I have written to Lord Liverpool to state that, under the change of circumstances which has taken place, affecting our home politics, and also the state in which the negociation stands at present here, I shall not deem it consistent with my duty to leave Vienna, or to transfer the conduct of it into other hands, without express orders from home, given under a full knowledge of these combined considerations.

I am, therefore, desirous that you should delay your setting out for Vienna till you hear further from me, unless Lord Liverpool should call upon you to do so, after the receipt of the despatches addressed to him by this courier.

I need not assure you of the confidence with which I should leave the business here in your hands; but there are moments in complicated concerns of this nature when, neither in justice to the parties nor to the public interest, a change of management ought to be hazarded, except under the pressure of a paramount necessity, upon which the King's Government at home can alone pronounce.

C.

Mr. à Court to Lord Castlereagh.

Palermo, January 5, 1815.

My dear Lord—I take the opportunity of the departure of a Sicilian courier for Vienna to inform your lordship that every thing here remains nearly in the same state as when I last wrote. The Parliament continues assembled, but makes no progress whatever; in fact, every thing is at a stand, and will probably remain so, until the decisions of the Congress be promulgated.

The foundations of the Constitution—or perhaps I should rather say props, for foundations it never had any—are removed on all sides, and it is ready to sink into a quiet despotism, upon the restoration of Naples, or, in the event of a contrary decision, to assume an aristocratical form, and to render the barons, already too powerful, the masters both of the King and of the people. Either alternative is to be deprecated; but I see no prospect of a different termination of this unfortunate experiment.

The secret marriage of the King with the Princess Partana, which I mentioned in one of my last despatches, is placed beyond a doubt. The Minister for Foreign Affairs requested to be allowed to contradict the report to the members of the *corps diplomatique*. The King, as the Minister observed, coloured excessively upon the subject being mentioned, and ordered him to be silent respecting it. You must, therefore, said the Duke Lucchesi Palli, draw your own conclusions.

The Sicilian Government still entertains a hope of the restoration of Naples. Should the decision of the Congress be unfavourable, your lordship may be prepared to expect some rash attempt to recover the kingdom by force.

My last letters from your lordship are of the 2nd October.

I have the honour to be, with great respect, &c.,

WILLIAM À COURT.

Lord Bathurst to Mr. Baker.

Foreign Office, January 7, 1815.

Sir—I transmit to you the copy of a despatch and its enclosure from Lord Castlereagh, respecting the capture, by an American privateer, of the monument of her late Prussian Majesty, which had been constructed at [blank]; and, being taken on its voyage from thence to the Baltic, has been taken into an American port: and I am to desire that you will make what inquiries you can, as to the possibility of obtaining a restitution of it from the captors. Should they require a reasonable sum as a ransom, or should it have been sold, and the present possessor be willing to part with it on reasonable terms, you will send to this Office a report of the expenses that would, in that case, be incurred for its recovery.

I am, &c., BATHURST.

The Duke of Wellington to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, January 10, 1815.

My dear Lord—I heard from Lord Liverpool, last week, about my going to Vienna and to England. He was desirous that I should go to Vienna, and he left it to me either to go to England or not, as I pleased. But, as he was going to Bath, and I should scarcely have had time to go there to speak to him, and be back by the time I should hear from you, and his mind appeared decided about the Sicilian question, the only one upon which I wished to speak to him, I determined not to go to England.

I have just received your letters and despatches to the 2nd. I think you are mistaken about the necessity of your return to England. I shall not set out from hence, however, till I shall receive your summons, which I expect will be next Sunday or Monday, unless I should receive a positive direction from Lord Liverpool to do so.

From what Pole said to me of the temper of Parliament, it appears your presence is absolutely necessary. There is nothing new here.

Ever yours most sincerely, WELLINGTON.

Lord Liverpool to Lord Castlereagh.

Bath, January 12, 1815.

My dear Castlereagh—I hope this letter will find you *faisant vos pacquets* for the purpose of returning to England. We shall want you on the 9th of February, or very few days after it. The discussions relative to the Property Tax and the Bank Restriction must come on immediately. The consideration of the Corn Laws cannot be long deferred, and, I have no doubt, will be mooted before the Houses have been assembled a week. Ground once lost by Government on questions of their importance in public opinion is not easily recovered. It is of importance that the first impression should be favourable and should inspire confidence. Our friends *en première ligne*, in the House of Commons, have proved themselves not equal to the burden. Those *en seconde ligne* might do, viz., Manners Sutton, Robinson, and Peel; but they cannot well come forward, except upon business connected with their own departments, unless they have a leader to whom they can look up. I am sorry to say Robinson was very idle, scarcely opened his mouth; the others have gained great credit, particularly Peel.

I have letters from Wellington to-day, who does not mean to come to England, and only waits your directions to set out. I have written to him to beg that he will not delay his journey, as the more days he can pass with you before you leave Vienna the better. I have endeavoured fully to explain our feelings to him upon the very delicate question of Naples, so that I hope he will be satisfied on that point. The question of Saxony will, I trust, be settled before it is necessary for you to depart. The proposal of Prussia to indemnify the King of Saxony by

giving him the country, or a part of it, between the Rhine and the Meuse, has made me more adverse to the annexation of the whole of Saxony to Prussia than I was before. The King of Saxony would, in this case, probably be the creature of France, and would hereafter second the views of the French Government upon the Netherlands, rather than resist them.

I feel, I confess, little kindness for the King of Saxony personally, and therefore a provision for him is not my object; but I do not wish to see the system of totally annihilating ancient States extended beyond what is absolutely necessary.

I have received great benefit from the waters since I have been here. I shall leave this place on the 20th, and be in town, or its neighbourhood, on the 21st.

Believe me to be, my dear Castlereagh, very sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

Lord Liverpool to Lord Castlereagh.

Bath, January 16, 1815.

My dear Castlereagh—I have this moment received your letter of the 5th instant, and sincerely wish you joy of the favourable turn which the negociation appears to have taken. I must, at the same time, inform you that it is the unanimous opinion of all my colleagues and those members of the House of Commons whom we are both in the habit of consulting on such matters, and who are perhaps better acquainted with the House of Commons than any Ministers, that it is absolutely necessary that you should be here as soon as possible after the meeting of Parliament.

You can have no idea how much ground the Government lost in the House of Commons, in the short session before Christmas; and the unfortunate circumstance in our present situation is this—that the debates of most importance which are likely to occur during the session, must take place before

the beginning of April. The questions of contest will be the questions of finance, and the political questions will principally be discussed and brought in as auxiliaries.

We do not feel that the American peace has in any degree relieved our embarrassments. Our financial difficulties, however they might have afterwards increased, would not have pressed upon us more severely during the present year, if the American war had continued, than they do now.

If the negociation had broken off upon popular grounds, we might even have derived immediate facilities from the rupture; but we shall now be placed in the situation of contending for what will be called a war expenditure in time of peace; and that under the circumstances of a general cry raised amongst all classes of people on the subject of the Property Tax, and of a deep alarm prevailing amongst the landed interest, in consequence of the great and unexpected fall in the prices of every description of grain.

I can assure you that I feel, in common with my colleagues, the greatest reluctance in proposing to you to withdraw at this moment from Vienna. Last year we could spare you: every thing was quiet in Parliament—every body waiting for the result—and no symptom of party-spirit appeared. Now, very few persons give themselves any anxiety about what is passing at Vienna, except in as far as it is connected with expense; and I never have seen more party animosity than was manifested in November, and, I understand, still appears at the Clubs and in private societies.

I will hope that, by the end of this month or the very beginning of next, most of the material points will have been settled; but as it is absolutely necessary that the Duke of Wellington should have a full communication with you, upon the supposition of any part of the negociation being transferred into his hands, I shall write to him to request that he will not delay his journey. There is no material business which need detain him at Paris, and no inconvenience can result from

leaving the correspondence there for the present in the hands of the Secretary of the Embassy.

Believe me to be, my dear Castlereagh, very sincerely yours,

LIVERPOOL.

Lord Liverpool to the Duke of Wellington.

Copy. Bath, January 16, 1815.

My dear Duke—Lord Castlereagh has transmitted to me a copy of the letter he wrote to you on the 4th inst. I send open for your inspection the answer which I have found myself obliged to return to it. I see not the least reason to alter the opinion which I gave you in my letter of yesterday, respecting the expediency of your setting out for Vienna. Castlereagh is quite mistaken in supposing that the American peace will relieve us from our difficulties in Parliament. There is no analogy whatever between the situation in which we are placed now and that in which we were placed last year. At that time, every person's eyes were fixed upon the Continent, and nobody would have listened to debates in Parliament. Now, all eyes are fixed on home, and it is quite astonishing how little interest is taken in what is going on at Vienna.

I trust, therefore, that, under all the difficulties, as I have represented them, you will not feel any objection in beginning your journey, without waiting for any further communication from Lord Castlereagh.

Believe me, &c., LIVERPOOL.

The Duke of Wellington to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, January 17, 1815, 6 P.M.

My dear Lord—The enclosed letter is just arrived, and you will see the anxiety that you should return; but I shall not stir till I shall receive Lord Liverpool's answer, written after seeing yours of the 4th.

Ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

[Enclosure.]

Lord Liverpool to the Duke of Wellington.

Bath, January 11, 1815.

My dear Duke—I have received your letters of the 5th inst. I am glad, upon the whole, that you have determined to go to Vienna, without first coming to England. I shall be glad to hear that you have set out; for it is very desirable that there should be some interval at Vienna, between Lord Castlereagh's departure from it and your arrival; and it is of the utmost importance that he should be in London by the 9th of February, or a few days after.

Upon the question of our engagements to Murat, I think we are quite agreed. There can be no difference of opinion likewise as to the policy of removing him from the throne of Naples, if it is just and practicable. The only question that can occur on this part of the subject is, how far we are likely to succeed, and whether the chances of failure, or the chances of his continuing in undisturbed possession of Naples, are most to be apprehended. I am satisfied that those who are on the spot must be better judges on this subject than we can be here; and we can therefore have no hesitation in leaving these considerations entirely to your discretion. The only point which I wish to impress upon you is the absolute impossibility, in the present state of the circumstances and feelings in this country, of our engaging in military operations for the purpose of expelling Murat. I do not mean that it is either necessary or could be prudent to make any such avowal public, least of all that Murat himself should be apprized of our difficulties; but it may become indispensable that some of our Allies should know on what they have to reckon; and, at all events, it is fit that you should be fully informed of our situation.

I have never thought that Austria would make any serious difficulty, in consequence of her treaty with Murat, if the other Powers of Europe were determined to get rid of him.

Her real interest must be to destroy every remains of the revolutionary system in Italy. She may naturally feel that, being the only Power which has concluded a treaty with Murat, she is the last to be expected to declare against him. She may likewise feel considerable apprehensions about the march of a French army through the north and centre of Italy; but, if security is given to her (as appears to be intended) on this last head, and if the other Powers are determined to declare against Murat, she will, I am persuaded, throw no obstacle in the way of their operations, and I should not despair of her even joining in the cause.

It will remain, therefore, to be seen, whether he will submit willingly, or be compelled to submit by the Neapolitans to the general voice of Europe, declared at Vienna. I shall be sanguine on this head, if a good provision is held out to him; and it must surely be the interest of the Powers of Europe to get out of such an embarrassment in such a manner. If he is determined, however, to risk everything for the purpose of keeping his throne, the labouring oar of expelling him must rest on France. Spain can afford little aid. We might blockade his ports by sea. Russia might send a body of troops, or, at least, threaten to send it: and I should think that, with such a combination of external means, the country itself would be led to declare against him. The English name has always been, and is, particularly popular in Naples. The alarm I entertain is not about Naples, but about other parts of Italy, where a very different spirit exists, and where Austria is unfortunately very much disliked.

I have thus given you all my sense on this subject, and I should hope that, after talking the matter fully over with Lord Castlereagh, you may be able to put this very delicate and difficult question into as satisfactory a course as the nature of it will allow.

Believe me to be, my dear duke, yours very sincerely,

LIVERPOOL.

The Duke of Wellington to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, January 17, 1815.

My dear Lord—I received your letter of the 4th, and sent it to England immediately, with the despatches which accompanied it. You will have seen that I had before determined not to leave Paris till I should hear from you, or should have received directions to do so from Lord Liverpool; and I wrote to him, with your last letter, that I should not set out, even if directed by him, until I should hear from him, after he should have read it. I likewise told him my opinion that it was most desirable that, if possible, you should be allowed to bring the business at Vienna to a close on the public account, as well as for your own sake and that of the Government.

You must be as well acquainted as I am with what is going on in England. The opposition to the continuance of the Income Tax in any shape is very general; and Pole, when he was here, appeared to think it was impossible to meet the Parliament without you. Indeed, he did not much like your being absent till the 16th; but his feelings are like those of all others at a weak advanced post.

The mail which ought to have arrived yesterday is not yet come in. I will write to you again if anything particular should occur after I shall have received it.

Ever yours, my dear lord, most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

The Duke of Wellington to Lord Castlereagh.

Paris, January 22, 1815.

My dear Lord—I enclose the letters for you from Lord Liverpool, and the copy of that which he has written to me, after receiving yours of the 5th; in consequence of which, I shall set out as soon as I shall have seen the King, which will be to-morrow. I am afraid that the state of the roads will delay me, but you may depend upon it that I will lose no time.

Ever yours most sincerely, WELLINGTON.

Sir Henry Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.

Madrid, January 26, 1815.

My dear Lord—The Duke of Wellington has sent me a copy of your note to him of the 2nd inst., from Vienna, and I feel extremely obliged to your lordship for the communication which, by your desire, my brother has made to me. It was my intention to have availed myself of my leave of absence in the month of November last; but, the Prince Regent having been pleased to signify to me, through your lordship, that I was to be empowered to invest the King of Spain with the Garter, I have thought it my duty to remain here for that purpose. The King received the Prussian Order some time ago, and that of Russia is daily expected, and some little ill-humour has been shown at the delay in sending the Garter.

I very much fear that I shall not be able to obtain any farther concessions in favour of the Slave Trade, such is the dread of offending the Havannah in the present critical state of Mexico. Your lordship may be assured, however, that no effort shall be omitted on my part to prevail upon the Spanish Government at least to confine the trade to the southward of the Line.

Our relations with this Government, with respect to commerce and to South America, are in a very unpleasant state. I cannot get them to issue the orders for placing our trade on the footing on which it stood in 1796. They have likewise insisted that the French should pay the duties imposed since the year 1792. Owing to the want of system in the Government, and of communication between the different departments, it is with the greatest difficulty that I can ever obtain an answer to any of my representations.

With respect to America, your lordship is already in possession of one example of the violence with which this subject is treated by M. de Cevallos. Within these two days, I have received another note upon the same subject, rather in still

more offensive terms, and purporting to be a reply to mine of the 21st of December. I am now occupied in replying to it, and will transmit it, with the reply, in my next despatches. Still, M. de Cevallos never fails to express the King's desire to maintain his alliance with England upon the most cordial footing; and I have learnt that this is really his Majesty's disposition, from other quarters, which I consider of better authority.

No farther advices have been received from Italy; but M. de Cevallos still insists upon it that it is Murat's intention to make himself master of Italy, and that he is in league with Bonaparte.

The French Ambassador has frequent conferences with M. de Cevallos on the affair of M. Casa Flores. I rather believe that the Spanish Government will be satisfied with the explanations which have been given by the French Government, and that they will not insist upon the return of M. Casa Flores to Paris; in which case, I conclude that the Spanish Ambassador will be ordered to proceed thither without loss of time.

It is reported here that the Princess of Brazil is coming here without the Prince, and that she is to land in a port of Spain, and to visit Madrid previously to going to Portugal. The King is said to have received a letter from his sister to this effect.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

H. WELLSLEY.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Bathurst.

Copy. Vienna, January 30, 1815.

Dear Lord Bathurst—Many thanks for your letter. You may rely upon my joining you as soon as I can, without essentially endangering the point immediately at issue; but you might as well expect me to have run away from Leipsick (if I had been there) last year, to fight Creevey and Whitbread, as to with-

draw from hence till the existing contest is brought to a point; and I think you do both injustice to your own supporters, and too much honour to me, in supposing my presence so necessary.

You will find things go quite smooth at Genoa. Dalrymple, by his last letter, is perfectly content, and pleased with Revel [?] —the Genoese flocking to Turin to pay their court. Lord William Bentinck had an apprehension that our troops might be unpleasantly committed at Genoa, and seemed disposed to move the 14th Regiment, bringing in its room the battalion of Italians from Nice. When the Duke comes, I will beg him to confer with Dalrymple, and arrange for the best.

I send you enclosed a *projet* of incorporation of the Italian levies, received from St. Marsan. I fully explained to him that we could not transfer the corps. It must be a new enrolment of both officers and men. Under these circumstances, he appears very desirous not to disorganize the force till the King's authority was better established in the Genoese territory.

Apsley quite well—Cooke gone to Italy, where he will look after Lord Pembroke's commands.

Yours sincerely, CASTLEREAGH.

I beg you will not give any money at present to any of the Continental Powers. The poorer they are kept, the better, to prevent them from quarrelling. Time enough to settle accounts, when we know who deserves it.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool.

Draft. Vienna, February 6, 1815.

Dear Liverpool—The Duke of Wellington arrived here on the 3rd. The cold weather on the road, followed by some hot rooms here, has, I am sorry to observe, given him a heavy cold, which, for the moment, confines him to his room; but Dr. Frank considers it of no essential consequence.

I hope to get away the 12th or 13th. My official despatch will apprize you that I have, after much difficulty, brought

the parties to a settlement upon Saxony, which, in the shape the details were prepared, decides at the same time the five questions which relate to the centre of Europe, viz., the Austrian, Prussian, Bavarian, Orange, and Hanoverian. The points collaterally connected with them I hope to dispose of in the course of the week, and to establish, in concert with the other Powers, some understanding upon the point of Naples, the Ionian Islands, and the other less material arrangements still pending in the north of Italy.

I have had the satisfaction of talking over with the Duke of Wellington the business in progress, and am happy to find no divergence of sentiment on any point is likely to occur.

My wish was, after placing business in a suitable shape to be delivered over, to pursue my journey by the shortest possible route; but, in consequence of a letter from the King of France, Prince Talleyrand makes so great a point of my seeing his Majesty for a day on my way, and being certainly impressed with a conviction that, in doing so, I may prevent difficulties hereafter on the Neapolitan question, I rather think I shall yield to his request; the rather as I am told the road by the Rhine will be very bad, after the thaw we have had. I propose setting out from hence on Monday next.

Believe me, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent.

Draft. Vienna, February 6, 1815.

Sir—My official despatch will have informed your Royal Highness of the considerations which, after communicating with Count Münster, induced me to be of opinion that it was most prudent, on behalf of your Royal Highness, to accept the minor amount of indemnity for Hanover, as specified in the Treaty of Reichenbach—the expression, as your Royal Highness will recollect, in the Secret Article, being 250,000 or 300,000 subjects.

In the dearth of means, I certainly thought it more than

probable that the former alternative would be insisted on, and that your Royal Highness might be deprived of the grace of contributing, by a voluntary sacrifice, to a general arrangement. I also foresaw that, if the negociation broke off, or if the Saxon arrangement was rendered odiously severe, that endeavours would have been made to attribute it to concessions in favour of Hanover. Under all these circumstances, having waved also claims on the part of Holland, to the extent of 200,000, I persuaded myself that I was acting for the best, and as your Royal Highness would wish me, in adopting, with the concurrence of your Hanoverian Minister, this course.

The deference I feel for your Royal Highness's wishes on a question of this nature, where I am presuming to interfere on a point connected with a distinct branch of your service, induces me to hope that you will graciously interpret my motives, and receive my apology.

I hope very shortly to pay my duty in person to your Royal Highness, and to have to report favourably of the state of your continental relations.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Sir Charles Stuart to the Duke of Wellington.

The Hague, February 13, 1815.

My Lord—The tenour of the last despatches received from M. de Capellen does not appear to have been agreeable to this Court. The Dutch Ministers allege that the cession of the ancient hereditary possessions of the House of Nassau, in Germany, has been painful to the feelings of the Sovereign Prince, and that no consideration would have induced his Royal Highness to accede to such a proposal, if he had not been persuaded the sacrifice would materially facilitate the arrangements in contemplation, for strengthening the frontier of the countries which are to be added to Holland.

His Royal Highness, therefore, exceedingly laments that, in appropriating the Duchy of Luxemburg to the younger branch of his family, the Congress should have determined to render the capital of the duchy a fortress of the empire, and consequently to place a garrison, not exclusively Dutch, in that important place; to permit the continued occupation of the canton of Horst and the town of Liege, on the left bank of the Rhine, by Prussian troops; and to leave the same Power in possession of Stavelot and Malmedy.

His Royal Highness is as little satisfied with the arrangement for giving the House of Nassau a vote as member of the Germanic Confederacy, in right of the Duchy of Luxemburg; because he considers any connexion with Germany, unless in virtue of possessions which entitle him to rank as a Sovereign of the first order, to be highly derogatory. His Ministers do not scruple, indeed, to declare, that the appropriation of any territory to the second branch is a matter purely domestic, and are of opinion that the specific choice of Luxemburg for this purpose will be disagreeable to his Belgic subjects, who will view the separation of the provinces with a jealous eye, and an embarrassment to the Prince's family arrangements which might have been avoided.

They have nevertheless issued the fullest general instructions to the Prince's plenipotentiaries at Vienna, authorizing their unqualified accession to whatever definitive settlement his Majesty's Ministers may deem advisable, in the hope that the feelings of the Sovereign will be somewhat consulted on this as on the other points which have not been finally decided; and they requested me, in stating their intention to your lordship, strongly to urge the propriety of placing in Luxemburg a garrison in the service of the Power to whom the province is to be ceded, and the evacuation of the districts on the left bank of the Rhine by Prussia, especially if the appropriation of Stavelot and Malmedy to that Power, under circumstances which add nothing at all to the strength of the frontier towards

France, cannot be prevented; in case the Prince shall not be allowed to bear the part in the affairs of the empire, to which his dignity as Prince Sovereign of the Netherlands entitles him, they flatter themselves that the influence of his Majesty's Government will suspend the offer of the vote attached to the mere possession of Luxemburg, from which they conceive inconvenience, rather than possible advantage, may be expected.

The Dutch Ministers have mentioned repeatedly the great embarrassments arising from the continued delay of the Congress to come to a determination which may allow his Royal Highness to assume the government of the Netherlands in his own name. They declare that this delay is productive of the most serious evil; that a bad impression on the public mind is to be traced to the uncertain situation of affairs in that country; and that it will be impossible to improve the finances, or to carry into full effect the plans of defence the Commissioners employed for that purpose shall recommend, until the Provisional Government shall be replaced by some positive and definite system—considerations which they conceive are sufficiently important to interest my Court in recommending the immediate and formal appropriation of the countries as far as the Meuse to Holland; though the fate of the districts within the triangle between that river, the Rhine, and the French frontier, is not finally decided.

I have the honour to be, with great truth and respect, &c.,

CHARLES STUART.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir Sidney Smith.

Vienna, February 14, 1815.

Sir—Having understood from you that you were informed by Colonel B——, who was sent on a secret mission to Buenos Ayres in the year 1809, that he had been instructed to desire you would by no means mention the objects of that mission to Lord Strangford, as being a character not to be trusted; and further, that you had made this communication to Mr. Canning,

in justification of your reserve to his lordship, I am to acquaint you that Mr. B—— never received any such instructions from my office. Mr. B——'s destination was to procure information of the state of the Spanish provinces, to which point his instructions were alone directed. He had, of course, no instructions from the War Department, as his mission was separate and secret, to act with any Minister employed in the Brazils. The sole reason of his voyage being communicated to you arose from the necessity of his obtaining assistance from you to land him at Buenos Ayres, and to transmit to England, when necessary, his correspondence.

I have thought it right to make to you this explanation, in order that you might be enabled to rectify in Mr. Canning's mind the erroneous conception which appears to have been created by Mr. B——'s statement, viz., that there was any special preclusion to his communicating the object of his mission to his Majesty's Minister at the Court of Brazil.

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to the Hereditary Prince of Mecklenburg.

Copy. Vienna, Wednesday, February 15, 1815.

Sir—Your Highness may be assured my silence has neither arisen from indifference nor from want of due respect. The interest her Majesty feels in whatever concerns your family, must, together with my personal consideration for your Highness, make me sincerely desirous of promoting your views. I have not, however, found it possible to do more than recommend them to Count Münster's attention, after conversing with Prince Hardenberg on the subject.

I shall add my instances, in like manner, with the Duke of Wellington, and shall be most happy to learn that they have been successful.

With the utmost respect, I am, Sir,

Your Highness's most faithful and obedient servant,

CASTLEREAGH.

Mr. Thornton to Lord Castlereagh.

Stockholm, February 15, 1815.

My Lord—It was my intention to have availed myself of the present conveyance by a messenger, in order to give your lordship some general idea of the politics of this country, or rather of the Prince Royal, although I have developed a considerable part of them in my two despatches, Nos. 6 and 7. But, unless I was to detain the messenger Williams longer than I ought to do, I am not equal to the mechanical operation of writing three copies of these reports, which are much more voluminous than I could wish.

As, however, I have room to conclude from the public reports that your lordship may be on your return to England, and consequently out of communication with the Ministers of his Danish Majesty at Vienna, I ought to apprize your lordship that M. de Krabbe received, the day before yesterday, a long reasoned answer to his official note, with no better result than I have had the honour of announcing in my despatch, but more moderate in its terms, and more conciliatory in its form, than he had had room to expect. He ascribes this to the intervention of your lordship; and this is, I doubt not, the case. But more must be done before the just objects of the Danish Government will be attained.

I ought to add, as your lordship will probably have conjectured already, that I have had an unreserved communication with M. de Krabbe, from the time that this question was first brought forward, and that, from the beginning, I never disguised from him my personal opinion, such as I have given it in my former despatches to your lordship. Since the receipt of your despatches by the messenger Williams, it became necessary that he should be acquainted with the contents of them, that his motions towards this Government should not be at variance with my own. I shall obtain from him in a day or two the copy of the Swedish answer; but he

himself is exhausted by the labour of writing for the last few days.

Among the objects which will be brought forward to this Government by foreign missions, at the period of the meeting of the Diet, is the sequester of the Dutch debt, sanctioned by the late Diet at Orebro, during the incorporation of Holland with France. It is probable that M. van Zuylen van Nyvelt will receive the formal orders of his Government to support the reclamations of the Dutch individuals, holders of the debt, which now, by the accumulation of unpaid instalments and of the interest, has attained nearly the amount of the original debt, or fifteen millions of florins. At present, there seems no intention to return to the principles of justice with regard to these creditors. But the order of Burghers in the Diet, who, as merchants and traders, feel the mischief and the dishonour of this conduct, will probably take it up with warmth.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

EDWARD THORNTON.

Lord Walpole to Lord Bathurst.

February 17, 1815.

My dear Lord—I have nothing new to tell you. I hope to send you shortly a new tariff which has been sent to the Emperor, and hitherto not answered. I understand that the change proposed is most complete: the old system prohibited everything, this excludes nothing. Cloth alone bears a heavy import duty—refined sugar a low one—it has been thus framed, to insure its rejection, and the continuation of the old.

The Grand Duke Constantine is playing the devil at Warsaw. He carried from hence the whole of his establishment, among which a Madame Fredericks, the former mistress of a Russian feld-jäger, who brought her some years [ago] from Paris. She has ever since lived with Constantine, and has a son—this *chère amie* he pretended to introduce into the best Polish society; the ladies left the room, and their husbands

were all arrested the next morning, by Constantine's order. I know not what has been the result. Silver rises in price every day; and the want of money has put a complete stop to all mercantile affairs; the best bills pay an interest of 1½ per 100 per month.

Your faithful, humble servant, WALPOLE.

Sir Charles Stuart to Lord Castlereagh.

Copy. The Hague, February 21, 1815.

My Lord—I have had several conversations with the Dutch Minister, respecting the consequences which may eventually result from the alliance to which this Court acceded on the 3rd of February; and the professions I have heard are so precisely in unison with the general system of policy which has been adopted by the King's Government, that I cannot but feel very great satisfaction in making his sentiments known to your lordship.

M. de Nagell has stated to me the substance of the instructions sent to the diplomatic agents of the Prince Sovereign in the principal Courts of Europe, which are not only couched in the spirit of the feelings giving rise to that important act, but prove that a dread of the encroachments of Prussia, which Court the Prince Sovereign considers to be a mere instrument in the hands of her powerful neighbour, is most thoroughly impressed on the minds of his Royal Highness and of his Ministers.

His Excellency has repeatedly mentioned to me, with some exultation, that the Russian and Prussian Envoys are alike ignorant of the measures to which the extravagant pretensions of their respective Courts have compelled the Allies to have recourse—which ignorance, he says, has been betrayed in discussions to which the encroachments of the Prussian troops in the Dutch territory on either bank of the Meuse have given rise, by the menacing observations of the latter, that the ill-humour manifested by this Government may disgust his Sove-

reign, and lead to an understanding with France highly prejudicial to the interests of Holland.

The general tone assumed by M. de Nagell induces me to think that the influence of Russia in this Court is not so great as his Majesty's Government have hitherto been led to suppose; for, although long acquaintance may have ensured General Phüll the protection of the Prince Sovereign, the personal feelings of his Royal Highness respecting that individual do not afford a criterion by which the feelings excited during the Emperor's visit at the Hague last year can be appreciated. Indeed, the language of all the Dutch Ministry is so perfectly unequivocal in this respect, that even occasional deference to M. Phüll's opinions on military matters would not alter my persuasion that a most unfavourable impression towards his Court exists at the Hague, which I must attribute to the unfriendly sentiments of that Power towards Great Britain, and particularly to the evident desire of his Imperial Majesty to estrange the Hereditary Prince from the views of his father, by constantly holding out the advantages he may derive from a Russian connexion.

I have, &c., CHARLES STUART.

The Prince of Orange to the Comte de Thiennes.

Copy. La Haye, ce 23 Février, 1815.

Monsieur le Comte de Thiennes—Les dépêches que j'ai reçues hier au soir de Vienne m'apprennent que les grands intérêts qui ont long tems occupé le Congrès ont été réglés à la satisfaction générale, et d'un commun accord entre l'Autriche, la Russie, l'Angleterre, la France, et la Prusse. Toutes les parties de la Belgique qui ont autrefois appartenues à la première de ces Puissances ont été placées sous ma souveraineté à l'exception de quelques portions du territoire de Limbourg et de Luxembourg, et sous quelques modifications à l'égard de ce dernier duché. Nous conservons sur la rive droite de la Meuse une lisière suffisante pour nous garantir l'entière

jouissance et la libre navigation de ce fleuve; et le ci-devant évêché de Liège est au nombre des pays qui doivent composer la nouvelle monarchie des Pays Bas.

Vous appréciez sans peine l'effet avantageux que ces arrangemens auront sur le bonheur des peuples que la Providence m'appelle à gouverner, et auxquels ce que j'ai déjà pu faire pour eux en des circonstances moins favorables doit servir de gage de ma constante sollicitude pour leurs véritables intérêts.

Mon intention est que vous réunissez sans délai mes Commissaires Généraux et les membres du Conseil Privé, afin de leur communiquer verbalement ce dont je viens de vous faire part.

Connaissant le zèle dont ils sont tous animés pour le bien de la patrie, je ne fais aucun doute qu'ils n'apprennent avec la même satisfaction que vous des nouvelles qui font enfin cesser l'incertitude à laquelle la Belgique a été livrée, et dont il n'a pas dépendu de moi de hâter le terme.

Et cette lettre n'étant à autre fin, je prie Dieu qu'il vous ait Monsieur le Comte de Thiennes, en sa sainte et digne garde.

Sir Charles Stuart to Lord Castlereagh.

Copy. The Hague, February 24, 1815.

My Lord—The courier Ruffe yesterday brought me your lordship's circular letter dated the 13th inst., together with a communication from Lord Clancarty, stating the progress of the general negociation at the Congress for the settlement of Europe, and referring to extracts of the Protocol containing the resolutions which the different Powers have adopted respecting the composition of the Sovereignty destined for the House of Orange, in the form they were transmitted by his lordship to the Prince.

M. de Hardenberg forwarded by the same opportunity his despatches to the Prussian Minister at this Court, containing a copy of the whole Protocol, which M. de Brockhausen communicated in a private audience on the following morning.

M. de Nagell had fortunately called upon me before this audience took place, for the purpose of concerting what measures it might be expedient to adopt in the first instance, and learning how far the publication of the news they had received might interfere with the wishes of the King's Government.

I had thought it my duty upon this occasion, to suggest that it would be prudent to confine their communications to the States-General and to the Council of Belgium to the mere assurance that the fate of the latter was decided, and to wait until further accounts should enable the Prince to ascertain when the whole substance of what has passed might be made known. I farther expressed my opinion that the execution of any act founded upon the intelligence they had already received, should be deferred until some official document, upon which such act could with propriety be grounded, should reach this Government.

These precautions in some degree anticipated the communications of the Prussian Minister, who, when admitted to the audience which he had demanded, expressed himself to be desirous that every communication which has been received should be immediately published, and urged his Royal Highness to assume the title of King, without waiting for any farther intelligence from Vienna—a suggestion the inconvenience arising from provisional arrangements in the Low Countries rendered his Royal Highness sufficiently anxious to follow.

M. de Brockhausen's suggestions having been overruled, and the communication sent to the States-General and the Council of Brabant having been framed by M. de Nagell, in concert with myself, according to the form of the enclosed paper, I presume his Majesty's Government cannot well, under any circumstances, feel inconvenience from the course which has been pursued.

The delivery of Lord Clancarty's letter of recall on the following day gave me an opportunity of hearing the Prince

canvass at considerable length the details of the whole arrangement. I am happy to assure your lordship that his Royal Highness fully participates in the sentiments of gratitude the proceedings of his Majesty's Government have excited among his Ministers. His Royal Highness particularly dwelt on the advantage which the States of his new monarchy will derive from the acquisition of a frontier on the right bank of the river Meuse, which ensures the exclusive possession of that river; and the prudent appropriation of territories to the kingdom of Hanover, which places a Government inclined to protect commerce in immediate contact with the Dutch subjects, appeared to be peculiarly gratifying.

Though the Prince said that a just sense of the vast advantages derived from the general result of the negociation renders him unwilling to criticise the stipulations which are to be carried into effect, he could not but hope it would yet be possible to avoid the inconvenience which must arise from the presence of a foreign, and particularly of a Prussian, garrison in the fortress of Luxembourg, hinting also that the possession of the territory of which that town is the capital, would have been more agreeable to him if acquired by any title than that of a co-estate of the German empire; his Royal Highness observed, however, that the desire his feelings upon these points should be known to his Majesty's Government must not induce me to consider him discontented with the whole arrangement, which far exceeded what his most sanguine hopes would have entitled him to expect.

Adverting to the stipulation for throwing the burden of the debt incurred by former Governments in Belgium upon the Sovereign Prince, although nominally at the charge of Austria, when that country shall be united to Holland, M. de Nagell expressed the wish of his Royal Highness (in consideration that the principal creditors are Dutch and Belgic subjects) that the whole should stand in his own name, and that his Royal Highness should be allowed to make any arrangements which

circumstances may require for the payment of the interest without having recourse to the intervention of the Austrian Government. The origin of the Russian debt being founded on a different principle, he expressed himself to be perfectly satisfied with the modification by which that Power continues to be charged with one half, while the two moieties of the other half are placed to the account of Great Britain and Holland.

I have, &c., CHARLES STUART.

Sir Charles Stuart to Lord Clancarty.

The Hague, February 25, 1815.

My Lord—I have been honoured with your lordship's despatch dated the 14th instant, enclosing his Royal Highness the Prince Regent's letter to the Prince Sovereign of the United Netherlands, which announces your lordship's recall from this Embassy, and an instruction from his Majesty's Secretary of State directing me to deliver that letter, in case the King's service should yet detain your lordship at Vienna.

In obeying this instruction, I took occasion to assure the Prince Sovereign that, as your lordship's exertions have been uniformly directed to the consolidation of the alliance between the two countries, by the promotion of the interests of the House of Orange, I hope to prove my conviction of the wisdom and policy which distinguished your management of the King's affairs, during the period you exercised the functions of Ambassador at this Court, by exactly conforming my own conduct to the same course.

The Prince expressed, in strong terms, the sense of the obligation he feels for your lordship's personal exertions in his behalf, which, his Royal Highness said, no time or circumstance can diminish, and he looks forward with great satisfaction to the opportunity of thanking you in person, if you pass through his dominions when at liberty to return home.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CHARLES STUART.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

Vienna, March 4, 1815, half-past 11 at night.

My dear Lord—With a degree of difficulty which I have seldom before experienced, I have at length procured the so long sought for map from the Prussian Chancery. Hardenberg sent it here to-day, but not till after two o'clock, and, as I had no map exactly of the same scale, it took me till dark to trace the several limits; and all our colouring has been by candle-light; so that, though we have endeavoured to follow those contained in an explanatory note of Hardenberg's, a copy of which goes herewith, Heaven only knows what effect they will show by daylight; however, as you are perfectly acquainted with the subject, I should hope you will be able to make it out.

You will perceive by the map that they have cribbed Bergen in the Department de Mont Tonnerre, to which they have no possible right; it is probable they may have done the same elsewhere.

Charles has got St. Marsan to apply to the King of Sardinia for the cession of the littorale of the Lake of Geneva, between the road and the lake, to a little rivulet near Filli, in addition to the cession of Carouge and its arrondissement.

For the state of the case with Bavaria, I refer to the Duke's despatches. One of them seeks instructions relative to the destruction of the works about Antwerp: the answer to this would be desirable. It is not pleasant to do an unpopular thing, with the certainty of being beaten in the commission; and more especially when, if the point should be carried, it would not be of the least service to us, while at the same time it would injure our friends. Think of this. God bless you!

Yours affectionately, CLANCARTY.

The Comte de Blacas d'Aulps to Lord Castlereagh.

[Indorsed, "Nine Enclosures respecting the Conduct of Murat in the Spring of 1814."]

Paris, le 4 Mars, 1815.

Mylord, la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire avant votre départ de Paris m'a offert une nouvelle preuve de l'importance attachée aux questions dont nous nous étions entretenus. Vous connoissez le désir qu'éprouve le Roi d'établir sur ce point une parfaite intelligence avec le Gouvernement Britannique; et sa Majesté va, en conséquence, envoyer en Italie, dans le plus court délai, une personne revêtue de sa confiance. Cependant vous devez comprendre, Mylord, que le Roi doit suivre, en cette circonstance, la marche que lui prescrivent la dignité de sa Couronne et la sécurité de ses États. Les sacrifices pécuniaires auxquels Sa Majesté peut consentir exigent des garanties dont la conduite de Buonaparte et les sentimens dont il se montre animé prouvent suffisamment l'importance.

Le Roi a donné des ordres à son Ministre des Finances pour que l'on s'occupât sans délai des réclamations faites par des négocians Anglois relativement au commerce de la ville de Bordeaux. Les intérêts des autres sujets de Sa Majesté Britannique vont également être l'objet d'un travail concerté entre ce Ministre et celui des affaires étrangères, qui ne tardera point à vous écrire sur cet objet.

Sa Majesté n'ayant rien de plus à cœur que l'exécution du plan formé au sujet de l'Italie, a déjà songé aux subsides éventuels qui peuvent être nécessaires. Les embarras qu'occasionnent dans ses finances les dilapidations précédentes ne l'empêcheront pas de faire tous les efforts qui seront en son pouvoir, et dans lesquels elle se flatte d'être sécondée par l'Angleterre. Le Roi s'est déjà assuré des moyens pécuniaires dont il lui sera permis de disposer, et je suis chargé, Mylord, de vous en instruire, en vous invitant d'informer Sa Majesté des intentions de votre Gouvernement sur le même objet.

M. le Prince de Talleyrand va recevoir du Roi les instructions les plus précises pour terminer l'important arrangement dont le principe est déjà reconnu. Elles sont conformes aux vues que Sa Majesté vous a fait connoître, et d'après ce que pense M. le Baron de Vincent, il paroit qu'aucune difficulté sérieuse ne mettra obstacle aux modifications qui doivent concilier tous les intérêts et tous les droits à ménager dans cette grande question.

Vous trouverez ci-jointes, Mylord, les copies des lettres dont vous avez vu les originaux entre mes mains. J'ai retrouvé encore depuis dans une autre liasse trois minutes de lettres écrites par Napoléon, dont une n'a point de date. J'ai l'honneur de vous en adresser pareillement des copies; et ce ne sont pas les moins intéressantes des pièces qui ont été decouvertes dans l'immense quantité des papiers où il a fallu faire des recherches.[1]

Recevez, je vous prie, Mylord, l'assurance réitérée de la haute considération avec laquelle j'ai l'honneur d'être votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur.

BLACAS D'AULPS.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

Vienna, March 11, 1815.

My dear Lord—The Duke will, of course, write you all the official intelligence necessary to be communicated by this messenger, and Charles all the rumours and unofficial interesting observations he has collected and made. To these, though far less valuable, I will add my own.

We were at Court the night of the arrival of Burghersh's despatch, containing the news of Buonaparte's flight; and, though there was every attempt to conceal apprehension under the mask of unconcern, it was not difficult to perceive that fear was predominant in all the Imperial and Royal personages

[1] I have not met with any of the papers to which Count Blacas alludes. —EDITOR.

there assembled; and, however much their principal officers endeavoured to make light of this event, the task of disguise was too heavy for them. It appeared to me desirable rather to encourage than to weaken the fears which obviously pervaded all, with a view through these as well to affirm the disposition of active co-operation as to hasten the march and final termination of affairs here. Charles, I know, is of opinion that this latter effect will not be obtained. I think otherwise: already it has had some, in relieving those countries, whose fate has been decided by the articles inserted by you on the Protocols, from the pressure of Provisional Governments; and, in my opinion, it will continue to bring the several contending parties nearer to each other, and impel them to an early agreement.

How far any advance has hitherto been made towards this desirable result the Duke will acquaint you: unfortunately, some time has necessarily been lost in impressing the few points in litigation here to agreement, by the absence for these three days past of the Duke and Princes Talleyrand and Metternich at Presburg, from whence they will not return till this evening. The length of time they have remained there leads me to fear they may have encountered difficulties in their negociation there, which at this moment would be peculiarly embarrassing. The result of it, however, will be communicated by the Duke by the present messenger.

Your letter from Paris would have greatly assisted us in the Parma business, if it did not seem at the present moment to be the impression that the whole treaty of April with Buonaparte has fallen to the ground by his hostile invasion of France.

The final close of the Swiss arrangement of territory only now awaits for the return of a courier from Turin, authorizing the surrender to Geneva of the district of Carouge, and of a small portion also between the road and the Lake.

Wrede informs me that he is inclined to be *coulant* upon

the exchanges with Bavaria from Austria; and it is expected that the King of Prussia's apprehensions may no longer lead him to oppose the cession of Hanau.

On German affairs, both Stein and Münster are of opinion that, the decision of the King of Saxony once declared, much time need not be required for their final arrangement. The late conduct of Wurtemberg may, however, create an obstacle; and the declaration of the Prince Royal, last night, at Cathcart's, that he would not suffer any Power, or number of Powers, to interfere with any of the concerns, whether relating to the *mediatisés* or otherwise, within the limits of his father's kingdom, would almost lead to the supposition of its being the intention of this house to declare an entire independence, and abstract itself from whatever may be the future Confederation of Germany.

You will recollect a Note from Russia to Wurtemberg, in answer to one from the latter, seeking an alliance, a copy of which I obtained for you from Gagern for another purpose; this will show you that, at that time at least, Russia was far from being favourable to a view of this sort in Wurtemberg, as the principal ground therein stated for declining the sought for alliance is that it would contravene the constitutional compact of the Confederacy.

Our River Commission can be terminated at any time. The Duke de Dalberg's illness (who is, however, now convalescent) has latterly delayed us. Upon this subject, I mean to obtain Wellington's sanction to my proposing in that Commission, relative to Antwerp, as the best means of obtaining the greatest degree of destruction, (if such destruction should still be thought expedient by our Government) that, as the article of the treaty had required Antwerp to be only a commercial port, the obvious way of carrying it into effect would be the destruction of all works created with a view of its being made one of naval equipment; but that as some of these, while they might be rendered unfit for a military marine, might be of conside-

rable service to the commerce of the place, a Commissary should be appointed on the part of England, and another on that of the Prince of Orange, to arrange and carry into effect the demolition of all which may fall under the description of being appropriate only to military marine purposes, and the partial destruction of such as may be useful to commerce, with a view to their being rendered immediately applicable to war. We shall have more chance under an arrangement of this sort, with our influence at his Royal Highness's Court, of carrying into execution the views of those who conceive the demolition of the basins requisite, than we could hope to obtain of carrying the work of destruction to any extent, through the medium of the Commission, where I could not hope for support from a single individual, and should meet with my greatest opponent in the Dutch Minister.

Such, as far as I am acquainted with them, is the state of the remaining points here, and I protest I see no reason, if the inclination exists, as I think, in contradiction to Charles's opinion, it now does, for their immediate adjustment, why we should not sign and seal perhaps even before the expiration of the present month.

The courier, with London letters to the 28th ult., arrived this morning, bearing one from Lord Liverpool to me of that date, which announces the Prince Regent's intention of investing me with the Order of the Bath, in consideration of those services which your partiality so kindly induced you to place in so prominent a point of view in one of your despatches of the 14th ult. It would ill become me, my dear lord, to overrate those services, or to undervalue any mark of his Royal Highness's approbation; but I believe you are sufficiently aware of my object in life, and of my sentiments upon this kind of distinction, to know that it is the very last which I should have sought as a mark of the approbation of my Government.

In truth, this intelligence has filled me with dismay. I was

induced to hope, not certainly from any direct authority to this effect, but founding myself on your constant and unremitting kindness, that the terms of your despatch of the 14th of February were perhaps designed to obtain for me that object which had once been so positively stipulated by Government in the year 1807—which has long since formed that upon which alone my hopes were bent, and which, if unattained now, neither my time of life nor my general state of health can ever authorize me to expect to lay legitimate grounds for attaining in future. Aware of the difficulties in which Government are and are ever likely to be placed, in the disposal of the species of patronage in question, I did entertain the hope that such services as had been rendered available by your despatch, having been performed under circumstances unique in themselves, and which consequently could not be pleaded by others, might perhaps have removed the embarrassments of Government, and led them to have embraced this opportunity of fulfilling my wishes upon a point which, in the Duke of Portland's time, had been positively stipulated as the price of a service which I had prepared myself and was immediately ready to have undertaken.

Having confessed my hopes, judge of my disappointment at these being at once annihilated by the receipt of Lord Liverpool's letter, and at their termination at being made the *confrère* of Sir Philip Francis! Such is the *bouleversement* of my ideas upon it, that I cannot put them in sufficient train to know how to address an answer to Lord Liverpool, upon the information he has conveyed to me. I will endeavour by the next messenger to collect them so as to address him, and shall send my letter (with a copy of it) to you, to be delivered or not, as you shall judge expedient. If, without offence, which is far from being intended, this honour of Bath investiture, so calculated to destroy all hope of the British peerage, could be declined, it would be extremely desirable to me. For this purpose, I have mentioned the offer only to Charles, in the

hope that it may not have been made public in England, and that, if still possible, the greater object may be substituted for that proposed, and which I should consider as inadequate to efface the deduction, however innocently still injuriously, flowing from the act of the other branches of Administration, by the appointment of the Duke of Wellington.

I have too long perhaps dwelt upon myself and my own concerns. You will do me the justice to admit that I am not in the habit of doing so in general: indeed, I have always found them better placed in your hands than in my own. There I am still anxious to leave them, and perfectly confident I am that, whatever may be the result, it will furnish an additional mass to the sum of gratitude I already owe you.

The Duke will send you officially, by this Messenger, the copy of the last letter received by me from the Prince of Orange, in answer to mine of the 14th ult., by which you will see how well satisfied he is with your arrangements in his favour. My answer to this letter, despatched by M. de Capellen on Thursday, will also be forwarded to you by this conveyance.

Yours, my dear Lord, very affectionately,

CLANCARTY.

Sir Charles Stuart to the Duke of Wellington.

The Hague, March 17, 1815.

My dear Lord—As the news from France is daily more alarming, I think it my duty, with reference to the communications which I have received from the King's Government, to transmit you the accompanying copies of the despatches I have addressed this day to Lord Castlereagh, and of which, I presume, you will state the substance to Lord Clancarty.

Mr. St. George, who is anxious to join his lordship or Mr. Cooke, will be the bearer of these letters.

I am, my dear lord, most faithfully yours,

CHARLES STUART.

[Enclosures.]

Sir Charles Stuart to Lord Castlereagh.

Copy. The Hague, March 17, 1815.

My Lord—The precautionary measures adopted by this Government are already in the progress of execution: they have determined to suspend the departure of the fleets which were already equipped, to convey the Dutch garrisons to the East and West Indies, which arrangements will give an accession of 4,000 men in the army, and the necessary seamen to man the flotillas.

The troops which have received orders to repair to Belgium are already in march to Maestricht and the countries on the Meuse.

The flotilla of gun-boats on the Scheldt and Meuse is in a state of preparation, and, in the course of a short time, will be in readiness for active service on those rivers.

Maestricht, Venloo, and Antwerp, will be provisioned without delay: allowance is made for the support of 15,000 men in the former place during two months.

The plan drawn up by the Commission, under the direction of General Krayenhoff, for the defence of the frontier, is, I understand, completed, and has been transmitted directly to the Prince of Orange, to be forwarded, through his Royal Highness's intervention, to his Majesty's Government. M. de Nagell said that, although he was hitherto ignorant of the general principle of defence laid down in this paper, the satisfaction expressed by those to whom it had been communicated authorized him to hold out a confident assurance that the labours of the Commission were conducted upon a system diametrically the reverse of that system laid down by General Phüll.

The expense already incurred in the purchase of supplies, which it is necessary to collect in the frontier towns, and the construction of works to protect those places against a *coup de*

main, has induced M. de Nagell to request me to represent to his Majesty's Government the urgent necessity of an immediate allowance on the account of the two millions to be appropriated to the defence of the Low Countries, to whatever amount it may be convenient for my Court to allow.

He has farther pressed me to state that it is very necessary that a supply of arms should be placed at the disposal of this Government, for the new levies, and for the militia of the Low Countries; and I have thought it my duty to say that I have every reason to believe this latter request will be forthwith granted without any difficulty.

I have also ventured to assure M. de Nagell that the unexpected event which has arrested the departure of the Dutch expedition to the Colonies will not make any difference in the dispositions of his Majesty's Government respecting those possessions; and I have no doubt that your lordship will not only confirm this assurance, but will enable me to facilitate their license trade to and from Europe, nearly to the extent which would follow a state of actual possession.

I have, &c., CHARLES STUART.

Sir Charles Stuart to Lord Castlereagh.

Copy. The Hague, March 17, 1815.

My Lord—The Baron de Nagell yesterday invited the Ministers of Russia and Prussia, and the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires, to repair at the same hour to the Foreign Office, for the purpose of stating to them the substance of the despatches which have been received from Paris, communicating the precautions which this Government have deemed advisable in the present crisis of affairs, and establishing such a concert of public measures as shall be conformable with the stipulations of existing treaties.

The Russian and Prussian Ministers appear to have determined, before they came to the meeting, to support a common opinion, and to propose certain measures to M. de Nagell

which had been agreed upon between them. The latter stated that, although a great part of the Prussian army hitherto cantoned on the French frontier had recrossed the Rhine, he calculated that a corps of 35,000 men still remained, under the command of General Kleist; and, as the column which was destined to march through Hanover had probably not hitherto moved beyond the neighbourhood of Wesel, a sufficient force may be brought together in time to prevent the advance of Napoleon, provided the British army in Belgium, which occupies the districts nearest the frontier, should avail themselves of the present circumstances to move into France and to secure some of the fortresses in the line of Luxemburg, whence the combined forces would be enabled to penetrate into the interior, and act on the communication between Paris and Lyons.

While the Prussian Minister offered to recommend these proceedings upon his own responsibility, and immediately to send directions to the Prussian generals to move the several corps under their command, M. de Phüll, who perfectly concurred in the propriety of the general measure, appeared rather desirous that nothing should be done before the last courier should return from Vienna.

I merely stated to these gentlemen that, although I could not take upon myself to say anything respecting the movement thus proposed, on the part of the British troops, I conceived it might be prudent to lose no time in concentrating the army under the Prince of Orange near the frontier, and urging General Kleist to do the same, by which means they would be in perfect readiness to execute such measures as may appear expedient under the instructions we may daily expect from Vienna and London.

Notwithstanding that the Dutch Minister did not appear in any respect biassed by the counsels of my colleagues, I thought it necessary to observe to him that the violent alternatives recommended might have a most unfavourable effect upon the

cause of the Bourbons, if adopted before the decided successes of Buonaparte should compel Louis XVIII. to have recourse to foreign assistance; and I reminded him that, although M. de Brockhausen calculated the force under General Kleist to be 35,000, we were well convinced he had not 20,000, which, united with his Majesty's troops in the Low Countries, would not by any means be a sufficient number to undertake an operation of the magnitude and hazard he had recommended.

M. de Nagell therefore agreed with me that the concentration of all the disposable force which can be brought together near the frontier is the only measure advisable at the present moment. As the Dutch corps, which are already in march towards Maestricht, will exceed 20,000 men, the whole will, by this means, be in a situation to execute any operation which shall appear advisable whenever the intentions of the King's Government are known.

I have, &c., CHARLES STUART.

Sir Charles Stuart to Lord Castlereagh.

Copy. The Hague, March 17, 1815.

My Lord—The proclamation, of which I enclose a copy, yesterday announced that the Prince Sovereign had assumed the dignity of King of the Low Countries, which event was communicated to me in the note I forward from the Secretary of State, together with my acknowledgment.

The King proceeded at ten o'clock to the States-General, to whom the change was formally notified. His Majesty afterwards received the compliments of the great officers of State and the *corps diplomatique*. The troops took the oaths of obedience the same day. The King will proceed this evening to Amsterdam, and will be present at the ceremony of the proclamation in that city.

As I conceive that I shall be earlier informed of any measure which may be adopted, after the arrival of the intelligence,

hourly expected, from France, I propose to follow the Court, and to continue at the capital until their return to the Hague.

I have, &c., CHARLES STUART.

Sir Charles Stuart to Lord Castlereagh.

Copy. The Hague, March 17, 1815.

My Lord—I had already written the accompanying despatches, which in some measure anticipate the instructions I have received, when I was honoured with your lordship's Nos. 9 and 10, with their respective enclosures.

I was thus enabled to repeat the substance of these important communications to the King, through the medium of M. de Nagell, and to hear the observations to which they had given rise, before the departure of the Court for Amsterdam. His Majesty highly appreciates the wisdom of the policy which his Royal Highness the Prince Regent has determined to adopt respecting the affairs of France, and has empowered M. de Nagell to declare to me his hearty concurrence in the measures which the Government of his ally considers expedient to meet every variation which may occur in that kingdom.

His Excellency farther assured me that the King has learned with grateful satisfaction the intention of the Prince Regent to entrust the command of the Allied armies in the Low Countries to the Duke of Wellington, and looks forward with confidence to the period when the resignation of the Prince of Orange in favour of that officer shall ensure the protection of his dominions. The King's feelings on this subject will, I understand, be expressed in a letter to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, which will be delivered by the ambassador in London.

As the union of the troops in the service of the United Netherlands with those of Great Britain is the basis of every system of defence which has been hitherto contemplated, I

conceive that it will be unnecessary to imply a doubt of the King's concurrence by a formal invitation to that effect.

The impropriety of public rejoicings during the season of Lent in a country where religious differences prevail with considerable acrimony, had induced this Government, at the suggestion of several among the Belgic deputies, to suspend the removal to Brussels until Easter: they have now, however, resolved to comply with the suggestion contained in your lordship's letter to me; but I do not think that it will be possible to reach Brussels before that period, though the King proposes only to stay at the Hague two or three days after his return from Amsterdam, and to begin his journey on Monday week.

I have the honour, &c.,

CHARLES STUART.

Mr. Edward Cooke to Lord Castlereagh.

Rome, March 17, 1815.

My dear Lord—Murat having declared that he would support Bonaparte's fortunes, in letters to Cardinal Fesch, which the cardinal read publicly, and having marched his whole army to the very frontiers, we are expecting the arrival of his troops. In consequence, the King of Spain left this place yesterday for Florence. The Queen of Etruria is preparing to follow; and his Holiness has made preparations for leaving Rome when necessary.

It occurred to me that circumstances might arise in which much should be hazarded to arrest the march of Murat: I understand that his language has been uniform, viz., that if England would declare for his establishment, nothing should induce him to break his neutrality, and that he would even support the Allies against Bonaparte; but, as England would not declare for him, and as he believed Congress against him, he must support himself, and endeavour to engage Italy in his cause.

Under these circumstances, I ventured to sound to-day the Bishop of St. Maloes, the French ambassador to this Court, and I submitted to him whether, in the event of an urgent necessity, which might make the continuation of the Bourbons on the throne of France dependent on the re-establishment of Murat on the throne of Naples, whether he would venture, though without instruction or powers, or under contrary instructions and powers, to make such a proposition to Murat, *sub spe rati*. I did not, however, find his Excellency's mind bold enough for such a measure. He said he had been sounded on the subject by Murat, and, though he had never favoured, he had never repulsed the overture; that many Frenchmen were favourable to Murat's establishment, but that the King's family affections were so strong, he could not venture to take such a responsibility without authority, and contrary to instructions.

I own, if the bishop's mind could have been inclined to entertain such a measure, I should have resolved to affect the minister, and to propose the establishment of Murat, *sub spe rati*, if necessary.

I thought of burning this, but you may as well read my thoughts.

Ever most truly, your lordship's servant,

E. Cooke.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

Vienna, March 18, 1815.

My dear Lord—Under the overwhelming circumstances which are hourly occurring in France, from the defection of the army, and black and bloody prospects thence arising placing as they do in jeopardy many of the arrangements here made, and especially those relating to the Low Countries, I am really ashamed to commence a letter to you with a matter of such insignificant import as one relating to myself. Nevertheless, it is impossible to leave Lord Liverpool's letter of the

28th ult., announcing the Prince Regent's intention of investing me with the Order of the Bath, any longer unacknowledged.

Upon the nature of this answer I have been at considerable loss. On the one hand, the strong and flattering terms of your despatch of the 14th ult. are so highly honourable, that I should be sorry by any act of mine to declare them as, in my own opinion, of no higher value than what would be repaid by my association with Sir Philip Francis and others of the twelve; and consequently should feel myself more highly honoured by that despatch remaining alone and unsupported on record, than by acknowledging that I was satisfied by the intended distinction.

On the other hand, I should be most unfeignedly averse to give offence, or to appear to undervalue a mark of distinction which his Royal Highness and my Government may appreciate more highly than, as referable to my own person, I am disposed to do.

Under these circumstances I have written two letters to Lord Liverpool, in answer to his of the 28th ult., both of which I send herewith under flying seal for your perusal, and throw myself upon your indulgence to request that, aware of my views and sentiments, you will be so kind as to deliver whichever of them you may think proper. They only differ in this, that the one contains a paragraph, requesting to be permitted to decline the intended distinction, which is omitted in the other. In the mean time, should it be pressed, I will postpone the ceremony of investiture till after the receipt of your opinion, upon the arrival of which, it can either be postponed *sine die*, or proceeded in, according to your desire. Pardon, I pray you, this trouble; pardon much more—the occupation of your attention with such a *misère* at such a time, and be most assured of my utmost gratitude for whatever line your superior judgment shall lead you to take upon it.

It seems to me unfortunate that the Duke of Wellington

was ever removed from Paris: his presence near the King, on the landing of Buonaparte in France, would have been invaluable, as well in assuring poor Louis, as in giving strength to those whose sentiments were in favour of the ancient dynasty. He would, besides, have thus been near our own Government, ready to take their orders for the formation, and, if necessary, for the movement, of ours and the other forces in the Low Countries. His going to Paris now must be out of the question: his person could not be hazarded in such a journey, under the present state of things.

Besides that, we have received no courier from England subsequent to that which brought us letters down to the 28th ult. We have other strong grounds to apprehend that one of our messengers has been intercepted in his passage hither from Paris. Brussels, therefore, will probably be the point to which the Duke will bend his course, if he shall set out, as he talks of doing, in a few days. I believe he waits for the arrival of another messenger from England, before he shall finally decide; but of all this he will doubtless give you better intelligence than I am enabled to do.

I must own, I could have wished that he, as being by far the most capable, or at least some other British officer of weight, had been immediately placed upon the northern frontier of France, to take advantage of any marks of loyalty either in the garrisons or inhabitants of the strong towns in that line, and, by countenancing it by the protection of our troops, to have, if possible, saved those towns for the King, and to have thus prevented them from becoming, as their defection will render them, a ready means of offence for the re-conquest of the Netherlands. The Duke, I know, is not of this opinion, conceiving that any foreign interference would be of no avail, either on the northern frontier or in any other part of France. Interference, however, of this sort, I should think, ought to be made an exception to his general rule; going only to protect, it could scarcely be suspected, and if

even opportunity should present itself for forcibly seizing, in the name of the King, such fortified places, as, from the circumstances of absence of garrison, want of provisions, &c., should be exposed to such seizure, it would fully enter into my ideas to avail themselves of it.

Neither does the latter paragraph of the declaration of the 13th of March oppose this, when coupled with that preceding it, which last, as being a general engagement to all the world, must necessarily supersede one formed only with such Powers alone as should be attacked, if even they should be deemed incompatible the one with the other.

The instructions of Government upon subsidies especially, and on all other arrangements likely to issue from the late events, will be much required here—would you were with us again!—this, under present circumstances, would be the event most devoutly to be desired. The confidence inspired into all by such a step, the influence in keeping things together, in pointing the united force in a proper direction, in counteracting intrigue, would be most invaluable. Surely, as things at present stand, the difficulties of re-establishing the whole of the war taxes must be greatly diminished; and, this once obtained, the more immediate urgency of affairs upon the Continent could in no other manner be so well satisfied as by your presence.

The Duke will give you a full account of the several transactions here: we have not, as you will perceive, made any considerable progress; and I begin to think Charles's opinion will turn out more correct than mine, as to the efficacy of the late events in hastening matters to a conclusion.

The Valteline question, upon which the final settlement of Switzerland and the affair also of Parma depend, you will perceive, is hung up till some future period. What advance has been made in the negociation between Austria and Bavaria I am not informed; but I believe matters remain nearly in the same state in which they were at your departure.

Doubtful whether we shall now be able to preserve the Pays Bas and Duchy of Luxemburg for Holland and its Sovereign, it is scarcely of consequence to tell you that the Duke has sounded both Rassamoufsky and Hardenberg, to know whether their Courts would have any objection to the Prince of Orange assuming the title of Grand, in lieu of that alone of Duc of Luxemburg; and, finding them disposed to gratify the Prince in this respect, an article will be proposed for insertion on the Protocol accordingly. The reasons of the Prince for desiring this are two; first, that his House should be placed *au pair* with those princes in the German Confederacy who, without possessing greater territories, had assumed this style; and, secondly, to prevent the Luxembourgeois from concluding that all the forms, privileges, and regulations of their ancient Government under the House of Austria should be exactly preserved to them under their new master.

By desire of St. Marsan, I send you herewith his Sardinian Majesty's present in lieu of the Annonciade: he has sent me a picture of the King, set in diamonds, as a substitute for the St. Maurice and St. Lazare.

God bless you, my dear lord, and send us all better days!

Yours most affectionately,

CLANCARTY.

Since I wrote the above, Wellington has cheered me a little by a letter from Paris, written on the night of the 11th, which places things in a point of view not so bad as the accounts previously received: it is from Jaucourt. Pray look to that part of his despatch relating to the proposed treaties on the model of those of Chaumont, in which he states the arrangement by which an option is placed in the hands of Great Britain, to pay such Powers as she may think fit the amount of deficiencies in her quota of force. This appears to me to follow up one of your late arrangements, and to be admirable for assisting the Pays Bas.

Lord Bathurst to Mr. Baker.

Foreign Office, March 21, 1815.

Sir—Your despatch, No. 1, of the 19th February, transmitting the ratification by the American Government of the Treaty of Ghent, has been duly received; and I have the satisfaction to convey to you the Prince Regent's entire approbation of the diligence and zeal which you have manifested in the execution of the important charge with which you were entrusted.

I am, &c., BATHURST.

The Duke de Castries to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent.

Brighton, ce 24 Mars à minuit, Castle Inn.

Monseigneur—Lorsque j'ai eu l'honneur d'écrire directement de Dieppe à Votre Altesse Royale, j'ignorois à qui m'adresser pour faire part des ordres du Roy mon maître que j'avais reçu; je n'avois qu'un moment pour écrire; j'étois embarqué avec ma famille; j'ai descendu du packet sur le champ, et toutes les dispositions étoient faites pour le recevoir et le défendre dans mon commandement; mais le Marquis de Castries, mon fils, que j'avois envoyé au devant de lui, m'a mandé qu'il étoit parti d'Abbeville pour Lille, ainsi que je l'ai écrit à Lord Liverpool hier au soir. Dans cet état des choses, et les proclamations de Buonaparte étant arrivées à Dieppe, je n'avois plus autre chose à faire, après les avoir retenu pendant 12 heures et avoir mis un embargo sur tous les bâtiments, que de partir, parceque on ne m'auroit plus obéi. Je dois cependant dire que la ville de Dieppe comme tous les citoyens français sont bons; il n'y a que la troupe de mauvaise: c'est un composé de brigands, à la tête desquels est Napoléon; tout le reste est royaliste. La Vendée a 50,000 hommes, à lat ête desquels est M. le Duc de Bourbon; M. le Duc d'Angoulême est à Nismes, Madame la Duchesse d'Angoulême à Bordeaux, M. le Duc d'Orléans étoit à Perronne

avec le Maréchal Mortier, Duc de Trevise; je ne sais pas ce qu'il a devenu. J'avois 10,000 hommes sous mes ordres; elles ont toutes trahies comme les autres; j'en avois prévenu le Roy et Monsieur, Dimanche à 9 heures du soir; ils sont partis à 2 heures après minuit le même jour. Le Maréchal Ney a joint Napoléon, dès que son armée l'a déserté. J'irois moi-même lui en rendre compte, si j'avois de l'argent, mais le peu que j'avois je l'ai dépensé pour le service du Roy; et il ne m'en reste que pour exister un mois avec ma famille, de sorte que je suis obligé d'avoir une grande économie.

Le Roy est parti d'Abbeville le 22 pour Lille, ainsi que je l'ai mandé à Lord Liverpool. Il a avec lui 3,000 hommes, de sa maison, qui sont harrassés, les Maréchaux Berthier, Marmont, Macdonald, les Généraux Lauriston, Lagrange, Durfort, Damas, &c., &c. Je ne sais s'il sera reçu à Lille, mais s'il ne l'est pas, il tâchera de se diriger, je suppose, sur Calais, et j'ignore où Monsieur qui faisoit son arrière-garde se portera. M. de Trogoff m'a porté des ordres de leur part et ils ont changé de projets je suppose, parceque ils ont trouvé des obstacles dans leurs chemins. Peut-être votre Altesse Royale en sait elle d'avantage plus directement, mais dans le cas où elle ne les auroit pas eû, je crois devoir lui envoyer deux gazettes officielles, qui lui apprendront les proclamations du Roy et de Napoléon.

Je n'ai pas le tems d'écrire à l'ambassadeur du Roy, le Comte de la Chatre, mais si votre Altesse Royale veut bien lui en faire part j'en serai bien reconnoissant. Je reste ici jusqu'à que je sache ce que le Roy est devenu. S'il vient à Calais, et que celui n'aye pas de troupes, il pourra le défendre beaucoup mieux avec les gens de la ville.

Je suis vraiment honteux d'écrire ainsi directement à votre Altesse Royale, mais en me rapellant des anciennes bontés et des circonstances, j'ose me flatter qu'elle voudra bien m'excuser.

Le fait est que la France est divisée en une armée de brigands, qui n'ont ni foy ni loy, et des citoyens, tous pour le

Roy. C'est le cas d'agir activement pour les puissances, si elles veuillent que l'Europe ne soit pas bouleversée.

Je suis avec profond respect, Monseigneur, de votre Altesse Royale le très humble et très obéissant Serviteur et Sujet de tous les Rois,

Le Duc de Castries.

The Duke de Castries to Lord Castlereagh.

Brighton, ce Samedi matin, à six heures, le Castle Inn.

Mon cher Lord—J'ai débarqué hier à une heure à Rye, à cause du mauvais tems, et suis venu de suite à Brighton, où je devois joindre ma famille que j'y avois envoyé, et qui étoit inquiéte de moi; mais elle étoit restée à m'attendre à Newhaven. Dès que j'ai appris que Mr. Clements de Dieppe avoit passé avec vos paquets, j'ai envoyé un exprès à Newhaven où il devoit s'embarquer pour l'arrêter. Il m'apporta votre dépêche, et je ne peux vous dire assez combien je suis reconnaissant de votre bonté, et le regret que j'ai que le Roy ait changé de direction; car j'avois mis un embargo à Dieppe pour l'y faire embarquer. Je l'ai levé dès que j'ai sçu qu'il alloit à Lille. Je suis parti, mais dans le cas où il ne seroit pas sûr de cette ville, et qu'il ne peut pas passer en Brabant, peut-être iroit-il à Calais. C'est mon opinion; mais Sa Majesté ne me le mande pas. Dans des circonstances comme celle-cy il faut tout prévoir.

Je mande au Prince Régent tout ce que je sçais. Il vous montrera ma lettre. Je vous présente mes hommages.

Le Duc de Castries.

Je resterai à Brighton ou à Newhaven jusqu'à ce que je reçoive des ordres du Roy.

The Count de Blacas to Lord Castlereagh.

Ostende, 25 Mars, 1815, à 1 heure après midi.

Mylord—Vous aurez déjà appris que le Roi mon maître avoit été obligé de quitter Lille et de passer à Menin, d'où

sa Majesté s'est rendue à Ostende hier au soir. Elle y est venue dans l'intention d'attendre des nouvelles de sa maison militaire, qui avoit ordre de se porter sur Dunkerque, et de savoir également le parti qu'avoit pris Monsieur et le Duc de Berri, qui marchoient à la tête des troupes de la maison du Roi, et de quelques corps qui devoient s'y réunir.

Dans cette attente le Roi ne peut prendre aucune détermination ultérieure; mais l'intention de Sa Majesté est de tenter tous les moyens qui pourront dépendre d'elle pour aller de nouveau en France, animer par sa présence le zèle de ses fidèles sujets, qui sont prêts à tout entreprendre pour seconder les efforts qui seront fait en faveur de l'autorité légitime. Vous pouvez être certain, mylord, que trente mille hommes, entrant actuellement en France, *avec la cocarde blanche*, réuniront tous les habitans qui ne démandent que des armes; et que ce corps, en marchant sur Paris, sans perdre un instant, ne rencontrera que bien peu d'obstacles, et trouvera dans la capitale une immense population, prête non seulement à se réunir à lui, mais à l'aider de tous ses moyens, pour renverser l'homme audacieux, qui veut de nouveau asservir la France et faire la guerre à l'Europe.

Quelques bâtimens et un vaisseau de guerre seroient bien nécessaire au Roi, pour le transporter où sa présence sera jugé utile, s'il ne peut aller sur le champ à Dunkerque. Sa Majesté compte sur l'appui de ses Alliés, et il est certain d'avance de tout celui qu'il recevra du Prince Régent d'Angleterre et de votre généreuse nation.

Recevez, mylord, une nouvelle assurance du bien sincère attachement, ainsi que de la haute considération, avec laquelle j'ai l'honneur d'être de votre Excellence le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

BLACAS D'AULPS.

Lord Cathcart to Lord Castlereagh.

Vienna, March 25, 1815.

My dear Lord—I am not aware that I can add anything to the information you will receive by this conveyance from the Duke and from Lord Stewart, concerning the state of public business here.

The first Russian division will have its head-quarters at Prague on the 14th of April, pointing towards Wurtemberg. The Emperor's field equipage and horses are to move from Warsaw with the head-quarters. It does not seem decided when the Emperor Alexander will leave Vienna, or where he may go before the army is assembled. His Imperial Majesty has very graciously declared to me his readiness to receive me again at his head-quarters as formerly.

In the meanwhile I of course remain here, to render the best assistance in my power in the business of the Congress, until further orders, or until it may become expedient that I should go to the Emperor.

The regrets on the subject of your departure have not abated, either in public societies or among your private friends.

Ever, my dear lord, most faithfully and sincerely yours,

CATHCART.

Lord Castlereagh to the Duke of Wellington.

Copy. London, March 26, 1815.

My dear Lord—I have nothing material to add to my letter. We wait with impatience for intelligence from all quarters. The great question is, can the Bourbons get Frenchmen to fight *for them* against Frenchmen? If they can, Europe may soon turn the tide in their favour; and, the process of fermentation once begun, they may create real partisans, instead of criers of *Vive le Roi!* and doers of nothing.

If we are to undertake the job, we must leave nothing to chance. It must be done upon the largest scale. With Mayence, Luxembourg, and Lille, you start on solid grounds,

and no fortresses in the rear to blockade as before. But you must inundate France with force in all directions. If Bonaparte could turn the tide, there is no calculating upon his plan; and we must always recollect that Poland, Saxony, and much Jacobinism, are in our rear.

I wish you would turn in your mind the principles to be acted upon in France. The applying those you acted upon in the South to the force you will now command of all nations, is out of the question. The utmost we could attempt would be to be honest ourselves, and this would only make our Allies more odious. My notion is, that France must pay the price of her own deliverance—that the King should consider the Allied troops—that every corps should be accompanied by a French ordonnateur, through whom all requisitions for forage and subsistence should be made; the value to be paid in Bons, the liquidation of which should be assured upon a peace, either in whole, or in the greater proportion, at the expense of the French Government.

Unless some system of this kind is agreed upon, the war will either degenerate, as it did last year, into an indiscriminate and destructive pillage, or *we* shall be bankrupts, and driven out of the field in three months. I know the difficulties of what I suggest; but the alternative in the less objectionable sense leads at once to impossibilities and ruin.

Pray consider whether the territorial acquisitions of Austria must not be reduced into articles. I think she cannot rest her title merely upon the secret and very general article in the Treaty of Paris.

I am, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

We long to hear of you in Flanders.

Lord Castlereagh to the Duke of Wellington.

Copy. London, March 27, 1815.

My dear Lord—It is to be presumed, in the hurry of their departure, the Foreign Office at Paris has not been stripped by

the King's Ministers of any of its contents, and consequently that our Secret Treaty with France and Austria, as well as all Prince Talleyrand's correspondence, will fall into Buonaparte's hands. He will of course try to turn this to account, first in privately sowing discord; and, if he fails in this, he will expose the whole in the Moniteur. I have desired Sir C. Stuart to ascertain from Blacas how the fact stands, and leave it to your judgment to take such steps as you deem most suitable for counteracting any unfavourable impression.

I flatter myself, after all he knew long since, it cannot produce any unfavourable impression upon the Emperor of Russia's mind. He must feel assured that the whole grew out of differences now settled, and a most indiscreet declaration of Prince Hardenberg's. The treaty is, upon the face of it, purely defensive; and all our proceedings since have proved this beyond a doubt.

In haste, ever yours, CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Walpole to Lord Castlereagh.

March 28, 1815.

My dear Lord—The state of the interior here daily becomes more alarming, and those hitherto most loud in praises of the Emperor have lately changed their tone. His refusal to reduce any part of the military establishment has caused a strong sensation: the whole revenue of the Empire is unequal to the expenditure of the army alone. The distress is so great for the want of money, that the interest due to the Bank for 92,000,000 roubles, lent upon mortgage, cannot be paid at the present moment.

Bonaparte's evasion has caused a strong sensation, and we are accused as the authors of it. Exchange fell yesterday, and likely to be still lower. Silver becomes dearer.

Yours, &c., WALPOLE.

Brouillon of a Despatch from Lord Clancarty to Mr. Stratford Canning.

Vienna, March 29, 1815.

Sir—I have the honour to acquaint you that his Grace the Duke of Wellington set out this morning from Vienna, to take the command of the army in the Low Countries. Having thus been placed in the direction of affairs at Congress, upon the part of Great Britain, I have to request that whatever communications you may think it expedient to make to his Majesty's Plenipotentiaries here may be addressed to me.

It having been agreed that the several Powers should act in concert with respect to the affairs of Switzerland, and send similar instructions for mutual co-operation there to their several Ministers, I have the honour to enclose you those which will be forwarded by the present courier to the Baron de Krudener, also a copy of a despatch from the Prince de Metternich to M. de Schraut, together with a copy of the Protocol therein referred to, and a copy of the late treaty entered into by the Allies, and alluded to in the *projet* of the despatch to M. de Krudener.

In consequence of the agreement above referred to, I take the liberty of requesting that you will be so good as to act in concert with the Ministers your colleagues, according with the directions conveyed in these papers.

By a courier which will set out hence to-night for England, I shall forward a copy of this despatch and its several enclosures, for the information of his Majesty's Government.

I am sure I need not recommend that, in co-operating with your colleagues in endeavouring to discover the intentions of the Diet, with respect to the system of co-operation to be afforded in the present effort, the greatest delicacy may be observed.

I have the honour to acquaint you that the Court of Sardinia have consented, in addition to the district of Carouge,

to cede a small portion of territory between the route de Simplon and the Lake of Geneva, bounded by the river Hermance, to the Canton of Geneva, and that this cession, and also the neutralization of Chablais and Faucigny, were last night acceded to by the five Powers. I shall take the first opportunity after the protocols on this subject shall be in a sufficiently forward state for this purpose, to transmit them to you.

I have the honour to be, &c., C.

Lord Cathcart to Lord Castlereagh.

Vienna, April 1, 1815.

My dear Lord—Field-Marshal Prince Schwarzenberg sent me an invitation yesterday, in the morning, to meet the Emperor of Russia at his office, at noon the same day. Having previously communicated with Lord Clancarty, I went to this appointment. There were present at this conference his Majesty the Emperor of Russia, the Prince Royal of Wurtemberg, Field-Marshals Prince Schwarzenberg and Prince Wrede, myself, Lieutenant-Generals Knesebeck and Prince Volkonsky, and Major-General Langenau to hold the Protocol.

After reciting the matters which had been considered at the former military conferences, at which Field-Marshal the Duke of Wellington was present, it was stated that the object of the present assembly was to settle, as far as possible, the composition of the several armies, and of the garrison of Mayence, and the quarters, marches, and communications, of the several corps.

It was agreed to begin with the left army, which is to assemble on the Upper Rhine. This army is to consist of upwards of 140,000 men, viz.:—

Bavarian force under Field-Marshal Prince Wrede		65,000
Under H. R. H. the Prince Royal of Wurtemberg.	Wurtemberg troops .	25,000
	Baden troops . .	8,000
	Colloredo's Austrian corps .	8,000
Prince Hohenzollern's corps, all Austrian . .		40,000
		146,000

Field-Marshal Prince Wrede to be on the right with the Bavarians, extending from Hanau, or opposite to Worms, to Bruchsal, and to construct works and *têtes de pont* at Manheim and Philipsburg.

The Prince-Royal of Wurtemberg in the centre, from Durlach, or between Durlach and Bruchsal, to Offenburg; and Prince Hohenzollern on the left, from the last-named place towards Lorach.

The head-quarters are to be, in the first instance, at Heilbrunn, on the Neckar. The officers of the Staff were appointed to meet, in order to define these cantonments, and the routes by which the corps are to move into them with most precision, which will be entered upon this Protocol. Marshal Wrede is to move part of the Bavarian army through Heilbrunn and Heidelberg. Orders were sent *to move* last night by courier to put the Bavarian army in motion. Colloredo's corps is moving upon Ratisbon: as soon as its head shall reach that point, the Prince Royal will move the Wurtemberg force into their position.

Mayence is to be garrisoned by detachments. It was proposed that the detail should be made up by Austrians, 4,000; Prussians, 4,000; Bavarians, 3,000; Prince Nassau, Princes Reuss, and other States, 3,500; and that Hesse-Cassel should be required to make up the remainder to the complement of 21,000 — that the use of this fortress should be given to the several armies in proportion to their emergencies— and that the great road leading to it should be kept unencumbered.

It has been very strongly reported that the Archduke Charles will take the government of Mayence.

General Knesebeck insisted very much on the expediency of giving to the centre army, viz., the Prussians, the preference in regard to Mayence and the roads to it, because the passages lower down gave to that army a portion of a circle to move upon for their communications, instead of a straight

line. But it was answered that they must make *têtes de pont* at Coblentz, or at Düsseldorf, as was the case above Mayence, and that it would be time enough to resort to Mayence in preference when circumstances rendered it necessary.

I understood that the Prussian army will consist of 63,000 men in three weeks. The Prussian force, when complete, will be in six corps, with a reserve, in all, upwards of 153,000 men; but the landwehr are embodied with the regiments of the line; and it will, therefore, require some time before the landwehr of the distant provinces can reach the army, but the whole are marching.

The Prussian general vehemently objected to any idea of appropriating the contingents of the northern and the centre States of Germany generally to the Duke of Wellington's army. He said it would be impossible to convince the lower orders of the people in those States that they were fighting their own battles; and, on the other hand, that the people in Prussia would think the whole weight of the war thrown on their shoulders unfairly, if no other troops are mixed with their army. He did not object to giving up the contingents of Hanover, Brunswick, Oldenberg, and of the Hanseatic towns, but most strenuously deprecated giving that destination to Hesse-Cassel. This discussion, however, went no further, as being premature.

I learn this day that it has been proposed in Congress, at the Conference of five Powers, to give to the Duke's army Hanover, Brunswick, Oldenburg, Hanseatic towns, Nassau, except its proportion of the garrison of Mayence, and, with these contingents, that of the kingdom of Saxony, stated at 14,000 men, but not that of the duchies of Saxony.

General Knesebeck stated that Field-Marshal Blücher has the King's order to join the army, and that General Gneisenau has authority to join the Duke of Wellington, if circumstances require it.

The cantonments of the first Russian army are from Bamberg, by Nuremberg, to Eichstadt.

As soon as the Protocol of this Conference is signed, I will not fail to send a copy.

I have the honour to remain, &c.,

CATHCART.

Memoir relative to the different Armies, by Prince Schwarzenberg, addressed to Lord Castlereagh and the Duke of Wellington.[1]

Les points de rassemblement des différentes armées sont fixés. Les rassemblements se font dans ces jours-ci. Jettons donc un regard sur la situation des armées.

Pour ne pas s'y tromper, il faut bien distinguer les différentes époques, savoir: — 1. Celle du mouvement présent. 2. Celle où les premières colonnes des troupes Autrichiennes, Prussiennes, et Bavaroises seront arrivées sur le bord du Rhin. 3. Celle où toute l'armée Autrichienne destinée vers le Haut Rhin sera arrivée dans ces contrées—enfin. 4. Celle où l'armée Russe et les réserves Autrichiennes et Prussiennes seront à même de soutenir ces armées.

Dans l'époque du moment, tel à peu près est la force des Armées Alliés et de celle de Buonaparte:—

Les Alliés.

L'armée du Haut Rhin:—

Wurtembergeois	20,000	
Badois	12,000	
Darmstadtiens	8,000	
Bavarois	10,000	
	———	50,000

[1] Without date, but affording internal evidence that it must have been written in March or April, 1815.

Entre le Rhin et la Meuse :—		
Bavarois	18,000	
Et les garnisons de Mayence et de Luxembourg.		
Sur la Meuse :—		
Prussiens	50,000	
		68,000
L'armée de Wellington dans les Pays Bas :—		
Anglois et Hanovriens . .	23,000	
Belges et Hollandois . . .	20,000	
		43,000
En tout . .		161,000

Et tel l'état des armées des Alliés, voilà celui des armées de Buonaparte.

Au moment de son retour en France, l'armée Françoise consistoit d'après les calculs que l'on a formés, en . . .	230,000
Décomptons les garnisons des places fortes, les troupes qu'il lui faudra laisser dans le midi, la Vendée, et Paris, en tout .	110,000
Restent disponibles .	120,000

Mais comme son activité ne laisse point de doute qu'il aura tâché de l'augmenter dès le premier jour de son arrivée à Paris, une grande masse sera déjà on formation.

La seconde époque sera arrivée vers le commencement de Mai. À cette époque, on pourra compter que—

Autrichiens	50,000	
Bavarois	40,000	
Wirtembergeois . . .	20,000	
Badois	10,000	
Darmstadtiens	10,000	
		130,000

Transporté de l'autre coté . .		130,000
De l'armée du Haut Rhin, sous le Maréchal Prince Schwarzenberg seront entre Manheim et Basle :—		
Disponibles de l'armée du centre sous le Maréchal Blücher entre Namur et Luxembourg		70,000
Anglois et Hanovriens . .	35,000	
Belges et Hollandois . . .	25,000	
L'armée disponible de l'aile droite sous le Maréchal Duc de Wellington		60,000
En tout . . .		260,000

L'avant-garde de l'armée Russe sera arrivée vers ce temps à la hauteur de Prague ; les autres corps Autrichiens destinés à l'armée du Haut Rhin, à peu près à la hauteur d'Ulm ; la réserve Autrichienne sur la hauteur de Munic ; la réserve de Prusse sur la hauteur de l'Elbe.

Avant que toutes les forces des Alliés soyent sur les frontières de la France, il faudra donc compter encore cinq semaines. Jusqu'aux premiers jours de Juin ces forces seront donc partagées en deux grandes masses, dont l'une à peu près de 260,000 hommes se trouvera vers le commencement de Mai sur les frontières de la France, l'autre en marche entre la hauteur de l'Elbe, de Vienne, et le Rhin. Les forces de Buonaparte en formation aujourd'hui auront été augmentées vers cette époque à peu près de tout ce qu'il aura trouvé en vieux soldats et officiers, pour lesquels il a eu des armes ; et comme les hommes ne lui manqueront pas, je crois qu'il faudra supposer, qu'autant d'armes que Buonaparte aura trouvé, son armée sera augmentée dans les premières six semaines. Je ne connois pas au juste à quel nombre il faudra évaluer l'effectif de ces fusils, mais si l'on considère que la France sous Louis XVIII. a fabriqué par mois 15,000 fusils, que cette fabrication a duré

pendant dix mois, qu'on a donc fabriqué depuis le départ de Buonaparte 150,000 fusils, et que dans la dernière campagne les grandes places et dépôts militaires, comme Metz, Strasbourg, Lille, Grenoble, ne sont pas tombées dans les mains des Alliés, je crois que sans exagération il faudra compter cet effectif à 250,000.

La force militaire de Buonaparte au commencement de Mai sera donc :—

L'armée qu'il a trouvé à son retour.	230,000	
L'augmentation depuis . .	200,000	
		430,000

Dont doivent être décomptés :—

Encore en formation . .	50,000	
Pour les garnisons . .	70,000	
Pour La Vendée . . .	30,000	
Pour le midi . . .	30,000	
Pour Paris	30,000	
		210,000
Restent .		220,000

avec lesquels il pourra paroître en campagne.

La balance des forces militaires des Alliés et ceux de Buonaparte sera donc à cette époque.

Forces disponibles à même d'agir :—

Alliés	260,000
Buonaparte	230,000

Cet aperçu montre qu'à l'époque mentionnée au commencement de Mai, la prépondérance des forces des Alliés ne sera pas si grande, et que c'est une erreur de croire, que chaque armée pourra agir indépendamment de ce qui se passe aux autres, espérant que ses forces seules suffiront pour vaincre ceux de l'ennemi, et contrebalancer toutes les avantages que donnent à la France sa situation centrale, et la série de ses forteresses.

Tout autre sera ce tableau à la troisième époque vers le 20 de Mai.

À cette époque tout l'armée Autrichienne destinée sur le Haut Rhin sera arrivée au pied du Schwarzwald; les Prusses de l'Elbe seront sur le Rhin, les Hanovriens arrivés de leurs pays, les forces de l'armée du Haut Rhin devront donc être évalué, y compris

Les Bavarois, Wurtembergeois, &c. .	200,000
L'armée de Blücher, à	100,000
Celle de Wellington, à . . .	70,000
En tout .	370,000

Celles de Buonaparte en troupes disponibles:—

D'après le compte formé . . .	230,000
Auxquels peut-être seroient à ajouter .	50,000
qu'on lui auroit à compter encore une formation au commencement du Mai. Le tout donc, tout au plus . . .	280,000

À cette époque la balance sera donc plus favorable pour les Alliés, et comme en même tems les têtes des réserves Autrichiennes, l'armée Russe, et les autres corps Prussiens seront à même de soutenir les armées; ces forces des Alliés augmenteroient encore de jour en jour, pendant que ceux de Buonaparte auront au terme le nombre de fusils.

Count Nesselrode to Lord Castlereagh.

Vienne, ce 2 Avril, 1815.

Le Duc de Vellington m'a communiqué avant son départ votre aimable réponse au sujet de la dette d'Hollande. Vous savez trop bien, Mylord, à quel point j'ai eu cet objet à cœur, pour douter de tout le plaisir qu'elle m'a fait. L'Empereur m'a chargé particulièrement de vous remercier: il est persuadé qu'il est uniquement à vos soins que nous devons l'heureuse conclusion de cette affaire. J'ai envoyé au Comte Lieven les pouvoirs et instructions nécessaires pour y mettre la dernière

main, et je compte avec confiance sur vos bonnes dispositions pour tous les détails qui restent à régler.

Vos dernières dépêches nous ont prouvé que vous envisagez comme nous le fatal incident qui vient de troubler le monde. C'est pour nous tous le cas de last shilling, last drop of blood. L'Empereur est profondément pénétré de cette vérité, et la soutiendra dans toute son étendue. Il m'avoit chargé de parler à Lord Cathcart pour une augmentation de vos forces en Belgique. Je regarde cette démarche comme superflue, car je ne doute pas que vous n'ayez fait l'impossible pour former une belle armée au héros de Vittoria.

Adieu, Mylord, vous connoissez tous les sentiments d'amitié que je vous ai voués à jamais. NESSELRODE.

Lord Castlereagh to the Duke of Wellington.

Draft. Downing Street, April 3, 1815.

My dear Lord—The importance of a full explanation and knowledge of your sentiments upon all the points, political and military, of our existing situation, is felt by the Cabinet to be so important, and so imperfectly attainable by letter, that we have prevailed upon two of our colleagues to pay you a visit, and return to us without delay.

They will inform you that, whatever qualification of the first assurances of support is given to the King of France, on Napoleon's landing, the disastrous change in France suggested, in order to keep the question, in its altered shape, fairly open to concert with our Allies, that there is no hesitation on the part of the Prince Regent's Government (notwithstanding that the King has been obliged to leave his kingdom without a struggle) in prosecuting the war against Napoleon, if the Allies continue to consider it is the best course to be pursued, and will embark heartily in the contest: whatever technical difficulties we may have in answering the declaration in Parliament, we shall have none in making the country feel that it is a most important bond of union amongst the Powers for the

salvation of Europe. I only delay the official approbation till you send me the document officially in its altered form. My despatches, written subsequent to the receipt of yours of the 12th, enclosing the *projet* of declaration, will have enabled you to give the fullest assurances of our readiness to go heart in hand with the Continent. C.

Mr. Wellesley Pole to Lord Castlereagh.

Bruxelles, Friday [April 7, 1815].

My dear Lord—Lord Harrowby's letter explains so fully all our proceedings, that I should have abstained from troubling you with a word, had I not thought that it would be satisfactory to you to be apprized of one or two points which did not properly belong to our narrative, but which nevertheless are, I am sure, interesting to the feelings of the whole Cabinet. It will gratify you to know that the Duke of Wellington is perfectly satisfied with the footing on which he stands with the Prussian troops in this neighbourhood, and that he thinks his control over them will be even more efficient and more beneficial to the general cause than if they were formally and unwillingly under his command.

Lord Bathurst will receive from the Duke the answer of General Gneisenau to the letter which the Duke wrote to him yesterday, respecting the movement of the Prussians (a copy of which was transmitted to Lord Bathurst). You will perceive the promptitude with which the Duke's recommendation has been obeyed by the General. I observed to the Duke, that the General had complied with his request, leaving the responsibility on his Grace, to which he assented, and said to that he had no objection: the Duke seems to feel confident that there never will be any difficulty thrown in the way of his receiving the most cordial co-operation from the Prussians, and seems to consider them as virtually under his command. I do not think he wishes them to be placed more closely under his orders. You will also be pleased to hear that the Duke is

very sanguine in his hopes of bringing the war to a successful issue in the course of the summer, provided the Allies act up to their professions as to the extent of their force and the period of its assembling on the frontier, and provided he is enabled to make the exertion he proposes. We shall be prepared to show you exactly what the Duke requires: I may now say, that in round numbers, it will be 55,000 men of British troops and German legion, including 15,000 cavalry. With this force, if it could be furnished in time to commence operations at the period he imagines the Allies ought to advance, he seems to think (if all the other arrangements are completed as promised) the war might be terminated in six months with *éclat* to the British arms. Sir H. Torrens will be in possession of all the Duke's ideas upon this subject, and we shall be enabled to show how far, according to our present establishments, &c., it may be possible to meet the Duke's wishes. He conceives promptitude in pushing out the troops to him is the main object, and he certainly considers that the greatest sacrifices would be well repaid, if his force could be immediately augmented to what is necessary to enable him to take the part in the war which he meditates.

I have said a great deal more on this subject than he would have done. You know him well enough to understand that he is quite sensible the Government will do all they can to strengthen him; and that, if he was left with only 20,000 men, he would do the best he could with them, and would not murmur. There seems to be the greatest satisfaction here at the Duke's having taken the command of the troops, and I believe the Prince is as much pleased at it as anybody.

We dined to-day with the King, and we return to Ghent to-morrow with the Duke and Sir Charles Stuart. We probably shall not remain at Ghent more than one night, but it is impossible for us to be quite certain of our movements.

Ever yours very sincerely,

W. W. POLE.

Prince Talleyrand to Lord Castlereagh.

Vienne, Avril 8, 1815.

Milord—En vous faisant tous mes remerciments du petit mot de souvenir que vous avez joint à la lettre de M. de Talleyrand, que vous avez bien voulu me faire parvenir, je veux vous adresser mes félicitations sur le succès de votre campagne parlementaire. Personne n'a vu avec plus de plaisir que moi que les débats ayent, en dernier résultat, tourné tout à votre avantage, et que votre triomphe ait été complet, ainsi qu'il le devoit être.

Nos affaires de Congrès n'avancent pas aussi vite qu'elles le devroient, à vrai dire, il n'y a guères eu d'activité que pendant la dernière quinzaine de votre séjour ici. Cependant, comme nous désirons tous, ou du moins pour la plupart en être bientôt quittes, j'espère qu'il arrivera enfin une explosion dont le mouvement nous fera sortir des difficultés qui, en Bavière, en Allemagne, et en Italie, nous arrêtent encore.

Les Autrichiens se sont enfin décidés contre Murat. Ils se placent comme auxiliaires de Ferdinand quatre.

Veuillez faire remettre les lettres que j'ai l'honneur de vous envoyer.

Agréez, Milord, l'assurance de tout l'attachement, et de la haute considération avec laquelle je suis votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

TALLEYRAND.

Lord Castlereagh to the Duke of Wellington.

Foreign Office, April 8, 1815.

My dear Lord—You will perceive from the enclosed that Buonaparte is trying to make mischief on the subject of our treaty of January 3rd—I do not think he can succeed. I only mention it that you may be on the watch. My own notion is, that it is better to be silent, unless Russia or Prussia should inquire as to the fact, in which case there can be no difficulty in

producing the treaty, which, coupled with Prince Hardenberg's declaration in Conference, explains and justifies the whole.

If you concur in this view of the question, I have to beg you will send a copy of this despatch, with your sentiments upon it, to Lord Clancarty.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Clancarty.

April 8 [1815].

My dear C.—I send you a copy of my private letter, with its enclosure, to the Duke of W[ellington]. You will fully appreciate the Parliamentary importance of not having imputed to us that Louis XVIII., by being made an Ally against Buonaparte, has been made master of the confederacy for his own restoration. His Majesty cannot wish us to feel more decisively the importance of his restoration than we do; and most assuredly every effort will be made so to conduct the war so as to lead to this result, but we cannot make it a *sine quâ non*. Foreign Powers may justly covenant for the destruction of Buonaparte's authority as inconsistent with their own safety, but it is another question avowedly to stipulate as to his successor. This is a Parliamentary delicacy. By a despatch from Sir C. Stuart, it appears that the King of France perfectly enters into this distinction. I am much hurried, and can add no more. C.

[Enclosure.]

Lord Castlereagh to the Duke of Wellington.

Foreign Office, April 8, 1815.

My dear Lord—Our discussion in both Houses last night was sufficiently satisfactory. Until we can open the whole extent of our confederacy, we must have a reserve; and it is better that our friends should be brought by degrees to look at the prospect of a renewed contest.

My despatches by this messenger to Sir C. Stuart will give you Caulaincourt's overture and my answer.

The general intelligence from France agrees with the en-

closed Report, and justifies a hope that the Allies, if enabled to move early, may keep alive an important diversion in the south and west.

You will best judge whether any and what steps can be undertaken to encourage early exertions. If war is actually decided on, a movement into the interior cannot be too soon made, as far as it can be pushed forward without military improvidence. Its effect must be proportionably decisive.

I have received your renewal of the Treaty of Chaumont. It will be immediately ratified, but we mean to accompany it with a declaration of the nature herewith sent. The latter branch of Article 3, which you very properly endeavoured to qualify, we think may be sustained as declaratory of the object of the concert. It is an engagement, although onerous in its nature, taken between parties who have a common interest in its execution. That which arises out of Article 8, stands somewhat on different grounds. In inviting the King of France, more especially when out of France, to accede to the treaty, we deem it material to mark that the object of the alliance and concert is to destroy Buonaparte's authority, and not to impose on France any particular Sovereign or form of government. We deem this declaration not less advantageous to the King's interests in France than to the maintenance of the contest in Parliament against Buonaparte.

The Russian note you sent us contains a most magnificent display of military strength. It is before Lord Liverpool; but I cannot authorize to admit that the Treasury can go beyond the £5,000,000 subsidy, and the £6,000,000 for our quota of 150,000 men. Out of the latter fund something may possibly be done for Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Hesse, Hanover, &c. I doubt the policy of preferring an excess of Russian force to the vigorous employment of Germans, to fight for what they are hereafter to defend.

We must also recollect that the Austrian force is likely to be far beyond its quota, and that a similar claim on the part

of that Court may be brought forward. I will talk this over further with Lord L[iverpool], but at present we must adhere to your reserve.

Lord Bathurst writes to you about the Portuguese troops; and we rely upon your judgment for comparing the advantages of a force *somewhat British* against the delay of bringing, and the expense of supporting and keeping it complete, from so distant a point. I am not myself enabled to judge whether the Regency would take upon themselves to send men on so distant a service, without express authority from the Brazils. The Prince Regent has signified his intention of not at present coming to Europe.

I do not write to Lord H[arrowby] or your brother, as they may be on their return. You will have the goodness to make my excuse, and communicate what I forward. Our earnest wish was to have seen you here, even for the shortest time; but conceiving your absence might be prejudicial, we made what appeared to us the best arrangement for obtaining the advantages of a full explanation.

Whitbread did not make much, last night, of his attack upon your declaration.

Lord Harrowby to Lord Castlereagh.

Dover, April 11 [1815], Tuesday night, 9 P.M.

Dear Lord Castlereagh—We are just arrived; but, as our carriages cannot be disembarked, we cannot leave this place before to-morrow morning. We prefer, however, setting out very early, and propose, unless we break down on the road, to be in Downing Street between two and three in the afternoon. I shall be ready to submit to any interrogatories on the part of yourself and his Majesty's *confidential servants*. You will find us as fully prepared as we ought to be. In the mean time I send you what will be more satisfactory—the Duke of Wellington's written remarks on our queries. He has unfortunately kept the queries themselves; but I suppose you have

the originals, and will be able to understand them by reference to the numbers.

There was no intelligence on the other side of the water later than the Moniteur of the 7th. On Friday, we dined with the King of the Netherlands, and left Brussels early on Saturday morning, with the Duke and Sir C. Stuart, for Ghent. We had a long talk in the morning with the King of France, with whom we dined, and after dinner were called in to assist at a sort of Cabinet Council with Monsieur, the Duc de Berri, Blacas, Jaucourt, and the Duc de Feltre.

The Treaty of Vienna was received while we were sitting, with Talleyrand's despatches, and the King immediately signified his intention of acceding, and of claiming the assistance of his Allies. The Duc de Feltre read a long Memoir, stating the present disposable means of Buonaparte, which he does not rate at more than 155,000 men, and that part of it which could, at this moment, act on the frontiers of Belgium at not more than 50 or 55,000. The Duke thinks this below the truth. The paper also contains a statement of the numbers required for different services, and for garrisoning particular places, which the Duke thought valuable. The latter part consisted of a sketch of a plan of campaign, which tallies nearly with that of the Allies. The Paper was given to the Duke, who kept it in order to take a copy, and will send it home with his next despatches.

We sat *twaddling* for more than two hours, and could not help wishing, with all our hearts, that Buonaparte and all his Council had been as unprofitably employed.

General Torrens had the opportunity at Ghent of completing his military discussions with the Duke; and, though a day or two more at Brussels might probably have been spent with some utility, in adding to our information on sundry points, we thought it on the whole better to proceed home, instead of returning there with the Duke, who did not appear to think there was any good reason for delaying our departure.

I had some conversation in the morning with Blacas and Jaucourt, who both charged me with letters for the Count de la Châtre, which I forward by this messenger to you. I saw also Lally Tolendal. On the whole they seem very helpless, with little knowledge of the past or present, and less plans for the future. They are mere adjectives, and, as such, are too faithful to grammar to presume to stand by themselves. Blacas desired me to assure you that no step would be taken without concert with the Duke of Wellington, whose arrival has given them the greatest satisfaction, but the limited extent of whose command they bitterly deplore. The style of some of the Prussian proclamations fills them with alarm, as they dread their producing in the country the same effects as that of the Duke of Brunswick.

As far as we could learn, the disposition of the Low Countries is good; that of Holland excellent.

Believe me, dear Lord C., ever faithfully yours,

HARROWBY.

Lord Bathurst to Mr. Baker.

Foreign Office, April 12, 1815.

Sir—I lose no time from transmitting a copy of a letter which I have received from Mr. Croker, of the Admiralty, giving a circumstantial account of the alarming riot which broke out on the 6th inst. amongst the American prisoners of war at Dartmoor, and of the measures which it became necessary to adopt for the purpose of restoring order; and I am to desire that you will take an early opportunity of communicating this statement of the unfortunate event to the American Government. I am, &c., BATHURST.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Clancarty.

Draft. St. James's Square, April 12, 1815.

My dear Clancarty—You will see by the papers that, although in this country we are disposed rather to take our

tone from the Continent, we shall not fail them in our due scale of exertion; but the Powers of Europe must not expect us to subsidize all the world, or to go beyond certain limits in point of expense.

These limits now are held by the Treasury to be £5,000,000 subsidy, and 150,000 men, or their equivalent, under the treaty. If to this you add all our extra expenditure in arms, clothing, ammunition, &c., to Holland, France, &c., you will perceive the effort is not an inconsiderable one at the close of an expenditure which, for past charge, independent of this new catastrophe, has rendered it necessary to fund, in the course of this year, nearly 40,000,000 sterling.

As the confidential *projets* which were exchanged between the Austrian and French Governments, with respect to Italy, were reserved for discussion at Vienna, as I was too much hurried, when they passed under my inspection, to give them any minute attention, I wish to call your attention to one or two points which require to be attended to.

Upon referring to the Treaty of Fontainebleau, I perceive that an interest is expressly created in favour of Marie Louise's son after her death, in the Duchies of Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla. So far as Buonaparte's return to France may be deemed to have annulled the whole treaty, a right may be held to accrue to the Allies to agree upon a new distribution; but, admitting the validity of the treaty, as we are bound to do previous to the escape from Elba, we do not see how a consent on the part of Marie Louise could in good faith prejudice the succession of her son. Pray look carefully into this point before any stipulation comes for our ratification. An exchange of territory, for a valuable consideration, or the cession of a part of any State to save in war the whole, may reasonably be argued to be inherent in the sovereign authority; but a gratuitous extinction of a minor's right of succession by a mother, at the instance of friendly parties, or by such parties without her consent, does not seem maintainable, parti-

cularly when the engagement was contracted with the father. Such a forfeiture, I apprehend, can only be defensible as incurred by Napoleon's act; and if Marie Louise is suffered to possess these duchies for her life, with remainder to the Queen of Etruria's son, to the exclusion of her own, it must be held to be a new grant to her, founded upon other considerations than those which influenced the Treaty of Fontainebleau.

Whenever the *projet*, prepared by the Italian Commission whilst I was at Vienna, was agitated, I always considered that the decision must have ultimately depended upon Marie Louise's consent: and such was my assurance, and also the Emperor of Russia's, to her plenipotentiaries; but, upon looking more narrowly into the question, I doubt the validity of this to extinguish any *essential* interest in the son.

With respect to the Seven Islands, I see no objection to leaving the future arrangement to be amicably settled between the British and Austrian Governments, as you propose.

We calculate here that the armies will be in a situation to act about the 10th of next month. It is desirable to produce our treaties to Parliament, to vote our subsidies, and to bring both Houses to a decision upon the war, as early as possible. To do this, we must have our ratifications of the three main treaties. You will see by the enclosed to the Duke of W[ellington], that, whilst we leave to him to distribute the payments under treaty for the troops not actually arriving in discharge of our quota of 150,000 men, we consider the £5,000,000 as the property in common of the three great Powers. To bring this part of the arrangement regularly before Parliament at the same time as the treaty, I have proposed to the Duke that you should sign an additional article to the treaty with each of the Powers, assigning to them their one-third of the £5,000,000, as was done in the Treaty of Chaumont; and that you should urge the three Courts to despatch their respective ratifications of the treaty and additional articles

instanter to London, there to be exchanged by their respective Ministers against ours.

This will save time in two ways: it will enable the article granting the subsidy to move *pari passu* with the treaty; and it will accelerate the period of exchange, as our ratifications, which are *in regular form*, cannot be ready to be sent to Vienna for some days; whereas theirs, in the form they usually adopt, may be completed, with proper diligence, in twenty-four hours after you receive this.

Mr. Cooke to Lord Castlereagh.

Rome, April 13, 1815.

My dear Lord—Since I wrote by Byng, I have remained here quietly. The Pope and his Cardinals were naturally averse from trusting to the assurances of Murat, who, in his whole conduct, has shown himself incapable of acting without the profligate contempt of sincerity and truth. Since the Pope's departure, between 8,000 and 9,000 Neapolitans have passed, not entered, the city. All remains here tranquil, and Murat's proclamations for the independence of Italy, and his invitations to the Italians to enlist under his banners, are treated hitherto with ridicule. The Romans in general are attached to their ecclesiastical government, and the few who wish a new order of things do not look up to such a regenerator as Murat.

It will require many victories by him in Upper Italy, before he will be able to make impression here, or, I believe, in any other part of Italy. I have so little apprehension of Murat's success, that I mean to remain here for your answer to my first letter. I did not follow the Roman Court, as I thought nothing could be done officially in the midst of such uncertainty; but your lordship may be assured that the principles stated in Quarantotti's letter will be agreed to.

Dr. Poynter wished that the names of the persons eligible for bishoprics should be sent for approbation previous to election, and the election made from the approved list. I like

this idea: it gives a negative previous to election, and gives the power to Government of selecting for the Pope's investiture the one of the three to be elected most agreeable. I have no doubt, when you have once a Minister accredited here, there will be no difficulty any longer on any part of the subject, except, *perhaps*, the giving a stipend to the clergy.

Your lordship will receive the accounts of battles and movements from the different head-quarters. I have not a word from any one.

Our travellers have not given universally very distinguished proofs of *retenue* and discretion here, and much less at Naples. As you must have found from Lord Sligo, it has been made a religion with some to consider Murat as one of the great men of the time, possessed of every right to Naples and the Marches, as the best friend to England, and the only sincere one; and the policy of making Italy independent under his auspices has been cried up in the highest tones, and the Government is vehemently accused for their conduct to him. But you must be extremely easy upon this point, after all the information which must have been transmitted of his treachery. I wished to obtain from Cardinal Sommaglia all the proofs the Court of Rome had obtained of his participation in Bonaparte's schemes. He said they had all been transmitted to Vienna; so I trust they have been sent to your lordship from Prince Metternich and Cardinal Consalvi.

As to what has taken place in France, my feelings are these: that, as the Constitutionalists and the Royalists, with the assistance of the Allied armies, brought back the King, and drove out Bonaparte, so the Jacobins, with Carnot at their head, who was rejected by the Bourbons, joined by the French army in the absence of the Allies, have brought back Bonaparte; and I doubt not but Bonaparte signed an engagement to the Jacobins before he left Elba. The resolutions of the Council of State are clearly Jacobinical. It is impossible that Bonaparte can be sincere in agreeing to them, especially as to

the liberty of person and the press. He always approved at Elba the conduct of the Bourbons in limiting the press, and said no Government could go on in France with the press free. My idea, therefore, is, that Bonaparte, in order to unshackle himself, will begin war on some pretext. If he remains at peace, and if, from his moderation, he is not attacked, it would be easy for the Royalists and Constitutionalists to overturn him by the press, or make him commit an act of violence, in order to preserve his power. The parties may prepare the public mind for the great meeting in May.

We are much amused by the Jacobin abuse of the Bourbons, and their silence on Bonaparte's cassation of the whole Legislative Body. If the government of the Bourbons, because unsanctioned by an appeal to the whole of the people, was illegal, how much more must the government of Bonaparte be illegal and null, since his dismissal of the Legislative Body, an essential part of the Constitution, approved by the people at large!

Our accounts from Paris are of the 28th, from London of the 21st. I cannot conjecture events, but I have no fears if the Allies are united and firm; for I doubt not but you will take the line which real consideration and true wisdom will require, of which at this distance, and in my utter ignorance, I cannot conjecture. Certainly the union of a Jacobin party and a Jacobin army does not present any favourable aspect, if we are to judge by their past efforts: but you will be properly harassed by round assertions that Bonaparte, his army, and his Jacobins, are now all reformed, and that their virtues are to be relied upon, like the piety of repentant sinners. At the same time, I am not either charmed or deluded by the doctrine that no oaths, however solemn, recent, and repeated, have any validity, unless they are taken in support of systems which have been approved by a direct appeal to the whole French nation in their individual capacities. This impious and anarchical theory can only be extirpated by arms, and I have no

doubt that by arms it will be exploded, and, I hope, by internal arms alone.

I congratulate your lordship sincerely on the ratification of the American peace.

I am happy, in one respect, at Bonaparte's narrative, which states his having spoke, on his voyage, French ships of war.

The English are going off in all directions. The Duke of Bedford, Ward, Valletort, are at Naples: I do nothing here, and go out little—hardly at all. No orders come from France; but the French Academy have taken down the Bourbon arms.

Believe me ever most truly your lordship's servant,

E. C.

Mr. E. Cooke to Lord Stewart.

Rome, April 15, 1815.

My dear Lord—I am leading a very quiet life here, and getting gradually strength. The people are as tranquil as if nothing had happened, and as if their Government had not fled. The great effort making here by the Neapolitan agents is to persuade every man that the Austrians are the falsest of people—that all their conduct to Europe, all their conduct to Murat, is false, and that they are already playing a part underhand with Napoleon; and they offer to lay wagers that, within a month, Austria will quit the coalition. As I believe the first part of this libel is false, as I know the second is, I am prone to disbelieve the third, and I trust Austria will show so by her vigorous conduct in chastising the unprincipled behaviour of Murat. I have always, and do always, uphold the fidelity of Austria to her engagements with Murat as a thing which I know, and state it to the Neapolitans.

The defence made by the English partisans of Murat is, that he has been forced to act as he has—that he felt and knew that the Bourbons were his enemies—that we would not

declare in his favour—that the conduct of Austria was insincere—and that the rest of the Powers were ready to join the Bourbons against him. He was, therefore, reduced to a desperate situation, and had a clear right to take the measures he thought most advisable for his own establishment—that he could only hope to succeed by the assistance of all Italy—and he, therefore, had a right to attempt to raise the whole in a general effort.

The answer was obvious: If Murat had claims of possession as a King, created by Buonaparte, the King of Sicily had much stronger claims, as being legitimate Sovereign—as being expelled, not by his subjects, but by a foreign force—that the different Powers of Europe had a right to consider in Congress which were the juster claims, and to take their part accordingly—that it was natural for the Bourbons to urge the restoration of their relation on the same principles on which they were themselves restored: it was natural for Great Britain, and not only natural, but required of her as a duty, to consider the claims of Sicily, our old ally, who had lost Naples for her attachment to the common cause, as well as those of Murat, who had no other claim than those of a hostile usurper, or of a treacherous friend—that the Powers of Europe in general were interested that the kingdom of such an adventurer should not be solidly established—and that, as to Austria, she was merely bound to support her engagements—these circumstances certainly made Murat's position critical; but it was for him to consider how to act under it—whether to conciliate Europe by a sincere conduct of real moderation and peace, and exerting himself for its tranquillity, or to set the Powers in a state of suspicion respecting him by extravagant armaments, advanced positions, threatening despatches, and treacherous correspondence; and lastly, by openly attacking all the existing Powers of Italy, and endeavouring to excite a general revolt.

If, then, Murat has attacked all the Powers around, because

he could not get an immediate recognition, and become a common aggressor, he has only to blame himself. He may consider general hostility as the best mode of defence—he may consider assisting Napoleon in his escape from Elba as a fair attack on the Bourbons; but, if he has done so, and appealed to the tribunal of arms as his best security, he must take the consequences, and we must defend our Allies, who have been wantonly and unjustly attacked. By his palpable and open falsehoods, he obliged the Pope to quit his dominions, by showing that his word was not to be trusted. In the same manner, he obliged the Grand-Duke of Tuscany to quit his capital, by marching troops against it at the moment he gave the most positive assurances that he would not enter his territories. Not contented with this, he invites the Italians to rise in mass, to drive out the Austrians, whose Government had solely, though invariably, espoused his cause, and risked great interests in his support; accusing them, without the slightest proof, of the most proved and consummate treachery.

I should hope that *now* the Austrians and the Viceroy will not object to furnish you with all the proofs of Murat's treachery. I understand that the *bureau* at Vienna is filled with them.

I have not received any letters for a long period, and know little or nothing about England. Lord Holland is gone home —Duke of Bedford gone to Naples, not *assassinated*, as they say here in the papers, which means attacked by robbers, though the robberies upon the Naples road have been most formidable.

I am very glad to be at such a distance from business, for my life's sake, for I could not have borne these times; but I think I may get well by quiet. I have no illness, nor any wrong symptom at present.

I enclose my letter to Lord C., open, which you will send. It merely contains my speculations.

I suppose they will denounce the armistice with Murat. I like Nugent calling Murat *il vile gladiatore;* it looks as if his Court were in a passion. I thought Murat would have taken a different line, and that, when Bonaparte went off, he would have offered the most moderate terms, declared against him, and placed himself on the honour of the Allies. In that case, I should have wished to establish him: like a fool and knave, he threw off the mask, and put all to venture.

I have no news as to France but what Bonaparte has sent us as far as the 28th ult.; and I see nothing but a conspiracy of the Jacobins and the army—and we are to trust to the principles of the one, and the moderation of the other! These late events must have struck you all at Vienna as an earthquake—it can be compared to nothing else. When the shock is over, I shall hope that at least the unanimity expressed in the first impetus will not cease, whatever may be the line of action which shall be ultimately adopted. That unanimity, and that alone, will save us all.

I may hear in a few days from England, and I wait for a letter: so it is uncertain when any letters from you may meet me. This I send by a Mr. Crackenthorpe, who has promised to give it a safe conveyance.

Believe me ever most truly yours,

E. C.

I know not a word of Burghersh or Lord W. Bentinck.

Lord Cathcart to Lord Castlereagh.

Vienna, April 15, 1815.

My Lord—I take the earliest opportunity of acquainting your lordship that Count Nesselrode told me that he had it in command from the Emperor of Russia to request that I would write by the first opportunity to your lordship, to state the particular wish of his Imperial Majesty that the army under the Duke of Wellington should be reinforced as much as pos-

sible. I said that there could be no doubt but that every exertion would be made for that purpose; but it was nevertheless particularly urged that I should deliver to your lordship this message.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CATHCART.

Louis XVIII. to the Duke of Orleans.

Gand, le 17 Avril, 1815.

J'ai reçu, mon cher neveu, vos lettres du 4 et du 11—elles m'ont fait grand plaisir en me donnant de vos nouvelles et de celles de ma nièce, qui j'espère, est tout-a-fait rétablie. J'ai été aussi un peu indisposé depuis mon retour à Gand, mais je me trouve maintenant beaucoup mieux.

Dans l'attente où je suis des grands évènements qui se préparent et qui doivent nous offrir avant peu des chances favorables, je n'ai rien de nouveau à vous mander pour le moment; mais dès qu'il se présentera une occasion d'agir, je ne tarderai point de vous appeller auprès de moi, où je vous verrai toujours avec autant de plaisir que de confiance. C'est avec les mêmes sentiments que je m'en remets à votre zèle et à vos lumières pour éclairer Monsieur le Prince Régent et la nation Angloise sur tous les faits dont vous avez été le témoin; en leur montrant l'irrésistible et funeste effet d'une défection qui m'a forcé de quitter jusqu'au dernier azile, où vous étiez venu me joindre.[1] Vous leur ferez voir à quel point la nation Françoise désavoue une semblable trahison. C'est un moyen d'animer, de concilier tous les sentiments généreux dont nous devons nous faire un appui; et personne n'est plus que

[1] Le Roi se trompe. Je n'ai pas été joindre sa Majesté. J'étais à Lille plusieurs jours avant le Roi, et je n'en suis parti que douze heures après lui. Je présume même que ma présence à Lille, et l'effet qu'on disait que j'y avais produit sur les troupes a été une des causes qui ont déterminé S. M. à s'y rendre d'Abbeville, où il parait qu'elle était encore incertaine de la route qu'elle prendrait.

vous, mon cher neveu, en position de remplir une pareille mission.

Adieu, mon cher neveu—vous connaissez mon tendre attachement pour vous.

LOUIS.

Lord Castlereagh to Prince Hardenberg.

Draft. London, April 17, 1815.

Mon Prince—I have been honoured with both your letters, and hope to see M. de Berger to-morrow. You know enough of my sentiments, public and *personal*, to be assured of my desire to fulfil *your wishes*.

You will see that we are preparing, as usual, to bear our part *with the Continent* in the good and great cause, which, if we remain united and in earnest, we shall bring to a glorious and secure conclusion, I doubt not. I know all your pecuniary wants, and you may rely on our doing our best; but the heavy charge of the last war, and the Commissariat debts in Spain and America, yet press upon us. I fear we shall be obliged to borrow this year from 35,000,000 to 40,000,000 sterling, to liquidate arrears, &c.

We shall, nevertheless, make every effort to aid the Continent. I have authorized Lord Clancarty to sign an additional article to the Treaty of the 25th, binding the Prince Regent to supply £5,000,000 to the three Powers. We shall also give about £2,100,000, in lieu of deficiencies under our quota, which, in British troops, we shall not be able, in this campaign, to carry above 50,000 men, exclusive, however, of Hanoverians or Dutch. As this fund must secure our contingent, I have left the distribution to the Duke of Wellington, leaving to his Grace to judge how far, consistent with this object, some aid can be afforded to the other minor Powers, in conformity to your Highness's suggestion.

I have not yet taken any steps, looking forward to the return of the King to Berlin as the natural moment for doing

so, to accredit Mr. Rose to your Court. Let me know your wishes and opinions upon this point, and I shall be happy to conform to them. The alternative is his remaining for the present at Munich, or going to Berlin: his presence at head-quarters, not being a military man, would only be an incumbrance.

The Duke of Wellington will have 40,000 British troops early in May. I hope you will give him a good proportion of Germans, and you may rely on his making a good use of them. His Grace writes to me in raptures of Gneisenau and your troops, and relies upon them, as he does upon *his own*.

Believe me, mon Prince, ever yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir Charles Stuart.

Draft. Foreign Office, April 19, 1815.

Sir—You will receive enclosed the copy of a Declaration with which it is proposed to accompany the ratification of the treaty of the 25th ult., on the part of the Prince Regent. I also add the communications which I have made to the Duke of Wellington and the Earl of Clancarty on this subject. You will communicate this document confidentially to his Majesty's Cabinet Ministers, with an assurance that this measure is adopted, as his Majesty well knows, under no feeling of indifference, but on the contrary, to the cause of the Bourbon family, on whose early restoration to the throne the Prince Regent and the British Government consider the peace of Europe to depend. But, from a conviction that whilst the British Parliament and the nation will be ready to make every effort in their support, an unqualified engagement on such a subject might excite dissension, and embarrass the measures of the Prince Regent's Government in the furtherance of this most desirable object, it will be for his Majesty's Cabinet Ministers to consider whether, in order to counteract the impression endeavoured to be excited in France against his inte-

rests, viz., that his Majesty has been, and is to be, forcibly imposed by foreign Powers as their sovereign, upon the nation, it might not be advantageous for his Majesty to declare that, whilst the armies of the Allies entered France to wage war against Buonaparte, in the destruction of whose power all mankind had a common interest, his Majesty would never consent that foreign Powers should interfere in the internal affairs of France—that it was upon the affections and attachment of his own subjects he alone relied for the support of his throne—and that, however the delusion of an usurper might for a time prevail, the affecting proofs he had recently received of the sentiments of his people left him without apprehension for the result.

From your Excellency's despatch No. —, these sentiments seem to correspond entirely with the intentions of the King, as expressed to your Excellency on the occasion of presenting to his Majesty your letters of credence.

Lord Bathurst to Mr. Baker.

Foreign Office, April 21, 1815.

Sir—I have the honour to transmit for your information the copy of a communication which the Admiralty has made to this Office, enclosing an application from Mr. Beazley, respecting the conveyance of the American prisoners from this country to America. I also enclose a copy of the answer which was returned to the Admiralty; and I take this opportunity of informing you that your correspondence with Mr. Munro on this subject, as transmitted in Mr. Beazley's communication, has been approved of by his Majesty's Government.

I am, &c., BATHURST.

General Pozzo di Borgo to Lord Castlereagh.

Gand, Avril 21, 1815.

Mylord—On peut convenir que le monde est bien changé depuis votre depart. Nous sommes ramené par les évènemens

au commencement de la guerre révolutionnaire; mais j'espère que les conséquences en seront différentes, comme la nature des deux époques est en effet. J'étois à Vienne au moment où la nouvelle de l'évasion de Bonaparte arriva. Je ne manquai de présager les suites dans toute leur étendue. L'Empereur en fut également convaincu dès le premier instant. Tout ce qu'on a fait à cet égard m'a paru juste et prudent. La guerre étant inévitable, il falloit prévenir l'ennemi, et en caractériser en même temps le motif et l'objet. Sans une explication franche et forte, l'adresse des Jacobins aurait toujours interprété notre conduite à leur manière: aujourd'hui ils sont obligé d'inventer; ils peuvent calomnier nos intentions; mais, du moins, ils ne sauraient dénaturer nos déclarations et nos démarches.

C'est un grand bonheur, mylord, que cet évènement soit arrivé lorsque le Congrès avait pris une attitude tout-a-fait pacifique. Ceux qui, comme vous, y ont si essentiellement contribué, doivent bien s'applaudir de leurs efforts. Si Bonaparte et les Jacobins ont pu mettre l'Europe entière en allarmes, lorsque nous étions tous d'accord, qu'est ce qu'ils n'auraient pas fait si nous avions le malheur de nous déchirer: je ne pense à ce danger sans horreur. Il a cependant resulté un bien inattendu de nos divisions passagères: c'est l'état de nos armements. Jamais on a vu en Europe tant de forces aguerries et disciplinées, réunies pour un même but. Murat nous cause une division fâcheuse pour le moment. Si le Prince Metternich avait voulu écouter ou prévoir, s'il n'avait pas différé à se mettre en mesure, cette affaire serait terminée sans des grandes sacrifices. Il faut l'aider du côté de Naples, dans le moment où le chef et les forces principales en sont éloignées, les Anglo-Siciliens pourraient aisément soulever la population.

Quant à la France, malgré les talents et la rage des hommes qui se sont emparés du pouvoir, la nation est encore dans un état d'incertitude et d'agitation: si nous marchons unis et serrés nous pénétrerons partout. Dans ce cas les défections

deviennent extrêmement probables, surtout si nous présentons un intérêt Français auquel on puisse s'attacher.

L'Empereur m'a renvoyé auprès du Roi reprendre mes fonctions de ministre: il m'a ordonné également de suivre le quartier du Duc de Wellington. Outre les devoirs de l'obéissance, j'ai accepté ces deux commissions avec plaisir, dans l'espoir de pouvoir être de quelque utilité à la cause générale. Son succès immédiat est fondé principalement sur celui de nos armes; mais la conclusion et la durée dépendent principalement de notre conduite politique en France. Je persiste à croire que le Roi est le seul que nous devons reconnaître et mettre en avant: si nous sortions de cette règle, on ne saurait plus où s'arrêter. Tout autre établissement, même s'il était tiré de la famille des Bourbons, ne serait qu'un pacte avec les Jacobins; et ce chef, quel que fut le titre qu'on lui donnerait, un instrument entre leurs mains. La nature de ce gouvernement continuerait à être révolutionnaire, et ses dangers pour l'Europe les mêmes contre lesquels nous combattons depuis vingt cinq ans, quoique sous des formes différentes. Il serait également impolitique de faire supposer de notre part de la facilité à se prêter à des mesures de ce genre; le Roi étant le seul que nous présentons à la France comme un moyen d'établir des rapports avec elle, ce serait de la dernière imprudence d'atténuer l'intérêt qu'il peut inspirer à la nation par l'indifférence que nous lui témoignerons mal-à-propos et hors de saison.

Je sais qu'on l'accuse de n'avoir pu se gouverner; il a commis une grande faute, celle de ne pas avoir un initiative; mais les actes séparés de son administration sont irréprochables en général. Quant aux difficultés en elles mêmes, jamais homme n'en a eu autant à combattre. Nous l'avons laissé front à front avec tous les démons de la Révolution, et nous l'avons chargé de nos imprudences et des siennes. Bonaparte étant survenu dans cette position, l'armée a renversé le trône qu'elle devait soutenir, le peuple a été spectateur étonné et stupide; il applaudira davantage à la pièce contraire, lorsque, comme je

l'espère, nous lui donnerons cette fête: mais il ne faudra pas nous contenter des compliments qui nous attendent. Si nous voulons notre repos, il faut mettre le Roi à même de disperser l'armée, et d'en créer une nouvelle, et de purger la France de cinquante grands criminels, dont l'existence est incompatible avec la paix. Les Français doivent se charger de l'exécution, et les Alliés leur donner l'occasion de pouvoir le faire. Notre salut est dû à notre union, et notre union est beaucoup l'effet d'une heureuse combinaison de circonstances qui ne se renouvellera pas aisément.

Tout ce que je ne fais qu'indiquer dans une lettre serait matière de longues et sérieuses conversations; je vous prie donc, mylord, de m'excuser si un sujet aussi vaste vous est présenté d'une manière si incomplète: j'ai voulu simplement qu'une personne dont j'ambitionne l'estime, et je croirais dire l'amitié, et qui est destinée à avoir tant d'influence dans la direction des affaires fut informée de ma manière de voir et de mes principes dans une crise aussi importante.

Veuillez bien agréer mes très humbles respects.

Your most obedient, POZZO DI BORGO.

The Right Hon. George Canning[1] *to Lord Castlereagh.*

Lisbon, April 22, 1815.

I think it right (having Lord Beresford's permission) to enclose to you an extract of the Duke of Wellington's letter to him, upon which my "Confidential Memorandum" (transmitted in my despatch No 47 of this day) was founded.

You will observe that the only point in the letter which is *not* stated in my Memorandum is that which I underline with pencil in the second page of this enclosure, which relates to the *mixing the Portuguese troops with the British*. To this I un-

[1] Mr. Canning, after having been out of office for some years, was appointed, in September, 1814, Ambassador to the Regency of Portugal. —EDITOR.

derstand the Government have great objections. It is a matter of detail, which may be well reserved till after the main principle and outline of the arrangement shall have been agreed to. But to have put it forward in the first instance would have been to give a great advantage to the opposers of the measure *in toto* on a single article, which they would have swelled into exaggerated importance.

In any arrangement for this object, a distinct stipulation that, if Portugal is menaced, Great Britain will come to her assistance, will be quite essential: the rather, because the *stipulating* it will seem to imply that, without stipulation, this might possibly not be done by Great Britain. The great difficulty in carrying any point here with the Government arises from the inveterate confidence that, do what they will, or if they do nothing, still they are sure of us at any time of need, for our own sakes (as they fancy) more than for theirs.

We are still entirely without intelligence from Brazil. Our last intelligence from London is of the 7th, and our latest sure intelligence from France is through the London papers.

I write in a great hurry, having only received half an hour ago notice of the arrival and sailing of the Zenobia, and not liking to detain her even for a tide.

Very sincerely yours, GEORGE CANNING.

[Enclosure.]

Extract of a Letter from the Duke of Wellington to Lord Beresford.

Vienna, March 24, 1815.

You will have heard of Bonaparte's audacious landing in France. All here are united in their determination to oppose him, let the result in France be what it may; and we shall in six weeks have 600,000 men on the French frontiers. I am now making a treaty with Austria, Russia, and Prussia, by which the four Powers will engage to maintain in active operations 150,000 men each; and the other Powers of Europe will

be called upon to accede with numbers each in proportion to their means. I have recommended to Palmella to accede with 20,000 men at least; and that on which I now write to you is respecting the point at which they should be employed.

Our effort will be made in Flanders, where I am going to take the command; and it is nonsense to suppose either that Great Britain can make an effort on the side of Spain, or that, without Great Britain, Spain and Portugal will or can do any thing. Neither have any money, and Great Britain will not give them any.

That, therefore, which I will recommend to our Government and to Palmella, and which you will do well to be prepared for in Portugal, is this—that two-thirds, or at all events half, of that number of men, should be employed by Portugal in Flanders; and, if you could come with them, we could, *by mixing them, as before, with ours*, put you in a situation in which you might be very useful.

I do not think it would do to take out of Portugal into Flanders more than 12,000 or 14,000 men. Notwithstanding our numbers, we may be unfortunate; and I don't think the modern Spaniards have more principle than those who went before them; and they could not withstand the temptation of the offer of the conquest and possession of Portugal, more particularly as they have a great thirst of military glory; and it is more than probable that they would have acquired none in the previous contest with Bonaparte.

The number taken away, of 12,000 or 14,000, might be made up with militia or other means; and then, with very little assistance from us at the period of the attack, I would warrant Portugal from the consequences.

I have not time now to write you more—indeed, this letter is sufficiently explanatory; and I will write to our Government on the subject by this same occasion.

WELLINGTON.

Lord Walpole to Lord Castlereagh.

[Petersburg,] April 22, 1815.

My dear Lord—I trust that I shall be excused for sending Mr. Bailey home: his brother will adequately fill his duties while he is absent, which need not be long, and I trust the information he can afford will justify me to you. May I beg you to acquaint Lady Walpole how long I am likely to remain here. We have been already separated nearly two years, and the momentary expectation of Lord Cathcart's arrival, which must occasion my return, has hindered me from bringing her here. Could your lordship fix any period when this is likely to take place, we could decide accordingly.

I shall willingly retire from public life, nor presume to expect either of those situations which, in justice to myself and family, I could accept; but I trust you will feel that, at my age, in my situation of life, and having been conversant in most of the important negociations in every part of Europe, for above ten years, how impossible it is for me to continue in my present situation after Lord Cathcart's return.

May I press upon your attention the affairs of Persia with this country?—I have not yet got the translations finished; but both the King and Mirza Shefi have written to me, as his Majesty's Minister, earnestly entreating our good offices, stating that, at our request alone, he consented to a peace, and trusts to our interference for the accomplishment of the promises held out by General Ritischew. I understand, from Sir Gore Ouseley, that the Prince Royal has written to the Persian Ambassador that the British officers have been recalled, and that, if we are unwilling to furnish substitutes, they intend to find them from other European States: they probably will send to Germany. Sir G. Ouseley, upon his return, will explain this subject more fully; but, doubtful whether you are yet informed of it, I venture to mention it as a subject of reflection.

The Empress mother is much displeased with the marriage of the Grand Duchess Catherine: she can neither stomach the former divorce of the proposed bridegroom, nor the idea of the arrangement having been made without reference to her.

Believe me, my dear lord, with great truth, &c.,

WALPOLE.

The Duke of Orleans to the King [*Louis XVIII.*]

Londres, ce 25 Avril, 1815.

Sire—Je reçois avec une vive reconnoissance la lettre que V. M. a eu la bonté de m'écrire de Gand le 17 Avril dernier: j'y vois, avec le plus grand plaisir, que l'indisposition de votre Majesté n'a pas eu de suite, et que sa santé est de nouveau aussi bonne que nous la désirons. Je voudrais pouvoir lui en mander autant de celle de ma femme, qui a souffert dans ces derniers tems, et qui a eu une toux épouvantable. Elle n'en est pas encore entièrement délivrée, quoique elle soit beaucoup mieux; et j'espère que l'air de la campagne, où je compte la mener à la fin de la semaine prochaine achévera de la rétablir. Mes quatre enfants ont la coqueluche, et la petite filleule de votre Majesté est celle qui en souffre le plus jusqu'à présent.

J'ai déjà anticipé en partie ce dont V. M. me charge pour le Prince Régent; et je lui ai fait un récit fidèle des tristes évènements dont j'ai été le témoin: je crois qu'il a fait sur son Altesse Royale une impression profonde et bien douloureuse; mais V. M. n'ignore pas que l'amitié que lui porte le Prince Régent est trop vive et trop sincère pour que rien puisse y ajouter, et que son désir de la voir rétablie sur son trône n'est ni moins vif ni moins sincère. Je puis même dire qu'il est constamment occupé de voir quels sont les moyens les plus efficaces d'y parvenir; et j'espère n'avoir pas besoin de dire à V. M. que telle est aussi mon occupation constante.

Comme V. M. je pense, que les grands évènements qui se

préparent doivent nous présenter des chances favorables: mais, selon moi, il est de la plus grande importance que nous les attendions, et que nous ne suscitions pas de nouvelles difficultés à en profiter par de la précipitation et de fausses mesures. Je prie V. M. de me permettre d'expliquer ce que je veux dire par là.

L'objet de V. M. me parait devoir être d'abord le renversement de Buonaparte, sans lequel votre rétablissement est impossible, et ensuite qu'aucun autre Gouvernement que celui de V. M. ne remplace celui de Buonaparte. Quant au renversement de Buonaparte, il me semble incontestable que V. M. n'a plus aucun moyen direct de l'opérer (au moins quant à présent) puisque toutes les tentatives qui ont été faites dans les différentes parties de la France ont échoué successivement. J'en vois donc plus dans l'état actuel des choses que l'arrivée à Paris des armées étrangères, ou leur approche de cette capitale, qui puisse abattre le Gouvernement de Buonaparte, et déterminer les factions qui l'entourent à l'abandonner. V. M. ne doit pas se dissimuler que ce moyen si onéreux et si pénible pour la France, y excitera des sentiments dont l'application à V. M. et à ses Princes serait très fâcheuse; et d'ailleurs en écartant cette discussion, inutile aujourd'hui, puisque ce sont les Alliés qui croyent nécessaire à leur sureté et à leur indépendance de marcher sur Paris et de renverser Buonaparte, la seule question à examiner, selon moi, pour V. M. c'est de savoir si sa présence et celle de ses Princes dans les armées Alliées ajouteront à leurs forces; ou si, comme j'avoue que je le pense, l'application au Roi et aux Princes des sentiments dont je parlais tout-à-l'heure ne les diminueraient pas effectivement, en rendant celles de Buonaparte plus indissolubles, et en créant de nouvelles difficultés à ce que ce soit le Gouvernement de V. M. qui remplace celui de Buonaparte.

Je prie V. M. de me pardonner, si cette opinion lui déplait: mais dans les circonstances où nous nous trouvons c'est le devoir de tout Français de lui dire franchement son opinion;

et ce devoir est encore plus impérieux pour le premier Prince de son sang.

Je pense, Sire, que la présence de vos Princes dans les armées Alliées n'ajoutera pas à leurs forces, parceque je suis bien convaincu qu'aucune partie de l'armée Française ne se joindra à elles. Il ne faut pas oublier ce que l'émigration des premières années de la Révolution doit nous avoir appris, et il ne faut pas retomber en 1815 dans les mêmes illusions qui ont été si funestes en 1791 et 1792, sans quoi les mêmes causes produiront les mêmes résultats, et l'émigration de 1815 ferait encore moins de prosélytes en France que n'en fit celle de 1791. Le séjour que nous venons de faire en France m'a mis à portée de connaître l'effet qu'a produit la présence des Français marquants dans les armées étrangères, et je suis d'autant moins suspect sur ce point qu'avant notre retour en France, je m'en avais formé une opinion différente: mais M. le Duc de Berri pourra certifier à V. M., car il me l'a dit lui-même bien des fois qu'on n'a jamais pardonné en France au Général Moreau d'avoir servi dans les armées Alliées.

Or, Sire, si, d'une part, la présence des Princes dans les armées Alliées ne produit pas une grande défection dans l'armée Française, et que, de l'autre elle jette en France sur les Princes Français une défaveur très fâcheuse pour eux, et propre à créer des difficultés additionelles au rétablissement de V. M. après le renversement de Buonaparte, il me semble qu'il faut éviter soigneusement de se placer dans cette position là.

Cela me parait d'autant plus important, que, ne comptant plus comme j'ai déjà avoué au Roi que je le faisais, que sur la force matérielle des armées pour arriver à Paris, et ne voyant rien que cette cruelle extrémité qui puisse, quant à présent, opérer le renversement de Buonaparte, que je regarde toujours comme la conséquence nécessaire de cette arrivée, il me semble que de toutes les manières, c'est pour ce moment là qu'il faut réserver tous nos moyens, afin qu'il s'élève alors, comme en

Avril, 1814, un cri national, qui détermine l'armée à se soumettre au Roi ; et par conséquent il me semble très essentiel d'agir avec l'armée Française de manière à diminuer autant que possible sa répugnance pour le Roi.

Ce qui s'est passé alors, et dont Buonaparte vient de faire connaître les détails en publiant les mémoires de l'Abbé de Montesquiou, trouvés chez M. de Blacas, doit faire sentir combien de difficultés le Roi aura encore à surmonter, et combien d'intérêts il faudra concilier et réunir. Je crains qu'il n'y en ait encore plus cette année que l'année dernière : mais le point le plus difficile de tous sera d'organiser une force, sur laquelle V. M. puisse compter, pour appuyer et soutenir son Gouvernement.

En pensant comme je le fais, que la compression des armées Alliées sur les armées Françaises soit encore aujourd'hui, comme l'année dernière, le seul moyen de faciliter à la nation de réclamer V. M. je ne peux pas perdre de vue que cette compression ne peut jamais être que momentanée, et que la cruelle expérience que nous venons de faire, ne nous fait que trop sentir qu'il ne peut plus nous suffire simplement, ni, je crois, à toute la nation Française et à toute l'Europe, que V. M. soit reconduite aux Thuilleries, et que le peuple l'entoure de nouveau des cris de *Vive le Roi !* Il faut que V. M. se crée en France une force physique et morale, qu'elle n'a pas eue après sa restauration, et dont l'absence a amené la catastrophe, que nous avons maintenant à déplorer, et à réparer si nous pouvons.

Quelqu' intéressant que cela pût me paraître à traiter, je n'importunerai point V. M. de mon opinion sur la marche à tenir pour se procurer cette force morale, parceque cette lettre n'est déjà que trop longue, et je me bornerai à ce qui regarde la force physique, d'autant plus que, quelqu'essentielle soit l'autre, je crains que ce ne soit plus par des illusions sur les moyens de se procurer la force physique que sur ceux de se procurer l'autre, qu'on se persuade de trouver le remède

là où, selon moi, on ne trouvera qu'une augmentation terrible d'obstacles au rétablissement de V. M.

Il est clair selon moi, et V. M. a prouvé en différentes occasions que c'était aussi son opinion, que la force destinée à soutenir le Gouvernement ne peut jamais être en France une armée étrangère. Je m'arrêterai donc pas sur ce point, et je ne m'occuperai des moyens d'organiser une force Française. Je suis plus que jamais persuadé que tant que V. M. cherchera cette force ailleurs que dans l'élite de l'armée, elle ne la trouvera nulle part, parcequ'il n'y aura jamais en France aucune force qui puisse lutter avec l'armée, que des portions de cette même armée. Toute autre espèce de force a toujours été et sera toujours inefficace. Ainsi de deux choses l'une: ou on croit pouvoir exterminer par la guerre actuelle toute l'armée Française, ce que je crois aussi impossible à opérer qu'impolitique à annoncer, et encore plus à faire, si cela était faisable; ou on doit se préparer à chercher dans cette armée les moyens de force nécessaires au soutien du Gouvernement, lorsque nous serons assez heureux pour que V. M. ait pu rétablir le sien.

Il ne semble que l'essai que V. M. a fait, l'année dernière, pour l'organisation de la maison du Roi a prouvé jusqu'à l'évidence qu'aucun corps formé sur cette base et de ces éléments là ne pourrait jamais lutter contre des portions et des réunions de l'armée. Il en a couté bien cher à V. M. pour la formation et l'équipement de cette maison; tandis que, d'un trait de plume, Buonaparte vient de former autour de lui trente mille hommes de jeune garde qui ne lui coûteront même plus que la simple troupe de ligne, et qui mettent dans la main une force supérieure à toutes celles qui pourroient se réunir contre lui en France, tant qu'il n'aurait à réprimer que des troubles intérieurs, et qu'il n'aurait pas à lutter avec les puissances étrangères. C'est une force comme celle-là, et organisée d'après les principes de la tactique moderne qu'il faut, à quelque prix que ce soit, que V. M. se procure après son rétablissement,

sans quoi une seconde chûte serait inévitable. Je n'ignore pas, Sire, que bien des gens pensent, et peut-être n'ont ils pas entièrement tort, qu'un corps de garde ainsi organisé serait, jusqu'à un certain point, une *garde prétorienne;* mais je réponds que dans l'état actuel des opinions en France, aucun corps armé ne défendra et ne soutiendra que ce qu'il trouvera son intérêt à défendre et à soutenir: ainsi il n'est pas douteux que V. M. ne doive faire en sorte que cet intérêt s'y trouve, et je suis persuadé qu'avec de l'adresse et un bon système de conduite on les contraindrait dans des justes bornes. Mais je crois que personne ne me contestera quil vaudrait bien mieux que V. M. fut aux Thuilleries, entourée d'une garde prétorienne, que de la voir à Gand entourée des débris de sa maison militaire.

Quoiqu'il en soit, il est certain qu'il n'y a point de partie de la nation Française plus importante et plus difficile à gagner pour le Roi que l'armée. Plus on adoptera l'opinion que V. M. m'enjoint d'inculquer—que la nation désavoue la défection de l'armée, et plus on doit; il me semble, se persuader que la nation seule ne peut pas soutenir un Gouvernement que l'armée repousse; et, par conséquent, plus on sera dévoué au Roi, plus on désirera son rétablissement, et plus on devra le supplier très humblement, mais très vivement, d'adopter et de faire adopter à ses Princes, un système de conduite et des mesures qui laissent toujours la porte ouverte à un rapprochement avec l'armée, sans lequel le rétablissement de V. M. ne saurait jamais acquérir la solidité qui lui a manqué cette fois ci.

Je supplie V. M. de me pardonner la longueur de cette lettre, et l'importunité des détails dans lesquels j'ai cru de mon devoir d'entrer. J'espère au moins qu'elle y verra une preuve de plus de mon zèle pour son service, et de mon dévouement pour son auguste personne. Je la prie d'agréer avec sa bonté ordinaire l'hommage de mon profond respect.

Sire, de V. M., &c.

Mr. George Jackson to Lord Castlereagh.

Berlin, April 25, 1815.

My Lord—Although the estimation in which the Duke of Wellington is so universally held can scarcely be heightened by any additional tribute of applause, yet, considering the influence of the quarter from whence it comes, I think it will be satisfactory to your lordship to know, as a favourable omen for future operations, that General Gneisenau, who has hitherto been extremely impatient for the recommencement of hostilities with France, and even inclined to blame what he called the tardiness of the measures adopted by the Allies, more particularly in the Low Countries, has written to a person here the most complete retraction of such opinions, in consequence of a long interview he had just had with his Grace.

The style of the General's letter does no less honour to the writer than to the illustrious person who is the subject of it. Admitting, in its full extent, his former impatience, he frankly acknowledges himself to have been in the wrong, and expresses himself in terms of equal admiration of the genius which could form the present plan of operations, and of the patient and persevering ability with which they are carrying into execution.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

GEORGE JACKSON.

Mr. Canning to Lord Castlereagh.

Lisbon, April 28, 1815.

My dear Lord—I am much obliged to you for the private letter which I received yesterday in company with your despatches. Your report of the numbers, and still more of the spirit, of the Allies, encourages the most confident expectation of success, and (what is most important) of speedy success, in a struggle, which I quite agree with you and Liverpool in thinking we had not the option to decline. The sanguineness,

with which, I hear, the Duke of Wellington looks to the result, is another source of satisfaction. What a happy consummation of his glory it would be to put the last hand to the destruction of Buonaparte's power, in direct conflict with Buonaparte himself. If in anything I am disappointed, it is that I do not find the Duke of Wellington where we were taught (though I know not exactly by what authority) to look for him—at the head of the combined armies.

I certainly hope, and shall endeavour, to the best of my power, to be enabled to send you a satisfactory answer to your despatch No. 17. But there certainly is a very great reluctance in the Government, especially in the two most active members of it, M. de Forjaz and the Principal Souza, (Funchal's brother) to adopt the Duke of Wellington's recommendation. The same reluctance, I believe, prevails among the people. As to the army, you will see that I have two accounts, one from Forjaz, the other from Lord Beresford. Lord Beresford's, however, is only negative; and I confess I incline to believe Forjaz's. Lord Beresford himself, with very proper delicacy, has forborne to give any opinion, though much urged by the Regency, alleging that he could not give any which would not be liable to be suspected of a partial bias—if for Flanders, the Portuguese would say that he was all English; if for the Peninsula, he might be accused of sacrificing greater interests for the sake of a separate and independent command.

From some expressions in your private letter, I should be led to infer that you do not think an operation on the side of the Pyrenees quite so hopeless as, I own, it appears to me. Is your notion that of a mere defensive position to be taken on the frontiers of Spain; or would you aim at once at penetrating into France? Would the Spaniards put their army under the command of Lord Beresford? Would a corps of ten or twelve thousand Germans (in failure of British) be to be had, as the cementing principle between Spaniards and Portuguese?

Lastly, of the £2,100,000 at the Duke of Wellington's disposal, would he give anything to set Spain and Portugal in motion?

These are questions which I do not mean to put to you to to be answered categorically, but as points upon which your own mind must be made up before the case of a Peninsular diversion can be brought forward or encouraged.

In my discussions with the Government upon the Flanders' expedition, I shall put that case entirely aside, and rather lead them to apprehend that they are to be left to their own resources, if they do not agree to what is proposed to them.

It will be absolutely necessary, if the war continues, and if the Court does not come home, that the Government here should be put upon a new footing. A reference to Brazil, upon such a question as this, for instance, is obviously equivalent to a direct negative, and it is in that shape, I have reason to apprehend, their refusal will come, if they do finally refuse to agree to the Flanders' plan.

I enclose a duplicate of a private letter which I sent with my despatch by the Zenobia.

I cannot conclude this letter, without thanking you for the kind and judicious manner in which you treated the matter which related to me in the debate on the Civil List. You are, long ere this, in possession of my full authority (so far as that could be required) to terminate this mission whenever you think it expedient to do so. We are still most unaccountably without any direct communication from Rio de Janeiro.

I am, my dear lord, with great truth and sincerity, yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

Mr. Q. Craufurd to Lord Castlereagh.

Jermyn Street, April 29, 1815.

My Lord—I some time ago had the honour to send your lordship letters I had received from Madame de Stael. I have since then received others, but which I thought it needless to

trouble your lordship with, as they are in substance nearly the same as the former—fear of the Jacobins, their numbers and influence; the danger, if they prevail, of revolutionary scenes being renewed at home, and of their endeavours to excite commotions abroad. But the one I enclose is rather of another cast: she speaks as if Buonaparte was regaining his former consequence, and of the probability of his making the war national. I have not replied to any of her letters, but merely desired Mrs. Craufurd to thank her for her remembrance of me.

As far as I can judge of the state of things in France at present, I do not believe that Buonaparte, whatever he may affect, wishes for immediate peace, but rather, from the apprehension of attack, to have the means of raising and assembling armies, which, besides enabling him, as he may hope, to resist the Allied Powers, will put it in his power to free himself of the restraint of the republican party—an object which I believe he has fully as much at heart as the other.

It seems to me impossible that a person of his intolerant disposition, and accustomed to the exercise of unlimited power, should long submit to be controlled in any way. Fouché, who, I believe, Madame de S. is a good deal connected with, and the other republican leaders, are undoubtedly aware of this; and perhaps they, on that account, wish for peace, as much as from their fears of the chances of war. The republican leaders took Buonaparte from necessity, in order to obtain the assistance of the army. None of them have confidence in him: they know the dissimulation he is capable of, and they know, at the same time, that his love of rule is invincible. They, as well as some of the principal persons in the army, wished the Duke of Orleans to be at the head of the government: the wishes of the latter in that respect I am certain of; he united in him what suited both. Every one under him was perfectly admissible to his court, and to fill any of the different offices of government. He had served himself two campaigns in the

early part of the Revolution, and his behaviour, appearance, and manners, were agreeable to the military.

These circumstances lead me to believe that, in forming the last article of what is called the Constitution, or proposed Constitution, Buonaparte thought more of him than of any of the other Princes of the House of Bourbon.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

Q. CRAUFURD.

[Enclosure.]

Madame de Stael to Mr. Craufurd.

23 Avril.

J'ai lu hier le mot que vous avez écrit pour votre voisine. Mon Dieu, my dear Sir, que je voudrois être près de vous pour quelques heures, et vous bien peindre l'état de la France!

Si la paix continue, les têtes se calmeront, et il y aura ici liberté et repos. Si ces deux biens nous manquoient, ce seroit par l'effet de nos agitations intérieures, et *seuls* nous en souffririons: mais les nations étrangères seroient tranquilles et dans la prospérité.

S'il y a la guerre, au contraire, toute la France se réunira contre l'invasion étrangère, et si l'empereur a un premier succès, comme il l'aura, l'orgueil national fournira à son vengeur toutes les ressources d'hommes et d'argent qui lui seront nécessaires.

Je dis qu'il aura le premier succès, et bientot je vous en donnerai les raisons.

Vous me direz que la coalition a bien sçu arriver jusqu'à Paris, l'année dernière. Oui, mais la position des puissances et la notre sont bien changées. L'année dernière, il y avoit ici dans les premières places des gens qui vouloient un bouleversement. Pendant le regne des Bourbons, tous ces hommes se sont vantés de leurs trahisons, qui étoient devenues des titres aux récompenses, des motifs d'orgueilleuse indiscrétion. Ils sont donc connus aujourd'hui, ne sont plus employés, et la coalition ne les aura plus pour l'appeller, et l'instruire de l'état de la France.

L'année dernière l'armée, presqu' anéantie par les glaces du Nord, par une campagne malheureuse—l'armée, étonnée de ses revers, était découragée : aujourd'hui elle s'est réformée de toutes les vielles troupes qu'on avoit laissées dans les places fortes. Vous connoissez mon exactitude, ma vérité, my dear sir, que l'Angleterre ne se laisse pas tromper par les émigrés. Il est positif que, depuis son retour, l'empereur a rappellé toutes ses vielles bandes, qu'elles arrivent de tous les coins de la France, amenant avec elles des jeunes gens que leur exaltation a électrisées ; que l'empereur a aujourd'hui tout équipés 250 mille hommes des troupes, dont chaque soldat croit valoir 4 hommes ; qu'a la fin de ce mois, il aura 50 mille hommes de plus, et, à la fin de May, 100 mille—encore ils sont là, on les équipe.

D'ailleurs l'esprit du paysan est monté à tel point que, si l'ennemi entre, l'empereur doit déclarer tous les hommes de France soldats, et ce pays sera pour vous, ce qu'a été l'Espagne pour nous. Déjà l'année dernière les Alliées craignoient fort le paysan et les partisans ; cette année ce sera bien autre chose ; ce sera comme nous étions en Espagne, où le soldat aimoit mieux mourir de faim que de s'éloigner de dix pas de leurs troupes. Ne croyez pas les émigrés : ils se flattent, et se trompent depuis 20 ans. Soyez certain que l'état que je vous donne des forces de l'armée et de l'exaltation du pays est absolument, exactement, vrai ; et si l'empereur avoit une victoire, le Brabant deviendroit aussi pour les Alliés une Espagne.

Le Prince Régent peut empêcher tous ces malheurs. Oh qu'il soit grand, magnanime, qu'il se porte en médiateur, qu'il attache son nom, sa force, sa gloire à dire à toutes les nations, *Je veux la paix, et vous resterez en paix !* L'Angleterre peut ainsi être la maîtresse du monde. Avec la guerre elle ne sera qu'une partie d'un tout déjà divisé. Puisque le Prince Régent ne peut marcher à la tête des Anglois, il ne peut commander aux nations qu'en leur dictant à tous la paix. S'ils courent à la guerre, c'est l'Empereur de Russie qui devient le maître, et

que ses troupes appelloient dès l'année dernière *L'Agamemnon, le Roi des Rois*, l'Empereur de Russie, qui veut la guerre, parce qu'à son arrivée à Paris, M. de Talleyrand, se trouvant compromis, voulant l'enchainer à lui, fit déclarer qu'il ne traiteroit pas avec Bonaparte; mais 15 jours auparavant toutes les puissances n'ont elles pas traité avec lui à Chatillon? qu'y a-t-il de changé? un traité avec Napoléon qu'on n'a pas tenu, une année de malheur pour Napoléon dont il a profité. Il désire, il veut la paix de Paris; quoiqu'il ne l'eut jamais signée, il n'y changera pas une virgule, afin qu'elle soit toujours la paix des Bourbons. C'est aussi la paix reçue par la nation Françoise et dont elle se contentera.

Je vous dirai même qu'il faut la main de fer de l'empereur pour retenir son armée, qui veut regagner ses trophées et sa gloire. Si une fois cette armée entre en Brabant, que les Belges prononcent pour les François, Napoléon ne pourra plus les abandonner; et nous voilà pour la vanité de l'Empereur de Russie, dans une guerre de 20 années avec l'Angleterre.

Oh, que le Prince Régent veuille être le Dieu de la paix, ou qu'il laisse (avec des chances bien douteuses) l'Empereur de Russie être le Roi de cette guerre! La question est entre ces deux—le reste leur obéira.

Brulez ma lettre, my dear sir, et God bless you.

J'ai encore bien des choses curieuses à vous dire sur notre état, mais ce sera pour demain: aujourd'hui j'ai mal à la tête.

Anecdote importante.[1]

Le 14 Mars, Bonaparte était déjà parvenu à Auxerre; la nouvelle de la défection de Ney était arrivée à la Cour: le Roi, calme sur son danger personnel, mais ébranlé par la consternation de ses ministres et de ses courtisans, dont les têtes trop faibles ne pouvaient lui donner aucun conseil dans cette crise, qu'aucun d'eux n'avait prévue, chargea son Chancelier,

[1] In the handwriting of General Dumouriez; without date, signature, or address.

M. D'Ambray, de s'aboucher avec le fameux Fouché, qu'on avait dédaigné et maltraité depuis la restauration. Le Chancelier, pliant sa dignité à l'ordre de son maître, et à l'urgence des circonstances, eut avec cet Exministre Jacobin une conférence, dont il a lui-même rendu compte, à son arrivée à Londres, à un grand personnage très digne de foi. Voici leur dialogue.

D'Ambray. Le Roi m'a chargé, Monsieur, de sçavoir votre opinion sur les progrès étonnants de Bonaparte, qui parait secondé par la défection des troupes de ligne, et sur le parti qu'il y aurait à prendre pour arrêter ces progrès et cette insurrection.

Fouché. Il est trop tard, Monsieur ; la révolution est inévitable. Bonaparte ne trouvera aucun obstacle ; il sera en Paris avant huit jours. Le Roi n'a qu'un parti à prendre c'est d'évacuer sans délai les Thuilleries, avec sa famille, sa maison, et sa cour, pour sauver une catastrophe épouvantable, qui serait le résultat du moindre délai.

D'Ambray. Mais, Monsieur, vous ne pensez donc pas aux grandes ressources qui restent au Roi, dans l'amour universel de la nation que ses vertus lui ont acquis, dans le courage des Princes et de la noblesse qui l'entourent, dans la force de sa maison militaire, dans le dévouement bien prononcé de quelques généraux et régiments de ligne restés fidèles, de la garde nationale Parisienne, et des autres qui se rassemblent à Melun et présentent une armée déjà trois fois plus forte que les rébelles qui suivent Bonaparte.

Fouché. Je sais tout cela jusqu'au moindre détail. Ces ressources ne sont qu'illusoires. Si le Roi pouvait compter sur six regiments de cavalerie, il ferait Bonaparte prisonnier. Mais dès que cet homme paraîtra devant le camp de Melun, les troupes de ligne passeront sous ses étendards, les gardes nationales seront entrainés, ou se dissiperont, les princes et les troupes de la maison ne trouveront leur salut que dans la fuite, et il entrera dans Paris du 21 au 22.

D'Ambray. Vous savez cela avec certitude ! comment ? expliquez vous.

Fouché. Je vais vous parler avec la plus grande franchise. Je suis neutre, parceque on m'a rejetté quand je pouvais être utile, quand je pouvais prévenir les malheurs qui accablent inopinément le parti Royaliste, qui, par sa conduite imprudente, a préparé la chute du trône. Je ne suis point de la faction qui ramène Bonaparte au pouvoir suprême ; au contraire, mon parti est très opposé à ce tyran féroce, dont je suis moi-même l'ennemi, irréconciliable, parceque je sçais qu'il me déteste et veut me perdre. Mais il existe entre son parti et le notre des connexions assez étroites pour que rien qui se trame en sa faveur ne nous soit caché. Nous n'ignorons aucune de ses mesures ; elles nous entraineront : il n'est plus tems de s'y opposer. La cause des Bourbons est perdue : il ne reste de ressource au Roi que la fuite.

D'Ambray. Mais monsieur, êtes vous bien sûr de ce que vous m'avancez ? Ce que vous me dites est tellement contradictoire que j'ai de la peine à concevoir comment étant d'un parti aussi ennemi de l'usurpateur, vous ne vous opposez pas, avec les bons serviteurs du Roi, à sa réussite.

Fouché. Notre conduite est conséquente. Toute résistance est inutile. Je vais même vous en convaincre par un autre trait de franchise qui vous étonnera. Nous nous joindrons au tyran. Moi-même qu'il déteste, moi-même qui l'abhorre, je reprendrai sous lui le Ministère de la Police deux jours après son installation. Il ne peut pas se passer de moi : quand il se croira fort, il cherchera à nous perdre ; mais nous ne lui en laisserons pas le tems. D'ici à trois mois nous l'abattrons.

D'Ambray. Sans doute alors, puisque vous ne le prouvez pas plus tôt, vous vous jetterez dans les bras de notre bon Roi, et vous employerez votre influence pour lui ramener la portion de la nation égarée en ce moment.

Fouché. Sans doute, Monsieur, vous ne vous flattez pas que je vous développe mes pensées les plus secrètes. Les circon-

stances nous guideront sur l'avenir. Je n'ai rien à ajouter à ce que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous dire. Vous pouvez en rendre compte au Roi, ainsi que du conseil que je donne pour répondre à sa confiance.

Tel est, si non les termes, au moins le sens de cet important dialogue. Le Chancelier en ayant rendu compte au Roi, Monsieur voulut tenter une seconde conférence lui-même avec Fouché, dont ni l'un ni l'autre ne sortit content. Le Conseil du Roi prit le parti plus qu'inutile d'arrêter Fouché et Carnot. Cette mesure manqua, et sept jours après Bonaparte prit aux Thuilleries la place du Roi, parti de Paris dans la nuit du 19.

Le pauvre Chancelier D'Ambray espérant sauver 180,000 livres de rente qu'il possédait, et qui sont confisquées, obtint du Roi la permission de se retirer dans ses terres, où il fut bientôt persécuté. Il apprit que Bonaparte voulait le faire arrêter; et il fut trop heureux que Fouché, à la protection duquel il eut recours, lui procurât un passeport pour venir en Angleterre, où sa présence donne la facilité de vérifier cette anecdote, d'où on peut tirer des inductions utiles sur les vues des chefs du parti républicain, aussi ennemi de la personne de Bonaparte que de la dynastie des Bourbons.

Prince Hardenberg to Lord Castlereagh.

Vienne, le 1er de May, 1815.

Mylord—Nous venons de recevoir les communications dont votre Excellence a chargé Lord Clancarty, relativement aux arrangemens à conclure pour les subsides. Nous avons en conséquence signé une convention qui a été envoyée immédiatement en Angleterre munie de la ratification des trois Souverains. Nos légations respectives sont autorisées à les échanger. Mais, à cette occasion, nous avons reçu l'ordre de revenir encore vis-à-vis de votre Excellence, sur une demande qui avoit fait l'objet de plusieurs explications que nous eûmes avec le Duc de Wellington au moment de son départ.

Il lui aura sans doute fait connoître dans le tems le vif in-

térêt que nous attachions à voir les autres Souverains et Princes de l'Allemagne obtenir également des secours pécuniaires de la part de l'Angleterre. Cependant les efforts qu'ils sont appellés à faire, et auxquels ils se sont engagés avec un empressement digne de la cause qu'il s'agit de défendre, sont tellement hors de proportion avec leurs moyens réels, qu'il seroit difficile à espérer qu'ils pussent les soutenir avec la persévérance que l'objet de la guerre réclame si impérieusement.

Ajoutez-y, Mylord, la position géographique de leurs États qui les soumet à toutes les charges si onéreuses qui résultent du passage et séjour continuel des plus grandes armées, et vous vous convaincrez aisément qu'un million de livres sterlings à répartir parmi eux ne leur offriroit qu'une juste indemnité pour des armemens dont les résultats présentent, sans y comprendre les troupes du Hanovre, un effectif d'environ 150,000 hommes. Il seroit à supposer que sans cet encouragement, nous éprouverions beaucoup de difficultés à maintenir avec eux l'union si nécessaire pour le succès de la guerre. Toutes ces considérations qui nous paroissent du plus grand poids, nous imposent le devoir de renouveller nos représentations auprès de votre Excellence pour qu'elle obtienne de son Gouvernement qu'un million de livres sterlings, spécialement destiné à être partagé entre les Souverains et les Princes d'Allemagne, fût ajouté aux cinq millions, qui ont été consentis en faveur des trois principales Puissances, et sans préjudice des sommes affectées à la solde des troupes étrangères qui font immédiatement partie de l'armée Angloise.

Nous pensons qu'en se prêtant à une démande aussi juste, l'Angleterre ne dépasseroit point le montant des sacrifices pécuniaires qu'elle a faits pendant la dernière guerre, et nous pouvons lui garantir que l'utilité que la cause générale en retirera répondra parfaitement à ce surcroit de dépenses.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, avec la plus haute considération, &c.,

Le Prince de HARDENBERG.

Count Lieven to Lord Castlereagh.

Harley Street, le 3 Mai, 1815.

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire parvenir, ci près, mylord, la feuille du Journal de Francfort qui contient l'article dont je vous ai fait mention ce matin.

Veuillez agréer en même tems l'hommage de mon respect et de mon sincère attachement,

. LIEVEN.

Extrait du Journal de Francfort du 14 *Avril*, 1815.

De Vienne, le 8 Avril.

(Par voie extraordinaire.)

Au moment où une nouvelle lutte va commencer, où des flots de sang vont de nouveau couler pour l'affermissement de la liberté et de l'existence de tous les États de l'Europe, un grand sujet de consolation et d'espoir c'est l'harmonie et le concert parfait qui règnent entre les souverains. Tous sont convaincus qu'il n'y a ni paix, ni tranquillité, ni sûreté, à espérer aussi longtems que Buonaparte sera à la tête du Gouvernement François, et fermement décidés à pousser la guerre avec la plus grande vigueur contre lui; car c'est contre lui personnellement que sont dirigés tous les efforts de l'Europe. Il n'entre dans la résolution des puissances aucune vue d'ambition, d'aggrandissement, ou de conquête. Elles ne prétendent pas faire la loi à la France, ni influer sur le gouvernement qu'elle voudroit se donner. Aussi ce n'est pas de disposer du trône de la France que les souverains feront la guerre; c'est uniquement pour en exclure Buonaparte. Ce sera ensuite à la France rendue à elle-même, et délivrée du despotisme militaire, à voir quelle est la forme de gouvernement qu'elle voudra adopter.

Count de la Châtre to Lord Castlereagh.

Londres, le 7 May, 1815.

Mylord—J'ai l'honneur de vous adresser ci-joint l'extrait de la lettre que S. A. R. Monseigneur le Duc d'Angoulême a écrit

à Madame, de Barcelonne, en date du 18 Avril dernier, ainsi de la convention signée précédemment en son nom. La conduite de ce Prince est remarquable par le caractère qu'il a déployé, la constance qu'il a manifesté, et surtout par le refus qu'il a réitéré à plusieurs reprises d'abandonner ses compagnons d'infortune. Je ne doute pas qu'elle n'ait vôtre suffrage, et j'espére que Son Altesse Royale le Prince Régent daignera l'approuver.

M. le Duc de Bourbon, après avoir couru beaucoup de risques dans la Vendée, qui avoit été momentanément terrorifiée par l'arrivée de Bonaparte à Paris, a été obligé de s'embarquer, et s'est rendu à St. Ander, avec le seul Comte de Nenilly, son écuyer.

Ces deux Princes ont écrit au Gouvernement espagnol pour avoir permission de se rendre à Madrid.

J'ai l'honneur d'être avec une haute considération, &c.,

Le Comte de la CHÂTRE.

Extrait de la Lettre de S. A. R. Monseigneur le Duc d'Angoulême, datée Barcelonne, le 18 *Avril.*

J'arrive enfin ici ayant fait tout ce que j'ai cru devoir faire: je vais vous dire en peu de mots ce qui s'est passé dans le Midi.—Le 30 Mars Amédée d'Escars a repoussé le Général Debelle, devant Montélimart. Le 2 Avril, nous avons battu complètement l'ennemi au passage de la Drôme. Deux canons, deux drapeaux, huit cent prisonniers en ont été le fruit. La possession de Valence, ainsi que du cours de l'Isère en ont été le résultat. Le 3, j'ai appris que le Général Ernouff, abandonné par le 58 régiment, avoit été obligé de rétrograder sur Sisteron, et que Nismes et Montpellier avoient arboré le signe de la rébellion. Je ne tardai pas à être informé que les Généraux Grouchy et Biré marchoient de Lyon sur moi, et que le Général Gilly marchoit de Nismes sur le Pont St. Esprit.

Je vis bien qu'il falloit songer à la retraite. Le 6 j'appris

par l'arrivée de M. Ferdinand Berthier que tout étoit fini à Bordeaux et à Toulouse. Le Général Biré tenta le même jour le passage de l' Isère, et fut repoussé. Les nouvelles de Nismes et de Montpellier, répandues parmi nos gardes nationaux, nous en avoient fait perdre une partie. Je quittai Valence à 10½ heures du soir ; je bivouaquai avec le 10e régiment, et me mis ensuite en marche pour Montélimart où j'arrivai le 7 à 4 heures du soir. Le Colonel du 14e qui m'avoit rejoint l'avant-veille, m'annonça qu'il n'étoit plus maître de son régiment, qui effectivement me quitta et se dirigea sur Valence. On m'avoit proposé de partir seul de cette ville. Je l'ai refusé. Les gens du pays, qui étoient mauvais, travailloient beaucoup le 10e d'artillerie, qui dès lors ne valût plus rien. On me renouvella la proposition de partir seul, et je persistai dans mon refus ; mais j'envoyai le Général d'Aultanne au Général Gilly au Pont St. Esprit, pour convenir avec lui qu'il me laissât passer avec mon corps pour me retirer sur la Durance : et le 8 je continuai ma marche.

Le Général d'Aultanne trouva au Pont St. Esprit le Colonel Laurent du 10e chasseurs, et convint avec lui qu'on me laisseroit retirer sur Marseille, escorté du 10e, au Colonel-Général. Mais le Général Gilly s'y refusa : j'en appris la nouvelle à Pierrelatte. Comme l'on retenoit le Général d'Aultanne prisonnier, j'envoyai le Baron de Damas qui signa avec le Général Gilly la convention que je joins ici.

L'ennemi s'étoit rendu maître du chemin d'Avignon, mais je voulus rester le plus de tems possible, pour assurer autant qu'il dépendoit de moi, la vie et la sureté des braves qui m'avoient suivi. Enfin je partis le 9 au soir, et je fus retenu au Pont St. Esprit, où j'ai été gardé prisonnier pendant 6 jours, en contravention à la convention. J'ai eu pendant 10 heures un officier de gendarmerie dans ma chambre : il avoit ordre de ne me pas perdre de vue. Je ne m'en suis débarrassé qu'en lui donnant ma parole de ne pas chercher à me sauver. C'est le Général Grouchy qui étoit au Pont St. Esprit, qui m'a em-

pêché de continuer mon voyage. Il étoit surveillé lui-même par un Général Corbineau, aide-de-camp de Bonaparte.

J'oubliois de dire que le Colonel du 10e m'avoit averti le 8 que le tiers de son régiment avoit déserté, et que le reste ne tireroit pas. L'artillerie étoit encore pire. Il ne me restoit que 800 gardes nationales. Le dernier jour de ma captivité le Général Grouchy est parti pour Marseille. J'ai été relâché le 15, et j'ai arrivé le 16 à Cette, où je me suis embarqué le même jour à 8 heures du soir: ma traversée a été de 35 heures. Enfin Dieu m'a préservé; j'espère que ce sera pour son service, et pour celui du Roi. J'ai fait tout ce que j'ai pû. Je quitte la France avec tristesse. Le pays en est très bon: on me bénissoit partout, mais l'armée et la gendarmerie sont détestable. Ceux qui me gardoient étoient abominables, mais 25 chasseurs du — me sont resté fidèles jusqu'à la fin; ils vouloient me suivre partout, ainsi que plus de 40 officiers. Nous nous sommes embarqué au nombre de 17. Quand j'ai quitté Cette, on disoit la guerre déclarée, et que Bonaparte avoit demandé une levée en masse de deux millions d'hommes et trois cent millions d'argent. L'opinion de la France est que les Jacobins vont reprendre le dessus, et que la terreur régnera.

Toulon et Marseille ont été obligés de se rendre le 11 et le 13. Le Maréchal Massena s'est conduit aussi bien que possible jusqu'à la fin.

Convention.

Son Altesse Royal Monseigneur Duc d'Angoulême Commandant en Chef l'armée Royale du Midi, et M. le Général de division Baron Gilly Commandant en Chef le premier corps de l'armée Impériale, pénétrés du désir d'arrêter l'effusion du sang François, ont chargé de leurs pouvoirs, pour régler les articles d'une convention qui puisse assurer la tranquillité de la France, savoir: S.A.R. Monseigneur Duc d'Angoulême; le Baron de Damas, maréchal de camp, son chef d'état major-général; et M. le Général de division Gilly, M. l'adjutant com-

mandant Lefebvre, chevalier de la Légion d'Honneur, chef d'état major du premier corps d'armée ; lesquels après avoir échangé leurs pouvoirs respectifs sont convenû des articles suivants:

Art. 1. L'armée Royale est licenciée. Les gardes nationales, qui en font partie, sous quelque dénomination qu'elles aient été levées rentreront chez elles après avoir déposé leurs armes. Il leur sera délivré des feuilles de route pour rentrer dans leurs foyers, et M. le Général de division Commandant en Chef leur garantit qu'il ne sera jamais question de ce qui à été dit et fait relativement aux évènements qui ont eu lieu avant la présente convention. Les officiers conserveront leurs épées. Les troupes de ligne qui font partie de cette armée se rendront dans les garnisons qui leur seront assignées.

Art. 2. M.M. les officiers généraux, officiers supérieurs d'état major, et autres de toutes les armes, les chefs et employés de toutes administrations, dont il sera fourni un état nominatif, se retireront dans leurs foyers, en attendant les ordres de S. M. l'Empereur.

Art. 3. Les officiers de tous grades qui voudroient donner leur démission, sont libres de le faire. Il leur sera accordé de suite des passeports pour rentrer dans leurs foyers.

Art. 4. Les caisses de l'armée, et les régistres du payeur général seront remis de suite au commissaire nommé à cet effet par M. le Général Commandant en Chef.

Art. 5. Les articles ci-dessus sont applicables aux corps commandés par Monseigneur Duc d'Angoulême en personne, et à tous ceux qui agissent séparément sous ses ordres, et qui font partie de l'armée Royale du Midi.

Art. 6. S. A. R. se rendra en poste au port de Cette, où les bâtiments nécessaires pour elle et sa suite seront disposés pour la transporter partout où elle voudra se rendre. Des postes de l'armée impériale seront placées à tous les relais pour protéger le voyage de S. A. R., et il lui sera rendu partout les honneurs dus à son rang, si elle le désire.

Art. 7. Tous les officiers et autres personnes de la suite de

S. A. R. qui désirent la suivre, auront la faculté de s'embarquer avec elle, soit qu'elles veuillent partir de suite, soit qu'elles demandent le tems nécessaire pour arranger leurs affaires particulières.

Art. 8. Le présent traité restera secret jusqu'à ce que S. A. R. ait quitté le territoire de l'Empire.

Fait en double expédition et convenu entre les chargés de pouvoirs ci-dessus désignés le 8e jour d'Avril, 1815, sous l'approbation de M. le Général Commandant en Chef, et ont signé, au quartier général Pont St. Esprit, le jour et an ci-dessus,

LEFEBVRE.
Le Baron de DAMAS.

Approuvé la présente convention par

Baron GILLY.
Le Baron de DAMAS.

La convention ci contre ayant été signée le 8, le Lieutenant-Général Corbineau, aide-de-camp de Bonaparte exigea l'addition des articles suivants, le 14.

Art. 1. Son Altesse Royale n'ayant aucuns diamans appartenants à la couronne, et n'étant point à sa connaissance que Madame Duchesse d'Angoulême en eut avec elle en quittant Paris, pour se rendre à Bordeaux, s'engage à demander que les diamans ou objets précieux appartenants à la couronne soient rendûs aussitôt que possible, dans le lieu qui sera indiqué, à des commissaires nommés réciproquement *ad hoc*.

Art. 2. Son Altesse Royale s'engage à insister à ce que les objets soient rendus dans le cas où il y auroit continuité de paix avec les puissances étrangères. Fait en double expédition au Pont St. Esprit.

Signé le Lieutenant-Général CORBINEAU.
Signé le Maréchal de camp des armées
du Roi, Le Baron de DAMAS.
Pour copie conforme: Signé Le Baron de DAMAS.

Lord Castlereagh to General Pozzo di Borgo.

London, May 8, 1815.

My dear Sir—Many thanks for your letter, which gave me great pleasure, as a further proof of your independent and honest adherence to the principles which you have invariably maintained.

As I have written very fully to Sir C. Stuart on the subject, who, I know, has no reserve in his communications with you, I shall not repeat my observations. Our wishes, and, I may add, our principles, are the same. We may differ, to a certain extent, in our mode of arriving at our object, but this, I doubt not, discussion will reconcile.

The spirit of this country and of Parliament is as good as I could wish it; but it required some management to bring them to the point of war; and I am confident that, if our pace had been more accelerated, we should have left the public sentiment behind us. If the Continent stands to the text, you may rely upon us implicitly. Excuse so short a note, and believe me, with great regard, dear sir, ever faithfully yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Cathcart to Lord Castlereagh.

Vienna, May 13, 1815.

My dear Lord—I had not, until yesterday, an opportunity that suited the delivery of the message to the Emperor of Russia, contained in your lordship's letter of the 13th ult., marked private. I wished to avoid the formality of a regular audience, and I suspect his Imperial Majesty did not incline to renew with me conversations, either on the subject of the Treaty of Kief, or of the inconvenient and dangerous consequences I had represented to him as likely to arise from the determination of the Prussian Government to divide the Saxon army, by withdrawing from it, at this period, the new subjects of his Prussian Majesty.

The military discussion, which I have reported in my despatch of this date, gave me a fair opening, of which I availed myself. His Imperial Majesty received every part of that communication in the most satisfactory and gracious manner. He repeated the civil things he was pleased to say some weeks ago on the subject of my being again with him in the field. He desired me to assure your lordship that I should find him ready to communicate on every subject, with the most open and unreserved confidence, for the information of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent. His Imperial Majesty desired me to add, that he considered the interchange of such frank and explicit communications between the Allied Sovereigns as the most infallible mode of cementing and consolidating a union among them, which, with the favour of Providence, would be more conducive to ensuring a successful termination of the war than the assembly of larger armies without such concert.

He desired me to say to your lordship everything that was most kind and civil. His Imperial Majesty added, in speaking of you, that he had always found you frank and open, and that he had the highest opinion of you; that he had looked upon your position here to be one of great delicacy and high responsibility; that he looked upon any animosities which had arisen in the course of the negociations to have proceeded from misapprehension, the clashing of different interests, too much heat, and causes of a like nature, which had not made much impression upon him, as he had trusted they would cure themselves.

Speaking of the march of the army, and the length of time it requires to remove troops, even from the nearest provinces of the Russian empire, to the centre of Germany, he said he hoped the time was come when it would be found that the power of Russia might be useful to the rest of Europe, but not dangerous to it.

In stating the force held in readiness within the Russian

frontier, particularly the nine divisions of infantry and seven of cavalry, under General Wittgenstein, and Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg, the Emperor said it was his wish to have moved forward a second army, which, with the addition of the Guards, might easily be made as numerous as the first; but the expense was too great for him to undertake it, unless it had suited Great Britain to give him a larger subsidy.

I have not any ground for supposing that the Emperor of Russia has a wish to set up any particular dynasty in opposition to the Bourbons, in the event of getting rid of that of Bonaparte; but I think that now, as in 1813, he doubts in his own mind the probability of the restoration of the King. He has not spoken to me of the Duke of Orleans, but I know there are persons for whose opinion he has deference, who look upon the Duke of Orleans as being more likely to unite the confidence and the good-will of the different parties than any of that family.

The Emperor has frequently and lately expressed to me his determination not to interfere, except for the removal of Bonaparte, and that he should not be succeeded by any of his generals or marshals, among whom he did not fail to name the Crown Prince of Sweden. I never heard him speak of a Regency, and I have not, from my own knowledge, nor from what I have been able to collect from others, reason to believe a report which has been circulated here, that he would be inclined to favour that arrangement, otherwise than if it should be found the best means of getting rid of the present occupation of the throne of France by Bonaparte: and I am inclined to consider what he said on that subject to Lord Clancarty, at his first audience, as meant to find out his lordship's sentiments and the views of Talleyrand, or Metternich, or both, rather than to convey any real notion of his own.

I do not think any encouragement that may have been, or that may hereafter be, given to those who have intercourse with the Jacobin or any other party to be intended as hostile

to the King, but as an instrument to remove Bonaparte, and to prevent him from reaping the benefit of coalition with such party. I lament that it should be anywhere said that it is doubtful whether, in the event of Bonaparte's removal, any other person would be more fit than the King to unite the interests in France, because the expression of the doubt is injurious to the King's interest; but your lordship is better informed than we can be here, to what extent that language has gone.

I can add nothing to the communications which you receive from both my colleagues, and I communicate to them every observation I make; still I think it my duty to state in this manner, from time to time, what I conceive to be worth your lordship's notice, in regard to the Court to which I am accredited.

I cannot throw light upon the disinclination of the Emperor to interfere with Sweden in regard to the Treaty of Kiel. The Emperor said to me, some time ago, that he thought it could be brought to a settlement *à l'aimable;* and I then urged the expediency of the Emperor's interference without delay with the Court of Sweden, by every argument I could think of. But, since the arrival of Count Löwenhjelm's brother, I have never been able to resume the subject.

In regard to the Saxon corps, the Emperor did not seem disinclined to interfere, when I named the subject, but appeared to have had an imperfect account of the extent of the measure, and desired me to ascertain the particulars, which I did forthwith: in the meanwhile, I suspect his Imperial Majesty found that orders had been sent to carry it into effect.

I have the honour to remain, &c.,

CATHCART.

Cardinal Consalvi to Lord Castlereagh.

Vienna, 13 Mai, 1815.

Mylord—Animé du plus vif désir de satisfaire, autant que les devoirs de notre religion le permettent, aux vues du

Gouvernement Britannique, avec lequel le Saint Père souhaite ardemment de resserrer le plus étroitement les liens de l'amitié et de la bonne harmonie, je n'ai pas manqué d'instruire Sa Sainteté de la conversation que j'eus l'honneur d'avoir avec votre Excellence avant votre départ de Vienne relativement aux negotiations à entamer avec Monseigneur Poynter, pour l'arrangement des affaires ecclésiastiques, afin que d'après ce que vous m'avez dit alors ce Prélat en référat à votre Excellence, à son retour à Londres, et que tout puisse être combiné avec le bon plaisir du Gouvernement Anglois.

J'ai écrit aussi à Monseigneur Poynter, l'engager d'attendre mon retour à Rome. Ayant toutefois prévu la possibilité de ma trop longue absence, j'ai proposé dans ce cas au Saint Père de traiter avec ce Prélat, même avant mon retour, en prenant en considération dans cette affaire tout ce que je lui ai fait connoître des vues et des désirs du Gouvernement Britannique. Les évènements arrivés en Italie ayant occasionné le départ de Sa Sainteté pour Gènes, ainsi que celui de Monseigneur Poynter, et ce dernier ayant désiré de retourner à Londres, le Saint Père lui a fait connoître avant son départ quelles sont ses dispositions à l'égard de l'arrangement des affaires ecclésiastiques, pour en faire part à votre Excellence. Monseigneur Poynter en a été très satisfait, et a dit qu'il ne sauroit douter que son Gouvernement le fût aussi.

À peine en ai-je été instruit de Gènes où Sa Sainteté se trouve, que je m'empresse d'en donner connoissance à votre Excellence, et je m'estimerois très heureux d'avoir pu réussir à concilier un arrangement qui me tenoit tant à cœur. Dans l'espoir que la fin du Congrès me permette d'être à Rome dans le courant de Juin, je puis assurer votre Excellence que je n'aurai rien de plus empressé que d'y employer tous mes soins pour l'exécution, et le complètement des arrangemens que votre Excellence aura pu agréer, ainsi que de resserrer toujours davantage les liens que j'ai eu le bonheur de nouer sous les auspices de votre Excellence.

En attendant à Rome vos ordres, je renouvelle aussi en mon particulier, à votre Excellence les offres de mes services pour tout ce qui pourroit lui être agréable, en la priant instamment de vouloir toujours me compter dans le nombre de vos dévoués serviteurs et amis. J'ai l'honneur d'être avec une considération très distinguée, et avec l'attachement le plus affectueux, de votre Excellence le très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

Stevente Cardinal CONSALVI.

Je vous prie, Mylord, de présenter mes hommages à Milady Castlereagh, ainsi que de vouloir bien donner à Milady Mathilde la lettre ci-jointe.

Lord Clancarty to Lord Castlereagh.

Vienna, May 19, 1815.

My dear Lord—I had a conversation with Talleyrand on Monday last, in which I mentioned to him the difficulties which had occurred respecting the arrangements in the north of Italy, and asked him whether any hint had been given him of the desire of changing the arrangements of the 28th of March. He told me that, except from me, he was in ignorance upon the subject; that he had just left the Emperor of Russia, who had conversed with him for some time by appointment, but who never touched upon the affairs of Italy.

Talleyrand did not seem to me so anxious upon this matter as I could have wished to have found him. His own job respecting Beneventum seemed to be the only point of interest with him. On this subject, your brother Charles, though *en seconde ligne*, can give you more information, and from better sources, than are within my reach. After our conversation relating to Italy, I renewed the subject of his joining the King at Ghent. He told me he thought of setting out for the purpose in the course of the next week; that, if matters turned out as he should wish, he would remain with the King, but that he was easily disgusted! and could not keep up a constant struggle

with the emigrant party; that, if the King followed his advice, he would give it freely, if not, he should withdraw.

Upon my mentioning the necessity of the King forming an efficient and responsible administration, and the importance of his forming a part of it, with a view to the King's interests being upholden against his concurrence, more especially as there might be those even in the Alliance who might perhaps prefer other governments to that of Louis XVIII., Talleyrand answered that he was sensible of this; that he knew the Emperor Alexander was adverse to the restoration; but that he was convinced there was not at present so popular a person in all France as the King, insomuch that he was certain, and had so written to the King, that if his Majesty could now take his cane and walk alone into France and to Paris, he might not only do so without molestation, but might, with the assent of all, reseat himself upon his throne, with even greater ease than Buonaparte had possessed himself of it. Talleyrand had just, as I said before, come from the Emperor Alexander. Charles, our gentleman *en seconde ligne*, has procured from an excellent source the substance of much of the conversation which passed between them, which, with reference to the King and Government of France, will not ill contrast with Talleyrand's account to me of the King's popularity.

M. de Capellen has sent me a volume of thanks to you for the snuff-box presented to him on the exchange of the ratifications of the treaty of adherence signed by you and me with the Dutch plenipotentiaries, previous to your departure.

I send you a letter and its enclosure from a M. Maas, chamberlain to the King of Denmark, seeking compensation for losses in the island of Anholt. I know nothing of the merits, and so told the gentleman, but informed him that his papers should be submitted to you.

The extract of the *Procès Verbal*, forwarded in my despatch No. 46, by this conveyance, upon being compared with the original draft forwarded on the 13th, will show you the altera-

tions which were made in it, all of which, I may say, were suggested by us. The words scored through, between crotchets, in the second page of the German and French paper sent herewith, were struck out at my urgent desire, in order to exclude the question of Kings *de jure* and Kings *de facto*, as referable to their own subjects; and Prince Metternich pressed the exclusion likewise of the words scored under immediately following, which I had desired to retain, but which I consented to forego, by way of compromise; because, in fact, the ambiguity which might be inferred if the paragraph stood alone, ceases to be such when referred to the question in discussion, and to the whole preceding and subsequent reasoning upon it.

I know not why they have omitted to publish Maret's letter to Caulaincourt at Chatillon, as a pure justification; it was the original intention to have done so; its omission, however, does not much signify.

The printed paper sent herewith has been only a proof sheet, and not published—at least so I am assured. You will see in one of the early lines on the discussions of the first question, that the Treaty of Fontainebleau is declared to be broken, although now the Emperor is pleased to set it up again as in full force, for his purposes with the Archduchess.

Upon the Parma question, I beseech you to stand our friend, and to send us your opinion without delay: I never yet was so embarrassed. Will you set a precedent of placing Buonaparte's bastard on a throne? Will you re-make the Treaty of Fontainebleau *quoad* this offspring of a usurper? Will you make a present to the Emperor of Russia of the sole dictatorship of all the affairs of Europe? and play into his hands, so as to further alliances for him hostile to the existence of any European balance? Will you, now the poor King of France is down, give him an additional blow, by reversing those things which, while he was in prosperity, you had desired to see carried into effect? These are questions for your decision, which I attend with the utmost impatience.

How the subject of the Dutch loan has reached Lord Grey's ears, except through the Russian Chancery, I cannot guess; but sure I am that, so little has this Emperor kept faith with us, in aiding us in the concluding negociations here, that he seems to me to have forfeited all claim to our future assistance.

Farewell, my dear lord! yours most affectionately,

CLANCARTY.

Metternich told me to-night that you might send as many negociators as you pleased to the head-quarters. How and to whom to be accredited, he did not answer me, though asked. Our last letters from England are of the 29th of April. We have nothing from London since I last wrote, on the 13th inst.

Lord Walpole to Lord Castlereagh.

St. Petersburgh, May 20, 1815.

My dear Lord—The constant expectations which the letters from Vienna held out of the Emperor's return to Petersburg, had induced me not to trouble you on the subject of my own affairs; but the little probability which now remains of Lord Cathcart's early arrival, forces me to lay before you my present situation.

I need not remind you that, for many years, this has been noted as the dearest capital in Europe for a stranger's residence, and you will have some idea of the increased expense attending it, when I assure you that, within the last ten months, every necessary of life, corn, wood, forage, &c., is more than doubled in price, and is still advancing: what was then had for 9, now costs 19½ to 20 roubles. Most of these articles are positively much dearer than in London. The fault is greatly attributable to the police, but the fact is so. From the destruction of Moscow and other causes, the price of houses has become enormous, and I can honestly affirm to your lordship, that the necessary expense of an English Minister, without any representation, is not less than between £5,000

and £6,000 a-year. Lord Cathcart's steward assures me his lordship's will exceed £30,000 a year.

You will not think that the services to be rendered by any one at St. Petersburgh, under the present circumstances, are equal to such an allowance: and I trust you will believe that the impossibility to raise the money necessary beyond my present appointments, alone induces me to request you to allow my return. It is not from my dislike to the climate or the people, among whom I have many friends, and by whom I have reason to think that I am generally esteemed; but because I have not the means of defraying the really requisite expense of my establishment, which, I can assure you, is much less than what Mr. Stuart had while in the same capacity.

Should you think it worth while to direct my stay here, may I beg of you to inform Lady Walpole of your determination, as, in that case, I hope, she will be enabled to join me.

I am, my dear lord, &c., WALPOLE.

The Duke of Orleans to Lord Castlereagh.

Richmond, ce 21 Mai, 1815.

Mylord—Je désire que vous ayez une connoissance exacte de ce qui passe entre le Roi de France et moi, et que par vous elle puisse parvenir confidentiellement aux autres membres du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté. Vous avez déjà eu les premières lettres: j'ai l'honneur de vous remettre à présent une copie de la réplique du Roi du 10 de Mai, et de la réponse que j'y ai faite. Soyez persuadé que mon objet est simplement de me prémunir contre les misreprésentations que je crains toujours, mais nullement de solliciter de votre part une réponse qui pourrait vous embarasser en aucune manière. Je suis satisfait dès que vous êtes instruit, et j'ai l'honneur d'être avec beaucoup de considération, Mylord, votre très affectionné

LOUIS PHILIPPE D'ORLÉANS.

Réplique du Roi au Duc d'Orléans.

Copie. Gand, ce 10 Mai, 1815.

J'ai reçu, mon cher neveu, votre lettre du 25 Avril, et je ne puis que vous rendre grâces de la franchise avec laquelle vous me parlez de nos plus chers intérêts. J'approuve entièrement le principe de conciliation, qui fait la base de votre opinion, et qui, comme vous le savez, a été la règle invariable de ma conduite. Je ne puis cependant en tirer les mêmes conséquences, et vous verrez, par ma déclaration du 2 de Mai, faite d'accord avec les ministres des Puissance Alliées, qu'en distinguant leur cause de la mienne, il n'en est pas moins indispensable que j'agisse avec elles conformément au traité fait entre nous. En me tenant éloigné de la France, je ne ferois qu'accréditer les bruits que Buonaparte cherche à répandre sur les vues interessées des alliés, et je contribuerois ainsi à soulever contre eux la nation entière. Mon dessein est de paroître dans mes états, dès que la moindre portion du territoire Français me deviendra accessible, mais de paroître à la tête d'un corps François entouré des princes de ma maison, et m'occupant à prévenir, ou du moins, à tempérer les maux que la guerre entraine à sa suite.

J'ai formé dans cette vue un plan, que je vous communiquerai. L'exécution n'en peut maintenant être différée. Je crois, mon cher neveu, que le moment est venu de vous rappeller auprès de moi sans délai. Partez donc tout de suite. Votre prochaine arrivée me dispense d'entrer dans des plus amples détails sur les objets dont je me réserve de vous entretenir avec toute la confiance, dont j'aime à vous donner ici un nouveau témoignage, en vous renouvellant l'assurance de ma bien sincère amitié. J'espère que vous m'apporterez de bonnes nouvelles de ma nièce et de ses enfans.

LOUIS.

Le Duc d'Orléans au Roi.

Sire—J'ai reçu la lettre dont Votre Majesté m'a honoré le 10 de ce mois. Je suis bien flatté de ce que vous daignez

me dire au sujet de la lettre que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous écrire le 25 Avril, et bien heureux que les principes que j'y ai posés ayent obtenu votre approbation. Cependant, comme Votre Majesté ajoute qu'elle n'en tire pas les mêmes conséquences que celles que j'ai déduites dans ma lettre, je regrette vivement que Votre Majesté n'a pas daigné me faire connoître quelles sont les conséquences qu'elle tire elle-même de ces principes, et en quoi je me suis trompé. Je regrette plus encore que vous n'avez pas daigné me communiquer le plan que vous m'annoncez, et à l'exécution duquel vous voulez bien me faire espérer que mes faibles services pourroient être de quelqu' utilité. Votre Majesté daigne me dire qu'elle me le communiquera lorsque je serai arrivé auprès d'elle; mais j'attacherois un grand prix à le connoître avant de m'y être rendu. Car s'il se trouvoit, comme j'en ai quelque crainte, que je ne crûsse pas pouvoir entreprendre ce dont Votre Majesté peut avoir l'intention de me charger, il deviendroit encore bien plus pénible pour moi d'être obligé alors de m'éloigner d'elle, que de continuer dans la retraite où je suis aujourd'hui.

Si, après avoir eu connaîssance de ses intentions, je reconnaissois cette impossibilité, cela seroit plus pénible pour moi, Sire, parceque cela seroit plus marquant, et que cela pourroit par conséquent fournir plus de prétextes aux malveillans pour donner à ma conduite la couleur que j'ai toujours désiré qu'on ne pût jamais lui donner.

J'ai lieu de me flatter que, jusqu'à présent du moins, Votre Majesté a rendû à ma conduite une justice à laquelle à la vérité je crois avoir quelque titre. Il ne m'a pas été difficile de m'appercevoir, dès le premier moment de mon retour en France, qu'il n'entrait pas dans les vues de Votre Majesté de m'admettre à sa confiance intime, je pourrois même presque dire à sa Cour, où les distinctions perpétuelles entre les Princes de sa famille et ceux de sa maison produisoient sans cesse des étiquettes, qui, en ravalant les princes de votre sang presqu'au niveau des particuliers, les séparoient de votre famille aux

yeux du public, et les plaçoient nécessairement dans leurs rapports avec les autres princes des maisons souveraines de l'Europe dans une position d'infériorité, quoiqu'ils eussent au moins le droit d'être leurs égaux, et qu'ils eussent été souvent les supérieurs même de quelques têtes couronnées, ainsi que Votre Majesté daigne elle-même me l'apprendre, car je l'ignorais, lorsque les désagrémens que nous éprouvions m'ont porté à lui faire aux Thuileries quelques représentations respectueuses à cet égard. Cependant Votre Majesté a pu voir que ces considérations n'ont eu aucune influence sur ma conduite et que j'ai tout supporté pour empêcher que cela ne fut remarqué, et qu'il ne put en résulter des doutes sur la sincérité de mon attachement pour Votre Majesté.

Il est bien connu, Sire, de toute la France, il est même probablement connu de toute l'Europe, que tandis que tous les princes de votre famille étoient appellés constamment et une fois pour toutes à votre Conseil, j'en ai été constamment exclu. Votre Majesté peut me dire que je ne m'en suis jamais plaint, que je ne l'ai jamais demandé—rien n'est plus vrai, et qu'elle me permettre d'ajouter ici une autre vérité. C'est que je ne l'ai jamais désiré. Je n'ai pas désiré d'avantage d'aller siéger à la Chambre des Pairs, dont Votre Majesté, selon l'ancien usage de la Monarchie Française nous a déclaré membres nés et de droit, mais dont néanmoins, elle nous a effectivement exclus par l'innovation d'exiger l'assentiment royal pour que les princes pussent y siéger, et de frapper de nullité tout ce qui seront fait en leur présence, lorsque cet assentiment n'auroit pas été préalablement exprimé et renouvellé à chaque session. Et pourquoi ne l'ai je pas désiré? Sire, je l'aurois désiré vivement, si j'avais pu me flatter d'obtenir de votre part cette confiance intime sans laquelle il est impossible de pouvoir être utile dans un Conseil; ou, si j'avois cru que ma présence et mes discours dans la Chambre des Pairs pussent consolider Votre Majesté sur son thrône et fortifier son Gouvernement; mais sentant, comme je le faisois, que mes opinions ne coin-

cideroient pas toujours avec ceux de Votre Majesté et de ses ministres, j'ai préféré être dispensé de manifester les miennes ; j'ai préféré ne pas être placé dans l'alternative fâcheuse pour le premier Prince de votre sang, d'approuver en apparence ce qu'il désapprouve en réalité, ou d'acquérir une funeste popularité par l'opposition qu'il apporte aux mesures du Gouvernement, et par la défaveur de la Cour.

J'ai donc préféré, Sire, la nullité dans laquelle vous me placez vous-même, et Votre Majesté a vu combien je m'y suis religieusement renfermé. Ceux qui avoient le plus de prévention contre moi ont été forcés de me rendre la justice que je ne me mêlai de rien au monde que de soutenir le gouvernement de Votre Majesté par tous les moyens qui restoient en mon pouvoir, et d'éviter scrupuleusement tout ce qui pouvait même ressembler à une opposition.

Sire, le premier vœu de mon cœur est de voir Votre Majesté rétablie sur son thrône, et de jouir en France, sous ses auspices, du rang et de l'existence du premier Prince du sang. Voilà ce que je désire bien sincèrement, et ce que dans mon âme et conscience je préfère à tout, ainsi que j'ai déjà eu l'honneur de le dire à Votre Majesté ; mais plus je le désire, et plus je désire que Votre Majesté adopte les mesures et le système qui peuvent le consolider plus efficacement, et nous préserver, par cette consolidation, d'un second renversement, lorsque nous aurons eu le bonheur de voir une seconde restauration.

Il me semble, Sire, que la principale difficulté n'est pas aujourd'hui de renverser Buonaparte, et de reconduire Votre Majesté à Paris, mais c'est de consolider votre rétablissement, et de vous procurer en France une force capable de vous préserver, ainsi que nous, d'une rechute comme celle du mois de Mars dernier. C'est cela qu'en général on entend bien mal hors de France, non pas par défaut de bonne intention à votre égard, car je suis persuadé que tous les gouvernements désirent sincèrement que Votre Majesté soit rétablie, et qu'elle le soit solidement ; mais par défaut de connaissance de la France et

du caractère français, et malheureusement la plupart des Français qui sortent de France, se laissent tellement entrainer par leurs passions, et s'échauffent tellement ent'reux, que leurs opinions achèvent d'égarer ceux qui, étant étrangers à la France, auroient eux-mêmes besoin d'être guidé et éclairé sur la véritable disposition des esprits. Je dois avouer à Votre Majesté que cette exaltation d'opinions parmi les émigrés est un des motifs qui m'a toujours éloigné de m'agréger à eux ; car, autre que je la crois très dangereuse et même funeste pour les intérêts de Votre Majesté, je sens, et j'ai souvent éprouvé que la difference de mes opinions m'attire, de leur part, des désagrémens auxquels je ne me soucie pas d'être exposé.

C'est pour cela, Sire, que je croirois infiniment fâcheux pour les intérêts de Votre Majesté qu'elle se présentât en France entourée d'une réunion de Français professant des opinions semblables. L'expérience de l'année dernière doit nous faire sentir combien il importe que Votre Majesté mette de circonspection dans sa conduite à cet égard ; et la lettre de Votre Majesté me fait craindre que ce ne soit votre intention de vous mettre à la tête d'un corps semblable à celui qui entra sous vos ordres en France en 1792, et cette crainte est pour moi un nouveau motif bien puissant pour vous supplier de daigner permettre que je reste encore dans ma retraite. J'aime à me flatter que la sagesse de Votre Majesté remédiera aux maux que la partie de son plan qu'elle m'a permis d'appercevoir me fait craindre et prévoir. J'aime même à me flatter que je me trompe dans ma manière de voir ; mais je ne puis me persuader que le Gouvernement de Votre Majesté ne soit reconnu par la France, tant que le siège en sera dans un lieu occupé et entouré par les armées étrangères. Je n'excepterois que Paris, dont (comme, j'ai déjà eu l'honneur de le mander à Votre Majesté) l'occupation me paroît devoir être nécessairement momentanée, par ce que je la regarde comme un coup mortel pour le Gouvernement de Buonaparte.

Je sais avec quels soins Votre Majesté doit éviter, ainsi

qu'elle daigne me le dire, *tout ce qui pourroit accréditer en France les bruits que Buonaparte cherche à répandre sur les vues interessées des Alliés;* mais je ne sens pas moins vivement combien il importe à Votre Majesté de ménager la délicatesse, je dirois presque la susceptibilité, de la nation Française à cet égard. Que Votre Majesté pense bien au cri qui sera poussé en France, si c'est elle qui fait ouvrir les portes des places aux troupes alliées, et si c'est d'une de ces places, et sous la garde d'une garnison étrangère dont un petit corps d'émigrés ne changera point la nature, et ne fera probablement que l'aggraver aux yeux de la nation Française que Votre Majesté entreprend de gouverner la France!

Puis-je croire que les puissances étrangères veulent sincèrement le renversement de Buonaparte et votre rétablissement, et moins je me persuade qu'elles puissent exiger de Votre Majesté des démarches qui me semblent devoir être aussi pénibles pour elle, que fâcheuses pour sa cause et nuisibles à ses intérêts.

Je n'importunerai pas d'avantage Votre Majesté avant de connoître plus en détail le plan dont elle à daigné me parler.—Ma femme me charge de témoigner au Roi toute sa reconoîssance pour l'intérêt qu'il daigne prendre à sa santé et à celle de ses enfans. Elle tousse beaucoup moins et est mieux, sans cependant être aussi bien que nous le désirions. La coqueluche de mes enfans est presque terminée.

Que Votre Majesté daigne agréer avec bonté l'hommage de mon profond respect et de mon entier dévouement,

Sire, &c.

Lord Castlereagh to Mr. Baker.

Foreign Office, May 23, 1815.

Sir—In a former despatch, I informed you of the unfortunate affray that had taken place at Dartmoor Prison, between the American prisoners confined there and the military stationed to guard that depôt, in which a number of the former were killed and wounded.

In consequence of the representation which was afterwards made on the subject to this Government by Mr. Beazley, grounded upon affidavits of several of the prisoners, tending in a great measure to throw the blame exclusively upon the officers and men on duty at the prison on that occasion, it became necessary to institute some further inquiry into the business; and accordingly Mr. Seymour Larpent, on the part of the British Government, and Mr. Charles King, on the part of the American, were sent to Dartmoor, as Commissioners for that purpose. I have the honour to enclose, for your information, a copy of Mr. Larpent's letter to me, accompanying the joint report made by him and Mr. King, after a mature examination of witnesses on the spot.

I also transmit herewith the copy of a letter which I have addressed to Messrs. Gallatin and Clay, by command of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, expressive of his sentiments of sincere regret on this unfortunate affair, and of his desire to make every suitable compensation to the families of the persons who suffered on this melancholy occasion. You will take the first opportunity of reiterating those sentiments on the part of this Government to the President of the United States; and you will lose no time in communicating with the American Government on the most efficient mode for carrying into execution the benevolent intentions of his Royal Highness, transmitting to me, as soon as you can, the particulars of the arrangement which you may conclude for that purpose, that no delay may arise in giving it effect.

I am, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

PS. I also enclose a copy of Messrs. Clay and Gallatin's answer to my letter.

Prince Talleyrand to Lord Castlereagh.

Vienne, 24 [Mai, 1815].

Milord—Veuillez bien permettre que je m'adresse à vous pour faire remettre à son Altesse Royale, Madame la Duchesse

d'Angoulême la lettre ci-jointe que je viens de recevoir pour elle.

Je quitte Vienne sous très peu de jours; et je serais déjà parti, si l'on n'avait pas cru essentiel de faire signer tous les protocoles par les chefs des Cabinets. Nous laissons un plénipotentiaire de chaque légation pour dresser l'acte. Les plénipotentiaires n'ont pas le pouvoir de changer, mais seulement de co-ordonner et de renvoyer aux traités particuliers entre les puissances ce qui ne tient pas aux intérêts généraux de l'Europe.

J'ai lu avec un extrême plaisir vos belles discussions parlementaires: elles ont eu ici un grand succès. Vous nous avez rappris nos affaires; je sais à present, et par vous, ce qu'il faut dire du congrès.

La Bernardière est parti: il va d'abord en Suisse, et ensuite en Auvergne où il se retire. Je le regrette.

Veuillez agréer, Milord, la nouvelle assurance du sincère attachement et de la haute considération avec laquelle je suis de votre Excellence, le très humble et très obeissant serviteur,

TALLEYRAND.

Lord Castlereagh to Count Nesselrode.

Draft. London, May 28, 1815.

My dear Sir—You will receive by the present courier the Convention I have signed with the Count de Lieven and the Baron Fagel, relative to the Dutch loan. I trust that it will prove satisfactory, and that I shall have thus fulfilled, as I have very sincerely desired to do, the Emperor's wishes.

The Count de Lieven, with his accustomed zeal for the service of his Court, was desirous that the 5th Article should have been confined in its operation to the part of the debt falling to the share of Holland; but this change, whilst it would have been at direct variance with all my arguments, as employed both from Vienna and since my return to reconcile the Government to the measure, would have destroyed my whole case in

Parliament, by enabling my opponents to describe the arrangement as one made not upon the principle of a fair equivalent with Holland, but as a gratuitous concession to Russia, for an object that might not survive the present crisis.

The risk to you is, I trust, small, whilst the principle is everything to us, in justifying the measure in Parliament. Although M. de Lieven pressed this point earnestly, I am confident you will do justice to the consideration which made it quite impossible for me to accede to his proposal. I should have deemed it highly imprudent, with a view to the success of the measure in Parliament, to have introduced so obnoxious a stipulation, which I could never defend; as the loss of the Netherlands would not only imply that Great Britain ought to save its money, but keep the Dutch colonies into the bargain.

Count Lieven will also inform you confidentially of the utmost we can attempt here in the shape of subsidy for the service of the ensuing year, and I prefer, as I am sure you will, in the spirit of that confidence in which we have personally acted on such subjects towards each other, this friendly explanation to a more formal answer to your and Count Rasumoffski's note.

The substance of what I have stated to him is, that, if it is thought *necessary* to bring forward Bennigsen's army of reserve, to make our *coup* against France *quite sure*, we shall be ready, out of our vote of credit, to make advances not exceeding, in the whole, one million, in twelve monthly payments —the payments to commence from the period the troops leave the Emperor's dominions—with reasonable allowance for their return home, to be regulated with reference to their position on service or march, when the contest may close. As this is the extent of what we can propose to undertake, I must trust to you to protect us against this being made the ground of new pretensions in other quarters.

You will, I trust, also be fully satisfied with what we have done for the minor Powers. You will observe that we have

sacrificed, in a great measure, the strength and efficiency of the Duke of Wellington's army, in order to preserve the entire confederacy in harmony and good humour, by spreading our subsidies over the whole surface of the Alliance. We shall have thus to pay—

	£
To the three great Powers . . .	5,000,000
To the minor Powers, in lieu of troops deficient in our quota . . .	2,500,000
Now proposed	1,000,000
	8,500,000

I hope you will be satisfied with our proceedings in Parliament. It required some management to embark the country heartily in a new war, under all the embarrassments of a Congress and an escape from Elba. You may rely upon it that it has been well done, and that we shall not be wanting to our Allies and to the good cause.

Believe me to be, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

The Duke of Orleans to Sir Charles Stuart.

Richmond, le 30 Mai, 1815.

Votre lettre du 26, mon cher Chevalier, m'a fait un grand plaisir. C'est pour moi une grande satisfaction de savoir que nous continuons à voir de même, et aussi que les conseils de l'Angleterre au Roi de France soient aussi sages et aussi bons. Fasse le Ciel qu'ils soient suivis ! Je le souhaite plus vivement que je ne l'espère.

Je ne suis point effrayé de la différence d'opinion que vous appercevez entre nous sur un point. Selon moi, cette différence est apparente, et non réelle ; et je vais vous déduire les raisons qui me le font penser. Vous me dites, mon cher Chevalier, que "la possession d'une ville Française, soutenue par une armée de Condé ou par un corps de troupes étrangères n'entre pas dans votre système, mais que la présence du Roi de France, soutenue par un corps de troupes Françaises, qui

prouvent l'existence d'une opinion en faveur de sa cause, vous parait préférable à ce qu'on peut attendre des armées étrangères pour le mettre en possession de sa capitale." Si ce plan me paraissait praticable, je le trouverais très bon; car la première partie de la phrase relative à l'armée de Condé et aux troupes étrangères exclut ce à quoi il me semble que le Roi devrait avoir une objection invincible; mais je vous avoue, mon cher Chevalier, que je ne comprends pas comment la seconde partie peut s'exécuter sans retomber dans la première. C'est donc la praticabilité de ce plan qu'il faut discuter, car ce n'est que sur cela que nous différons. Vous croyez qu'il est exécutable sans tomber dans les mouvements que vous craignez autant que moi; et moi je ne le crois pas—voilà toute la différence qu'il y a entre nous.

Je ne vois pas bien où et comment le Roi pourrait être présent en France, sans y être avec un corps étranger, et je suis persuadé que le Roi lui-même ne le croit pas possible, et ne s'en soucie pas. Je ne vois pas d'avantage où et comment le Roi pourrait se former un corps de troupes Françaises qui ne fût pas une armée de Condé, et qui put se soutenir par lui-même sans un corps de troupes étrangères. Car un corps composé de Français, mais formé hors de France, au milieu des troupes étrangères, ne passera jamais en France, pour un *corps Français*. Cela sera toujours vu en France comme l'armée de Condé, où comme les brigades Irlandaises de Jacques second, formées en France sous Louis XIV., étaient vues en Angleterre dans ce temps là.

Quant à la présence du Roi en France, il ne parait pas qu'il y ait un seul point du territoire Français où le Roi pût se présenter sans être accompagné d'une force suffisante pour résister à celle que Buonaparte a actuellement à lui opposer. Vous admettez, comme moi, que cette force ne doit pas être une force étrangère, ni une armée de Condé; ainsi je ne vois plus qu'une portion de l'armée Française se déclarant pour le Roi, et l'appellant au milieu d'elle, qui fût une force analogue à l'exé-

cution de votre plan. C'est l'expérience qui prouvera si cette force là peut se trouver ou non; mais nous devons, ce me semble, être d'accord sur le point que jusqu'à ce que le Roi se soit procuré une force de cette espèce, il est impossible d'exécuter votre plan, et par conséquent, il faut passer à examiner les moyens de se procurer cette force.

Je pense, mon cher Chevalier, qu'on aura toute l'armée Française, ou qu'on n'en aura aucune partie, comme cela est arrivé dans toutes les époques de la Révolution, et notamment lors de la restauration du Roi et de son expulsion. Ce serait en vain, et nous en avons vingt exemples que par des moyens honnêtes ou malhonnêtes, on déterminerait un ou plusieurs chefs de corps à entraîner leur troupes et à les séparer du reste de l'armée, ils seraient eux-mêmes abandonnés par leurs troupes, ou bien il arriverait ce qui a eu lieu à Versailles, lorsque le corps du Maréchal Marmont passa au côté des alliés sans s'en apercevoir. On n'a pas encore pardonné dans l'armée au Maréchal Marmont cette affaire dont Buonaparte a fait une arme principale, quoique elle ait été expliquée par le maréchal d'une manière qui devait l'affranchir de la sévérité avec laquelle il a été jugé à cet égard par ses camarades—mais tel est l'esprit de l'armée; et elle regarde cet esprit d'inséparabilité comme une partie de son honneur.

Si je ne me trompe pas dans cette opinion, vous conviendrez, avec moi, mon cher Chevalier, qu'il est chimérique de se flatter de mettre le Roi de France à la tête d'un corps de troupes Françaises qui ne fut pas une armée de Condé, ou une armée d'Alost, ce qui me parait synonyme, et qui soit en même temps séparé des armées alliées, et assez fort pour se soutenir et pour agir par soi-même.

En tout, mon cher Chevalier, je crois que quand un Roi n'a plus d'autre force matérielle à employer pour le renversement de son antagoniste que celle de ses Alliés, et par conséquence celle des étrangers à son pays, il ne doit s'occuper que d'acquérir une grande force d'opinion par une conduite honorable

et prudente, en adoptant un système qui convienne à la nation, et surtout en réformant ce qui l'a offusqué, et ce qui lui a déplu avant sa chute. Il doit être très clair pour la France et pour l'Europe, et plus encore pour le Roi, que Sa Majesté ne peut ni disposer des armées alliées, ni se mouvoir à son gré, ou diriger la politique de leurs cours, par conséquent jusqu'à ce qu'un parti Français se forme en France pour le rétablissement du Roi, et qu'il soit assez fort pour l'opérer ou au moins pour se retrancher dans un point quelconque de la France, où le Roi pût être transporté, le Roi est dévoué à l'alternative d'être nul, ou d'être un instrument des cours alliées. Il est impossible d'échapper à ce dilemme, qui a toujours paru décisif contre le système de l'émigration à la partie pensante de la nation Française.

C'est à cette partie pensante qu'il faut s'adresser, et ce n'est que par cette voye qu'on obtiendra de bons résultats. Votre lettre me prouve encore plus, ce que je savais bien, avant de l'avoir reçue, c'est que vous le pensez comme moi. Vous voudriez détourner le Roi du système de l'émigration, et vous avez cent fois raison, car ce n'est qu'en s'en éloignant entièrement qu'il rendra son rétablissement possible, et qu'il le consolidera s'il s'effectue. On vous a promis un ministère solide et constitutionnel, et je souhaite de tout mon cœur que vous l'ayiez en réalité. J'en doute, mais si je dois vous avouer toute ma pensée, nous avons déjà très mal enfourné toute cette affaire, et c'est en vain que nous cherchons à la raccommoder par tous ces moyens là: nous n'en viendrons pas à bout. L'armée d'Alost est une armée de Condé; la réunion de Gand est un Coblentz, et selon moi il est impossible de donner à tout cela une apparence et une allure raisonnables.

Les conséquences de ce système d'émigration envers les individus ne sont pas moins funestes; et vraiment on ne conçoit pas qu'on y revienne encore, après en avoir autant souffert soi-même; après avoir exhibé pendant tant d'années à l'Europe le triste spectacle de la misère des émigrés; après les avoir vu

un fardeau presqu' inutile sur la magnanime commisération de l'Angleterre; après qu'on a vu le désespoir de la plupart d'entr'eux, et les cris de leurs familles persécutées les amener à se résigner à l'humiliation d'aller en France, fléchir le genou devant la puissance avec laquelle ils avaient juré avec tant d'imprécations de ne jamais transiger, sous peine de déshonneur et d'infamie; et les malheureux ne retiraient pour fruit de cet avilissement que quelques chétifs débris de leurs patrimoines, dont encore les nouvelles loix Françaises sur les dettes les frustraient presque en entier. Et cependant on recommence! On envoye des agens partout; on écrit de toutes parts pour faire émigrer tout ce qu'on pourra, sans savoir que faire de toutes ces victimes, quand une fois elles sont hors de France, et qu'elles ont tout perdu; on menace tout le monde de déshonneur et de destitution s'ils n'émigrent pas et ainsi (comme, hélas, en tout!) on assiste le gouvernement qu'on veut renverser, car, d'une part il obtient l'éloignement de ceux qu'il serait enchanté d'avoir le pouvoir de bannir, et de l'autre on lui livre le peu de biens restés à l'ancienne noblesse, et on lui fournit une ressource qu'il vendra sans doute à bas prix, mais qu'il vendra, et dont il faudra bien que les ventes restent bonnes comme pour la première fois. En outre, par l'approbation donnée par le Roi à l'émigration il blâme toute la France qui n'émigre pas; et tous les malheureux ainsi approuvés croyent acquérir des droits sur la bienveillance royale, qu'une saine politique oblige ensuite à ne pas reconnaître, et qu'il serait, par conséquent plus loyal de décourager dès le principe. Mais à quoi bon s'arrêter sur tout cela, que vous savez aussi bien que moi!

Je voudrais fixer votre attention et celle du Duc de Wellington sur ce qui se passe en France, qui est bien remarquable et très intéressant. C'est la formation de cette assemblée dont, *à la longue*, l'existence me paraît incompatible avec celle de Buonaparte. Si c'est lui qui triomphe dans la lutte qui va s'engager, il la détruira, et ils le savent aussi bien que nous:

mais s'il succombe, ou que les Alliés s'approchent de Paris, ce sera cette assemblée qui le renversera, et alors c'est avec elle que vous aurez à traiter, comme vous avez eu à traiter avec le Sénat l'année dernière. Je doute fort que vous les trouviez aussi traitables, et je crois qu'ils prendront plus de précautions que n'en avait prises le Sénat; mais ce ne serait pas seulement pour ce moment là, il serait d'avance qu'il me semblerait essentiel d'avoir des communications avec cette assemblée, de s'assurer de ses vues, de ses projets, et surtout des conditions qu'elle pourrait exiger pour se déclarer contre Buonaparte. Croyez, mon cher Chevalier, qu'un décret de cette assemblée, rendu d'accord avec vous, le pulvériserait sans coup férir et rendrait la guerre inutile, si on pouvait l'obtenir avant qu'elle n'éclatât.

Voilà ce dont on devrait s'occuper à Gand—ce serait de démêler quels sont les sacrifices, ou les concessions, par lesquels le Roi pourrait déterminer cette assemblée à se déclarer contre Buonaparte et pour lui: mais on préfère à Gand le moyen anodin du million de bayonettes dont Lord Castlereagh a donné le détail à la Chambre des Communes; et les émigrés disent froidement (ou follement si vous voulez) que *cela est plus sûr*, ce que je ne crois pas; et que *cela exigera moins de concessions de leur part*, ce que je crois encore moins. Ces Messieurs ont toujours mieux aimé laisser tout à faire aux Alliés, et ils croyent toujours les employer, comme si les Alliés leur appartenaient, et étaient à leur service! Ce système là ne plaît pas plus en France qu'en Angleterre, en Allemagne, et en Russie, et il est aussi pernicieux dans ses effets qu'absurde dans son principe.

Vous êtes bien bon de me regretter, mais je suis bien heureux que vous reconnaissiez la justice des motifs de mon absence. Je le serai bien plus de pouvoir coopérer avec vous à faire sentir au Roi ses véritables intérêts, et à concourir par tous les moyens en mon pouvoir au salut de la France, de l'Angleterre, et de l'Europe. Je n'ai pas encore reçu du Roi la réponse qu'on vous a dit que Sa Majesté comptait me faire,

et cependant c'est aujourd'hui 5 Juin, que je termine cette commencée le 30 Mai. Je ne serais pas très étonné, mais je serais fâché qu'on ne me répondit pas du tout. Ce qu'il y a de sûr c'est que depuis un mois que je suis à Richmond, le Comte de la Châtre, et ambassadeur du Roi, n'est pas venu m'y voir, et n'a pas cherché à avoir de communication avec moi une fois. Je suis fâché, mais comme cela n'est pas ma faute je m'en console.

Recevez, mon cher Chevalier, l'assurance de toute ma considération pour vous.

Votre affectionné, &c.

Lord Walpole to Lord Castlereagh.

St. Petersburgh, June 2, 1815.

My dear Lord—The formation of the Committee appears to have destroyed all hopes of a new tariff. Gourieff, however, seems confident of carrying his point, in spite of the Minister of the Interior. It is likely that Campenhausen may vote with him, and Kotschubey publicly professes the same ideas; but he is so false, that little dependence is to be placed on him, and, independent of his private reasons of dislike to Gourieff, he will only act according to what he may discover of the wishes of his Imperial Master, whose opinions no conviction or sense of duty can engage him to contradict.

The first column of Guards leave this on the 2-14th June: they will march by brigades daily, till the whole have left. The division which was in Finland is on its way here, and will also follow.

I am assured that Bernadotte told young Suchtelen, who is just come here, that the whole of the Russian Guards were to be placed under his command, and form one *corps d'armée* with the Swedish troops. This would not please. Of the three divisions hitherto stationed in Finland, two are to be withdrawn, the Guards into Poland, and the rest to form the garrison of St. Petersburgh.

I understand that new taxes, to the amount of 60 millions of roubles annually, are to be imposed, and will be made public in a few days. I have also heard that an issue of Government paper, to the amount of 50 millions, in notes of 500 roubles and upwards, bearing an interest of 6 per 100, and payable in a year, will immediately take place. I am, however, inclined to believe that this latter measure had been proposed, but rejected by Gourieff, who preferred additional taxation to the emission of this paper, and to what was equally proposed, the raising a forced loan.

Arcekchief does not join the Emperor: his place as *Général de service* is filled by another. He is the only man who is supposed to have had power over his master's mind.

The King of Poland very much displeases here. The Grand Duke's letters of the 22nd of May do not mention any disturbances in that country.

I am, with great regard, &c., WALPOLE.

Silver again rises in price; it is nearly 5 roubles the silver rouble: ducats 14½ roubles.

The Duke de Feltre to Lord Castlereagh.

Gand, Juin 4, 1815.

Mylord—Le Roi mon maître s'est déterminé à envoyer M. Donnadieu, Maréchal des Camps de ses armées, près de son Altesse Royale Monseigneur le Duc d'Angoulême en Espagne. Le Roi a pensé qu'il pourrait être utile à la cause générale que M. Donnadieu vît votre Excellence ainsi que Mylord Bathurst avant de passer dans la Péninsule: c'est pour faciliter à cet officier le moyen d'aborder votre Excellence que je lui confie la présente qu'il lui remettra personnellement. Le but de cette entrevue sera de faire connaître en détail à Son Altesse Royale Monseigneur le Duc d'Angoulême les moyens que la Grande Bretagne pourrait se proposer d'employer pour seconder les efforts de l'Espagne, du Portugal, et de Monseigneur le Duc d'Augoulême contre Bonaparte vers et en deça des Pyrénées.

Je prie donc votre Excellence de traiter le Général Donnadieu avec quelque bonté.

Je saisis cette occasion de remercier votre Excellence de ce qu'elle a bien voulu me transmettre quelques lettres; et après l'avoir priée de présenter mon respect à Son Altesse Royale Monseigneur le Prince Régent, j'oserai démander encore à votre Excellence de parler de mes respectueux hommages à Mylady Castlereagh.

Nos nouvelles de la Vendée sont meilleures que celles qui ont été reçues à Londres. Il y a un grand désir en France que les hostilités, commencent, afin que Bonaparte n'ait pas le tems d'écraser Marseille, Bordeaux, et la Vendée.

Il me reste, mylord, à assurer votre Excellence de la haute considération avec laquelle j'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.

Le Ministre Secrétaire d'État de la Guerre de Sa Majesté très Chrétienne,

Duc de FELTRE.

Lord Castlereagh to Mr. Edward Cooke.

St. James's Square, June 4, 1815.

Dear Cooke—I am afraid my long silence may have proved inconvenient to you; but, in truth, I knew not where, in the existing events in Italy, a letter was likely to find you. The Pope's departure from Rome took place almost immediately after the date of your last despatch. It was only by the messenger from Vienna, who arrived a few days since, that I received your letter of the 13th of April, apprizing me that you had maintained your position at Rome, in all these changes of scene.

I waited with the more patience again to hear from you, as I thought it little probable that the Pope would be induced to take any decision upon the questions which had been brought before him, till he should resume his functions at Rome, surrounded by his conclave.

I should not have delayed writing to you even for the few

days that have elapsed since I knew where you were to be found, had not the agitation of the Catholic question been at hand. I wished to write to you with reference to its result, and I should also have desired previously to know what the nature of the document is which Dr. Poynter, now on his return home, is understood to be charged with by his Holiness.

The Doctor describes it as satisfactory, but, to be so, it must be quite explicit upon all the principles which might and ought to constitute a good Concordat and State Settlement. I am afraid that, partly from their taste for mystery, and partly for the purpose of trying to turn these concessions to political account, that the Court of Rome will endeavour to make the whole hinge on a negociation with our Government, and that little more will appear upon the face of the rescript than an avowal of the Pope's readiness to meet the wishes of the British Government as far as the principles of the Church will permit him.

Now, if this is the case, I foresee nothing will be done. The fact is, as a Government, we are too discordant in our view to negociates upon this subject; feelings, *in all quarters*, are more adverse than they were, and I should at this moment find it quite impossible to bring my colleagues to any common system upon it.

I need not detail to you the various modes in which impediments have arisen to any formal negociation on this subject. When we parted, I did not contemplate that we could take advantage of any favourable disposition you might find at Rome, to the extent of proceeding to act upon it *by full* powers and a regular Convention, which involves the agency of the Great Seal and many other knotty points. I am now quite clear that this cannot be attempted, and that the good must be done, not so much at the *formal instance* of the State, as by the intervention of such discreet and leading Catholics as may feel the importance of strengthening their claims to indulgence with their own Government and Parliament, by

procuring the sanction of Rome to the principles contained in Mr. Grattan's bill. It is in vain to expect that those who are adverse to the Catholic concessions will labour to remove the main obstacles to their success.

The Catholics must effect this themselves. They now are fully aware of the nature of the securities expected from them; and, if they mean to succeed, they must first make it clear that they have the Pope's sanction for granting them, and then they must work their own body into a better temper upon the measure itself. Two years ago, a great and favourable impulse was given to the measure. If the body had then received the Bill with common sense or common decorum, I have no doubt the number of their supporters would have increased. The tide is now turned strongly against them, nor will it be arrested in its course, without activity on their part to make a character. They must positively determine to make love to the Protestants—making war will not do, nor will secession and inactivity reinstate the cause where it was.

I should recommend you to make this understood at Rome: you must undeceive them, if they suppose that the British Government, however well disposed to the Pope's interest, will take the initiative on this question; and the Catholics must themselves find the means of putting their intentions and principles beyond dispute, if they desire to conciliate.

I see so much of the High Church spirit abroad at this moment, that I should not deem it discreet at present to excite it by any formal recognition of the Pope's authority. A regular treaty, I am clear, cannot be attempted, nor should I wish to encourage his Holiness to send a regular mission to this country. If there was any prudent individual sent here in the first instance, to solicit the political good offices of the Prince Regent and his Government, and who might afterwards remain as a species of unavowed Resident, much good might arise from such an arrangement, and we might reciprocate it; but ostentation must be avoided, and what is requisite must

be done quietly, and not be unnecessarily brought into notice. There exists every friendly feeling to the Pope's interests in this Government—quite as much, I think, amongst the opponents as amongst the friends to the question of emancipation; but they will not relish anything like a *new system*, and the religionists in the country would be very likely to cry out if my friend Consalvi's red stockings were seen too often at Carleton House.

Upon the whole, I should wish you to advise the Court of Rome to be content for the present with receiving hints and suggestions from the Government, as to the means of being of use; but that they should determine to act ostensibly through and upon their own body, till the feeling here is better prepared for a direct intercourse on the part of the State with the See of Rome.

The Opposition conducted themselves very properly in the late debate. They rebuked the Irish agitators in very becoming terms, and adhered firmly to the measure of 1813.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Stewart.

London, June 9, 1815.

My dearest Charles—I have written to Clancarty to say that, under all the circumstances of the case, it is not my wish to act upon the suggestion I made to him some time since, and that he is at liberty to return home as soon as all the business of Congress is concluded.

I should be sorry to give pain either to you or Cathcart, and as I may possibly again visit the head-quarters myself, it is not worth while to incur the dissatisfaction of an intermediate arrangement; but I cannot go along with your reasoning that Ministers accredited to foreign Courts, whatever may be their rank, are entitled to consider themselves as aggrieved, if under extraordinary circumstances they should be instructed to act under other orders than those of a Secretary of State.

Clancarty not being actually accredited to any sovereign,

makes the case more anomalous in his person; but if the credentials of Louis XVIII., for instance, had been sent to him, instead of to Sir C. Stuart, and you had all been ordered to conform to such directions as you might receive from him, it would have been not only consonant to the rules of the service, but to the uniform and indispensable practice, where, with a view to a particular object, the authority of Government must be brought to some common centre.

In looking to Clancarty for this service, I did not feel or intend to mark any exclusive or even superior confidence in him, however much I respect his zeal and efficiency. The idea arose from a recollection of the separation that naturally exists, during a campaign, between the civil and military head-quarters. I conclude you and Lord Cathcart will feel it your duty to be personally present in the field, moving actually with the troops. I presume Metternich, Nesselrode, and Prince Hardenberg, will as certainly preserve, as they did last time, a position completely in the rear, and that, in this Cabinet, political questions of great importance will daily arise, and be disposed of upon the spur of the moment. It is impossible that you can lead a soldier's life, and watch the movements or follow the daily measures of these Ministers; nor ought your absence to be the cause of their standing still, till a summons can reach you at the advanced posts.

It is not, therefore, from concurring in your opinion that the duties of the Cabinet and the field can be united for daily service in the same individuals, that I have determined to abandon, at least for the present, the arrangement I had in contemplation, and which would not have excluded you from your full participation in our political councils, when actually present, but from not thinking it worth while to create an unpleasant feeling in the minds of those I love and respect, if circumstances shall not render it necessary to the public service.

I earnestly hope, by the time this reaches you, that operations

will have begun. The delay, no doubt inevitable, renders the enemy more formidable, both in a political and military sense, and the fate of La Vendée may depend on immediate exertions.

Ever, my dearest Charles, your most affectionate, C.

Lord Cathcart to Lord Castlereagh.

Head Quarters at Heidelberg, June 18, 1815.

My dear Lord—The presence of one of his Majesty's principal Secretaries of State, and afterwards, during the Congress of Vienna, that of a first Plenipotentiary, naturally led to direct communications between those Ministers and the Ministers of the Emperor of Russia, with which, however, your lordship, while on the spot, and also the first Plenipotentiaries, with whom I have since that time had the honour of acting, have made me acquainted.

Now, that I have returned to the sole exercise of the duties of my office, I wish to be favoured with such information as your lordship will judge to be expedient to give me in regard to the recent transactions which, I learn from the Russian Government, have been completed at London with the Russian Ambassador. I have great satisfaction in assuring you that these transactions appear to have produced the best effect here, and to have much increased the cordiality of this Court, and to have been sensibly felt by the Emperor. At the same time, if I were to continue to be unable to speak on those subjects when they happen to come under discussion, it will give me some embarrassment, and look like a want of confidence which certainly does not exist.

The plans of operation which have been concerted here have been communicated to the Duke of Wellington by officers of rank sent for that purpose. They have been detailed to me since my arrival; but I am afraid of entering into that subject by the present conveyance; lest, if hostilities continue in progress, an accident might happen to the bearer.

The report of the movement of the enemy, commencing

from Maubeuge on the 15th, was received this morning by the aide-de-camp of Lieutenant-General Toll, an officer of the Russian Quartermaster-General's staff, recently sent to the Duke of Wellington by the Emperor, and who also brought a letter from Pozzo di Borgo. General Toll remained to see the event, and both letters speak with great confidence of the state of preparation of the Duke's and of Blücher's armies.

I have not been sent to for any conference this evening, but I have learned that a resolution has been formed to make an immediate movement with the forces nearest at hand, in the quarter which has already been mentioned, in reference to the case of the enemy's making an attack upon those armies, before the commencement of the general movement of the Allied armies.

The Russian army, if not in time to take the lead in this operation, will, at least, have troops enough present to support and to follow up this operation.

Accounts may have reached your lordship of very injudicious and unfit language, which has been held in Switzerland by Monsieur de la Harpe. This language is perfectly unauthorized, and has been heard of by his Imperial Majesty, and much disapproved. The Russian ratification of the Swiss Treaty has been sent from hence, which is a practical disavowal; and I hope I may obtain an authority to acquaint Mr. Canning that the person in question has no power whatever from the Emperor to use that language.

As long as the Russian army may act collectively, I do not foresee that I shall have occasion to apply for an officer of superior rank to be employed under me, to make reports of its strength and proceedings; but, if the case alters, I will take the liberty of stating it to your lordship.

Count Nesselrode is at head-quarters, and has been with me for some time this evening.

I have the honour to remain, &c., CATHCART.

Lord Cathcart to Lord Castlereagh.

Imperial Head-quarters, Heidelberg, June 21, 1815.

My dear Lord—I hope still to be in time to avail myself of Lord Stewart's messenger, to express my most hearty and sincere congratulations to your lordship upon the glorious and most important victory of the 18th, the accounts of which have reached the Russian, Prussian, and Austrian Courts and Generals here this evening. These all express themselves in the highest terms in praise of the Duke of Wellington, and of the distinguished bravery and discipline of the forces under his command, particularly the British; and indeed from these accounts it would appear that more intrepidity and greater talents in a general, or more bravery in soldiers, never were displayed. Lord Stewart met the Emperor of Russia at Prince Schwarzenberg's, (who is at present confined by a slight inflammation in his leg, connected with an old wound) and will, I have no doubt, write to you that he expressed the most rapturous joy on the victory, and on its being gained by the Duke of Wellington.

Every thing will immediately be put in motion towards Paris. Prince Metternich showed to Lord Stewart and me this evening the draft of the order or proclamation to be published on passing the French frontier. It seemed, on the perusal, (he read it to us) to be well drawn up, and not long: at the same time, it repeats the most important expressions of all the later declarations; and, while it defines the object of the Allies to be that of removing the USURPER, does not specify any intention of the Allies to interfere farther in regard to dynasty than that of securing for Europe the blessing of a lasting peace.

We look with impatience for farther accounts of the immediate consequences of a victory so decisive; as it seemed to be the received opinion that Bonaparte's hopes and expectations depended greatly on the result of his first battle. At the

same time, such a victory could not be obtained without great loss; and we have as yet learned the names only of very few of those officers who have fallen, or who have been wounded.

Ever, my dear lord, most sincerely yours,

CATHCART.

PS. I hope our progress towards Paris will induce your lordship to make arrangements to come to us as speedily as possible. As I thought in 1813, so I am now decidedly of opinion that your early presence here would be of the greatest importance.

Lord Castlereagh to the Right Hon. G. Canning.

Draft. Foreign Office, June 22, 1815.

My dear Sir—I regret that you should personally have any drawback to the triumphant news the packet will convey to you. The astonishing, even by himself the unexampled, exertions made by the Duke in this greatest of all his battles, necessarily led to an extraordinary exposure of his own person, and consequently of his Staff; to this is to be attributed the fall both of Lieutenant-Colonel Canning and Sir A. Gordon; Lord Fitzroy [Somerset] lost only an arm; but none around him, I believe, escaped some injury. The Duke's sword was struck, but his person, as usual, seemed invulnerable.

We have just heard by telegraph that 5,000 prisoners had reached Ostend. The French cavalry have suffered enormous losses, as have their artillery. They could ill afford this sacrifice, by draining every thing from inland, and replacing them with militia. We hope to reinforce the Duke with nearly 10,000 men now, and nearly as many more when the troops from Canada arrive.

The Portuguese Regency ought to feel humiliated by the situation in which they are placed, or have chosen, from a timid policy, to place themselves. By the decision they have come to, they have, in fact, turned their back upon the cause of Great Britain and the Allies, for the entire of one campaign.

In this, as in other instances, they make but an ungracious return for the assistance afforded to them in their late difficulties. Combining the acts of the Government with the understood propensities of those in power, I am very much disposed to take as little trouble about them as possible, till they find out that we are more necessary to them than they can be to us: and, in this view, having the means, through Mr. Chamberlain, of transacting ordinary business at Rio Janeiro, and, as I shall have a facility, when Palmella arrives here from Vienna, to convey such impressions as may be useful, I do not incline at present to send any one to the Brazils, but to leave the whole diplomatic arrangement as open as possible.

As there seems no immediate prospect of the Prince's return, or of such an exertion in the war as could afford a motive to you, as matters now stand, to continue in your present situation, after conversing with Huskisson, I have thought it best not to delay officially notifying that your resignation has been accepted. I shall, by the next mail, intimate the arrangement which I have made for carrying on the business, which I am desirous of so regulating as not to deprive the public service of the advantage of recurring to your assistance, if, whilst you continue to reside in Portugal, the business, either from the personal presence of the Prince or other circumstances, should assume a shape of sufficient interest to explain and justify such a mission.

Portugal having altogether withdrawn itself, I see no other resource left, to keep the enemy in check on the southern and western departments, than to authorize Sir H[enry] W[ellesley] to give some aid to the Spaniards, limiting the amount to the ordinary scale of subsidy, and giving it only for a certain number of troops, when actually employed beyond the frontiers.

CASTLEREAGH.

M. Pozzo di Borgo to Lord Castlereagh.

Chateau Cambresis, Juin 25, 1815.

Mylord—Je vous félicite de tout ce qui est arrivé d'heureux et de la part décisive que l'Angleterre et son héros y ont pris. Après que la valeur a vaincu les restes de la Révolution sur le champ de bataille, il faut que la prudence préside à un arrangement durable, qui puisse être le fruit de tant de sacrifices. Cet ouvrage, quoique loin d'être impossible n'est pas bien aisé, et il mérite la coopération des personnages les plus graves et les plus influentes. Vous êtes dans ce nombre, mylord: venez à Paris; vous ne sauriez être plus utile nulle part ailleurs.

Si, avant de partir, vous trouvez un instant pour vous souvenir de l'affaire que je vous avais recommandé à Vienne, je vous prierais de la terminer.

Veuillez bien agréer les sentiments de respect et d'attachement avec lesquels j'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.,

POZZO DI BORGO.

Mr. J. James to Lord Castlereagh.

The Hague, June 27, [1815].

My dear Lord—The portefeuille alluded to in my despatch No 5, was represented to me by General Alava to be such as I have described it. It now proves to be that of a private Secretary of Buonaparte. It was taken by a Dutch officer at Charleroi, and despatched hither without having been examined by the Duke of Wellington or any officer of high authority in the Allied armies.

As it was found, upon investigation, to contain military reports of importance—principally details upon the present state of the French fortresses—they were sent to the Duke of Wellington by an aide-de-camp of the King, after having been detained at least twenty-four hours at this residence. Political papers of some interest have been also discovered in this collection. Of these the most interesting appears to be one from

M. de Talleyrand, containing his comments upon the questions discussed at Congress, and pointing out the causes of their success and failure. M. de Nagell has thought this paper sufficiently interesting to be transmitted to M. de Fagel, who has instructions to do with it what may appear most proper to him.

I remain, &c., J. JAMES.

Sir Charles Stuart to Lord Castlereagh.

Cambray, ce 30 Juin, 1815.

My dear Lord—The events which passed both at the head-quarters of the Duke of Wellington and at Cambray during the two last days, are of such material importance, that I think it my duty to commit an irregularity by sending your lordship the extract of the Duke's private letter, and the copy of his letter to Talleyrand which passed through my hands.

As your lordship will learn, when the communications through Calais are re-established, sooner than ourselves, I presume you will send me instructions to which these events may give rise by that route.

I am, my dear lord, your very faithful

CHARLES STUART.

[Enclosures.]

The Duke of Wellington to Sir Charles Stuart.

Oliviers, June 28, 1815.

My dear Stuart—I send you my despatches, which will make you acquainted with the state of affairs. You may show them to Talleyrand if you choose.

General Nommelin has been here this day to negociate for Napoleon's passing to America, to which proposition I have answered that I have no authority. The Parisians think the Jacobins will give him over to me, believing that I will save his life. Blücher writes to kill him; but I have told him that I shall remonstrate, and shall insist on his being disposed of

by common accord. I have likewise said that, as a private friend, I advised him to have nothing to do with so foul a transaction—that he and I had acted too distinguished parts in these transactions to become executioners—and that I was determined that, if the Sovereigns wished to put him to death, they should appoint an executioner, who should not be me.

Nommelin said nothing positive, excepting that Fouché was working for the King. He said they wished for securities, and that Fouché was anxious to communicate with me personally, if possible, or through a third person. I answered, I would see him when he liked.

I am not pleased with the King's hesitation about Péronne. I have behaved in such a manner to him that he ought to be certain I would not propose anything to him which was not for the good of the cause which is his interest more than mine.

WELLINGTON.

The Duke of Wellington to M. de Talleyrand.

D'Ereras, St. Denys, ce 29 Juin, 1815.

Mon Prince—M. Boissy d'Anglas, General Valence, General d'Andreossy, M. la Bernadière, and M. Flagergues, have been sent from Paris to me, to request to have a suspension of hostilities, and I have had a conversation with them so highly interesting to the King, that I think proper to write to you without loss of time.

I explained to them that I did not consider the abdication of Bonaparte to afford such a guarantee to the Allied Powers as to induce me to stop my operations, and, after some discussion, I told them that I should consider the object attained, if Napoleon were given to the Allies, if our advanced guards enter Paris, and if a Government were established in France which should conciliate the confidence not only of France but of Europe.

After some hesitation, the gentlemen desired that I would explain what I meant by such a Government. I told them

that I had no authority to speak upon the subject; but that, as an individual, I gave them my opinion that they ought to call back the King without any condition whatever, and the honour of France required that this should be done without loss of time, and before it could be supposed that the interference of the Allied Powers had occasioned his Majesty's recall. In this opinion all the gentlemen concurred; and it was evident that, though they all conceived there were some amendments necessary in the Constitution, particularly in the Ministry and in the mode of proposing the laws, they all agreed with me that it was better to leave those amendments to grow out of the Constitution than to make any conditions with the King.

M. Flagergues was, however, of opinion that it could not be possible to bring the two Chambers to consent to call back the King without conditions, and the discussion then turned upon the mode in which what was most desired by all should be effected without breaking in upon our principle, which goes to bring back the King quietly and naturally, without conditions. While we were discussing this point, we received the King's Proclamation of the 28th instant, countersigned by your Highness, which all the gentlemen considered admirably calculated to answer all objects, if the two paragraphs which I enclose were omitted entirely, or were more explicit.

By the persons referred to in that marked No. 1, you certainly mean those who were concerned in the late plot; but it is conceived that you have not been sufficiently explicit, and it may be deemed by some that you mean the regicides. I have combated this notion, as I knew that the King, before he left Paris, having adopted the principle of employing Fouché, could not now object to employing him or any other person: and the paragraph immediately preceding that they complained of explains this one tolerably clearly. But it is as well that it should be explained or omitted entirely.

That marked No. 2 is objected to by the gentlemen, as

holding out a threat unnecessary in such a paper, as extending to too many persons, and moreover couched in stronger terms than ought to be used by the King, and they think it ought not now to be brought forward.

They object most strongly to the words marked No. 3. They say that the measure of recalling the King cannot be adopted in the mode most advantageous to his Majesty's and the general interests, if the Chambers are to be told that they are forthwith to be sent away. What I would recommend should be that the words I have underlined should be omitted.

The King will then have the power of calling a new Chamber, or of continuing these, as he may think proper. He cannot admit *à priori* that the Chambers are legal assemblies; but there is no occasion for telling them at once that they shall be sent about their business. Your Highness will see in all this my desire that the King should be restored, first, without condition; and, secondly, that it should not appear to be the effect of force by the Allied Powers; and it will probably appear to you, as it does to me, that it is worth while to make some sacrifices to obtain such a result.

I am now going forward to consult with Marshal Blücher, and to endeavour to prevail upon him to consent to the armistice upon the conditions proposed; and I shall be anxious to receive your answer to this letter at an early hour to-morrow. In the mean time, I think the King should come forward to Roye, leaving a garrison at Cambray.

I have the honour, &c., WELLINGTON.

Paragraphs of the King's Proclamation.

No. 1.

Je ne veux exclure de ma présence que ces hommes dont la renommée est un sujet de douleur pour la France et d'effroi pour l'Europe. Dans la trame qu'ils ont ourdie, j'apperçois beaucoup de mes sujets égarés et quelques coupables.

No. 2.

Cependant le sang de mes enfans a coulés par une trahison dont les annales du monde n'offrent pas d'exemple. Cette trahison a appelé l'étranger dans le cœur de la France. Chaque jour me révèle un désastre nouveau. Je dois donc pour la dignité de mon trône, pour l'intérêt de mes peuples, pour le repos de l'Europe, excepter du pardon les instigateurs de cette trame horrible.

No. 3.

Ils seront désignés à la justice des loix par les deux Chambres, *que je me propose d'assembler incessamment.*

Extraits du Bulletin envoyé dans l'Étranger, depuis le commencement d'Avril, jusqu'à la fin de Juin, 1815.

No. 11. 12 Mai, 1815.

Napoléon ne sort de l'Élysée que le Dimanche pour passer des revues. Il parait depuis quelque temps un peu embarrassé et même déconcerté, quoique il affecte une contenance tranquille et ferme, qui n'est au fond que factice. C'est tous les jours de nouveaux projets, qui renversent ceux de la veille, de nouvelles mesures, qui sont contredites par celles du lendemain.

Il a visité Samedi dernier avec des ingénieurs les différentes positions qu'il veut faire fortifier autour de Paris. Déjà ces travaux sont commencés et poussés avec toute l'activité possible par une foule d'ouvriers, dont le nombre va croissant de jour en jour. On a peine à concevoir le *cui bono* de ces travaux extraordinaires, qui coûteront des sommes considérables; car il n'y a point ici de pièces de position. Le plus gros canons qui sont au Champs de Mars sont de 12 au plus, à ce qu'on assure. Où en prendrait-on? On ne dégarnira surement pas les places fortes; il faudra donc les faire venir des ports de la mer; mais quelque diligence qu'on y mette, arriveront-ils à temps? Ce ne sera certainement pas avec pièces de 12 qu'on pourra arrêter des armées, bien pourvues de

tout ce qui est nécessaire. D'ailleurs qu'est ce qui obligerait les Alliés à attaquer les points fortifiés, tandis que Paris est ouvert partout, et partout d'un accès très facile. Ce sont donc des dépenses bien inutiles, et même extravagantes, en la pénurie actuelle des finances.

Deux ingénieurs ayant été visiter la caserne de Belleville, près de Montmartre, ont dit à l'autorité locale qui les a accompagnés, que l'Empereur était dans l'intention de s'établir lui-même dans cette caserne, si l'ennemi attaquait Paris de ce côté là, afin d'être toujours à la tête de ses troupes et de pouvoir rentrer à Paris, s'il était forcé dans ses positions. Ne pourrait-on pas raisonnablement supposer que la crainte ou la méfiance est la vraie cause de cette précaution, et qu'il a le double projet de se garantir ainsi des effets de la malveillance et de la trahison? On n'ignore pas qu'il se méfie beaucoup des Républicains et des Jacobins, plus encore que des Royalistes, qui n'assassinent personne. Il craint ceux qui l'entourent; il soupçonne même ceux qui lui jurent tous les jours dévouement et fidélité. C'est de l'autorité locale dont je viens de parler que je tiens cette anecdote: ainsi le fait est certain.

No. 16. 22 Mai, 1815.

Depuis quinze jours il n'est rien de plus triste que la physionomie de Paris. Le plus morne silence y règne; le chagrin et la consternation y sont peintes sur toutes les figures. Les espions y sont tellement multipliés qu'on n'ose se confier à personne, et que ceux-là même qui se connaissent s'évitent avec soin de peur de parler et d'être entendu. Les promenades publiques, si fréquentées en d'autres temps, n'offrent plus maintenant que l'aspect de la solitude. On voit par ci par là quelques femmes et quelques hommes, qui ont plutôt l'air de courir pour prendre l'air que de se promener. Le Palais Royal même, ce rendezvous de l'Europe, ce monde en raccourci, n'est plus qu'un désert: on y voit à peine quelques unes de ces Syrènes enchanteresses qui y attiraient la foule de

jeunes étourneaux de province, ainsi que les voyageurs de tous les pays qui affluaient à Paris. Aucun genre de commerce ne va; et il y a plus d'un marchand dont les frais journaliers s'élèvent de 50 à 60 francs, et qui ne vendent pas pour 6 francs par semaine. Toutes ces causes réunies rendent le séjour de la capitale bien triste. Le calme et le silence qui y règnent semblent être les funestes présages de quelque crise violente, qui doit tout engloutir.

Que doivent penser de nous les étrangers qui ont le courage de lire nos journaux depuis le retour en France du grand Napoléon? Est il rien de plus fastidieux, de plus mensonger, de plus perfide, et de plus plattement absurde que la plupart des articles politiques dont ils nous régalent? Ne dirait-on pas que ces journalistes regardent les Français comme un peuple ignorant, abruti, stupide, auquel on peut tout dire, tout persuader, tant ils mettent peu d'adresse et de retenue à falsifier et dénaturer les nouvelles qu'ils débitent, non seulement de l'étranger, mais encore des provinces de la France—et ce qui est bien plus fort, les faits mêmes qui se passent sous nos yeux dans la capitale? C'est d'une effronterie, d'une audace, que rien n'égale: mais ils savent très bien, ces écrivains mercenaires, qu'ils peuvent tout dire, comme le gouvernement peut tout faire, impunément. Qui oserait, en effet les démentir ou les contredire? Celui qui se permettrait d'oser dire la vérité dans ce moment d'effervescence, serait-il cru? Serait-il écouté? Que dis-je?—ne serait-il pas arrêté à l'instant, puis exilé, peut-être déporté? Tout ce que l'on écrit en France depuis deux mois porte le cachet du Vandalisme et de la Terreur: tout nous prouve que les grands feseurs de 1793 ne sont pas encore tous morts. Quelle horrible situation!—quel temps!—et quelles mœurs!

No. 19. 7 Juin, 1815.

Les patriotes de 1793 se réunissent dans plusieurs quartiers de Paris. Ils discutent les grands intérêts de l'État, et font

à l'envi les motions les plus incendiaires. On a déjà osé dire dans ces clubs, qu'il fallait, pour sauver la patrie, sacrifier les restes des Royalistes, &c. Ces mêmes réunions ont lieu dans presque toutes les villes du royaume, sous la protection des autorités. Ainsi après 25 ans de révolution, nous voilà encore dans les griffes des Jacobins !

On fait à ce moment le recensement général des habitans males de cette ville. Tout est inscrit depuis 15 ans jusqu'à 60. Chacun reçoit ensuite l'ordre de servir dans tel ou tel régiment, dans celui des éclaireurs, des chasseurs, de tirailleurs, &c., de la garde nationale. On donne l'uniforme à ceux qui n'ont pas les moyens de s'habiller. Les fortifications autour de Paris se continuent avec activité : on oblige tous les citoyens sans distinction à y travailler.

On a répété jusqu'à satiété dans les journaux, que la garde nationale, rivalisant de zèle avec les confédérés des fauxbourgs, a elle-même démandé à partager l'honneur de travailler aux fortifications. La vérité est que chaque garde nationale reçoit une lettre portant, non l'invitation mais l'ordre positif de se rendre tel jour à ces travaux, sous peine d'amende et de prison. La crainte, plus encore que l'avarice, a en effet déterminé des citoyens de toutes les classes de la société à obéir à cet ordre oppressif.

Précis des Contributions, Requisitions, &c., levées, depuis le commencement de la Révolution jusqu'au Consulat de Bonaparte, par les Français dans les Pays étrangers, tirées des Mémoires et Proclamations officiales.

Territoire de sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche.—1. *Cercle de Bourgogne ou Provinces Belgiques, y compris l'Évêché de Diège incorporées avec la France.* 1795.

1. Extrait d'une Mémoire de l'Administration au Directoire des contributions militaires jusqu'à la fin de 1796, montant à	Livres de France.	45,000,000

	Livres.
Transporté de l'autre côté . .	45,000,000
2. Réquisitions en toutes sortes de fournitures, bestiaux, vivres, ammunition, payées en assignats au pair	40,000,000
3. Effets précieux pris par force dans les Lombards, Palais, &c. . . .	60,000,000
4. Emprunt forcé	80,000,000
5. Patentes et Privilèges vendus . .	25,000,000
6. Domaines Nationaux, du Clergé, Propriétés mobiliaires tant que immobiliaires des Émigrés ordinaires, évaluées à . .	600,000,000
7. Revenus du Prince à 40,000,000 livres par an, pour quatre ans	160,000,000
8. Coupe immense du meilleur bois . .	60,000,000
9. Entretien de grandes armées pendant 4 ans, estimé à	48,000,000
10. L'arrière de contributions de 1794-5, et 6, avec les nouvelles en 1797 . . .	200,000,000
11. Contributions après la conquête en 1794 .	75,000,000
12. Leur part dans l'Emprunt forcé . .	56,000,000
13. Seconde contribution pour la ville de Bruxelles	1,250,000
N.B. On suppose que les Français ont tiré de la Belgique deux milliards de livres en outre.	
Total pour Brabant et Autriche .	1,450,250,000

Territoire de Sa Majesté Prussienne.—Pays de Clèves et Meurs.

1. Contributions et Réquisitions de 1794 .	1,600,000
2. Revenu du duché, évalué par an à 1¾ millions, pendant trois ans . . .	3,600,000
3. Fourniture depuis l'occupation jusqu'à la paix, 1795	720,000
	5,920,000

	Livres.
Transporté de l'autre côté . .	5,920,000
4. Coupe considérable de bois du Prince évalué à	1,000,000
5. Contribution de Crefelt, ville de manufactures	100,000
	7,020,000

Les Sept Provinces Unies de la Hollande, ou Batave.

1. Contribution en numéraire ou Emprunt forcé, payable en huit ans, négocié par les Français	200,000,000
2. Vingt-cinq mille Français soldés pendant trois ans, dont la solde et l'entretien étaient évalués à un florin (deux livres) par jour	54,750,000
N.B. Les Français y vivaient comme des *Seigneurs*, en comparaison des troupes Bataves.	
3. Réquisitions et fournitures, suivant la proclamation des États Généraux à la Haye, le 17 Jan., 1795, pour être livrés en 3 mois, en grains, foin, avoines, paille, souliers, bottes, habits, et vestes, drap fin, pantalons, des chemises, chapeaux, et des bœufs évalués à	18,995,000
4. Perte immense que les Hollandais ont souffert par les assignats, qu'ils étoient obligés de prendre pour 10 stivres par livre valué au pair, quand chaque soldat recevoit 500 livres pour un louis d'or—de manière qu'ils commencerent, à l'aide des Juifs, un négoce terriblement usuraire, et dont le montant était au moins, au delà de 200,000,000 de florins . . .	400,000,000
	673,745,000

	Livres.
Transporté de l'autre côté . .	673,745,000
5. Revenus et biens mobiliaires incalculables du Stadhouder, transportés en France.	
6. Effets et marchandises en Hollande appartenant aux Anglois, Brabançons, &c., et aux Émigrés, de la valeur de . .	100,000,000
7. Contributions en argent comptant avant la paix	50,000,000
8. Territoire cédé évalué à	11,700,000
	835,445,000

Territoires divers depuis la Hollande jusqu'à l'Alsace situés entre la Moselle, la Meuse, et le Rhin.

1. Divers Emprunts forcés	23,000,000
2. Aix-la-Chapelle et Territoire—Contributions	16,000,000
Ditto, Réquisitions	7,000,000
3. Le pays de Juliers et Limbourg—Contribution	24,000,000
Ditto, Réquisition	3,480,000
4. L'Électorat de Cologne—Contribution .	24,000,000
Réquisition (dont le Chapitre Métropolite fournissait 3,000,000)	4,720,000
5. La Ville de Cologne—Contribution et Réquisition	5,200,000
6. Toute la grande Bibliothèque, Desseins, Estampes, Gravures, Manuscrits, évalués	500,000
7. Entretien des Troupes jusqu'à Décembre, 1797	2,000,000
8. Pays de Saarbruck—Contributions . .	840,000
Ditto, Réquisitions	540,000
	111,280,000

		Livres.
	L'Électorat de Trèves.	
1.	Contributions pour Trèves et Coblentz .	4,600,000
	Réquisition	1,520,000
		6,120,000
	Le Palatinat du Rhin depuis le Grand Baillage d'Oggersheim et de Germersheim.	
1.	Contributions, 8,000,000; Réquisitions, 2,420,000	10,420,000
2.	Impositions particulières, Franckenthal .	160,000
	Kirchberg . .	140,000
	Simmern . .	192,000
	Kreutznach .	218,000
	Bingen . .	280,000
	Alzey . .	232,000
	Oppenheim .	220,000
	Villages différents	600,000
		12,462,000
	Pays de Deux-Ponts.	
1.	En Contributions et Réquisitions imposées deux fois	470,000
2.	Les villes de Worms et Spire . . .	2,400,000
	Évêché de Spire	1,000,000
3.	Contribution, Réquisition, et dommages, deux fois	200,000
4.	Buschweiler 25,000	385,000
	Zabern 35,000	
	Dortweiler—Contributions . 25,000	
	Ditto, Réquisitions . . 300,000	
		4,455,000
	Duché de Berg.	
1.	Contributions	800,000
2.	Réquisitions en froment, seigle, avoine, paille, orge, bœufs, moutons, chevaux, &c.	1,664,000
		2,464,000

Cercle de Souabe depuis 1 *Décembre*, 1792, *jusqu'au* 1 *Mai*, 1793.

		Livres.
Suivant l'Almanac de la Diète de Regensburg, le Cercle de Souabe paya en Contributions et Réquisitions . . .		24,248,418

En Allemagne, 1796.

1. Contributions depuis la paix avec l'Empereur aux environs du Lahn . . .		900,000
Dont le territoire de Laubach pourroit à peine fournir 14,800 livres, et les Français demandèrent encore . . .		18,000
2. La ville de Wetzlar, malgré sa neutralité fut obligée de payer		150,000
3. Général Hoche, par proclamation fesait payer aux pays entre le Sieg, le Nidda, le Maine et le Rhin (à l'exception de Hesse et de Prusse)		4,000,000
Ceux entre le Sieg et le Roer, 1,800,000; de Mayence, 1,200,000; Trèves, encore, 3,000,000; Cologne, 160,000; total .		6,160,000
4. La table du général en chef Hoche à Friedberg, 1,500 livres par jour; les généraux de brigade, 300; estimé . . .		200,000
5. Réquisitions partout et de toute espèce. Général Hoche ordonna que l'on fournisse la nourriture aux troupes d'environ 60,000 hommes et chevaux, durant deux mois		7,200,000
6. Revenus de l'Empire		346,900,000
Ditto, des Provinces . .	19,230,000	
Dépense de l'armée jusqu'à 1796	48,805,375	82,635,375
Argenterie dans les Églises, ventes de bois . .	14,600,000	
		448,163,375

	Livres.
Transporté de l'autre côté . .	448,163,375
7. Les biens confisqués; provision et ammunition dans toutes les villes prises, estimé à	35,000,000
8. Franconie—Armistice de Juillet, pour sa neutralité, pour être payé en 45 jours en numéraire	10,000,000
9. Dont la ville de Frankfurt a fourni, 2,000,000; et en froment, eau de vie, vinaigre, sel, foin, paille, avoine, des bœufs, au montant de 4,000,000.	
10. Autre réquisition	1,000,000
Huit magistrats et 15 citoyens furent pris comme ôtages. En outre, 150 maisons et magazins détruits, par lequel plus de 300 familles furent ruinées.	
11. Autre réquisition	1,800,000
12. La ville de Wurzburg, par capitulation paya	2,500,000
13. Bamberg, ditto	2,000,000
	500,463,375

Pays de Würtemberg: suivant le Traité de Paix en Août, 1796.

Contribution en numéraire . . .	4,000,000
Réquisition de chevaux, bled, souliers, &c.	431,000
Territoire cédé, viz., Montbéliard, Hericourt, et Passavant, et vente des domaines du Prince. Dans les articles secrets, par le deuxième, s'est engagé de payer ses dettes à tous ses sujets devenus Français, qui jouiroient d'une rente constituée. Par article quatre, il ne pou-	
	4,431,000

voit plus envoyer son contingent à l'armée de l'Empire dans nulle guerre ci-après. Article cinq permet aux Français d'occuper en tems de guerre toutes les places fortes dans ses domaines.

		Livres.
Transporté de l'autre côté . .		4,431,000
En outre il étoit obligé de payer tous les mois 200,000 livres jusqu'à la paix avec la maison d'Autriche, c'est à dire du premier de Vendémiaire 1796 jusqu'à Avril 1797, huit mois, qui portent		1,600,000
En outre les Abbés de Kempten, Lindau, Buchau avec tout le Banc d'Évêques s'étoient engagés d'entretenir toute l'armée de Wirtemberg		7,000,000
		13,031,000

Suabe par la Paix, Août 1796.

En numéraire		19,000,000
8,400 chevaux . . .	3,360,000	
150,000 quintaux de grain .	1,950,000	
150,000 quintaux de foin .	450,000	
5,000 bœufs	1,250,000	
100,000 sacs d'avoine . .	1,000,000	
100,000 paires de souliers .	500,000	
		8,510,000
		27,510,000

Bavière, Septembre, 1796.

En numéraire . . .	10,000,000	
3,300 chevaux . . .	1,320,000	
200,000 quintaux de grain .	2,600,000	
100,000 sacs d'avoine . .	1,000,000	
200,000 quintaux de foin .	600,000	
100,000 paires de souliers .	500,000	
		16,020,000

		Livres.
Transporté de l'autre côté . .		16,020,000
10,000 paires de bottes . .	200,000	
30,000 aunes de drap pour des officiers	750,000	
		950,000
		16,970,000

Margraviate de Baden à la Paix Août, 1797.

1. En numeraire . . .	2,000,000	
1,000 chevaux . .	400,000	
2. 25,000 quintaux de grain .	325,000	
3. 50,000 quintaux de foin .	150,000	
500 bœufs . . .	125,000	
12,000 sacs d'avoine .	120,000	
25,000 paires de souliers .	125,000	
		3,245,000

Territoire Milanais, ou République Cisalpine envahi en 1795 *par Bonaparte.*

1. A la prise de Milan, les Français y ont trouvé 5,000 fusils et 20,000 livres de poudre à canon, avec beaucoup d'autre ammunition et vivres, évalués à . .	2,000,000
2. Première contribution dont le ¼ devoit être payé dans 3 jours . . .	20,000,000
3. Réquisition d'une personne en 100, pour former une armée de trente mille hommes, et dont 200 familles nobles furent obligées de payer l'équippement . .	5,000,000
4. Payement d'un million de livres par mois à l'armée Françoise, 15 mois de Jan., 1797	15,000,000
5. L'entretien de 20,000 François, dont leur solde à 2 livres chaque homme par jour fait par an	14,600,000
	56,600,000

	Livres.
Transporté de l'autre côté . .	56,600,000
6. Réquisitions, viz., 12,000 vestes, 10,000 paires de pantalons, 32,000 aunes de drap fin, 20,000 chemises, 10,000 paires de souliers, 5,000 paires guêtres, 2,000 chapeaux fins, grandes quantités de grain, avoine, paille, foin, farine, chevaux, bœufs, &c., évalués à . . .	41,000,000
7. Le Directoire Cisalpine à été forcé d'acheter les domaines et les biens Imperiaux dans le duché de Mantoue, pour . . .	3,000,000
N.B. Toutes ces sommes énormes étoient fournies en grande partie par le moyen d'emprunts, de loterie, &c.	
8. Dans les Lombards, on trouva 7,000 balles de soie et autres effets precieux lesquels les François vendoient publiquement, evalués à	40,000,000
9. Ferrara a fourni 1,500 bœufs et beaucoup d'autres vivres et après sa réunion il a payé	3,000,000
10. Revenus du Prince, &c. . . .	20,000,000
11. L'argenterie de toutes les églises, les fonds dans toutes les caisses publiques, les effets des Lombards, des tableaux, des statues antiques, et tout ce qui étoit de prix, et mobiliare, evalués à plus de . .	100,000,000
12. Les commerçans etoient obligés à un emprunt forcé	600,000
13. La République Cisalpine, par traité de commerce et d'alliance, s'engagea à payer tous les ans à la France	18,000,000
14. Général Berthier demanda un emprunt de	1,800,000
Articles non évalués.	
1. Toutes les terres et biens du Clergé; des Emigrés; des Etrangèrs . . .	10,000,000
	294,000,000

Sardaigne, 15 *Mai*, 1796.

Par le traité honteux de paix, dont le feu Roi mourut de chagrin bientôt après la signature—

1. Cession de la Savoie, du comté de Nice, Tenda, Boglio, et les fortifications de Coni, Ceva, Fortua, Exiles, Suza, Assiette, Brunette, Chateau Dauphin, Alexandria, Valenza, &c. . . . .
2. Munitions de guerre et de bouche trouvées dans les citadelles; entretien des troupes, contributions, réquisitions énormes dans tous ces endroits . . . . .
3. Fraix des démolitions de Suza et Brunette au dépense de Sa Majesté, stipulé par le traité . . . . .
4. Domaines et Revenus du Prince, du Clergé, et des Emigrés; tous les effets des sujets ennemis . . . . . .
5. Argenterie de toutes les églises . .
6. Contributions et entretien des armées avant la réunion par le traité de paix . .
7. Une partie de Piémont occupée par les Français, restée sujette aux réquisitions par le traité de paix. Total evalué à .

Livres. 5,000,000,000

Modene, 12 *May*, 1796.

Malgré le traité de paix, les Jacobins étoient instruit de forcer le Prince, en mois du Juin, à payer 30 millions au grand trésorier Haller, ce qui effraya tellement le vieux Prince qu'il prit la fuite à l'age de 70 ans dans la nuit, et passa la mer à Trieste.

1. Numeraire pour être payé dans 8 jours .	10,000,000
2. Vingt tableaux précieux . . .	400,000
	10,400,000

	Livres.
Transporté de l'autre côté . .	10,400,000
Le 10 Juillet, le territoire étoit envahi malgré le traité; et Massa fut prise et incorporée.	
3. Terres et biens du Prince, du Clergé, et des Emigrés	20,000,000
4. Revenus et argenterie des églises . .	
	30,400,000

La République de Lucques, 1796 *et* 1798.

1. Contributions et réquisitions . . .	4,000,000
N.B. En cas de réfus ou du délai, ils exigeoient encore les fraix d'une expédition de guerre.	
2. Emprunt forcé	1,000,000
	5,000,000

Parme, Novembre 1796, *par le Traité de Paix.*

1. Numeraire et contribution	2,000,000
2. Réquisitions, viz., 17,000 chevaux harnachés, 2,000 bœufs, 10,000 quintaux de grains, 5,000 d'avoine, 20 tableaux précieux—le tout evalué à . . .	1,850,000
	3,850,000

Naples, par le Traité de Paix, 1796.

1. Chevaux tout équippés, 250, évalués à .	150,000
2. Il a été dit qu'en vertu d'un article secret une contribution de 7,000,000 livres devoit être payée	7,000,000
	7,150,000

Genes, 1796.

1. Numeraire par un emprunt forcé, et réquisitions de toute éspèce sur le territoire pendant 18 mois	4,000,000

Toscane, 1796.

	Livres.
1. Emprunt forcé en numeraire . . .	8,000,000
2. Entretien des troupes pendant 9 mois .	600,000
3. Proprieté immense des Anglois et autres sujets ennemis, etablis à Livourne, et de grandes sommes dues aux négocians d'Angleterre, qu'on a estimées au-dessus de plusieurs millions sterling . .	250,000,000
	258,600,000

Etats Héréditaires de l'Empereurs, envahi en Mars, 1797.

1. Les contributions avant la signature des préliminaires ont été énormes à Trieste, Fiume, Gratz, &c.—incalculable.	
2. Mines d'Istria pillées, dont une partie étoit sauvée par les Autrichiens, avant qu'elle pouvoit être transportée de Trieste.	
3. Entretien de l'armée pendant l'invasion .	10,000,000
4. Par le Traité de Leoben l'Empereur se charge de l'approvisionnement de 80,000 hommes dans leur retour, estimé à .	100,000
	10,100,000

Les Etats Ecclésiastiques.

Première Armistice à Bologne, Juin, 1796.

1. Numeraire, 21 millions livres, au compte des quels a été payé avec l'aide du trésor Sixtinien d'Engelsburg 5,000,000 livres en deux payements de 1,250,000 scudi .	5,000,000
2. Réquisitions de toutes espéces évaluées à cinq millions, et dont la plus grande quantité a été fournie . . .	5,000,000
	10,000,000

	Livres.
Transporté de l'autre côté . .	10,000,000
3. Cent des meilleurs tableaux et statues suivant le choix des Commissaires François, et dont la *moitie* a été fournie, evalués, quoique invaluable pour les amateurs, seulement à 20,000 livres chaque pièce	1,000,000
4. Contribution de la ville de Bologna 4,000,000, et de Ferrara 2,000,000 .	6,000,000
5. Réquisitions de toute espèce dans le mois de Juillet, d'Août, et de Septembre, pour les villes	6,000,000
	23,000,000

Paix de 18 *Fevrier*, 1797.

1. Numeraire en argent et en diamants .	30,000,000
2. Deux cent tableaux, statues, et manuscrits les plus précieux, estimés, quoique invaluables, à 20,000	4,000,000
3. Pour le meurtre de Basseville, donné à sa famille	300,000
4. Réquisition de 800 chevaux de sel (dont le Pape a fourni 400 de ses écuries) 800 ditto de voiture, 800 bœufs . . .	800,000
5. Revenus de Santa Casa à Loretto . .	450,000
6. Biens allodials et terres appartenantes .	3,000,000
7. Prise du territoire d'Avignon, ses revenus et l'argenterie des églises, avec tous les biens ecclésiastiques	30,000,000
8. Cession des provinces de Bologna, Ferrara, Ancona, et Romagna, avec tous les vivres, ammunitions, biens allodials et ecclésiastiques, argenterie des églises, estimé à la moitié de tout le revenu de sa Saintété.	
9. Le trésor de Loretto, estimé à 120 millions, et dont une partie a été saisie par les Français, evaluée à . . .	65,000,000
	133,550,000

	Livres.
Transporté de l'autre côté . .	133,550,000
10. Entretien des troupes Françaises depuis l'invasion, evalué à	200,000
	133,750,000

Rome devenue libre en 1798.

1. Le premier baiser de cette liberté cherie couta aux Romains en contributions 4 millions scudi, ou 20 millions livres, dont ¼ devoit être payé en 24 heures, ¼ en argent, ½ en lettres de change, et dont 18 des premières maisons devoient contribuer 20,000 scudi chacune, d'autres 10,000, et une troisème classe 6,000 scudi chacune	20,000,000
2. En réquisitions, vivres, fournitures, &c. .	20,000,000
4,000 chevaux nous évaluons à 500 chacun	2,000,000
3. L'argenterie considerable de toutes les églises, des biens du Saint Père, du Clergé, &c.	
N.B. Le grand trésorier Haller, le General Berthier, &c., pourront donner des renseignements encore plus exacts.	
En Avril le Général Français ordonna une contribution de trois pr. cent. sur toutes propriétés laïques, et 5 pr. cent. sur celles des ecclésiastiques, pour l'entretien des troupes Françaises.	
La mine d'alum à Rocca etoit mise en sureté pour la valeur d'un million de scudi. Messrs. Giorgi payaient 105,000 pezzi-duros pour privilège de travailler la dite mine, jusqu'à la fin de leur terme, viz. 18 mois	5,525,000
	47,525,000

La Republique de Venise en 1796 *et* 1797.

	Livres.
1. Divers emprunts forcés et toutes espéces de fournitures pour	14,000,000
2. Préparations immenses pour sa défense contre les Républicains, estimé à 30 millions, et qui sont presque tous tombées dans les mains des Français—vivres, ammunition, fournitures, &c. . .	30,000,000
3. La ville de Verona avoit payé depuis le commencement de Mai jusqu'à la fin de Juin, dans deux mois, de contributions et réquisitions, avec augmentation de sa dette de 3 millions	4,095,788
4. Les grands négocians de Vénise étoient taxés pour des sommes immenses, savoir. M. Neck, 110,000 ducats; Heinzelmann, 50,000; Treves, 45,000; Sarias, 30,000; plusieurs autres de moindre importance, 200,000 . . .	21,750,000
5. La Municipalité de Venise a commencé son regne passagère avec des emprunts forcés et des réquisitions immenses pour ses nouveaux frères en liberté à 2½ millions ducats	12,500,000
6. La quantité de toutes espèces de fournitures que les Français avoient exigé étoit si énorme qu'on n'a pu les emporter: ils forçaient les Venitiens de les racheter pour	1,500,000
7. Toute la flotte Venitienne, *bien équippée*, evaluée à raison de mille livres sterling, ou deux mille ducats par canon—36 vaisseaux, (dont 20 étoient de ligne) de deux mille canons	48,000,000
	131,845,788

	Livres.
Transporté de l'autre côté . .	131,845,788
8. Tout l'arsenal de Venise richement pourvu d'ammunitions	40,000,000
9. Tous les effets des Lombards—les fonds dans toutes les caisses publiques de l'administration	22,000,000
Tous les monumens les plus precieux, &c.	
Isle de Zante en partie de contribution .	200,000
	194,045,788

Espagne.

1. Les territoires envahis, écrasés de contributions—St. Domingue Espagnole cédé aux Français—l'entretien des armées pendant un an—pillage des deux fonderies de Regny et d'Orbinelle et les manufactures de Gratia—evalué à . .	30,000,000
2. En outre augmentation de 200 millions de piastres à sa dette national qui la fait monter à present à 460 millions . .	

Portugal.

Par le traité de paix en 1797, qui n'étoit pas d'abord ratifié, le Gouvernement devoit payer une somme de 3½ millions crusades, ce qu'il avoit déjà offert en diamants à la valeur de 1½ million sterling. Probablement sa neutralité lui contera bien plus que .	36,000,000
Neutralité negociée par Lucien Bonaparte, et dont la plus grande partie il mit dans sa bourse.	

La Suisse.

General Schauenburg leva une contribution militaire sur le Canton de Berne—le tout évalué à	4,000,000

	Livres.
Transporté de l'autre côté . .	4,000,000
Outre 200,000 livres de Berne, ou 300,000 de France, payés en numeraire le 2 d'Avril, qui furent fournis par des familles qui jouissoient de la plus grande influence . .	300,000
Trouve dans le Trésor public de Berne . .	6,000,000
L'arsenal de Berne contenoit autrefois 600 pièces de canon, et des armes pour 20,000 cavalerie et 80,000 infanterie. Joseph II. disoit que c'étoit trop peu pour une grande monarchie, mais trop considérable pour une petite republique—estimées à . . .	10,000,000
Les Français y trouverent 200 pièces de canon de gros calibre et la plupart des armes et munitions comme ci-dessus.	
N.B. Lecarlier ordonna, malgré la Diéte d'Arau, que l'argent de toutes les caisses publiques soit rendu aux Français.	
	20,300,000
Le Canton de Berne fut obligé d'entretenir 10,000 infanterie Française, et 1,000 cavalerie. C'est ainsi que *la Grande Nation* a une armée de plus de 100,000 hommes, nourrie par ses Etats tributaires pour les tenir dans l'esclavage, et *d'en reduire* le reste de l'Europe, dépense pour 4 mois . .	4,000,000
	24,300,000
Hambourg.	
Contribution en 1796	3,000,000
——— en 1798	4,000,000
	7,000,000
Bréme et Lubeck.	
Ont paye au moins	3,000,000

On a demandé des trois villes Anséatiques 12 millions contre une *sureté bien éphémère ;* de sorte que la ville de Hambourg a préféré de faire un *cadeau* de 4 millions, pour être quitte d'un emprunt si dangereux.

Sommaire.

	Livres.
Territoire de l'Empereur d'Autriche . .	1,450,250,000
——— du Roi de Prusse . . .	7,020,000
Les Provinces Unies de la Hollande . .	835,445,000
Territoires divers entre la Moselle, la Meuse, et le Rhin	111,280,000
L'Electorat de Treves	6,120,000
Palatinat du Rhin	12,462,000
Deux-Ponts	4,455,000
Duché de Berg	2,464,000
Cercle de Souabe	24,248,418
Empire-Allemagne	500,463,375
Wurtemberg	13,031,000
Souabe	27,510,000
Bavière	16,970,000
Baden	3,245,000
Territoire Milanais, ou République Cisalpine .	294,000,000
Sardaigne	5,000,000,000
Modène	30,400,000
Lucques	5,000,000
Parme	3,850,000
Naples	7,150,000
Gènes	4,000,000
Toscane	258,600,000
États Héréditaires de l'Empereur . .	10,100,000
États de l'Eglise (par Bonaparte) . . .	156,750,000
Rome (par Bonaparte)	47,525,000
Venise (par Bonaparte)	194,045,788
	9,026,384,581

	Livres.
Transporté de l'autre côté . .	9,026,384,581
Espagne	30,000,000
Portugal	36,000,000
Suisse	24,300,000
Hambourg	7,000,000
Brême et Lubeck	3,000,000
Livres de France .	9,126,684,581

Jusqu'à la paix de Campo Formio et l'expédition en Egypte cette somme immense est entrée en France en *bon métal réel*, dont la moitie est possédée par les Maréchaux, Généraux, &c., l'autre moitié, par les Ministres, &c.

Lord Walpole to Lord Castlereagh.

July 1, 1815.

My dear Lord—I have no particular news. Archchief has been supposed out of favour, on account of his opinions expressed about Poland, but he has probably been left here as a spy upon the conduct of others. He expected, by the last courier, some important commission from the Emperor; I know not if he received it: if not, he will try to go to the army.

I have heard from one in the Foreign Office, that a feld-yäger who started the night before Dr. Campbell left this for Persia, carried with him orders to stop him, and seize his papers, &c. It is not an uncommon thing to disguise Cossacks as Circassians, &c., for such purposes. Should I hear anything certain (for I doubt it) I will not fail to let you know the details.

Your faithful, obedient servant, WALPOLE.

Convention for the Evacuation of Paris by the French Troops, concluded July 3, 1815.

Aujourdhui, 3 Juillet, 1815, les Commissaires nommés par les Commandeurs en Chef des armées respectives, savoir

M. le Baron Bignon, chargé du portefeuille des affaires Etrangères, et M. le Comte Guilleminot, chef de l'état major-général de l'armée Françoise, M. le Comte de Bondy, prefet du département de la Seine, munis des pleins pouvoirs de Son Excellence M. le Marechal Prince d'Eckmühl, Commandant en Chef l'armée Française, d'une part, et M. le Général Major Müffling muni des pleins pouvoirs de Son Altesse le Prince Blucher et M. le Colonel Harvey de Sa Seigneurie le Duc de Wellington, de l'autre part, sont convenus des articles suivans.

1. Il y aura une suspension d'armes entre les Armées Alliées commandées par le Prince Blucher et le Duc de Wellington et l'armée Française sous les murs de Paris.

2. Demain l'armée Française commencera de se mettre en marche pour se porter derrière la Loire: l'évacuation totale de Paris sera effectuée en trois jours, et son mouvement pour se porter derrière la Loire sera terminé en huit.

3. L'armée Française emmenera, avec elle tout son matériel, artillerie de campagne, caisse militaire, chevaux et propriétés de regimens sans aucun exception. Elle en fera de même pour le personnel des dépôts et pour le personnel des diferentes branches d'administration qui appartiennent à l'armée.

4. Les malades et les blessés, ainsi que les officiers de santé qu'il sera nécessaire de laisser près d'eux, sont mis sous la protection spéciale de M. M. les commandeurs en chef des armées Angloise et Russienne.

5. Les militaires et employés dont il est question dans l'article précedent pourront aussitôt après leur retablissement rejoindre les corps auxquels ils appartiennent.

6. Les femmes et les enfans de tous les individus qui appartiennent à l'armée Françoise auront la liberté de rester à Paris. Les femmes pourront sans difficulté quitter Paris pour réjoindre l'armée et emporter avec elles leurs proprietés et celle de leur maris.

7. Les officièrs de ligne employés avec les fédérés ou avec les tirailleurs de la Garde Nationale pourront ou se réunir à

l'armée, ou retourner dans leur domiciles, ou dans le lieu de leur naissance.

8. Demain 4 Juillet, à midi, on remettra St. Denis, St. Ouen, Clichy, et Neuilly; après demain 5 Juillet, à la même heure on remettra Montmartre; le troisième jour 6 Juillet, toutes les barrières seront remises.

9. Le service intérieur de la Ville de Paris continuera à être fait par la Garde Nationale et par le Corps de Gendarmerie Municipale.

10. Les commandeurs en chef des armées Anglaise et Prussienne s'engagent à respecter et à faire respecter par leur subordonnés les autorités actueller tant qu'elles existeront.

11. Les proprietés publiques, à l'exception de celles qui ont rapport à la guerre, soient qu'elles appartiennent au Gouvernement, soient qu'elles dependent de l'autorité Municipale, seront respectées, et les Puissances alliées n'interviendront en aucune manière dans leur administration et dans leur gestion.

12. Seront pareillement respectées les personnes et les proprietés particulières: les habitans et en général tous les individus qui se trouvent dans la capitale continueront à jouir de leurs droits et de leur liberté, sans pouvoir être inquiétés, ni récherchés en rien relativement aux fonctions qu'ils occupent, ou auront occupés, à leur conduite, et à leur opinion politique.

13. Les troupes étrangères n'apporteront aucun obstacle à l'approvisionnement de la capitale, et protégeront au contraire l'arrivage et la libre circulation des objete qui y seront destinés.

14. La presente Convention sera observée et servira de règle pour les rapports matériels jusqu'à la conclusion de la paix; en cas de rupture, elle devra être annoncée dans les formes usitées au moins dix joins d'avance.

15. S'l arrivent des difficultés sur l'exécution de quelqu'un des articles de la présente Convention, l'interprétation en sera faite en faveur de l'armée Française et de la ville de Paris.

16. La presente Convention est declarée commune à toutes

les armées alliées sauf la ratification des Puissances dont ces armées dépendent.

17. Les ratifications en seront échangées demain le 4 Juillet à 6 heures de matin au pont de Neuilly.

18. Il sera nommés des Commissaires pour les parties respectives pour veiller à l'exécution de la présente Convention.

Signée en forme.

Mr. Morier to Mr. Baker.

Foreign Office, July 4, 1815.

Dear Baker—Should any inquiries be made on the subject of the delay which has arisen in the departure of Mr. Bagot for the United States of America, as his Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary, it is as well that you should be informed that it proceeds solely from Mrs. Bagot's expected confinement.

Colonel Barclay has been appointed the Commissioner for executing the 4th and 5th Articles of the Treaty of Ghent; and another Commissioner will soon be nominated for the execution of the 6th. It would therefore be right that you should ascertain what steps the American Government are taking for the fulfilment on their part of those articles of the Treaty.

J. P. Morier.

Lord Liverpool to Lord Castlereagh.

Fife House, July 7, 1815.

My dear Castlereagh—The Duke of Wellington's letters of the 2nd and 4th, enclosing the Capitulation of Paris, were received last night. I confess I am glad that Paris has been taken by a military Convention, rather than by a capitulation to the King, as it will leave us more unfettered as to the conditions on which peace is to be restored.

I hope the 12th Article of the Convention has reference

only to the foreign military authorities, and is not considered as granting an indemnity to all persons in Paris, whatever their offences may have been against the legal national tribunals, either civil or military.

It is in vain to conceal from ourselves that the situation of the King will become very critical, as soon as the Allied armies are withdrawn from France; and it is even doubtful how far his authority can be established, under present circumstances, on such a footing as to secure it against another revolution.

There are three questions which occur to every person one meets—What is to become of Buonaparte? What course is to be adopted with respect to those who assisted him in resuming his authority? What is to be done with the French armies? If these three points cannot be solved in a satisfactory manner, the country will expect, and justly, I think, expect, further securities for the continuance of peace on an improved frontier; and they will, above all, expect that, having been at so considerable an expense in the renewal of the war, and having wasted so much of the best blood of the country in the operations of it, we should not loose the hold we have now of France, until we have brought the arrangements which may be judged necessary to a satisfactory conclusion. I am not insensible to all the difficulties which must arise in settling so many nice and important points; but we never can hope to have another opportunity of negociating with so much advantage as at the present moment.

I conclude the Emperors and King will come to Paris, as soon as they hear of the capitulation. By that time we shall be able to form some judgment of the probable fate of Buonaparte. If he sails from either Rochfort or Cherbourg, we have a good chance of laying hold of him. If we take him, we shall keep him on board of ship till the opinion of the Allies has been taken. The most easy course would be to deliver him up to the King of France, but then we must be quite certain that he would be tried and have no chance of escape.

I have had some conversation with the civilians, and they are of opinion that this would be, in all respects, the least objectionable course. We should have a right to consider him as a French prisoner, and as such to give him up to the French Government.

If it is asked why so much importance is attached to one man, it is because I am thoroughly convinced that no other man can play the same part that he has done, and is likely to play again, if he should be allowed the opportunity. Independent of his personal qualities, he has the advantage of fourteen years' enjoyment of supreme power. This had given him a title which belongs to no other man, and which it would be very difficult for any one to acquire.

I need hardly remind you of the Slave Trade. I should hope Louis XVIII. can have no difficulty in confirming, in some way or other, what has been done by Buonaparte on this subject. He owes it to us, who will have restored him to his throne; and, indeed, if he does not meet our wishes on this point, I do not see how we ever shall be able to satisfy the country of the sincerity of our exertions.

Believe me to be, &c.,

LIVERPOOL.

Mr. N. Vansittart to Lord Castlereagh.

Downing Street, July 7, 1815.

My dear Castlereagh—The military operations in France appear now to have taken a course so decidedly favourable, that I hope you will have little except political difficulties to contend with. In consequence, I cannot but think the Allied force now either actually in France, or on the frontiers, fully equal to any military operations which may remain to be executed; and that it is now time to consider whether we may not begin to limit our foreign expenses. With respect to the British army, I entirely agree with Liverpool in thinking that nothing should be spared to render it powerful and effective,

and that we should proceed in that respect to take the same measures as if the late splendid successes had not been obtained. But a large proportion of our subsidiary forces are still at so great a distance, that there is no reasonable probability of their ever being usefully employed. I particularly allude to the second Russian army, and the Danish corps. With respect to these, and some other distant forces, I cannot but think you should enter into some arrangement as soon as possible for relieving us from our subsidiary engagements, making some reasonable allowance for the return of the troops to their cantonments. I need scarcely say, that I should be far from wishing you to take any step which you thought politically unwise, or which the Duke of Wellington deemed objectionable on any military ground. But you must be sufficiently aware of the necessity of all practicable economy, and of reducing our expenses within the narrowest limits which can be consistent with vigorous and successful exertion.

In any details connected with these subjects, you will find Herries, who is gone to Frankfort, but who will be at your orders, and Rosenhagen, who is with the Duke, capable of giving you every assistance.

Believe me, ever with the sincerest congratulations on your favourable prospects, my dear Castlereagh, ever faithfully yours,

N. VANSITTART.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool.

Paris, July 8, 1815.

My dear Liverpool—You will perceive Fouché has played us a shabby trick at starting; but we must forgive him, as I believe he has been of essential use to the King. I was amused with Talleyrand's apology for him. After abusing him violently, he said, he had no doubt his defence would be—Have I not done what you wished?—why inquire as to the means? But, as we cannot take the same liberties as M. Fouché, I

have thought it material to furnish you with the means of contradiction.

I understand Carnot drew the paper, probably to compromise Fouché with the King and the Allies. It is a most unjustifiable transaction, but not one which ought to induce us, having prevailed on the King to use Fouché, now to quarrel with him. I understood from the King, this evening, that he had given orders to Fouché to use every exertion to arrest Buonaparte. I apprized both his Majesty and Talleyrand that I conceived the policy of Europe towards France must be materially influenced by Buonaparte's being left at liberty to return again to the charge, when a new *complot* could be arranged. I have written to my brother and Lord Cathcart to press the arrival of the Sovereigns.

I am, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool.

Paris, July 8, 1815.

My Lord—As I have no doubt that every endeavour will be made to poison the minds of the Sovereigns, and especially the Emperor of Russia's, on the steps taken by the Duke of Wellington to accelerate the advance of the King and his restoration to his throne previous to their arrival, I have concerted with the Duke to send General Pozzo di Borgo to meet the Emperor at some distance from Paris. He will carry with him copies of the papers that have passed; and, having been present at all that has occurred, he will have the means of giving his Imperial Majesty a correct view of the whole before he reaches Paris.

The immediate difficulty is now to keep Blücher and the Prussians within any bounds towards this town. They have notified to the Duke to-day that they had laid on the city of Paris a contribution of 110,000,000, and equipments for 110,000 men; and they are at this moment mining the bridge of Jena,

with a view of blowing it up. The Duke has written to urge them at least to suspend all measures of this nature till the arrival of the Sovereigns; and we propose to-morrow morning to pay the Marshal a visit, at St. Cloud, together, to stop, if possible, these measures of arbitrary and unconcerted severity. The King sent for the Duke and me, this evening, to the Tuileries, principally on this point. We found him in a state of great emotion and exaltation at the reception he had met with from his subjects, which appears to have been even more animated than on his former entrance. Indeed, during the long audience to which we were admitted, it was almost impossible to converse, so loud were the shouts of the people in the Tuileries gardens, which were full of people, though it was then dark.

Previous to the King's dismissing us, he carried the Duke and me to the open window. Candles were then brought, which enabled the people to see the King, with the Duke by his side. They ran from all parts of the garden, and formed a solid mass, of an immense extent, rending the air with acclamations. The town is very generally illuminated; and I understand from Mr. Planta and Mr. Morier, who have traversed the principal streets and the Palais Royal, that every demonstration of joy was manifested by the inhabitants.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Sir Charles Stuart to Prince de Talleyrand.

Paris, July 10, 1815.

The Undersigned, his Britannic Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, having been informed that the message which appears in the journal enclosed was actually delivered by the late Provisional Government to the Assemblies, as therein set forth, deems it due to the Government of his Most Christian Majesty and to himself to declare that no declaration of the nature therein stated was made either

on his own part, or on that of any of the persons present at the conference alluded to, on the part of the Allies.

The principal object of the discussion which then took place was to convince the President of the Provisional Government, and through him to undeceive the persons in authority, as to a divergence of opinions prevailing amongst the Allied Sovereigns, as has been alleged in the report of the French deputies, on their return from the head-quarters. This was done in your Highness's presence, by producing the official communications, and especially a letter addressed to the Duke of Wellington, on the part of their respective sovereigns, by Prince Metternich and Count Nesselrode, the original of which was entrusted to the Duke of Otranto, for the information of his colleagues.

Your Highness, having been present at the whole of the interview, can bear witness that, whatever arguments were used to induce a Government to retire peaceably, which the Allied Powers could regard in no other light than as an usurpation, that nothing fell from any of the persons present to warrant the statement that the Sovereigns had taken an engagement among themselves to impose a particular Government upon France; their language upon that point having been strictly consonant to the declarations of the Allies in their public treaties.

As it is obvious to what mischievous purposes this document may be turned, the Undersigned has availed himself of this, the only mode which he can properly adopt, to protest against its accuracy; and he is authorized by the Duke of Wellington and Viscount Castlereagh (then present) to declare to your Highness that they severally concur in the correctness of what is herein stated.

The Undersigned seizes this opportunity of presenting to Prince Talleyrand the assurances of his most perfect consideration.

CHARLES STUART.

Lord Bathurst to Mr. Baker.

Foreign Office, July 10, 1815.

Sir—I have the honour to inform you that, in consequence of the application of the American Government, transmitted in your despatch No. 7, respecting the admission of their ships of war into the ports of this country, whilst engaged in war with the Algerines, the necessary directions for allowing to these ships all the privileges to which the vessels of a nation in amity with this country are entitled will be forthwith issued, in compliance with the request of the American Government, to this effect.

I am, &c., BATHURST.

Lord Liverpool to Lord Castlereagh.

Fife House, July 10, 1815.

My dear Castlereagh—I received this morning your letters of the 7th, and Sir Charles Stuart's of the 6th. The account of the state of Paris, and, indeed, of a large part of the interior of France, appears to us by no means favourable. Though the general disposition may be in favour of the King, in many quarters, it is quite clear that he has no party to support him, and that the most able and active members of the community are against him. It will be an Herculean task, I think, to give any real strength to this Government. For, what is a King, unsupported by opinion, by an army, or by a strong national party?

I am glad, upon the whole, that he has determined to employ Fouché. He may betray him; but he may likewise feel it his best interest to save him. In a desperate state of affairs, we must try desperate remedies. The more I consider the present internal state of France, and the little chance there is of security for Europe from the character and strength of the French Government, the more I am satisfied that we

must look for security in frontier, and in really weakening the power of France. This opinion is rapidly gaining ground in this country; and I think, even if Buonaparte was dead, there would now be considerable disappointment at any peace which left France as she was by the Treaty of Paris, or even as she was before the Revolution.

Bathurst will write to-night to the Duke of Wellington on the subject of the system for supplying our army. It is quite right to prevent plunder of every description; but France must bear a part of the expenses of the war. This was, indeed, understood, when we agreed to the Convention at Ghent; and we shall not be able to justify the system which we adopted last year, either to our own country or to our Allies. We do not exactly know what course, in this respect, the Duke of Wellington has been following, for we have received no information in regard to it since he entered France.

I trust, however, that you will be able to satisfy him that the French nation ought to bear a part of the expenses; and we should take care that this part of the charge is defrayed before we leave the country; for otherwise we shall certainly gain nothing.

We have our Council to-morrow, for the Prince Regent's Speech, and Parliament will be prorogued on Wednesday. I conclude we shall hear by the next courier whether the Allied Sovereigns intend coming to Paris, or what place is fixed for the general discussions on political affairs.

Believe me, my dear Castlereagh, yours very sincerely,

LIVERPOOL.

The Duke of Orleans to the King of France.

Twickenham, Juillet 12, 1815.

Sire — Je m'empresse d'offrir à Votre Majesté mes très humbles félicitations sur votre heureux retour en France, et votre arrivée à Paris, et je la supplie de les agréer avec bonté. J'ai été vivement affligé que Votre Majesté n'eut pas daigné

répliquer à la dernière lettre, que j'ai eu l'honneur de lui adresser le 18 Mai, ni me faire aucune communication quelconque depuis cette époque: et ce silence, joint à la conduite envers moi de votre Ambassadeur près de cette Cour, qui s'est abstenu de tous les rapports ordinaires, d'une manière aussi marquante pour moi que remarquable pour le public, ne m'a que trop donné lieu de craindre d'avoir encouru le déplaisir de Votre Majesté en attendant ici qu'elle daignât me faire connoître la part qu'elle me destinoit dans l'exécution du plan qu'elle m'avoit annoncé.

Cependant, Sire, il me semble que les évènemens n'ont que trop confirmé ce que j'avois eu l'honneur de vous mander, pour que la manifestation de mon opinion ait pu vous déplaire. Quant à la répugnance que j'ai cru devoir ne pas cacher au Roi, que j'éprouvois pour m'agréger à un rassemblement d'émigrés François fermé au milieu des armées étrangères, j'ose me flatter que la déclaration que Votre Majesté a publiée à Cambray, dans laquelle elle annonce avoir défendu à tous les Princes de sa maison de paroître dans les rangs étrangers a pleinement établi que le Roi partageoit les sentimens qui m'inspirent cette répugnance.

Que Votre Majesté me permette de lui rappeller aujourd'hui les opinions que je lui ai manifestées il y a deux mois. J'ai dit, Sire, que je ne voyois plus dans l'état de choses où l'on étoit alors que l'arrivée à Paris des armées étrangères, ou leur approche de cette capitale, qui pût abattre le gouvernement de Buonaparte; mais que Votre Majesté ne devoit pas se dissimuler que ce moyen, si onéreux et si pénible pour la France y exciteroit des sentimens dont l'application à Votre Majesté seroit très fâcheuse. J'ai dit que votre présence et celle de vos Princes dans les armées alliées n'ajouteroit point à leurs forces, parceque j'étois bien convaincu qu'aucune partie de l'armée Françoise ne se joindroit à elles.

J'ai ajouté que, "ne comptant plus comme j'avois déjà avoué au Roi que je le faisois, que sur la force matérielle des

armées alliées pour leur arrivée à Paris, et ne voyant que cette cruelle extrémité qui pût alors opérer le renversement de Buonaparte, il me sembloit que c'étoit pour ce moment là qu'il falloit réserver tous nos moyens; et je pense aujourd'hui que plus on est attaché à Votre Majesté plus on doit regretter qu'on ne l'ait pas fait, afin, qu'il s'élevat en sa faveur un cri national qui déterminât l'armée à se soumettre au Roi, comme cela étoit arrivé en Avril, 1814; qu'il me sembloit, par conséquent, très essentiel d'agir avec l'armée Françoise de manière à diminuer autant que possible sa répugnance pour le Roi."

Je disois encore "que nous ne devions pas perdre de vue que la compression des armées étrangères ne pouvoit jamais être que momentanée, et que la cruelle expérience que nous venions de faire ne nous faisoit que trop sentir qu'il ne pouvoit pas nous suffire, ni à la nation Françoise, ni à l'Europe, que Votre Majesté fût reconduite aux Thuileries, et que le peuple François l'entourât de nouveau des cris de *Vive le Roi*, qu'il falloit que Votre Majesté se créât en France une force physique et morale, qu'elle n'a pas eu après la restauration, et dont l'absence a amené la catastrophe du mois de Mars."

Il ne me reste plus, Sire, qu'à souhaiter, ce que je fais bien sincèrement, que Votre Majesté se procure cette force physique et morale, et à la supplier d'agréer avec bonté l'hommage de mon profond respect et de tout mon dévouement.

The French Commissaries to the English and Prussian Commissaries, for carrying into execution the Convention of Paris, July 3, 1815.

Paris, le 12 Juillet, 1815.

Le Ministre Secrétaire d'Etat de la Guerre vient de faire connôitre aux Commissaires sous-signés, chargés de veiller à l'exécution de la Convention du 3 Juillet que M. le Major Prussien Lavenitz s'est présenté à la galerie des plans en relief des places fortes de France, établie dans les combles de l'Hôtel

des Invalides, et qu'il a déclaré en prendre possession par le droit de la guerre.

Si l'on veut s'appuyer des termes de l'article 11 de la Convention, pour justifier cette prise de possession, les soussignés avouent de bonne foi qu'ils n'ont rien à y objecter; mais cette intéressante collection, fondée par Louis XIV., fruit de cent cinquante années de travail, ne peut être considérée que comme un monument militaire, qui n'est d'aucune utilité pour les armées alliées. Le déplacement et le transport de cette immense collection en opérerait nécessairement la destruction.

Si on pouvait espérer de transporter sans dommage et avec quelque facilité quelques uns de ces reliefs, ce qu'on regarde comme presqu' impossible, nous sommes autorisés à offrir ceux qui pourraient être, agréables à Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse, et qu'on emballerait avec soin, et de prier qu'on ne déplace pas les autres.

Les sous-signés ne pensent pas qu'il entre dans les intentions de L.L. Ex. Ex. les Généraux en chef des armées Anglaise et Prussienne de s'autoriser de la rédaction d'un des articles de la Convention pour faire détruire des objets d'art, qui ne sont d'aucune utilité pour le service des armées alliées.

Ils ont l'honneur de réiterer à Messieurs les Commissaires Anglais et Prussiens l'assurance de leur haute considération.

Le Lt.-Gl. CORBINEAU.
Le Lt.-Gl. TURREAU.
Le Mar. de Camp Cte. GRUNDLER.

The French Army to the King.

Paris, le 14 Juillet, 1815.

Sire—L'Armée aux ordres de M. le Maréchal Prince d'Eckmühl, pénétrée des maux de la Patrie, et désirant faire tout ce qui dépend d'elle pour en arrêter le cours, nous a députés vers Votre Majesté pour lui exprimer le désir qu'elle a de se rallier sincèrement à Elle et de lui ramener par son exemple ceux de

ses sujets que les circonstances extraordinaires dans lesquelles nous nous sommes trouvés en ont éloignés.

Pleines de confiance dans la générosité de Votre Majesté, l'armée se flatte, Sire, que vous accueillerez avec bonté sa soumission et que, jettant un voile sur le passé, vous ne voudrez fermer votre cœur à aucun de vos enfans.

Nous sommes, avec un profond respect, Sire, de Votre Majesté les très humbles Serviteurs et Sujets,

Les Lieutenants Généraux

Cte. GERARD.

Cte de VALMY.

Ministère de la Guerre.

Le Directeur du Dépôt Général des Fortifications à M. de Faure, Medecin du Roi, au Château des Thuileries, Galerie noire.

Paris, le 14 Juillet, 1815.

Monsieur—Je n'ai pu encore avoir l'honneur de vous voir, malgré tout le désir que j'en avais. Cependant comme vous approchez de Sa Majesté, je crois de mon devoir de vous prévenir par écrit d'une vexation des Prussiens, ne pouvant avoir l'honneur de vous le dire de vive voix.

Vous avez vu, au printemps dernier, la galerie des plans en relief des places fortes du royaume aux Invalides. Cette magnifique collection, fondée par Louis XIV., était avant la Révolution une propriété particulière du Roi. Elle occupait la grande galerie du Louvre, et était spécialement destinée à l'instruction des enfans de France. En 1778 elle fut transférée aux Invalides.

La Convention d'évacuation de Paris n'a pu donner aux Prussiens des droits sur une propriété particulière de nos rois.

J'ai informé, le 11 du courant, le Ministre de la Guerre d'une mesure prise par le Major Prussien Lavenitz, qui étoit venu prendre possession de la galerie, au nom de l'armée Prussienne, et à y établir un poste. Ce matin quatre officiers

Prussiens sont venus au nom du Maréchal Blücher, ils ont dit, pour faire prendre mesure des caisses nécessaires pour le transport de tous les plans des places du Nord.

J'en rend encore compte au Ministre, mais je crains qu'il n'ait aucun moyen d'empêcher cet enlèvement. Comme vous avez, Monsieur, le bonheur d'être près du Roi, j'ai l'honneur de vous prévenir, afin que l'on avise à la conservation de ces plans, qui peuvent devenir fort dangereux entre les mains d'un ennemi habile qui saurait en profiter dans des guerres contre Sa Majesté.

Agréez, Monsieur, l'assurance des sentiments distingués avec lesquels je suis, &c.,

HD. NOUILARD.

Rue des Petits Augustins, No. 24.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Bathurst.

Paris, July 14, 1815.

Dear Lord Bathurst—I hope we are going on as you wish us; but you must give us time, and we must do nothing to destroy the King's authority, which it is our first object to create. The question of securities is not the first in order—it is, in fact, the last. It is enough now to keep the principle sufficiently open. Nothing can be decided at present upon its application; nor can it indeed be properly judged of, till the moment arrives for retiring our armies. It is upon the then state of things this question can alone be negociated; and as long as we have five or six hundred thousand men in France, we need not be afraid of not having sufficient means to enforce any proposition which we should deem it wise or becoming to propose for the King's adoption.

I have the satisfaction of assuring you that the Duke and I are perfectly agreed upon the mode in which the business shall be conducted here. Whilst the war is going on, notwithstanding our amicable relations with the *de jure* Sovereign, we are of opinion that the military and political authorities should be kept quite distinct, and the armies, with their Chiefs, be controlled

by their respective Cabinets. This control is very unimportant, as applied to the Duke and his army, which is a model of conduct as well as bravery, and is considered as such by all the Powers: but it is every thing to restrain others. When the moment comes that we may venture to proceed to frame that Act which, if not an actual treaty of peace with Louis XVIII., with whom we are already both at peace and, to a certain degree, in alliance, is to regulate the future relations of France with Europe, the Duke has consented that his name shall be included with mine in the full powers for signing, in conjunction with the Allies, this settlement. This will produce no confusion in our ordinary relations, and it will afford me not only the most important assistance, but I shall feel it an additional honour to have my name associated with the Duke's, in winding up what he has achieved. In the mean time, I shall not be deprived of the aid of his important assistance, as the Duke will assist at our Conferences whilst his military duties do not call him from Paris.

Believe me, dear Lord Bathurst, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Liverpool to Lord Castlereagh.

Fife House, July 15, 1815.

My dear Castlereagh—Amongst other matters, I have been particularly directed by the Prince Regent to call your attention to the collections of statues and pictures of which the French plundered Italy, Germany, and the Low Countries. Whatever it may be fitting to do with them, whether to restore them to the countries from which they have been taken, or to divide them amongst the Allies, the Allied armies have the same title to them by conquest as that by which the French authorities acquired them. It is most desirable, in point of policy, to remove them, if possible, from France, as, whilst in that country, they must necessarily have the effect of keeping up the remembrance of their former conquests, and of cherishing the military spirit and vanity of the nation.

I recommend this matter likewise to your serious and early consideration. You will let me know, at a proper time, what appear to be the sentiments of the other Allied Sovereigns with regard to it.

Believe me to be, &c., LIVERPOOL.

Lord Liverpool to Lord Castlereagh.

Fife House, July 15, 1815.

My dear Castlereagh—We have received this morning your despatches of the 12th instant. Before I enter on other matters, I am desirous of apprizing you of our sentiments respecting Bonaparte. If you should succeed in getting possession of his person, and the King of France does not feel sufficiently strong to bring him to justice as a rebel, we are ready to take upon ourselves the custody of his person, on the part of the Allied Powers; and, indeed, we should think it better that he should be assigned to us than to any other member of the Confederacy. In this case, however, we should prefer that there were not Commissioners appointed on the part of the other Powers, but that the discretion should be vested entirely in ourselves, and that we should be at liberty to fix the place of his confinement, either in Great Britain, or at Gibraltar, Malta, St. Helena, the Cape of Good Hope, or any other colony we might think most secure.

We incline at present strongly to the opinion that the best place of custody would be at a distance from Europe, and that the Cape of Good Hope or St. Helena would be the most proper stations for the purpose. If, however, we are to have the severe responsibility of such a charge, it is but just that we should have the choice of the place of confinement, and a complete discretion as to the means necessary to render that confinement effectual.

Believe me to be, &c., LIVERPOOL.

Lord Liverpool to Lord Castlereagh.

Fife House, July 15, 1815.

My dear Castlereagh—We have had a long sitting this day on the several despatches which have been received from you since your arrival at Paris. It is satisfactory to find that the Emperor of Russia is in so reasonable a state of mind, and so likely to co-operate with us cordially in the great objects we must all equally have in view.

The more we consider the various circumstances which have attended the return of the King of France to Paris, the more strongly are we impressed with the opinion of the impossibility of giving that strength to his Government which can afford any real security to the Allies, or to Europe. The forbearance manifested at the present moment can be considered in no other light than as weakness, and not mercy; and, though the King may follow the advice which has been given to him by disbanding his army, I am afraid that very little dependence will be to be placed on any army formed out of the same materials; and, if an army could even be otherwise constituted, what dangers might not be apprehended from forty thousand officers unemployed—men of desperate fortunes, and possessing a large proportion of the talents and energy of the country! A severe example made of the conspirators who brought back Bonaparte could alone have any effect in counteracting these dangers: but this is not now to be expected, and perhaps would have been very difficult, considering the share in the Government which the King has been obliged to assign to some of the members of the Jacobin party.

In this state of things we must look to other measures for our security, and we shall never be forgiven if we leave France without securing a sufficient frontier for the protection of the adjoining countries. The prevailing idea in this country is, that we are fairly entitled to avail ourselves of the present moment to take back from France the principal conquests of

Louis XIV. It is argued with much force that France will never forgive the humiliation which she has already received—that she will take the first convenient opportunity of endeavouring to redeem her military glory—and that it is our duty, therefore, to take advantage of the present moment to prevent the evil consequences which may even flow from the greatness of our own success. It might have been not unwise last year to try the effect of a more magnanimous policy; but in the result of that we have been completely disappointed; and we owe it to ourselves now to provide, in the best manner we can, for our own security.

These, I can assure you, are the generally received opinions in this country at present, and I think it is material that you should sound our Allies with respect to them. If, however, you should find them not disposed to proceed to such lengths, we think we are completely entitled to an arrangement upon the principle which I am about to state; and, indeed, their interests will be found as much involved in it as our own.

Supposing Bonaparte to be dead, or a prisoner in the hands of the Allies, we might be induced to wave any permanent cession of territory on the part of France, upon the following conditions:

First. That a considerable part of the northern barrier of France, including Lille, should be placed in the hands of the Allied Powers, until such time as a sufficient barrier for the Netherlands was completed, and the expenses thereof defrayed by the French Government. The period of seven or five years (as the Duke of Wellington might judge necessary) might be definitely fixed as the time for completing the barrier, and the sum of five millions as the expense: the French fortresses to be restored, at the time fixed, and as soon after as the money should be paid, to Louis XVIII., or to his descendants in line direct, but to no other sovereign of France.

Secondly. The same principle to be applied in such degree

as the Allies may think proper to the eastern frontier of France.

If Bonaparte should escape, and should, therefore, be alive and at liberty, the French frontier above alluded to should be retained during his life, as well as during the time necessary for erecting the new frontier, and for the liquidation of the expenses of it.

These propositions appear to be founded upon a principle perfectly equitable. The French nation is at the mercy of the Allies, in consequence of a war occasioned by their violation of the most sacred treaties. The Allies are fully entitled, under these circumstances, to indemnity and security. We might not unreasonably claim a security that was permanent, such as France has so frequently enforced under similar circumstances; but we are contented to limit the extent of the security to the necessity of the case, and, having delivered the adjoining territories from invasion, and being in possession of a considerable part of the kingdom of France, we feel that we have a right to retain such part of the kingdom of France as is necessary for the security of adjoining countries, until that security shall have been provided for in another manner, and the enemy has defrayed the expenses of it.

This arrangement would have the advantage likewise of affording some security to the Government of the King of France, as the restoration of the fortresses would be limited to him and to his legitimate successors. I sincerely believe that this proposition would be far short of the expectations of the country at this time; but I state it to you, on the part of the Cabinet, as one which, we are convinced, under all the circumstances, is reasonable in itself, as the lowest point to which we ought to go, and as one to which we have little doubt, after all the expense they have incurred, and the dangers to which they may hereafter be exposed, our Allies may be reconciled.

Believe me to be, &c.,

LIVERPOOL.

Lord Liverpool to Lord Castlereagh.

Fife House, July 21, 1815.

My dear Castlereagh—I have this moment received your letters of the 17th instant, with the intelligence of the surrender of Bonaparte, of which I wish you joy. When your letter was written, you had evidently not received mine of the 15th, which will explain to you the sentiments of Government on the subject of his detention.

We are all decidedly of opinion that it would not answer to confine him in this country. Very nice legal questions might arise upon the subject, which would be particularly embarrassing. But, independent of these considerations, you know enough of the feelings of people in this country not to doubt he would become an object of curiosity immediately, and possibly of compassion, in the course of a few months: and the circumstance of his being here, or indeed anywhere in Europe, would contribute to keep up a certain degree of ferment in France.

Since I wrote to you last, Lord Melville and myself have conversed with Mr. Barrow on the subject, and he decidedly recommends St. Helena as the place in the world the best calculated for the confinement of such a person. There is a very fine citadel there, in which he might reside. The situation is particularly healthy. There is only one place in the circuit of the island where ships can anchor, and we have the power of excluding neutral vessels altogether, if we should think it necessary. At such a distance and in such a place, all intrigue would be impossible; and, being withdrawn so far from the European world, he would very soon be forgotten.

We are very much disinclined to the appointment of Commissaries on the part of the other Powers: such an arrangement might be unobjectionable for a few months, but when several persons of this description got together in a place in which they had nothing to do, they would very soon be tired; they would be very likely to quarrel amongst themselves; and

the existence of any disputes amongst them might seriously embarrass the safe custody of the prisoner.

Believe me to be, &c.,

LIVERPOOL.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool.

Paris, July 24, 1815.

Dear Liverpool—I send you such intelligence as has accumulated in the last two or three days. I have nothing to complain of; on the contrary, much to acknowledge in the spirit of conciliation hitherto shown by the Emperor of Russia, but I think you must not expect him to go all your lengths, especially on the subject of the Gallery and the Statues. Indeed, I doubt the latter proposition being relished, even by the Austrians; and I doubt still more the possibility of the King's holding his ground in France, if, after holding himself out to the nation as a means of appeasing the Allies, they disavow him so far. The Duke of Wellington, I know, doubts very strongly the prudence of this measure. The French Commissioners wanted an Article in the Convention on this subject: this the Duke refused, telling them they must trust, as before, to the *bienveillance* of the Sovereign.

The Emperor of Russia, in expressing his wish to act in concert with the Prince Regent in consolidating the peace of Europe, asked me in confidence whether anything had passed, when he was in England, on his part, which had given umbrage to his Royal Highness, expressing himself at the same time in very proper terms on the subject. I told him that, if any misinterpretation of his Imperial Majesty's sentiments had taken place, I was convinced that the wish, on his Imperial Majesty's part, to remove them, would at once be effectual to the object. I beg you will mention this conciliatory overture to the Prince; and, as any personal coolness between two such personages can be productive of no advantage, perhaps his Royal Highness will authorize me to say something

civil, on his part, to the Emperor, who takes great pains to show attention to the Duke of Wellington, and to the British army here.

I should also wish to receive the Prince's commands upon the invitation to be given to the Emperor of Austria. In obedience to his Royal Highness's orders, I mentioned to the Emperor, in my first audience, that the Prince hoped to see him in England; but I delayed the more formal invitation till I knew whether the Prince would wish anything to be said to the other Sovereigns. I can venture to say positively that all will decline. The Emperor of Austria is most impatient to go to Italy, and the Emperor of Russia not less so to return home.

I am impatient to receive the notification of Buonaparte's arrival in England, and to be informed of the steps you have thought it advisable to adopt, both towards himself and his suite, which contains two very flagrant criminals, Savary and L'Allemand. I have written to procure, if possible, before the messenger goes, a copy of the ordinance which the King has issued, or is about to issue, against the principal conspirators. Lucien Buonaparte has been taken, and is confined in the citadel of Turin.

You will receive by this courier the official notification of a mark of favour conferred by the King of the Netherlands on Clancarty, for the share he has borne, as our ambassador, in his restoration. His Majesty has created the Duke of Wellington Prince of Waterloo, with a dotation double of that which he has assigned to the marquisate conferred on Clancarty. Having some doubts upon the propriety of an English ambassador receiving a mark of favour of this description from a foreign Sovereign, under the principles laid down and acted upon lately by the Prince Regent; and at the same time considering that it was due to Clancarty that so flattering and valuable a mark of public service should not be denied him, if the acceptance could be reconciled with the rules and interests

which the purity of the service enjoined, I begged him confidentially to state to me such reasons as occurred to himself in favour of his receiving the Prince Regent's permission to accept this honour. I now send this communication for your private perusal, and shall be obliged to you to have the case considered. I am sure you will feel every disposition to indulge Clancarty, if you can with propriety; and you may rely on his being satisfied with the decision, whatever it may be, that you and the Cabinet advise the Prince Regent to adopt on this very peculiar instance of royal gratitude.

I am, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

I forgot to mention that I believe there will be no sort of difficulty in leaving the unrestricted custody of Buonaparte's person to the British Government, under perhaps some engagement with the other Powers not to turn him loose without their consent. The idea of Commissaries was a party suggestion of my own, which, upon re-consideration, appears to be open to much objection.

Lord Exmouth and Sir Hudson Lowe to Lord Castlereagh.

Marseilles, July 25, 1815.

My Lord—Upon a review of the subject of our despatches of yesterday to Lord Melville and Lord Bathurst, (transmitted by Captain Arden, which were left under open cover for the Duke of Wellington's and your lordship's information) and after a conversation this morning with the Marquis de Rivière upon the present posture of affairs in this province, we have, upon mature consideration, thought it advisable to refer to your Lordship's authority for our further proceedings, before we remove from a situation which we cannot always command, after having once abandoned. But it is our intention to give immediate increased naval assistance to the operation which, we have been informed by Lord Burghersh, was about to be carried on against Elba.

We have thought it advisable to follow our former despatch with as much celerity as possible, to prevent any expectation that might have been formed from the intended movements.

We request the honour of your lordship's early instructions on the following points:

1. Whether it is your lordship's wish we should continue to occupy this position, or that you would approve of our undertaking the operation already suggested.

2. Whether, in the event of hearing of the fall of Elba, your lordship would still recommend our remaining at Marseilles.

We think it right to apprize your lordship that information has arrived this day of Major-General Count Nugent having crossed the Var, and demanded a passage through Antibes, where the white flag was flying; and that another Austrian column is advancing upon Draguignan, both apparently with a design of moving upon Toulon. No information could have been received by these columns of the submission of Toulon to the authority of Louis XVIII., which, however, has since been communicated to them by express.

We have the honour to be, my lord, &c.,

EXMOUTH.

H. LOWE, Major-General.

Lord Liverpool to Lord Castlereagh.

Fife House, July 28, 1815.

My dear Castlereagh—We have completed all the arrangements for conveying Buonaparte to the island of St. Helena. Melville writes to Lord Keith to-night, to desire that he will announce to him his destination. Sir George Cockburn is to have charge of him, and to convey him in a line-of-battle ship.

Bathurst has written to Sir Hudson Lowe, to offer him the military government of the island. It will be garrisoned by King's troops, and all ships of every description will be

excluded, excepting ships of war, and those of the East India Company. The Court of Directors have shown every disposition to accommodate in every part of the business. The question of the security of the station has been most fully discussed. We have taken the best opinions upon it, and listened to all those who had any objections to make to it. It is, however, now generally admitted that, provided neutrals are excluded, it is the safest station that could be found for such a purpose. St. Helena is perhaps the only place in the world from which neutrals can be excluded without any material inconvenience.

We certainly concur with you in opinion, that a Convention should be signed between us and the Allies, by which Buonaparte is to be considered as a *common* prisoner, though in our custody, and that we should not give him up or release him, except by joint consent. You will perhaps employ somebody to draw up the draft of such a Convention.

I am, my dear Lord Castlereagh, very faithfully yours,

LIVERPOOL.

Lord Liverpool to Lord Castlereagh.

Fife House, July 28, 1815.

My dear Castlereagh—The measures which the French Government have adopted for disbanding the armies appear to be very slow in their progress, and by no means satisfactory in their result. We feel it necessary, therefore, to desire that you will direct the attention of the Allies to the very important question of denouncing the armistice as to all those corps which remain embodied. We ought not to forget that the season of the year is advancing, and that military operations will not be as easy two months hence as they are at present: besides, the French nation will begin to recover from its first panic, and may find the means of more effectual resistance, particularly when supported by a national representation, and assisted by long nights and wet or cold weather.

Whatever, therefore, is to be done for dispersing the army, should be done without loss of time. We shall send the Duke of Wellington reinforcements, as if he was going immediately to take the field. The return of the troops from America has been most opportune, and he will certainly soon have, if he has not already, an army considerably more numerous and efficient than that with which he fought the battle of Waterloo.

I have no doubt that you have been seriously considering with him all the different contingencies which may occur in the course of the next few months, and that he will be prepared for events as they may arise. It is very material that you should look sharply after the northern fortresses. If the means were in our own power of occupying them, in case of necessity, I should not dread anything that could happen.

I am, with great truth, my dear Castlereagh, yours most faithfully, LIVERPOOL.

Lord Liverpool to Lord Castlereagh.

Fife House, July 28, 1815.

My dear Castlereagh—I read to the Prince Regent that part of your letter which relates to the conversation his Imperial Majesty had with you, relative to what passed on his visit to this country last year. The Prince wishes you to express to the Emperor of Russia that his Royal Highness is perfectly satisfied that, if there was any misconception, it was perfectly unintentional, and that he can never entertain any sentiments but those of cordiality and friendship towards his Imperial Majesty.

The Prince leaves it to you to take such measures as you may think proper, for inviting the Sovereigns to come to this country. The reason which induced his Royal Highness to desire you particularly to intimate his wishes to the Emperor of Austria, arose from the circumstance of his not having had the pleasure and satisfaction of seeing and receiving that Sove-

reign when the other royal visiters came to England, in the spring of last year.

I am, with sincere regard, &c., LIVERPOOL.

Lord Bathurst to Lord Castlereagh.

Downing Street, July 28, 1815.

Dear Lord Castlereagh—I shall not trouble you again on French affairs, as Lord Liverpool will write fully on the subject.

I do not believe a word about the Vendeans joining the army against the Allies. I have, however, given directions that the delivery of arms to them shall be suspended. Although none of the wounded were sent to Lille except such as were rendered unserviceable, I have given directions that none more should be sent.

M. Foresti has told Bunbury that the Ionian Islands were to be independent, and that we were to be only protectors of them. He said that he had this from Capodistrias, and that they hoped we would accept the Islands under their conditions. I have desired Bunbury to take the first opportunity of telling him he was sure we would not.

Is this an intrigue of these two Ionian gentlemen, or is it at the suggestion of the Emperor of Russia?

I enclose you a letter I received this morning, together with my answer.

Admiral Linois and the army at Guadeloupe have declared for Bonaparte.

Yours very sincerely, BATHURST.

[Enclosures.]

Mr. Rochfort to Lord Bathurst.

Friday Morning, Harcourt House.

My Lord—Pray read this note with attention. I am unexpectedly called upon by my brother, just arrived from Paris,

with a message from a female relative of the French branch of my family, requiring my immediate presence in Paris. It may not be inexpedient to premise that this lady, from family and fortune, is and always was of the very first rank in France. She was the bosom friend of my mother, and, when I was a youth in that country, was a mother to me, which she has continued through life. The import of the message is, that the Emperor of Russia is captivated with one of her daughters, *who is most unequivocally virtuous;* that he sups frequently at her hotel; and that she (the mother) managed an interview, at the Emperor's desire, (not many hours since) with a *celebrated public character*, and that she introduced this man at midnight through her garden to the apartment where the Emperor awaited him; that they both felt the tapestry before they spoke; and that they remained together two hours and a half, when this person was re-conducted through the garden back to the street.

I am confident she has something of importance to communicate to my ear; and her affection suggests my being the channel to lay it before Government. The pride of family, of blood, is evident to me in the transaction. At all events, if the Prince Regent thinks this letter worth attending to, he is not personally unacquainted with the feelings that bind me to him, and I trust he fully knows my devotion. At the same time, I shall clearly state that I shall only communicate with *a fountain head*, and that I shall, *in no instance*, lose sight of the delicacy and affection due to the relative who enables me to make this offer.

I see by the papers, that a person called Las Casas is now with Buonaparte in Torbay. I knew him about the year 1795 or 1796, by the name of Le Sage. He was an emigrant, and published a compilation called the Historical Atlas. I had occasion to mention him at the time as a suspicious character to Mr. Windham, whom I knew at Mr. Burke's, at Beaconsfield, and he shortly after disappeared. I merely state

this last fact, in order to give you all the light I can; and, assuring you how much I feel obliged for your kindness, I remain with great respect, &c.,

R. ROCHFORT.

PS. I have learned this moment, at your Office, that a Cabinet Council is to sit this day, and I empower you (if you think proper) to lay the substance of my note before it, in which I have suppressed everything except the single and important fact.

Lord Bathurst's Answer.

Downing Street, July 28, 1815.

Lord Bathurst presents his compliments to Mr. Rochfort, and is much obliged to him for his letter of this day's date. He must, however, beg to decline the offer which Mr. Rochfort has been so good as to make, as it might be considered as an instance of distrust in the rectitude of the Emperor of Russia's intentions, which nothing in the conduct of his Majesty can at present justify.

Lord Melville to Lord Castlereagh.

Admiralty, July 28, 1815.

Dear Castlereagh—I enclose, for your information, a copy of a letter which I have this day addressed to Lord Keith. It will be conveyed to him by Sir Harry Bunbury, who will also accompany him on board the Bellerophon. Lord Liverpool will probably have explained to you that if Bonaparte desires to have Bertrand with him, we are not disposed to object to it, even though he is in the proscribed list of the French Government; and though it may compel us to let Madame Bertrand also be of the party to St. Helena.

Bunbury will be merely a listener at the conference. If Bonaparte makes demands or inquiries on points which are not adverted to in my letter, even though we should have

already made up our minds on them, our Plenipotentiaries will reply, that they have no other instructions, and that they must refer to Government.

Believe me, ever yours most sincerely,

MELVILLE.

[Enclosure.]

Lord Melville to Lord Keith.

Admiralty, July 28, 1815.

My Lord—As it may be convenient to General Buonaparte that he should be apprized, without further delay, of the intentions of the British Government respecting him, your lordship is at liberty to communicate to him the information contained in this letter.

It would be inconsistent with our duty to this country, and to his Majesty's Allies, if we were to leave to General Buonaparte the means or opportunity of again disturbing the peace of Europe, and renewing all the calamities of war: it is therefore unavoidable that he should be restrained in his personal liberty to whatever extent may be necessary to secure our first and paramount object.

The island of St. Helena has been selected for his future residence. The climate is healthy, and its local situation will admit of his being treated with more indulgence than would be compatible with adequate security elsewhere.

Of the persons who have been brought to England with General Buonaparte, he will be allowed to select (with the exception of Generals Savary and L'Allemand) three officers, who, together with his surgeon, will be permitted to accompany him to St. Helena. Twelve domestics, including the servants of the officers, will also be allowed. It must be distinctly understood that all those individuals will be liable to restraint during their attendance upon him and their residence at St. Helena, and they will not be permitted to withdraw from thence without the sanction of the British Government.

Rear-Admiral Sir George Cockburn, who is appointed to the chief command at the Cape of Good Hope and the adjacent seas, will convey General Buonaparte and his attendants to St. Helena, and will receive detailed instructions respecting the execution of that service. Sir George Cockburn will probably be ready to embark in the course of a few days; it is therefore desirable that General Buonaparte should make without delay the selection of the persons who are to accompany him.

I have the honour to be, &c., MELVILLE.

Lord Liverpool to Lord Castlereagh.

Fife House, July 28, 1815.

My dear Castlereagh—We have considered your despatch of the 24th instant.

We are not at all surprised at the different shades of opinion which subsist amongst the Allied Powers as to the measures which it may be proper to adopt respecting the frontier of France. It is quite natural that the Powers bordering on France should look to their own security in some permanent reduction of the territory of that country.

It is quite intelligible, likewise, that the Emperor of Russia should be desirous of being considered as a protector of the French nation; but this disposition on the part of his Imperial Majesty should be kept within reasonable bounds. He should recollect that those who are near to France, and consequently in the post of danger, have the deepest interest in the issue of the contest. And, though it may be very proper that he should so far act the part of a mediator as to keep down extravagant and unreasonable pretensions, he ought not to sacrifice what may be necessary for the security of his Allies to the pretensions of the French nation, particularly as that nation has never acted upon those principles of permanent territorial integrity with respect to other countries, when the fortune of war has placed the power in its own hands.

With regard to the two alternatives of dismantling the French fortresses, or their occupation for a given number of years by the Allied Powers, there appears to us to be no question which of these propositions is the most advantageous to Europe and even to France.

In the first place—the dismantling of fortresses has rarely ever been completely effected. The works are partially destroyed, and may be restored for a small part of the expense at which they had been originally constructed. In the second place—though dismantling the fortresses on the frontier of France would uncover that country, expose it for a time to invasion, an advantage as far as it goes, it would not materially protect neighbouring countries which had no fortresses; and the contest, if it should arise, would depend in that case upon which Power would bring into the field the superior army. Whereas, if the French fortresses were occupied by the Allied Powers, till such time as a barrier could be created by the Allies, they would have the advantage of the security of the French frontier till such time as they had been enabled to create one of their own. In the third place—the occupation of the French frontier by the Allies, to be restored at a given period to the King and his legitimate successors, would be some security for the continuance of his Government; whereas the dismantling the fortresses could not be productive, at least in anything like the same degree, of such an advantage.

If, therefore, the principle of security ought to be the rule of our conduct, the option between these alternatives is clear. We do not feel that we should discharge our duty, if we did not urge this opinion upon you with all possible earnestness, and desire you to urge it upon the Allies.

We are strongly impressed with the idea that the continuance of the King of France's authority and Government, after the evacuation of the country by the Allies, must be very problematical, and if his Government should then be over-

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Lord Liverpool to Lord Castlereagh.

Fife House, July 31, 1815.

My dear Castlereagh—I enclose two private letters received from Canning by Casamajor, and one from Lord Beresford, which his brother delivered to me two days ago, and desired me to open. The first were written before they could know of the battle of Waterloo; the latter after the knowledge of it.

I confess, I doubt very much, under present circumstances, the expediency of Lord Beresford's going to the Brazils; and I am inclined to the opinion that, small as is the expense to this country of the Portuguese army, we cannot recommend the continuance of it, after what has passed. To contribute to pay an army during peace, of which you are not to have the advantage during war, can hardly be justified on any public principle; especially when it is considered that the war was not a merely British war, but was a war in which all other countries, and Portugal amongst them, were as much interested as ourselves.

I feel, moreover, that the British officers at present employed in the Portuguese service might be very useful in the Hanoverian service; and, if the country is to be at any expense for the maintenance of foreign troops, we shall, under present circumstances, be more likely to profit by contributing to keep a Hanoverian than a Portuguese force.

I wish, however, you would talk the matter fully over with the Duke of Wellington and with Hamilton, who will reach Paris nearly as soon as this letter.

I understand from Casamajor that Canning will be well pleased not to receive his letters of recall. I shall write to him, however, by the next mail, and explain to him what my feelings are respecting our relations with the Portuguese Government at the present crisis.

Believe me, &c., LIVERPOOL.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Bathurst.

Paris, July 31, 1815.

Dear Lord Bathurst—I attach no importance to Foresti's language. Capodistrias expressly says he considers British protection as in itself a sufficient assurance of independence. I enclose, for your consideration and correction, a *projet* of Convention, prepared by Clancarty, after a conference with Capodistrias, upon an express instruction from me that we must insist upon having a complete sovereignty, and consequently a full legislative discretion as to the best mode for securing to the people of these islands their liberties, commerce, and religion.

I find Austria not disposed *to oppose* our retaining these islands, saying that the two States cannot have an adverse interest; but, nevertheless, unwilling to separate the decision from the general arrangement, and complaining a little of this change of plan, after the expectations given that these islands should fall to them.

I am glad you gave Mr. Rochefort so dry an answer. He is a most importunate suitor for a consulship, and I suspect that object to have been behind the tapestry when he undertook, at the expense of his fair cousin's reputation, to furnish you with information.

I think we ought to charge the Ionians with nothing, for naval protection.

Yours, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Alexander Hart, John Lewis Boissier, and Peter Boissier, to Lord Castlereagh.

Bath, August 1, 1815.

The Memorial of the undersigned British subjects, claimants upon the French Government, humbly showeth—

That your Memorialists are creditors of the French Govern-

ment, for property unjustly confiscated by the late authorities. That, by the acknowledgment of the Commissioners of their inability to explain the 4th additional article of the Treaty of Paris, and by their advice, they first intruded, and are now again compelled to intrude, on your lordship, and humbly to submit that theirs is not a "special case," but common to a great number of others, and for a very considerable sum, and particularly provided for in the 4th said additional article, where the word "liquidation" applies exclusively to your Memorialists, who have received part, been deprived of part, have had *Bons au Porteur*, not worth anything, imposed on them for part, and who have besides large demands for arrears and interest, and whose claims are thus alone the objects of settlement or "liquidation." That this is confirmed by the subsequent clause, which specifies "the total or partial loss of their debts or other property," where "total" applies to those who have not received any part, as partial does to your Memorialists. Further, that France engages to treat British subjects "with the same spirit of justice as the French have experienced in England," where they have received every thing due to them. And again—"that complete justice shall be done to its British subjects:" thus every part of the 4th additional article coinciding with each other in favour of your Memorialists. They further beg leave to represent to your lordship that they never did enter into any compromise or agreement on the subject; they were forced to submit to an arbitrary act they could not resist, retaining their rights and claims till a proper opportunity should offer of asserting them, and which have been clearly and fully established by your lordship in the said 4th additional article.

To you, therefore, my lord, your Memorialists look up for support, and humbly entreat that directions be given to the British Commissioners that their undoubted claims may be maintained and secured to them, and that they may not be the only part of his Majesty's subjects who do not fully par-

ticipate in the great benefits derived to the British Empire from the late glorious peace, concluded under your lordship's auspices with the kingdom of France.

ALEXANDER HART.
JOHN LEWIS BOISSIER.
PETER BOISSIER.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool.

Paris, August 3, 1815.

Dear Liverpool—Labedoyère was taken last night, in Paris, and a military Council is ordered to try him. Fouché, I understand, is horribly unpopular in England: I don't wonder at it, as far as the mass are concerned; but those who know how impossible it is to find men of character in France who can be employed ought to be very cautious about encouraging this clamour. I am always abusing him for not executing with more vigour his own decrees: and yet I doubt whether the King could do without this man. The Duc Dalberg, who knows France well, and is an entire creature of Talleyrand's, but with sense enough to judge for himself, told my brother, yesterday, he was convinced that, if Fouché was removed, Talleyrand could not go on; and that such he knew to be the general impression of his colleagues.

I mention this, because I have reason to believe that Blacas is working to create in England a different impression; and there is also a movement amongst the pure Royalists in France against the Government, to which, perhaps insensibly, the Duke and Duchess d'Angoulême give a countenance; but this is, I am confident, a most hazardous resource for the King to look to; and, whatever may be the repugnance felt to the individuals now in power, I hope the King will not be induced to risk a departure from the system upon which he has declared his determination to act.

Whilst I argue against playing tricks with Fouché, in the present state of France, I must give you a short correspon-

dence, which Talleyrand assured me had passed between him and Carnot, who was his colleague, and is now in his proscribed list No. 2. Carnot, (who, by the by, is but a foolish mathematician) being required by the decree to place himself under Fouché's *surveillance* till the Assemblies shall pronounce further upon his case, addressed to him this short epistle—"Traitre, où veux-tu que j'aille? (Signé) CARNOT." To which he received a reply as follows: "Où tu voudras imbécille. (Signé) FOUCHÉ."

The ordonnance for disbanding the army will appear in a day or two. The Duke of Wellington has assisted the Government very much in its details; and I hope the best will be made of bad materials. The Government has not yet heard from Marshal Macdonald.

I am, dear Liverpool, ever yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Bathurst to Lord Castlereagh.

Downing Street, August 3, 1815.

Dear Lord Castlereagh—I think it right to call your attention to the fortress of Briançon, which the Sardinian Minister, in a conversation on other subjects, stated to be of the utmost importance for the defence of Piedmont, commanding the pass of Mont Genevre, which was without defence. On the principle we seem likely to adopt, it would be fair to occupy that fortress until another was constructed within the limits of Piedmont, and the expense charged upon France, provided the pass be of the importance which the Sardinian Minister describes: of that you will be informed at Paris.

It is certainly our policy to secure a good position for Piedmont; otherwise she will throw herself in the arms of France rather than look for defence to Austria, of whom she is outrageously jealous.

Yours very sincerely, BATHURST.

Lord Liverpool to Lord Castlereagh.

Fife House, August 3, 1815.

My dear Castlereagh—Hamilton will go with the messenger from London who carries the despatches of this day. He will explain to you the strong sensation in this country on the subject of the spoliation of statues and pictures. The Prince Regent is desirous of getting some of them for a Museum or a gallery here. The men of taste and virtù encourage this idea. The reasonable part of the world are for general restoration to the original possessors; but they say, with truth, that we have a better title to them than the French, if legitimate war gives a title to such objects; and they blame the policy of leaving the trophies of the French victories at Paris, and making that capital in future the centre of the arts. Might there not be some compromise upon this question? The pictures which were taken from the Low Countries and Germany might surely be restored, at all events, at the proper season. You must write me an explanatory letter, stating the principles on which the Allies have acted on this question, and showing that your attention had been seriously directed to it.

Bonaparte is giving us great trouble at Plymouth. We have been obliged to order the ship to cruise, by telegraph, till the Northumberland can come round. We have had abundant proof that it would have been quite impracticable to have detained him here, without the most serious inconvenience.

With respect to the Commissaries, might not an agreement be made with the Allies, that they should have alternately a Commissary at St. Helena, who should remain a year. This would be a considerable saving of expense to the Allied Powers; it would fulfil their principle; and one man would be much less likely to intrigue and give trouble than three or four.

I have not forgot your application regarding Canning's Irish peerage. There are, however, some old expectations in Ireland, and the Prince rather presses for Cradock. I think

it may be as well to put off deciding anything upon it till your return. You may write to him to say that there are difficulties, but that you have desired me to take no step till you have seen me.

Our Colleagues begin to be impatient to get out of town, but I must detain them till we can see our way more clearly as to the frontier question. I have no thought of moving to Walmer till the middle or end of September. Remember me kindly to Lady Castlereagh.

Ever sincerely yours, LIVERPOOL.

Lord Liverpool to Lord Castlereagh.

Fife House, August 3, 1815.

My dear Castlereagh—I send you an official Memorandum, in consequence of the Russian paper transmitted in your despatch No. 21. Although our reasoning, in some respects, differs from that of the Russian Minister, I trust it will be found that there will be no practical difference in our conclusions. But I am convinced that we have not overstated the just pretensions arising out of our situation, and that it will be by not underrating them that we shall have the best chance of bringing the French Government to agree to the arrangement which is proposed, and which is as advantageous for the permanent authority of the King of France as for the general security of Europe.

Believe me to be, &c., LIVERPOOL.

[Enclosure.]

Observations on a Russian Paper mentioned by Lord Castlereagh in No. 21.

There is so much obscurity in some parts of the Russian Memorandum, and many of the points which are brought forward are stated with so little precision, that the Prince Regent's servants are not satisfied that they rightly understand the bearing of them.

Some of the reasoning in the early part of the paper appears to be liable to very serious objection. If the French nation had answered to the call which was made upon them by the declarations which were issued from Vienna in the months of March and May, and had materially contributed to the overthrow of the system of Buonaparte, the Allied Powers might fairly have been held to be bound by the Treaty of Paris, and could certainly not have claimed any permanent acquisition from France on the principle of conquest. But, when it is considered how great has been the sacrifice of blood and treasure with which the operations of the Allies have been attended; that the King of France has, in fact, been established in his capital by the Allied arms; that every fortress continued its resistance as long as any hope of relief could have existed; and that the occupation of the country by the Allied armies, north of the Loire, is really an occupation in consequence of conquest, there can be no doubt that, within just limits, the Allies are entitled to the fruits of conquest, and therefore to such permanent acquisitions as they might deem necessary for their own security.

Whether they will act up to this principle is a question of policy and prudence. But it is desirable that this should not be considered as a mere abstract distinction; for, though they may not be disposed to press the application of the principle of permanent acquisition, if the French Government are ready to agree to a satisfactory arrangement upon other principles, it is very material that it should be held out as that to which the Allies have a right to revert, in case the unreasonable expectations of the French Government should leave them no other alternative.

To come, however, to the practical result of the paper, the Prince Regent's Government have no difficulty in acquiescing in the Russian propositions, provided they are correctly understood in the following sense:

First. In the present convulsed state of France, no Govern-

ment whatever, not even that of Louis XVIII., can, in itself, afford to the Allies and to Europe that security which they are entitled to expect.

Secondly. This security, therefore, must in part be obtained by diminishing the means of aggression possessed by the French nation, either through permanent acquisitions of territory by the Allies, or by the temporary occupation of a military line within the country.

Thirdly. If the Allies are willing, under all the circumstances, to wave the demand of any permanent cession of territory, and consequently to acknowledge the integrity of the kingdom of France, as it existed before the Revolution, or as it was settled by the Treaty of Paris, it must be on the express condition that the French Government agrees to the occupation by the Allies of a part of the frontier of France, including some of the fortresses of the first and second order, until such time as a barrier can be created, for the protection of the neighbouring countries, and until the expense of it has been defrayed by the French Government.

Fourthly. It is not unreasonable that the French Government should expect that the contribution which they are to pay should be fixed in its amount, and that, provided it is duly paid, the time for the occupation of their frontier should be limited.

It might be stipulated, therefore, that the amount of the contribution should be ——,[1] and that the time for occupying the frontier, provided the contribution was paid, should not exceed seven or five years.

Fifthly. In order to secure, as far as possible, the continuance of the legitimate authority in France, it should be provided that the Allies were only bound to restore the parts of

[1] This sum should be sufficient to pay for the expense of the new frontier, and for the occupation of the French fortresses, in the mean time.

the frontier of France which they are admitted to occupy, to Louis XVIII. and his successors by rightful inheritance.

Sixthly. The French frontier should be occupied by the forces of the neighbouring Powers; but the French Government should have the advantage of the guarantee of those Powers which do not occupy the frontier, that the territory will be restored at the time limited, upon the conditions which have been stipulated being duly performed.

The Prince Regent's servants are inclined to believe, notwithstanding the ambiguity which pervades the Russian paper, that the summary of principles above laid down is conformable to the intentions of the Emperor of Russia, as meant to be set forth in that paper.

If they are not mistaken in this respect, an arrangement, founded upon a fair application of these principles, will, as far as regards the question of territory, be perfectly satisfactory to the Prince Regent's Government; but the value of the arrangement will essentially depend on the strength of the military positions which the Allies are to occupy.

As the arrangement, after being agreed to in principle, might be defeated in detail, by providing military positions inadequate for the three great objects for which they were intended, viz., security for the neighbouring countries against fresh aggression, indemnity for the expense of the new barrier, and the more effectual maintenance of the legitimate monarchy of France, it appears to be very desirable that there should be, as soon as practicable, an understanding with the Allies as to the mode in which it was intended to carry those principles into effect.

Lord Melville to Lord Castlereagh.

Admiralty, August 4, 1815.

My dear Castlereagh—As everything relating to Bonaparte at the present moment will be interesting to you, and to the French Government, I send you such details as I have

received from Lord Keith. Finding, from Sir Henry Bunbury's Report, on his arrival yesterday, as well as from Lord Keith's letter, that considerable inconvenience arose from the concourse of people in Plymouth Sound, joined to the refractory spirit of some of Bonaparte's followers, we sent an order by the telegraph, and also by express, for the immediate sailing of the Bellerophon, accompanied by the Tonnant, (Admiral Hallowell's ship) and another, to cruise off the Start, and not to return into port. The Northumberland (Admiral Cockburn's ship) sailed yesterday from Portsmouth, but, as the wind is contrary, she will scarcely reach the Start or Plymouth before to-morrow. She will, I hope, tranship her passengers without going into any port: the wind, however, is blowing fresh, and they may be forced to go into Torbay.

Lord Keith mentions in his letter to-day, that the visiters were less troublesome and encroaching, more especially as the men-of-war's boats had overset one party and drowned a gentleman. We sent an answer two days ago to Bonaparte's remonstrance, that we could make no alteration in the arrangements we had already ordered. We also announced that, as soon as he was gone, we would consider of the disposal of those of his followers who did not accompany him to St. Helena.

Believe me, &c., MELVILLE.

Lord Bathurst to Lord Castlereagh.

Downing Street, August 4, 1815.

Dear Lord Castlereagh—As it is possible you may have some questions asked you concerning the Kandian war, and as I believe you not only are not able to explain the cause of it, but perhaps did not know we had such a war on our hands, I think it better to state shortly that we were provoked into it by repeated acts of aggression on the part of the Kandian monarch, with whom, in fact, we have never been in relations of amity, (though not in a state of hostility) ever since

Major Davy's confinement, and the massacre of the men with him.

If you should wish for any particular statement of the late transactions which led to the war, I will send them to you; but General Brownrigg is rather lengthy in his despatches, as you may imagine when I tell you that his letter in the Gazette is only an extract, although I have published it as entire. In the mean time, I send you a copy of my despatch, which is not much to my credit as a prophet, but will convince the most incredulous that we were not disposed to the war.

Yours very sincerely, BATHURST.

I have received the *projet* respecting the Ionian Islands. France ought, I think, to be a party to it, or her accession, required at the signing of the peace: the latter will be the better way. It does not appear to me that any alterations, except verbal possibly, need be made: I have sent it for the King's Advocate's inspection, marked secret.

Lord Exmouth to General Bianchi.

Boyne, off Marseilles, August 6, 1815.

Sir—I have this moment received your Excellency's letter of the 31st ultimo, accompanied by one addressed to the Marquis de Rivière, which has been delivered to him. I beg to express my acknowledgments for the communication you have made to me of the intended movements of the army under your command. In compliance with your Excellency's wishes, as well as from a sense of duty, I shall detail to you the military, as well as political, situation of this province.

The spirit and temper of the people are excellent, and, since our arrival, they have afforded us the most unequivocal proofs of their attachment to the cause of Louis XVIII. Toulon, which was the only refractory garrison, has, some time since, sent in their submission to their legitimate sovereign, and have

become quite tranquil and reconciled since the departure of Murat and Marshal Brune, who, during the time they were there, took every means, and used all their influence, to inflame the minds of these men.

I must now call your Excellency's attention to the subject of the resources of Provence. The produce of corn is found to be absolutely unequal to the consumption of its inhabitants: from this circumstance, I consider it incapable of maintaining an army so extensive as that under your command, without exposing the population to the greatest distress, approaching absolute famine; on which account, and under the consideration of the perfect tranquillity of this part of the country, I beg to suggest to your Excellency the propriety of suspending for the present the moving the troops across the Var, at least until further instructions are received by reference to Paris.

I have had a long conference on this subject with the Marquis de Rivière and the Prefect, who are of opinion that the most serious consequences may be expected from imposing so heavy a burden, at this particular period, on a people so ill capable of bearing it. I have had a conversation with General Nugent on this subject, who has, from the same consideration, marched the troops under his command to the town of Aix, this port being already occupied by near 5,000 British.

It is my intention to forward a copy of this letter to Lord Castlereagh and the Duke of Wellington by the same express the Marquis de Rivière sends to Paris; and, if it is consistent with your orders, I should certainly press upon you the weighty reasons there exist for your forbearing to move forward, until a return from Paris arrives, as an act of justice due to the good principles these loyal people have manifested for their Sovereign.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

EXMOUTH.

[Enclosure.]

General Bianchi to Lord Exmouth.

Torino, July 31, 1815.

After I had received different orders concerning the road upon which the troops under my orders have to enter in the south of France, it has been finally fixed that all those troops, composed of about 33,000 men, will take the road of Coni and Nice, in order to pass there over the Var.

The troops commanded by the General Nugent must already have passed that river and entered France. I doubt not that this General will have conferred with your lordship concerning his further movements, in order to operate in the most strict union with your Excellency.

The two first detachments of the troops under my orders, consisting together of 5,000 men, infantry, will enter Provence the 7th or 9th of August, with the General Eckhard. The remainder will follow in seven detachments of 3,000, 4,000, and 5,000 men, and begin to pass over the Var the 12th or 13th of August. The difficulties of procuring quarters and supplies of provisions in that mountainous road, and the representations which are made to me by the Piedmontese Government, have not permitted me to march in greater detachments.

Whilst I have the honour to inform your Excellency of those circumstances, I pray you to have the goodness to communicate to me by the way of Nice (which, according to our intelligence, is yet the only way of our communication) all the particulars of the Conventions which exist perhaps in those countries with Marseilles, Toulon, &c., and of all the political and military circumstances.

I hope to be in Nice the 1st day of August, and I pray your Excellency to remit the enclosed letter to the Marquis de Rivière.

BIANCHI, Lieutenant-General.

Memorial of the Foreign Artists at Rome, addressed to Lord Castlereagh.

Rome, ce [blank], 1815.

Les soussignés osent présenter à Son Excellence Mylord Castlereagh l'expression respectueuse du vœu qu'ils forment avec la presque généralité du monde artistique, "que les monumens de l'art enlevés par les Français de Rome soient restitués à leur destination antérieure et consacrée par une possession de plusieurs siècles." Ils supplient en même tems son Excellence: "d'appuyer de sa généreuse intercession auprès de son Souverain et auprès des autres hautes puissances alliées, les observations suivantes qui semblent justifier ce vœu énoncé, par les considérations du bien général qui en résultera pour les arts chez toutes les nations policées."

Rome a été considéré depuis une longue série d'années comme le centre des arts et comme leur meilleure école. Les Français eux-mêmes, après avoir ramassé de tout côté ce que les arts offrent de plus précieux, et après l'avoir entassé dans leur capitale n'ont pu cependant se dispenser d'envoyer leurs élèves pensionnaires du gouvernement à Rome, persuadés que ce n'est que là qu'ils pouvoient atteindre à la perfection. Plusieurs artistes Français ont partagé l'amertume que la transplantation de ces objets, quasi indigènes à Rome sur un sol étranger, a causée au reste de l'Europe. Ils ont élevé publiquement leur voix contre une barbarie, usitée, il est vrai, sous les anciens Romains, mais qu'alors déjà Cicéron foudroyoit de son éloquence. Ajoutons encore que les artistes les plus fameux actuellement en France datent leur perfection d'un tems antérieur à cette rapine, et que la plupart d'entre eux a étudié à Rome.

Cette cité éternelle par un concours de circonstances unique dans l'histoire du monde, est devenue la capitale des arts pour tous les peuples. La nature et les arts s'y prêtent les mains pour leur perfectionnement mutuel. Tout ce qui entoure ses

habitans coopère à élever l'imagination et le cœur, à former le goût de l'amateur, à renforcer le génie créateur de l'artiste. Ce dernier, libre des entraves qui compriment son essor ailleurs et surtout en France, par l'esprit de système et de mode, et l'égarent par l'appât d'un succès du moment vers une manière fausse et mesquine, saisit ici la nature avec originalité, et n'aspire qu'à ce qui dans les arts est le seul vrai et le seul immuable.

C'est à Rome qu'un saint recueillement, et une simplicité de vie vraiment patriarchale, en sauvant l'artiste des distractions, du tumulte de Paris, lui assurent une jouissance pûre et tranquille des arts. Aussi n'existe-t-il ici que pour eux. Tout autre intérêt s'évanouit, si ce n'est celui de l'émulation avec les grands modèles qu'il a journellement et à chaque pas sous ses yeux, et avec cette foule d'artistes de toutes les nations qui s'élancent avec lui dans la même carrière.

Mais ce n'est pas l'artiste seul qui profitera de cette restitution des monumens antiques au siège central des arts. L'amateur y gagnera également. Ce qu'il étoit forcé naguères de considérer sous des rapports et sous des entours peu favorables, il le verra rétabli sur son sol classique et primitif, dans un cadre propre à en relever les beautés, et avec ce repos d'esprit nécessaire pour jouir des arts et des antiquités— but qui ordinairement conduit seul les voyageurs à Rome.

Les soussignés originaires de différens pays dans lesquels la plupart d'entr'eux retourneront sous peu, font preuve par leurs sentimens ci-dessus très humblement énoncés, et de leur universalité, et de leur désintéressement personnel. Ils se flattent d'autant plus que son Excellence Mylord Castlereagh les accueillira gracieusement lui-même, et les fera accueillir par son auguste Souverain, et par le reste du Congrès des hautes puissances alliées. Le noble but de cette auguste réunion est d'assurer le bien général de tous les peuples civilisés, et en ajoutant le bienfait respectueusement demandé à tant d'autres que l'Europe lui doit, elle ajoutera un nouveau titre à la

reconnaissance universelle. Les Français eux-mêmes ne pourront méconnoître l'utilité de cette mesure à moins qu'ils ne soient aveuglés par l'intérêt particulier d'une étroite vanité nationale.

Les soussignés supplient son Excellence d'agréer les hommages de leur profond respect,

Les Artistes Etrangers à Rome.

ALBERT THORVALDSEN, Sculpteur Danois.
PIERRE BIANCHI, Architecte Ingénieur Suisse.
FERDINAND BERGER, Graveur de Berlin.
FREDERIQUE GAERTNER, Architecte Bavarois.
CHARLES VOGEL, Peintre Saxon.
W. F. GMELIN, Graveur de Carlsruhe.
J. P. CORNELIUS, Peintre de Dusseldorf.
J. C. REINHART, Peintre Allemand.
KASS, Architecte Belge.
DE POTTER, Belge.
J. M. ROHDEN, de Hesse Cassel, Peintre.
JOSE L. ALVAREZ, Sculpteur Espagnol.
FEDOR MATVEOFF, Peintre Russe.
T. SCHALLER, Sculpteur d'Autriche.
J. RIEPENHAUSEN, Peintre d'Hannovre.
F. RIEPENHAUSEN, Peintre d'Hannovre.
J. F. OVERBECK, Peintre Allemand.
RUDOLPH SCHADOW, Sculpteur Prussien.
GUILLAUME SCHADOW, Peintre Prussien.
L. J. LIMAN, Architecte Prussien.
F. VEIT, Peintre Prussien.
J. N. BYSTRÖM, Sculpteur Suedois.
GUST. ERIC HASSELGREN, Peintre Suédois.
C. FROMMEL, Peintre de Carlsruhe.
E. PLATNER, Peintre de Saxe.
C. METZ, Peintre de Bonn.
F. MÜLLER, Peintre de la Bavière.
VERSTAPPEN, Peintre Belge.

PILTOO, Peintre Hollandais.
TEERLINCK, Peintre Hollandais.
FRANÇOIS CATEL, Peintre de Berlin.
CHRISTOPH WILHELM ECKENSBERG, Peintre Danois.
ANTOIN SOLÁ, Sculpteur Espagnol.
FERDINAND RUSCHEWEGK, Graveur de Meclenbourg.
C. SIEG, Peintre de Magdebourg.
C. R. COCKERELL, Architecte Anglois.
HENRY KELLER, Sculpteur Suisse.
C. GAU, Architecte de Cologne.
JACQUES IRVINE, Peintre Anglais.

Mr. M. Brackenbury to Lord Castlereagh.

London, August 8, 1815.

My Lord—I have the honour, on the part of the numerous claimants, under the decree of his Most Christian Majesty, dated July 30, 1814, to request your lordship's interference on their behalf. I am not aware that I can occupy less of your lordship's time than by enclosing a copy of the memorial originally presented by the parties interested in Liverpool and Manchester, (there were others to the same effect from London and Bordeaux) and by referring your lordship to two letters, which I addressed on the 18th and 21st ult. to Sir Charles Stuart and Lord Stewart, under the presumption that one of their Excellencies was at that time the British ambassador at the Court of France.

These letters briefly detail the nature of our claims, and I venture to believe that your lordship will be pleased to issue such instructions to our ambassador at Paris as will enable him to renew his negociations, and to obtain from the French Government a valid security for the fulfilment of their engagement in this particular case, unconnected as it is with any arrangements which it may be necessary to enter into in consequence of events that have occurred since the 20th of March,

ment whatever, not even that of Louis XVIII., can, in itself, afford to the Allies and to Europe that security which they are entitled to expect.

Secondly. This security, therefore, must in part be obtained by diminishing the means of aggression possessed by the French nation, either through permanent acquisitions of territory by the Allies, or by the temporary occupation of a military line within the country.

Thirdly. If the Allies are willing, under all the circumstances, to wave the demand of any permanent cession of territory, and consequently to acknowledge the integrity of the kingdom of France, as it existed before the Revolution, or as it was settled by the Treaty of Paris, it must be on the express condition that the French Government agrees to the occupation by the Allies of a part of the frontier of France, including some of the fortresses of the first and second order, until such time as a barrier can be created, for the protection of the neighbouring countries, and until the expense of it has been defrayed by the French Government.

Fourthly. It is not unreasonable that the French Government should expect that the contribution which they are to pay should be fixed in its amount, and that, provided it is duly paid, the time for the occupation of their frontier should be limited.

It might be stipulated, therefore, that the amount of the contribution should be ——,[1] and that the time for occupying the frontier, provided the contribution was paid, should not exceed seven or five years.

Fifthly. In order to secure, as far as possible, the continuance of the legitimate authority in France, it should be provided that the Allies were only bound to restore the parts of

[1] This sum should be sufficient to pay for the expense of the new frontier, and for the occupation of the French fortresses, in the mean time.

the frontier of France which they are admitted to occupy, to Louis XVIII. and his successors by rightful inheritance.

Sixthly. The French frontier should be occupied by the forces of the neighbouring Powers; but the French Government should have the advantage of the guarantee of those Powers which do not occupy the frontier, that the territory will be restored at the time limited, upon the conditions which have been stipulated being duly performed.

The Prince Regent's servants are inclined to believe, notwithstanding the ambiguity which pervades the Russian paper, that the summary of principles above laid down is conformable to the intentions of the Emperor of Russia, as meant to be set forth in that paper.

If they are not mistaken in this respect, an arrangement, founded upon a fair application of these principles, will, as far as regards the question of territory, be perfectly satisfactory to the Prince Regent's Government; but the value of the arrangement will essentially depend on the strength of the military positions which the Allies are to occupy.

As the arrangement, after being agreed to in principle, might be defeated in detail, by providing military positions inadequate for the three great objects for which they were intended, viz., security for the neighbouring countries against fresh aggression, indemnity for the expense of the new barrier, and the more effectual maintenance of the legitimate monarchy of France, it appears to be very desirable that there should be, as soon as practicable, an understanding with the Allies as to the mode in which it was intended to carry those principles into effect.

Lord Melville to Lord Castlereagh.

Admiralty, August 4, 1815.

My dear Castlereagh—As everything relating to Bonaparte at the present moment will be interesting to you, and to the French Government, I send you such details as I have

Rapport du Duc d'Otrante au Roi, sur la situation de la France.

9 Août, 1815.

Sire—Les ravages de la France sont à leur comble: on ruine, on dévaste, on détruit, comme s'il n'y avait pour nous ni paix ni composition à espérer. Les habitans prennent la fuite devant les soldats indisciplinés. Les forêts se remplissent de malheureux qui vont y chercher un asile. Les moissons vont périr dans les champs: bientôt le désespoir n'entendra plus la voix de l'autorité; et cette guerre, entreprise pour le triomphe de la modération et de la justice égalera la barbarie de ces invasions, dont l'histoire ne rappelle le souvenir qu'avec horreur.

Les Puissances Alliées ont proclamé trop hautement leur doctrine pour qu'on puisse douter de leur magnanimité. Quel avantage peut-on retirer de tant de maux inutiles? N'y aurait-il plus de liens entre les peuples? Veut-on retarder la réconciliation de l'Europe avec la France? L'une des vues des Souverains semblait être d'affermir le Gouvernement de votre Majesté, et son autorité est sans cesse compromise par l'état d'impuissance où on l'a réduite. Son pouvoir même est rendu odieux par les maux dont elle semble être complice, parcequ'elle ne peut parvenir à les empêcher. Votre Majesté a signé, comme Alliée, le Traité du 26 Mars, et on lui fait la guerre la plus directe.

Les Souverains connaissent l'état de lumière en France. Aucun raisonnement, aucune espèce de faute, aucun genre de convenance n'échappe à la pénétration de ce peuple. Quoique humilié par la nécessité, il s'y résigne avec courage. Les maux seuls qu'il ne peut soutenir sont ceux qu'il ne peut comprendre. V. M. n'a-t-elle pas fait pour l'intérêt des puissances tout ce qui dépendait, de ses efforts? Buonaparte a été non seulement dépossédé, mais il est dans les mains des Alliés; sa famille est également en leur pouvoir, puisqu'elle est sur leurs territoires. Les chambres ont été dissoutes; bien-

tôt il n'y aura dans les fonctions publiques que des hommes *dévoués*, *les amis de la paix*. On craint les Buonapartistes, quoiqu'aucun ne puisse être dangereux. V. M. a cependant à ce sujet accordé tout ce qui pourrait être réclamé pour l'exemple.

Si après avoir vaincu la France, on prétendrait vouloir la punir, ce langage, auquel on n'aurait pas du s'attendre, d'après les promesses des Alliés, exigerait qu'on voulut bien en peser toutes les conséquences. De quoi voudrait-on nous punir? Est-ce à nous d'expier les torts d'un seul homme et les maux qu'ils ont produits? Nous étions les premières victimes: nous en avons deux fois délivré l'Europe. Ce n'est pas le pays étranger, c'est en France que la terreur a constamment troublé son repos, malgré sa puissance.

L'armée est soumise à V. M., mais elle existe encore. Nous devons nous expliquer à ce sujet avec franchise. Ce qui reste existant de cette armée ne se rattache plus qu'à la pacification et à la tranquillité publique. Son état de réunion bien loin d'être un mal, empêche le mal de s'étendre.

La rentrée des soldats dans le sein du peuple n'est d'aucun danger, quand la fin de la guerre laissera au peuple les moyens de reprendre ses occupations et ses habitudes; mais avant ce moment, quand la fermentation n'est pas encore éteinte, ni l'obéissance établie, ce mélange des soldats avec les citoyens ne ferait que jetter de nouvelle matière inflammable dans un incendie.

Jamais Buonaparte n'est parvenu à rendre la guerre nationale. Des instrumens ne sont point des complices; et qui ne sait pas que celui qui exerce la tyrannie trouve toujours des complices dans la multitude pour se faire obéir? On nous reproche jusqu'à ses succès: ils sont compensés par assez de revers. Quelle image nous apportait l'annonce de ses victoires, si ce n'est celle des conscriptions que le feu de combats alloit de nouveau moissonner! Nous nous sauvions, comme toute l'Europe, pour le même deuil et les mêmes malheurs.

Il est bien affligeant de penser que cet état des choses n'a sa

source que dans l'erreur de quelques cabinets, dans le jugement qu'ils portent de la situation de la France. Il dépend d'eux que tous leurs desseins s'accomplissent: il n'est point de sacrifices auxquels un peuple éclairé ne soit prêt à se soumettre, s'il voit le but pour lequel on l'exige, et si il y trouve du moins un moyen de prévenir les plus grands des maux.

Telle est la disposition, tel est le vœu de la France. Veut-on au contraire exiger des mesures préparatoires pour des plans inconnus? C'est demander une chose impossible.

Il n'y a pas d'obéissance aveugle en France: les Puissances n'ont encore fait connaître aucun de leurs desseins; personne ne sait quelle idée, il doit se faire ni de l'autorité de Votre Majesté ni de l'avenir. L'anxiété et la défiance sont à leur comble, et tout paraît un sujet de terreur au milieu de cette obscurité; mais d'un seul mot toutes les dispositions seraient changées; il n'y aurait d'obstacle à aucune mesure, si elle fesait partie d'un plan général qui offrirait dans son ensemble quelques consolations à l'obéissance. Que les Souverains Alliés daignent nous expliquer leurs raisons. Pourquoi voudraient ils se refuser à cet acte de justice? Qu'ils daignent réunir toutes leurs demandes comme autant de conditions du repos des peuples; et que notre accession à toutes leur vues fussent partie d'un traité réciproque: il n'y aura alors plus de difficultés.

Les Souverains ne remarquent peut-être pas assez dans quel cercle d'embarras nous sommes placés et où ils se placent eux-mêmes. Nous avons besoin du bon ordre pour les seconder, et de leurs explications peut résulter le bon ordre. Veulent ils des sacrifices? qu'ils exigent des répartitions et une prompte obéissance: il faut pour cela que l'autorité de Votre Majesté soit pleine et entière. Rien n'est possible, rien n'est exécutable, si la paix n'existe point de fait, du moins provisoirement; et, bien loin d'être en paix, nous éprouvons tous les fléaux de la guerre. Que les Souverains prêtent du moins quelqu' attention à leurs intérêts. Quand tout sera ruiné autour de leurs armées,

comment y trouveront elles leur subsistance? N'y a-t-il aucun danger à disséminer les troupes? Toutes les armes ne sont pas enlevées: *dans les mains du désespoir toute arme devient meurtrière.* Quel nouveau sacrifice aura-t-on à demander là ou le soldat aura tout pillé, tout détruit? Sous le rapport de la force des armées, la discipline une fois altérée, on aura bien de la peine à la rétablir.

L'Allemagne est loin de s'attendre qu'après une campagne glorieuse on lui raménera ses soldats corrompus par un esprit de licence, de rapine, et de pillage. Tout aurait dû distinguer cette guerre des autres, au lieu d'imiter et de surpasser les excès contre lesquels les Souverains s'étaient armés. Leur gloire sera-t-elle satisfaite? Nous avons fait ce qu'ils ont désiré, et, de leur côté, tout ce qu'ils avaient annoncé au monde se trouve accompli, hors un seul point. Quel contraste entre ce qui se passe et leurs promesses les plus solennelles!

Ce siècle est celui de la raison et de la justice, et jamais l'opinion publique n'a eu plus de puissance. Qui pourrait expliquer des maux aussi excessifs après des promesses de modération! La guerre actuelle a été entreprise pour servir la cause de la légitimité. Cette manière de faire la guerre est-elle propre à rendre l'autorité de Votre Majesté plus sacrée? On a voulu détruire et punir celui qui se faisait un jeu du malheur des peuples, et l'on exerce sur la France la même violence ou la même inhumanité.

Toute l'Europe a pensé que l'entrée des Alliés à Paris terminerait la guerre. Que pense-t-on en apprenant que c'est alors que les excès de l'oppression ont commencé, sans combats et sans résistance. Ces maux qu'on nous reproche d'avoir fait aux autres n'ont jamais été aussi grands, jamais, du moins, ils n'ont eu lieu quand l'emploi des armes n'avait aucun but; et fût-il vrai que nous eussions donné l'exemple de tels abus de la force, devrait-on l'imiter quand on nous en fait un crime?

On sait dans le Nord, on sait en Prusse, ce que notre défaut de modération a produit d'énergie et d'esprit public dans nos

ennemis; il n'y aurait donc plus de larmes aux maux de l'humanité si les vengeances alternatives devenaient un droit de la guerre, car les peuples ne meurent jamais.

Votre Majesté daigne-t-elle me permettre d'insister sur une dernière considération? Tant que la France aura quelque chose à conserver et qu'elle sera soutenue par l'espoir de se maintenir en corps de nation, aucun sacrifice ne lui sera impossible, et tous les plans d'une équitable politique pourront s'exécuter; mais, le jour où les habitans auront tout perdu, où leur ruine sera consommée, on verra commencer un nouvel ordre de choses, une nouvelle série d'évènemens, parcequ'il n'y aura plus ni gouvernement, ni obéissance; une fureur aveugle succèdera à la résignation; on ne prendra conseil que du désespoir; des deux côtés on pillera, on ravagera; le pillage fera la guerre au pillage; chaque pas des soldats étrangers sera ensanglanté. La France aura moins de honte de se détruire elle-même que se laisser détruire par les autres: le moment approche; déjà l'esprit national prend cette affreuse direction; une fusion se forme entre les partis les plus opposés. La Vendée elle-même rapproche ses drapeaux de ceux de l'armée.

Dans cet excès de maux, quel parti resterait-il à Votre Majesté. Celui de s'éloigner. Les fonctionnaires publics quitteront d'eux-mêmes leur places, et les armées des souverains seront alors aux prises avec des individus délivrés de tous les liens sociaux. Un peuple de 30,000,000 d'âmes peut, sans doute, disparaître de la terre; mais dans cette guerre d'homme à homme, plus d'un tombeau renfermera, près les uns des autres, les opprimés et les vainqueurs.

Lord Bathurst to the Hon. Charles Bagot.

Foreign Office, August 10, 1815.

Sir—I have the satisfaction to acquaint you that his Royal Highness the Prince Regent has been graciously pleased to appoint you to be his Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States of America;

and I have herewith the honour to transmit to you his Royal Highness's letter of credence to the President of the United States. On your arrival at the seat of Government in the United States, you will present his Royal Highness's letter, in the usual form, to the President, accompanied with suitable expressions, in his Royal Highness's name, of his satisfaction at the happy restoration of peace between the two countries.

I likewise transmit to you a copy of the Prince Regent's letter, and also the Sign Manual instructions which his Royal Highness has been pleased to direct should be furnished for your information and guidance during your residence in the United States.

Mr. Baker, his Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in the United States, has been directed to deliver to you all the official correspondence in his possession, together with such other information he may be possessed of, as may be useful to his Majesty's interest in America.

I am, &c., BATHURST.

Lord Castlereagh to the Right Hon. N. Vansittart.

Paris, August 10, 1815.

My dear Vansittart—Although I have not replied to your letter, calling my attention to consider whether any and what retrenchments could be made in our subsidiary arrangements, I have not failed to keep your suggestions in mind. I delayed my answer till I could state the nature of the arrangement I had made with Russia, concerning the second Russian army, whose further advance I had early prevailed upon the Emperor to stop; and I delayed this arrangement, not wishing to entangle our first discussions on political matters with pecuniary details, the basis of the retrenchment being secured by the orders sent to the troops. I propose, however, without delay, to enter upon this question; and I hope to settle it upon the principle of giving a proportion of the intended subsidy, for the period the army was in march from the Russian frontier to

the point where it received the orders to halt and to retrograde, allowing an equal time and sum for its return within the Russian territories.

With respect to the Danish troops, orders have been sent them not to advance; but this will be rather a relief to France than to our finances, as the Convention with Denmark, as well as that with all the minor Powers, has been framed in the same terms as the great Subsidiary Treaty of Vienna, which makes us liable within the year to the payment of the monthly instalments till the conclusion of a general peace, and for a fixed period afterwards, to cover the return of the troops. We cannot, therefore, save anything by this branch of expense; nor is it just that we should, as these troops, so subsidized, go in discharge of our own contingent of 150,000 men, which we cannot look to reduce, whilst our three great Allies have armies on foot, and in France, considerably exceeding their respective quotas.

With respect to the Spanish arrangement, no expense will be incurred. The instructions sent to Sir H. W[ellesley] confined the payments to 20,000 men. The subsidy was to take effect only from the period the troops should pass the frontiers; and, as the power rested with the British Government at any time to order them home, and thereby to stop the subsidy, it is enough to say that their advance has been stopped, to protect you from any extraordinary charge under this head.

Upon the whole, I trust you will find the public expenses fall, this year, much lighter than you expected. Your naval expenditure will admit, no doubt, of great reduction; and as to the armies in France, I hope you will find their extraordinaries comparatively trifling. You will see, by the Protocols sent home, the system we propose to act upon. It goes to charge France—

First: with the supply of the Allied armies in provisions and forage.

Secondly: with the equipment of the troops in necessaries

and such articles of military clothing as the exigency may require, and the Colonel should not be called on to provide.

Thirdly: with the principal repartition of the revenues of the Departments occupied by our troops, to defray the pay and other issues to the troops; and

Fourthly: with an ultimate contribution, the amount of which is not yet fixed, to be divided into five shares, each of the four great Powers being entitled to one-fifth, and the remaining one-fifth to go to the minor Powers, whose troops have actually entered France.

My object, and not the least difficult I shall have to urge, will be, before this division is made, that one-half, or some liberal proportion of the whole sum, shall be appropriated exclusively to fortifications.

This system of making war is so new in our military annals, that there is some risk of its making even Bankes ambitious of continental glory. As I have no doubt, notwithstanding the auspicious change, that you have not more money than you know what to do with, you may rely upon my saving as much for you as I possibly can, consistent with the military attitude which the Confederacy must still assume, in order to secure and consolidate the peace they have so successfully conquered.

C.

The Committee for prosecuting the Claims of British Creditors in the French Funds to Lord Castlereagh.

No. 6, Berners Street, London, August 11, 1815.

My Lord—The Committee appointed to prosecute the claims of British creditors in the French Funds beg leave again to express to your lordship their sincere thanks for your constant and kind exertions in their favour. Fully aware of the weighty concerns that must otherwise occupy your lordship's attention, and gratefully confident in your zeal for our interests, we should not now presume to address your lordship, if we were

not urged by the anxiety and solicitations of the creditors at large, who, from having so lately experienced the prejudicial effects of delay, (a system hitherto so successfully practised against them) are much afraid, without your lordship's assistance, that they shall still be subject to chances and events.

We therefore beg most earnestly to request your Lordship will take those measures which in your judgment may seem most meet, in order that, without any farther delay, those comprehensive words of the late treaty may be fulfilled—"that the British subject may receive in France the same justice which the French subject has received in England."

We have the honour to be, with the utmost respect, &c.,

CORNS. BULLER.
JOHN CARSTAIRS.
C. POLE.
J. H. STRACEY.

Lord Liverpool to Lord Castlereagh.

Fife House, August 11, 1805.

My dear Castlereagh—I am obliged to call your serious attention to the state of our foreign expenditure. I am sure you will do us the justice to acknowledge that no Treasury has ever made such considerable financial exertions as the present, or has ever manifested so fixed a determination to overcome all minor difficulties, when the public service has required great and unexampled sacrifices.

We must not, however, conceal from ourselves that the country cannot go on for any length of time at its present scale of expense. The accumulations of our Sinking Fund, on which we relied so confidently, are nearly all exhausted by the efforts of the present year. We shall have considerable difficulty in reconciling the country to the continuance of any part of the Property Tax in time of peace; and yet, without the Property Tax, it would now be impossible to keep up the necessary peace establishment. If the present war should

continue, or a new one should arise in the course of a few years, I am at a loss to know where we are to find taxes to defray the interest of our loans.

On the other hand — if external and internal peace could be acquired by France, her financial situation is prosperous beyond that of any country which perhaps ever existed; the revenue is about six hundred millions of livres; the interest of her debt not more than eighty millions; her peace expenditure, at the utmost, four hundred and twenty millions sterling: so that, with a debt the interest of which is little more than three millions sterling, the French Government would have in time of peace a surplus revenue of more than four millions sterling.

I have gone into these particulars, not from any desire of proposing to economise our exertions, where exertions are really of importance, but in order to induce a reduction of expense, where every one must see, on reflection, that we have no chance of receiving money's worth for our money.

Since the battle of Waterloo, more than twenty thousand British troops have been sent to the Continent, and, in my judgment, wisely sent, because we cannot render the British army too strong and formidable, in the present critical state of our relations towards France. But I cannot see any adequate reason for our entering into new subsidiary engagements, particularly with respect to those Powers whose armies have not yet taken the field, and from which, in any case perhaps, no considerable advantage could be expected.

You will recollect that, previous to the battle of Waterloo, I most *reluctantly* acquiesced in the Spanish subsidy, but I never expected that any part of it would have been granted after the Allies were known to be in possession of Paris. Indeed, I doubt very much whether the entrance of a Spanish army into the southern provinces of France can have any other effect than that of serious prejudice to the royal cause, which is certainly popular in that part of the country.

The same observation applies, in some degree, to the Danish subsidy, and indeed I know that the Danish Government had no expectation that a subsidiary engagement would have been concluded with them, after the battle of Waterloo.

I must beg you therefore seriously to revise these different engagements. If the troops have marched, we must certainly make them the allowance of the subsidy for a certain time; but I think that those corps which we really do not want, should be informed that we have no further need of their services, and that some arrangement should be made, by which the subsidies should be discontinued as early as is consistent with justice. I trust likewise that measures have been long since taken for preventing the advance of the Russian army of reserve.

We must expect to meet in Parliament with considerable difficulties on the subject of subsidiary treaties already concluded and acknowledged to Parliament. It will be said, with some reason, that those subsidies were granted on the principle that the Powers to whom they were given could not have taken the field without them; but, now that they are not only subsisting but proposing to levy contributions in France, the amount of those contributions ought, in part, at least, to be set off against the subsidies, and I confess I think it would be very difficult to find a good answer to this statement. I call your attention, however, to it, in order that, when we come to the period of settling the amount of force which is to remain in France, or on the frontier, Great Britain may not unnecessarily be burdened with an expense which we are little able to bear, and which, I am satisfied, if it is to continue for some years, Parliament will be very unwilling to sanction.

In your despatch No. 27, when you speak of the fortifications to be erected in the Low Countries, you refer to the four millions for this purpose, two millions of which you suppose to be already provided by Parliament. No provision for that sum has yet been made, and I really think that both the

Government of the Netherlands, and that of this country, have a right to expect that the whole of this sum shall be defrayed by France, unless France is disposed to cede fortresses which may render the expense itself unnecessary; for we must not go upon the principle that, whatever our success may be, we are to remain just in the same situation as if we had never gone to war. Having been involved in the war by the act of France, and having expended so large a treasure and the best blood of the country in the prosecution of it, we have a right to expect a fair indemnity for our losses; and if the French Government are unwilling to pay that indemnity by sacrifice of territory, we must require it of them in such means as may render the territories of our Allies secure against future aggression.

Believe me to be, &c., LIVERPOOL.

Lord Liverpool to Lord Castlereagh.

Fife House, August 11, 1815.

My dear Castlereagh—We have received your despatch No. 27, of the 3rd instant, with the enclosed memorandum from the Duke of Wellington, on the subject of the military proposition to be made by the Allies to the French Government. With respect to the two *projets* contained in this memorandum for the occupation of the French frontier, we are disposed on every account to place entire confidence in whatever may be the ultimate military judgment of the Duke of Wellington upon them. However desirous we may be of seeing the Government of Louis XVIII. popular in France, we do not feel that we should be justified in endeavouring to accomplish the object by the sacrifice of everything which is judged important for the general security of Europe. We doubt very much whether forbearance on the part of the Allies would really have the effect, under the present circumstances, of rendering the King popular, and we are decidedly of opinion that we may thereby deprive ourselves of the means of giving that

support to him on which for some time ... authority must essentially depend. We wish, therefore, that this question may be considered on military principles, and decided according to the best view that can be taken of what is likely to contribute most to the general security.

Whilst we are ready to leave it to your discretion not to insist on the occupation of Lille, if it shall be the opinion of the Duke of Wellington that the object of the Allies can be better or as well accomplished without it, we are nevertheless of opinion that Lille should, in the first instance, be demanded from the French Government, and that we ought only to give up our claim to it, upon the French Government consenting to an arrangement which shall be considered in other respects as entirely satisfactory.

As we have not yet seen the Austrian or Prussian projets, we do not know the extent of the views of those Governments, but we are informed that they propose to a certain degree the principle of permanent cessions by France, at least as far as regards the external line of fortresses. We ought not to forget that these Governments have more of common interest with us in the whole of this question than the Government of Russia; and, though we must all have deeply at heart the consolidation of the legitimate Government in France, we should consider that our success in this object must necessarily be very uncertain, and that the security of the neighbouring countries against France may be much more easily attained than the rendering France orderly and pacific.

Believe me to be, &c., LIVERPOOL.

The Right Hon. N. Vansittart to Lord Castlereagh.

Downing Street, August 17, 1815.

Dear Castlereagh—I am glad you are able to give an account, upon the whole, so satisfactory of our pecuniary relations with the Continent, and I shall hope to learn, before

long, that you have been able to realise the arrangements suggested in your letter of the 10th.

The principle proposed for a settlement with Russia, respecting the march of the second army, is certainly a fair one. As four months were allowed by the treaty for the return of the troops to Russia, supposing them to be collected in France, a time for their return from their present stations might be allowed upon the same principle, in proportion to the distance. It is important to shorten their stay in Germany as much as possible, not only with a view to curtail this expense, but in order to relieve the country in which they are stationed from so great a burden. I understand, for instance, that Madame Barclay de Tolli passed through Frankfort with a suite of one hundred and sixty attendants, and expected to be magnificently entertained, wherever she went, at the expense of the country.

The same reason will apply to the return of the Danish troops within their own frontier as soon as possible, even if we were to continue chargeable with the subsidy. But, though I should be disposed to show as much favour to Denmark as was consistent with fairness and discretion, I cannot see any claim she has to subsidy beyond the time her forces were employed, and a moderate allowance for their return. The remainder of the subsidy (if due at all, which, I am sure, is very questionable) must be rather made applicable in some other manner to the common cause. I apprehend that we are at perfect liberty, with the consent of the great Powers, to put an end to the expense of any of the minor Powers, by dispensing with their assistance. I have not the means of knowing, with any accuracy, how far the force we employ falls short of our quota of 150,000 men; but I think you will find that our subsidies to the secondary Powers, exclusively of Denmark, will go much beyond the stipulated compensation for any deficiency.

With respect to the Spanish Treaty, I cannot but regret it as a great oversight, but one for which the Government here

is in a great degree answerable, for not having distinctly revoked Sir H. Wellesley's instructions immediately after the battle of Waterloo. I hope much expense will not be incurred by this treaty, in consequence of the directions you have given; but it seems clear that Sir H. Wellesley has drawn some bills, and I fear they will affect the exchange beyond their amount.

The total of our military expenses is certainly much reduced by the arrangements taken in France. Herries calculates upon a reduction of the extraordinaries of the Duke's army from £330,000 per month, to £170,000. If you can succeed in appropriating a large proportion of the French contributions exclusively to fortifications, it will effect most important objects of future economy as well as security.

I will not, after the satisfactory sentiments you express, say anything further on the general subject of frugality, but there is one point on which I cannot forbear touching, as it relates to a subject with which you are so particularly acquainted: I mean the union of the British and Irish finances. You feel how much our difficulties will be increased by it, or rather, perhaps, how many difficulties before existing and increasing, but concealed, will be brought into view: and you will be sensible of the embarrassment, perhaps danger, of beginning the new arrangement with a year of great expense. It is not the least of my burdens at present to have to frame this new system without your immediate assistance; but, as soon as it can be brought into any shape, I shall send it to you, for at least general consideration.

Believe me, &c.,

N. VANSITTART.

Since I have been writing, Herries has called in, and I am sorry to learn from him that, notwithstanding the estimated savings, the actual issues on account of the Duke's army, in the last month, have exceeded £400,000.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Bathurst.

Paris, August 17, 1815.

Dear Lord Bathurst—I have delayed saying anything on Barbary politics, upon which I have some doubts but no strong opinion. I am afraid, as soon as we embark in the task of protecting the weaker Powers, that every other Power, even the American, will rely upon us for destroying, or keeping in port, the Barbary corsairs, and that the whole charge of the police of the Mediterranean will fall upon us.

The only thing I particularly wish is, that nothing should be done or said upon the subject, till the point of the Ionian Islands is finally settled. The great motive the Ionians have to become *our subjects* is that of our flag being now the *only one* respected. If the idea transpires that we are disposed to protect Allies or dependent States, you will have them all for the old Republic, with a British garrison. This is the more material, as Capodistrias, notwithstanding his explanation to Lord Clancarty appeared quite satisfactory, has been throwing out this as a basis of settlement. I repeated to him the original declaration I made to the Emperor at Vienna, that this was an arrangement to which we must object, in whatever hands the sovereignty might be placed. I have given him the *projet*, but I have not yet received an answer.

Lord Melville adverts to your having probably informed me of the determination taken with respect to Savary, L'Allemand, &c. As this may bear upon the line to be observed by other Powers, towards persons who, being proscribed by the French Government, have sought shelter in their States, I should be glad to know what has been the decision, and on what principles founded.

I am, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Bathurst.

Paris, August 17, 1815.

Dear Lord Bathurst—I should be glad to know how we stand at this moment with the Government of Louis XVIII. as to the execution of the Treaty of Paris, and what yet remains *en dépôt* in our hands. The occupation of Martinique stands upon distinct grounds, and, in point of honour, ought not to be withheld on any ground which might bring into doubt the good faith of our conduct.

But before we fulfil all the remaining stipulations of the treaty, we are fairly entitled, after the attempts made to defeat the claims of the creditors, to exact some improved security for the fulfilment of that particular article of the peace.

I am, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool.

Paris, August 17, 1815.

My dear Lord—I mentioned, in my despatch No. 31, that I had sounded the Allied Ministers here upon the principle of permanently restraining France within the frontier of 1790, assigning the *enclaves* to the country in which they respectively stand insulated; and this with a view to acquire for Germany the important fortress of Landau, and to recover for the Kings of the Netherlands and Sardinia the cessions made by the Treaty of Paris of certain portions of Belgium and Savoy. I have since had reason to assure myself of the Emperor of Russia's support in favour of this demand, as well as that of the other two Powers. The Emperor thought this suggestion the more reasonable, as it rested upon a principle, and did not open an arbitrary selection of points, in which the local pretensions of the Allies might either stand in competition, or the general demand be swelled by their collective demands.

As I originally adverted to the probability of the Emperor

putting himself forward as the protector of Louis XVIII., I think it due him to observe that he has not shown himself disinclined, after fair discussion, to the adoption of such measures of salutary precaution as have been proposed to him; and I still think that, by the course I adopted towards his Imperial Majesty, as reported in a former letter, I not only deprived him of that character of being the *exclusive* protector of the King—a relation in which, for the general politics of Europe, it is of great importance he should not be permitted to place himself—but that I have gradually brought him publicly to adopt all the principles of the Allied Powers as his own, and to push them as far as it is at all clear they can be pushed without a dangerous reaction.

I quite concur with the remark contained in your last letter, that the true interests of Great Britain are much more identified with those of Austria and Prussia, in the existing crisis, than with those of Russia; but I must, at the same time, observe that both these Courts require to be narrowly watched at the present moment, with respect to the mode in which they pursue their particular views, in order that we may not be involved in a course of policy in which Great Britain has no principle of common interest with them but the reverse.

The first point is, that I much suspect neither Austria nor Prussia, and certainly none of the smaller Powers, have any sincere desire to bring the present state of things to a speedy termination: so long as they can feed, clothe, and pay their armies at the expense of France, and put English subsidies into their pockets besides, which nothing can deprive them of, previous to the 1st of April, 1816, but the actual conclusion of a treaty with France, you cannot suppose they will be *in a great hurry* to come to a final settlement, since the war may be said to have closed. The Austrians, it is true, have halted a reserve corps of 15,000 men in Lower Austria; but they have brought the whole of Bianchi's army into Provence, to feed upon that poor but loyal country. The Prussians have

not only brought an entire new *corps d'armée* of 40,000 men forward, much to the annoyance of the King of the Netherlands, on whom they have been feeding by the way, but they have now reinforcements to an equal amount in full march, to fill up all their other corps, making their numbers in France, according to their own returns, 200,000 men, for which they now draw rations. The Bavarians, also, not to lose time in drawing as much resource from the country as possible, have brought up reinforcements from Munich to the Loire, in waggons, at a moment when their service in the field was out of the question; the transport of these troops being, of course, at the expense of the country. The Prussian Minister of Finance, Bülow, yesterday told me that he did not calculate the Allied force now in France lower than 900,000 men, and their expense, including forage and waste, at less than three livres per man per day, which is about £112,000 a-day, or £36,000,000 a-year, exclusively of pay and clothing, the latter being provided by distinct requisitions, the former by the revenue of the departments occupied.

To judge of the effect of the invasion, in a financial point of view, upon France, to this must be added the final contribution to be demanded, which, from all I hear and observe, is not likely to fall short of 600,000,000; and if to this you add the charge of 100,000 men who are to occupy for a number of years the intended position in France, you will probably be of opinion that the pressure is likely to be as heavy, in a pecuniary shape, as the country can be expected quietly to submit to.

I have adverted to the ultimate contribution, for the purpose of observing that there is another point of view, in which our views will not be found altogether in unison with those of the two Powers in question, namely, in appropriating a considerable portion of the contribution to fortifications. You reason the justice of throwing upon France the expense of providing those defences which her position and conduct render indispen-

sable to the security of the neighbouring States. Austria and Prussia state the justice as strongly and preferably in favour of being indemnified for the expenses of the war and for former contributions levied upon them by France. It is quite clear that France cannot meet all these demands; that the charge upon her must be limited in amount; and that it will be a question amongst the Allies, in appropriating this fund, which pretension is to give way.

From what fell from Prince Hardenberg, some time since, I apprehend much opposition to my proposal in that quarter; and I have found Prince Metternich more impracticable upon this point than on any I have ever discussed with him. I hope, however, I have made some impression upon him; but you must not suppose that this is a question between us and France: it is, in truth, a question much more between us and our Allies, in which, as I foresaw before I left England, we should have to contend, upon grounds of remote precaution, against the immediate pressure of avarice and poverty.

Much to my surprise, in my discussion with Prince Metternich on this subject, I received not only a concurrence, but a considerable degree of support, from the Russian Minister; and he has since told me that the Emperor will agree to my proposition of appropriating one-third of the whole contribution to fortifications; which, considering the remote interest Russia has in this arrangement, is a very liberal proceeding on his Imperial Majesty's part. In the management of his troops, the Emperor has been as little open to reproach. He put his second army in motion without any bargain with us, before he had received even the smallest assurances of any assistance; and he stopped their march, and ordered them back to Russia, upon my representation to him that their advance was deemed no longer necessary. His Imperial Majesty now urges what, in order to economize our subsidies, we must most desire—a prompt settlement with France—being anxious to send home all his troops, with the exception of such contingent as he may

be required to leave in France, as early in next month as the state of our negociations will permit.

There is another point of view in which we must be on our guard with these Courts. Their politics, at this moment, receive an extraordinary impulse from the public sentiment of Germany, from the temper of the smaller Powers, and from the desire they each feel not to yield to the other the influence in Germany which belongs to what is most popular. No doubt, the prevailing sentiment throughout Germany is in favour of territorially reducing France. After all the people have suffered, and with the ordinary inducements of some fresh acquisitions, it is not wonderful that it should be so; but it is one thing to wish the thing done, and another to maintain it when done; and, in calculating the chances of the latter, we ought to be aware that none of these Powers can, for any time, keep up war establishments, or, having once laid them down, find the means of speedily resuming them; and that, if the course adopted materially increases the chances of early war with France, these acquisitions may be of short duration, whilst our chances of an interval of peace will be diminished, and we may be obliged, in order to keep France within any bounds, to take the weight of the war, in a pecuniary sense, upon ourselves.

The more I wish the alternative, the more I am impressed with the wisdom of what the Duke of Wellington states upon this subject, in his letter to me, when he says that he deems the possession of a certain number of French fortresses, for an extended period of time, in itself preferable to the actual cession of the same places, and for this obvious reason, that the one is compatible with French connexion, the other leads to unite all Frenchmen against us, or rather against the Power that shall be found in possession of their spoils; and, as the King of the Netherlands would probably be the first to be attacked, we have more reason to weigh well the course to be pursued.

When I state that the temporary occupation is not incom-

patible with preserving a useful influence in France, I do it from knowing that the King and his Ministers do not wish to see France without foreign troops—that they admit the Allies cannot leave their troops in France, without the security of a certain number of their fortresses. My belief and hope, then, is, if the arrangement is made with some attention to the feelings and interests of the country, that the King, his Government, and the loyal party in France, will ally themselves with you; and that, thus sustained, the King will be able gradually to establish his authority, which, if accomplished, is valuable beyond all other securities we can acquire. If he fails, we shall not have to reproach ourselves with having precipitated his fall, and we shall have full time to take our precautions. If, on the contrary, we push things now to an extremity, we leave the King no resource in the eyes of his own people but to disavow us; and, once committed against us in sentiment, he will be obliged soon either to lead the nation into war himself, or possibly be set aside to make way for some more bold and enterprising competitor. The whole of this view of the question turns upon a conviction that the King's cause in France is far from hopeless, if well conducted, and that the European alliance can be made powerfully instrumental to his support, if our securities are framed in such a manner as not to be ultimately hostile to France, after she shall have given *protracted proofs* of having ceased to be a revolutionary State.

I don't know what impressions the Austrian and Prussian papers may have made in England in opposition to this reasoning; but, if you should deem it necessary to demand securities against which all Frenchmen must protest, which I do not consider to be by any means the case, with respect to those recommended by the Duke of Wellington, my advice then will be to you and to the Allies to have no reserve towards France. You cannot—you must not. In that case, calculate upon the submission of France but for the shortest interval;

and the only objection I should then to have to urge against General Knesebeck's plan is that it does not go far enough. It leaves France nearly entire, both in population and resources, whilst it deprives her precisely of those objects which will revive in every Frenchman, whatever may be his principles, a desire of war at the first favourable moment.

I have troubled you with this long letter, because I think we must make up our minds whether we are to play a game with any portion of France, or against France collectively. If we mean the former, the duty of the negociator will be to get as much direct security as he finds compatible with that object. If, on the contrary, we are to sacrifice the former object, in order to gratify what, I have no doubt, is the prevailing temper in England, as well as in Germany, the Cabinet ought to instruct the Duke of Wellington not to look to secure a fortified place the more or the less, which seldom tells for much in the contest of nations, but to confer with the other Powers how we can best reduce the power of France, and most effectually disqualify her from again making the attempt to assail Europe. I have no doubt the middle line would be the most popular, and that, in extorting the permanent cession of one or two fortresses of great name, our labours would carry with them an *éclat* which is not likely to attend them, according to the course we recommend. But it is not our business to collect trophies, but to try if we can bring back the world to peaceful habits. I do not believe this to be compatible with any attempt now materially and permanently to affect the territorial character of France, as settled by the Peace of Paris; neither do I think it a clear case (if we can, by imposing a strait waistcoat upon that Power for a number of years, restore her to ordinary habits, and weighing the extraordinary growth of other States in latter times, and especially of Russia) that France, even with her existing dimensions, may not be found a useful rather than a dangerous member of the European

system; but these are the problems you are to weigh. You have now all the materials before you; you know the Duke of Wellington's sentiments and my own; and, if you wish us to alter the view we have taken of the question, or have to make any change in the instructions given me on leaving England, there is no time to be lost.

As far as we have gone, I apprehend the securities proposed exceed in amount (Bonaparte being in our hands) what was then required, in the event of his being at large; but this is no objection, if the thing is right in itself.

I have, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool.

Paris, August 17, 1815.

Dear Liverpool—I took the opportunity, since I last wrote, of a representation received from the King of the Netherlands, enclosing a list of the works of art carried away by the French from Holland and the Low Countries, to bring this subject under the consideration of the Allied Ministers. We were all of opinion that something must be done; and it was agreed to consider what principle of restitution it was best to adopt.

Upon those taken from Holland, there seemed no doubt. The disposition to do a good deal, but not to sweep away all that was conquered, as distinguished from what was *ceded by treaty* or *bought*, affords a line: but yet Buonaparte's treaties, as, for instance, that of Tolentino, were not inferior in immorality to his wars. There seems also a question whether the spoils of countries, the cession of which to France had been recognized by all Europe, as, for example, the Low Countries at the Peace of Amiens, did not stand on somewhat a better title. No decision was come to, and the subject was taken *ad referendum*.

I am, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Liverpool to Lord Castlereagh.

Fife House, August 18, 1815.

My dear Castlereagh—I believe I have hardly adverted in any of my former letters to the relations between France, on the one hand, and Savoy and Switzerland, on the other. It is thought very important that the errors which were committed in the Treaty of Paris should, if possible, be rectified by restoring to the King of Sardinia, on the side of Savoy, what was then taken from him. It may likewise be of material consequence that some rectification should take place as to the frontier of France and Switzerland.

Such an arrangement, it is conceived, might be made without any material sacrifice on the part of the French Government; and, as Switzerland is so much the weaker Power, and can never, in point of fact, be expected to act offensively against France, no collateral inconvenience could arise to the latter from a very reasonable concession, which it might be called upon to make in that quarter.

I would suggest likewise whether the principle of temporary occupation of fortresses, which is applied to the rest of the frontier of France, should not be applied to that part of the territory of France opposite to Savoy; and whether it should not be stipulated that Grenoble should be occupied for the same time as the other fortresses. As far as I recollect, Grenoble surrendered by capitulation to the Allies, not having previously hoisted the white flag.

Believe me, &c., LIVERPOOL.

Lord Liverpool to Lord Castlereagh.

Fife House, August 18, 1815.

My dear Castlereagh—I have directed the ratifications to be prepared of the conventions respecting Buonaparte; but it is material that I should call your attention to the expense which

will be incurred by confining him in St. Helena. I do not believe that this expense will be less than a hundred thousand pounds a year.

As he is the common prisoner of the Allies, it appears by no means just that the whole expense should fall on this country. In the sum to which I have referred, I of course include the additional naval and military expense which Buonaparte's confinement in St. Helena will render necessary; some proportion of which, as well as of his maintenance and support, and that of those of the persons who attend him in the island, should be defrayed in just proportions between France and the other Allies. This object, in itself, may be thought to be one not of much importance; but it really is so; in *appearance*, particularly; as we cannot keep the subject out of Parliament, some awkward questions may arise respecting it; and as it may be of consequence to show that Buonaparte is not only a common prisoner *nominally*, but that all the great Powers feel a common interest in his fate, and are ready to submit to some sacrifice, however small, for the security of his person.

Believe me, &c., LIVERPOOL.

Lord Sidmouth to Lord Castlereagh.

Whitehall, August 21, 1815.

Dear Lord Castlereagh—Allow me to trouble you with a letter and an enclosure which I received a few days ago from my friend Lord de Dunstanville. Lord Bathurst advised me to transmit them to you, as you would be the best judge whether the letter addressed to the Emperor of Russia ought to be delivered to his Imperial Majesty, and, if it appeared to you that it might, you would be the proper channel through which it should reach his hands.

I will only add that my best wishes constantly attend you, and that I am, dear Lord Castlereagh, ever sincerely yours,

SIDMOUTH.

[Enclosure.]

Lord de Dunstanville to Lord Sidmouth.

Tehidy Park, August 2, 1813.

My dear Lord—I know not how far the request contained in the enclosed may be thought reasonable, or, if so, whether it would be proper to address his Imperial Majesty himself on the subject. The facts are shortly these. The mother of the writer was the widow of Captain Trevenen, who distinguished himself much in the Russian service, and was killed in action with the Swedish fleet, I think at Sweaborg. The widow afterwards married Mr. Bowdler, who used to be called Dr. Bowdler; but, as they did not agree, she lives separate from him in this neighbourhood. She has no allowance from her present husband. The object of the enclosed letter is to obtain the restoration of the pension which has been suspended on account of the mother and daughter not residing in Russia. If you think that the enclosed can be with propriety presented through Lord Castlereagh, or through any other channel, I shall be much obliged by its being sent.

I congratulate you on the surrender of Buonaparte: of course, I know nothing of his future destination; but, without asking improper questions, I wish it may be St. Helena, as it seems to me the safest place to which he could be sent. France, I fear, must long continue in a very unsettled state.

We have showery weather—the harvest is just beginning—the crops are, on the whole, great—the wheat, indeed, rather thin, but very clean.

All here unite in best wishes to the Misses Addingtons and yourself.

I am, with great truth and esteem, my dear Lord, your most sincere friend and most obliged servant,

DE DUNSTANVILLE.

Lord Liverpool to Lord Castlereagh.

Fife House, August 23, 1815.

My dear Castlereagh—I have laid before the Prince Regent and the Cabinet your very able letter, marked Private and Confidential, of the 17th instant. Under all the difficulties which unavoidably attend our present relations with the French Government, we are prepared to concur in the alternative stated in your letter, to which both the Duke of Wellington and yourself give so decided a preference, and, instead of urging the permanent cession of any part of the French territory by the French Government, we shall be satisfied with an arrangement which secures to the Allies, for a time sufficiently extended, the military occupation of certain of the French fortresses, according to the *projets* in the Duke of Wellington's paper, and which provides at the same time for the rectification of the French frontier, by restoring France to the situation in which she stood in the year 1790, and giving the fortresses *enclaves* in the neighbouring territories to the States to which those territories belong.

We cannot conceal from ourselves and from you that an arrangement on this principle (which I believe to be entirely novel in its character) may be subject to many serious inconveniences; and we should be most desirous that there should be added to it, therefore, a stipulation for the dismantling Lille and Strasburg. Such a stipulation need not, in our judgment, mortify the pride of the French nation. It would in no way affect the permanent interest of France, whilst it would add considerably to the temporary security of the Allies; and we are of opinion that this object is the more deserving of attention, as the other part of the arrangement might, in a great measure, fail, in the event of differences unfortunately arising amongst the Allies, from any change in the policy of their respective Courts, by which any one of the considerable Powers might separate itself from the alliance

during the period specified for the occupation of the fortresses, and might thereby throw the whole arrangement into confusion, or defeat the purpose of it altogether. In short, the principle of temporary occupation must necessarily be so complicated in its nature, that we feel all the importance of annexing to it something which may afford security to the neighbouring States, independent of the contingencies above stated, till such time as measures can be adopted for placing their own frontiers in a respectable state of defence.

You will understand me as not bringing this proposition for dismantling Lille and Strasburg forward as a *sine quâ non*, but as wishing it to be urged with all the weight which we feel is due to it; and, considering how very short our propositions fall of the Austrian and Prussian *projets*, I cannot but entertain a confident hope that, when the French Government are aware, as they must be, of the extent of sacrifice which would have been demanded from them, if it had not been for the moderation of Great Britain and Russia, they will not feel it possible to make any serious resistance to a concession of this nature.

We are fully sensible of the great importance of bringing our negociations with France to a speedy issue. We understand that the Emperor of Austria has announced his intention of quitting Paris about the 20th of September, and that the Emperor of Russia will leave it about the same time. It is very material that the arrangements with France should be concluded before their departure; as it is impossible to say what difficulties may not occur after the separation of the Sovereigns. The public in France may consider it as an epoch, and may be disposed, as well as some members of their Government, to create embarrassments, and to take the chance of misunderstandings, on which they will not venture to calculate so long as so many of the Sovereigns of Europe and their immediate representatives are united at Paris.

There are a great many points of detail relative to the tem-

porary occupation of fortresses, to which it will be necessary particularly to direct your attention.

First. How is the combined army which is to be left in France in the first instance to be paid? It must be clearly understood that the troops which are not British or French, or directly in British pay, must, in no case, look to be paid by us. If the British Government were once to make an advance for this purpose, it is obvious that the whole expense would very soon fall upon them.

Secondly. In order to obviate inconveniences which may arise from any delay in the payment of the Allied troops, it should be provided that the French Government should assign a certain sum quarterly or half-yearly for this purpose; and, if the sum should not be supplied within the time to be specified, the officers commanding the corps of the Allied troops should, in that case, and not otherwise, be empowered, with the permission of the Commander-in-Chief, to raise the sum due to them upon a district of country to be agreed upon, in the neighbourhood of the fortresses which they may be called upon to garrison.

I have stated these ideas upon the definitive arrangement as they have occurred to me at present. I may have other suggestions to make of the same nature; but I cannot too strongly impress upon you and the Duke of Wellington the importance of providing beforehand distinctly for the different contingencies which may arise, in order that there may be hereafter as few matters of dispute and contention as possible in the execution of so new a system.

Believe me to be, &c., LIVERPOOL.

Note of Count Nesselrode.

[Indorsed, "In Lord Castlereagh's No. 40, to Lord Liverpool, August 24, 1815."]

Après avoir pris en mûre considération les idées développées dans les différents mémoires qui ont été remis sur l'état des

négociations actuelles avec la France, S. M. l'Empereur de Russie est d'avis que le projet suivant sera le plus propre à concilier ce qu'exige la sûreté future de l'Europe, avec les ménagements que les Puissances doivent au Gouvernement du Roi, dont le rétablissement et la solidité sont à considérer comme les premières garanties d'un état de paix et de tranquillité.

1. Occupation des places désignées par le Duc de Wellington pour cinq années.

2. Cession de Landau, comme enclave de l'Allemagne.

3. Cession à la Suisse, ou démolition de Huningue.

4. Restitution au Roi de Sardaigne de la partie de la Savoye réunie à la France par la paix de Paris, contre la cession de sa part, pour la rectification des frontières de Genève.

5. Restitution des districts détachés des Pays Bas par la paix de Paris.

6. Contribution équivalente à une année de revenu de la France, savoir, six cent millions de francs.

7. Comprendre dans cette contribution les cinquante millions exigés actuellement, et le montant des objets d'équippement qui ont été fournis.

8. Employer le tiers de cette contribution à la construction de quelques points fortifiés en Belgique et dans le midi de l'Allemagne.

9. La contribution sera payable dans trois ans.

Lord Bathurst to Lord Castlereagh.

Downing Street, August 25, 1815.

Dear Lord Castlereagh—I have this moment received your letters of the 17th instant; they ought to have come by the last mail. In answer to your question respecting Savary and L'Allemand, we excepted them from the persons whom Bonaparte was told he might take with him to St. Helena, as soon as we found that their names were included in the list of

proscription. We did so under the impression that we might, if we thought proper, surrender them to the French Government. This I explained to the French Ambassador, to whom, however, I at the same time said that circumstances might make it expedient for us not to surrender them. He answered that he was sure his Government would not make the demand if it was embarrassing to us.

On Savary and L'Allemand finding themselves excepted, they naturally coupled it with the insertion of their names in the list, and became furious. They wrote the strongest letters of remonstrance and reproach, asserting that they had come on board with a direct promise of protection, and so worked upon Captain Maitland as to induce him to write a letter to Lord Melville, which gave too much countenance to the declaration, although it did not distinctly confirm it. Under these circumstances, we thought their cases had become so doubtful, that it appeared better to send them out of the way; and have therefore sent them to Malta, to be confined there as prisoners of war not on parole; but, at the conclusion of this war, their release must, I am afraid, be ordered. As our laws are strict as to questions of this nature, and the disposition of the people alive on the subject, we are obliged to act with a delicacy which does not appear to be necessary in other countries.

Nothing shall be done with respect to the Barbary States until the Ionian question is settled; but the clamour among the smaller States is great, and our conduct not very advantageously contrasted with that of France and even of America.

Yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

You see that my information respecting Capodistrias was not unfounded. As to M. Foresti, junior, I have discovered him to be a complete rogue.

Lord Bathurst to Lord Castlereagh.

Downing Street, August 25, 1815.

Dear Lord Castlereagh—Although I am persuaded that the principle on which we are proceeding in the negociation for peace is that which sound policy dictates, provided there be what you encourage us to believe, a reasonable ground for looking to the final establishment of Louis XVIII.'s authority, yet it must be confessed that there are very strong arguments urged in the several notes and memorials (the copies of which you have transmitted to us as having been delivered in by the Austrian and Prussian Ministers) in favour of a more rigorous policy towards France.

Nothing, however, appears to me more captious and unfounded than the objections which Prussia makes to the proposition that a certain part of the contribution to be imposed on France should be allotted to the construction of a barrier for the Netherlands, rendered necessary by France being permitted to retain her present formidable frontier.

The Allies have an unquestionable right to be indemnified by France. But for what?—for the expense they have incurred by the violation of the Treaty of Paris. But the Prussian Memoirs, in order to magnify their claims, take into calculation all that they suffered in the wars previous to that Treaty; which Treaty must be understood as having settled the account up to that period. The claims of the Allies must begin with the violation of the last Treaty; and which of all the Allies has incurred as heavy expense (I might say one-quarter of the expense) as Great Britain has done during this short war? In addition to our own expenditure, which has been enormous, we have subsidized all the Allies. It would, therefore, be stating our claims very low, if we were to require that one-half of the whole indemnification to be demanded of France were to be allotted to us. Under what pretence is it, then, that Prussia can withhold her consent to our obtaining,

not one-half, or even one-quarter, of the proposed contribution, because we are disposed to employ our share in measures for the defence of the Netherlands, instead of putting it into our pockets? Had we demanded five millions as our share of the contribution, could they have denied our right to it? And do we forfeit our right, because we are willing to devote that share for the security of Europe, instead of confining it to our immediate advantage?

As Lord Liverpool will have told you that we are determined not to give way in this particular, you will understand my being anxious, in common with my colleagues, to think of every argument by which the claim may be supported. It is not the amount of the sum, though that is very far from being immaterial, but the complexion which the conditions of the peace will take, if the expense of the fortifications shall ultimately fall upon us, which makes this question of great importance.

At any rate, you cannot expect our peace to be popular, although I am persuaded its policy will be hereafter approved, if it shall succeed in what we, I think, wisely propose as its main object—the re-establishment of the legitimate monarchy in France. But we must despair of reconciling the public to the peace, if the event be that we are to pay for the expense of making a barrier, when we might have obtained one at the expense of France herself. The public could never be made to understand why we should be severely taxed, in order to preserve the integrity of France.

The policy of preserving that integrity, when the two great Continental Powers most deeply interested in the independence of Europe are so anxious to break in upon it, will, with many persons, be questionable; but you will find no one who will justify it, if we impose a severe charge upon the public in consequence. Had there been no disposition in the principal States in Europe to reduce permanently the power of France, it would not have been difficult to justify our not pressing such

a measure: but that we should combat a proposition for the reduction of her power, in opposition to those who have a common interest with us to guard against it, is what will require some address to render palatable. It will, therefore, never end well, if we do not lay upon France the charge to which our forbearance towards her would otherwise expose either us or our most immediate Ally. It is very true that, previous to the return of Bonaparte, Holland had agreed to take upon herself part of this charge. It was very evident, however, that she began to find excuses for not undertaking it; and we cannot now press upon her a charge which our own policy will have rendered necessary. There is, therefore, but one alternative—either France or we must bear the expense; and you will not be surprised at the determination which we have taken between the two parties.

Yours very sincerely, BATHURST.

Lord Bathurst to Lord Castlereagh.

Downing Street, August 28, 1815.

Dear Lord Castlereagh—I did not answer your question respecting the state in which we stood as to the execution of the Treaty of Paris, on Friday, as I had only on that day received your letter, and had not seen Lord Buckinghamshire.

In India, the Treaty has not been executed, and the instructions are not to execute it until further orders. The Isle de Bourbon has been given up. On the coast of Africa the Treaty has not been executed; and it has not been executed in Newfoundland: the orders are not to execute it until further orders.

We have retaken the Saintes and Mariegalante. Guadeloupe will probably be attacked and taken. We are in possession of Martinique; but I entirely agree with you in thinking that no consideration should induce us to retain it whenever it is required of us by Louis XVIII.

I have given directions that all vessels (detained from the commencement of hostilities) which shall have sailed from any port of France, in which, at the time the vessel sailed, the white flag was flying, shall be released. The same indulgence to be shown to all vessels sailing *to* as well as from Martinique; and, in consideration of the exemplary loyalty displayed by the city of Marseilles, which at no time, except under symptoms of manifest constraint, abandoned the royal cause, all vessels sailing *to*, as well as *from* thence, will be likewise released. I am inclined to extend this to Bordeaux; but it appears very doubtful whether the merchants, who will be chiefly benefited by it, were as zealous in their loyalty as the common people.

I am yours sincerely,

BATHURST.

The Governor of Mauritius has considered the establishment at Madagascar as a dependency of Mauritius, and intends to refuse giving it up. It is in no way at present valuable or even important, except in enabling the French to carry on the Slave Trade.

Lord Bathurst to Lord Castlereagh.

Downing Street, August 28, 1815.

Dear Lord Castlereagh—I have always omitted to beg you to represent to those Governments who intend to send Commissioners to St. Helena, that the place is very deficient both in lodging and supply of food, and that, in consequence, it is one at all times very dear, and likely to become much more by the circumstance of General Bonaparte's residing there. It will therefore be very important that the Commissioners sent over by the several Powers should have adequate salaries. From all I hear, I do not believe that the salary for each should be less than two thousand pounds per annum.

I am yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

Memorandum.[1]

In considering the course of policy which it may be expedient for the Allies to adopt under the present circumstances, there are obviously three alternatives which present themselves to our view.

1. Louis XVIII. may be restored, Buonaparte being dead, or a prisoner in the hands of the Allies.

2. Louis XVIII. may be restored, Buonaparte being still alive, and having escaped to America, or elsewhere.

3. The difficulties in the way of the restoration of Louis XVIII. may have rendered that event, however desirable, impracticable; and it may become, therefore, necessary to treat with some other Government, as representing the French nation.

Upon the first alternative, it will be necessary to consider whether the previous declarations and engagements of the Allies compel them to consider the integrity of France, as settled by the Treaty of Paris, as a question concluded by what has already passed, or whether it will admit of any modifications which it may be judged expedient to adopt, after the experience of the last twelve months, for the general security and permanent tranquillity of Europe.

Upon this point it does not appear possible to give any precise or positive instructions, until we are more particularly informed of the sentiments of the Allies, in consequence of recent events.

In the second alternative, it is to be hoped that there would be no difference of opinion. We must all be sensible that, if Buonaparte is alive and at large, we can have no security that he will not again make his appearance in France in the course of a few months, and we may, therefore, be again involved in a war as critical and burdensome as the present, without many advantages which have attended the renewal of the contest at this time.

[1] This Paper, without date, ought by right to have had an earlier place, probably about the end of June, or the beginning of July.

We shall have a clear right, therefore, under such circumstances, to require some additional securities. And, although Louis XVIII. should be restored to the throne of France, we should be entitled to provide for the future security of Europe, by insisting upon taking from France some of her frontier fortresses, including Lille; and the only modification which should be admitted of this principle is, that it might perhaps be provided that, instead of being actually ceded in sovereignty by France to the Allies, they should be retained by the Allies during the life of Buonaparte, or for a given number of years, and then revert again to France.

With respect to the third alternative, it would leave the discretion of the Allies entirely unfettered; and, if they cannot have the security for peace arising out of the character of the Government with which it is concluded, they would be fully justified in attempting to obtain it by a reduction of the power and territory of the enemy. As this alternative, however, is not likely, under present circumstances, to occur, it does not appear to be necessary to say more upon it. The principle, as above laid down, cannot possibly be disputed. The expediency of acting upon it to a certain degree will hardly be denied, but the extent to which we may carry it must depend upon contingencies, of which, at this time, we cannot have the means of forming any judgment.

It appears to be quite indispensable that, in the event of the restoration of Louis XVIII., a severe example should be made of those commanding officers of garrisons or corps who deserted the King and went over to Buonaparte. Such a proceeding is not only become necessary, with a view to the continuance of the power of the House of Bourbon, but likewise for the security of the object for which the Allies have been contending —a safe and lasting peace.

The true principle, taken in its full rigour, would be to consider all the officers commanding garrisons or corps as subject to the penalties of high treason who had gone over to Buona-

parte, previous to the King leaving the French territory; but it might be as well to modify the principle by confining it to those who took that step before the King was known to have quitted Paris.

Considering the elements for conspiracies and rebellion which must exist in France for some years, there can be no chance of stopping them but by an exemplary punishment, on the present occasion, of those who were forward to join the standard of Buonaparte. With respect to the conspirators who were not military, it might be proper likewise to make an example of those who are most dangerous, subjecting the most criminal to the pains of high treason, and those who were less so to that of banishment.

Whilst measures of just severity are adopted with regard to the authors or abettors of the late revolution, it is of the utmost importance that the King should take the most public measures for allaying the fears of the purchasers of national property.

The apprehensions of this class of the King's subjects were productive last year of the very worst effects, and it will be in vain for the King to think that he can consolidate his authority, unless by the security of property as it now exists, without reference to the title by which it was acquired.

Lord Liverpool to Lord Castlereagh.

Fife House, August 28, 1815.

My dear Castlereagh—Your brother, Lord Stewart, arrived in London yesterday morning, and came down to me soon after to Combe Wood. I had the opportunity there of a long conversation with him on all the points contained in your despatches, and we have had a Cabinet this morning, at which he has attended, in order that such of our colleagues as were in town might be correctly apprized of your sentiments and those of

the Duke of Wellington upon the present state of our negociations.

I was inclined at first to hope that my letter of the 23rd instant, which must have reached you after your brother left Paris, would have relieved you from all difficulties, inasmuch as it distinctly gives up all idea of permanent cessions from France, except as far as such cessions had been suggested by yourself: and, although we recommend the proposal being made for dismantling Lille and Strasburg, it is distinctly stated that this demand should not be brought forward as a *sine quâ non;* nor was it our intention that it should be urged in such a manner as might materially retard the conclusion of an arrangement between the different Powers.

The explanations, however, which we have since had with Lord Stewart have convinced us that considerable embarrassment might arise from a proposition of this nature being even brought forward under the present circumstances, and in the existing state of the negociation—that it is far better, in the situation in which we now stand, to advance no demand to which we are not determined to adhere—and that it is most expedient, therefore, to confine our proposition to the principle of *temporary occupation*, and to that of the rectification of the frontier, according to the suggestion contained in your despatch, and approved by the Emperor of Russia in the memorandum delivered by Count Nesselrode.

We have been the more inclined to concur in this opinion from feeling the importance and even urgency of bringing the negociation to some issue before the period at which the Emperors will leave Paris, and before the new assemblies shall have met.

These two events cannot fail to form a crisis in the relations of the Allies with the French Government, and it appears to be essential that, before it shall arise, the intention of the Allied Powers with respect to France should be distinctly made known—that they should have committed themselves to

each other as to the points which they were determined to press—and that they should, if possible, have succeeded in bringing the French Government to agree to the arrangement which shall have been proposed to them.

Lord Stewart has been so fully apprized of our sentiments on some of the details of the proposed arrangement, that I feel it unnecessary to trouble you by detailing them in this letter.

You will understand, however, that we attach great importance to the precise nature of the stipulation by which the fortresses which are to be temporarily occupied by the Allies are, at a period agreed upon, to revert to France.

The terms of *the King or his legitimate successors* may be open to cavil, as it may be contended that any successor approved by the nation is a *legitimate* successor. It was to avoid this objection that the Chancellor suggested, in the memorandum of the 3rd of August, the terms, *Louis XVIII., or his successors by rightful inheritance;* and we wish you would attend to the adoption of this phrase, or designation, in the instrument which may be to be signed.

We are further of opinion that it cannot be too clearly expressed that the fortresses are not in any case to revert to France, except it shall be under the Government of Louis XVIII., or his successors by rightful inheritance. The explicit recognition of this principle, whilst it explains the motives which have actuated the councils of the Allies, affords one of the best securities for the continuance of the King's authority. I am not aware that I can have anything further to add on this most important branch of your negociations.

I trust that the explanation which I have given in this letter and those which you will further receive from your brother will enable you to bring the negociations to a conclusion; for, whatever evils the French nation are at present suffering, they must be augmented in an infinite degree by their uncertainty as to their future fate. I am likewise firmly con-

vinced that the same uncertainty has a most unfavourable impression in this country and throughout Europe.

Whatever may be the first popular impression on the result of the negociation according to the principles which have been agreed upon, your brother will be authorized to assure you that you will be most cordially and zealously supported and upheld by all your colleagues in this country.

Believe me to be, &c.,

LIVERPOOL.

Proceedings after the King's Arrival in Spain, with respect to the Constitution and the Conduct of the Government towards the Liberales.

Madrid, March 25, 1814.

When the first intelligence was received of the King's having left Valençay, several persons consulted Sir Henry Wellesley as to the line of conduct which the King ought to pursue, upon his arrival in Spain; and he gave it as his opinion that he ought to accept the Constitution.

Valencia, April 19, 1814.

The King arrived at Valencia on the 16th. General Elio tells the King that the army authorizes him to renew the oath to his Majesty of 1808, binding themselves to maintain his integral rights, *as they had descended to him from his ancestors.* And the Duke of San Carlos publicly declares the whole army of Spain to be in the same sentiments, and ready to take the same oath.

Sir Henry Wellesley's opinions adverse to the King's advisers—determines not to compromise the British Government with either party.

Valencia, April 24.

The King, in his progress from Gerona, through Spain, had found the Constitution was generally odious to the people.

Sir Henry Wellesley advises the King to accept the Constitution, and tells him it was impossible for him to take any

active part in support of the measures which he understood his Majesty to have in contemplation; nor could Lord Wellington make any offers of support, of the nature suggested by the Duke of San Carlos.

San Carlos said, in the new Constitution, none of the institutions which were oppressive or odious to the people would be restored.

Ferdinand VII. entered Madrid on the 13th May, 1814—his carriage drawn by the populace from Aranjuez to Madrid, a distance of 30 miles—his reception surpassed all belief.

The King's Proclamation, dated the 4th May, 1814, not promulgated until the 11th May, 1814.

Madrid, May 15, 1814.

The Constitution, which was annulled by the Proclamation, was very unpopular not only in the provinces through which the King passed, but in the North and South of Spain; and the revolution which has taken place may be considered more as an act of the nation than as one of arbitrary power on the part of the King.

Sir Henry Wellesley took the earliest opportunity of expressing to the Duke of San Carlos his detestation of the arrests which had taken place: nevertheless, they gave great satisfaction to the people at Madrid.

Madrid, June 3, 1814.

Sir Henry Wellesley says the downfal of the Constitution does not seem to have excited a murmur.

On the 3rd June, 1814, Sir Henry Wellesley states that, in reply to proposed pecuniary aid from Great Britain to Spain, he stated the impossibility of his even transmitting such a proposition to Government, while the country was kept in a state of suspense as to the future intentions of Ferdinand VII.; while it appeared doubtful whether the promises he held out in the Proclamation of the 4th of May should be fulfilled; and while the persons arrested were still in confinement.

Madrid, August 5, 1814.

Desires leave to apply, on the part of the Prince Regent, in favour of the persons arrested.

Madrid, August 25.

At a private audience with the King, Sir Henry urged him to release the prisoners and to fulfil the promises of the Proclamation of the 4th May.

Madrid, December 7, 1814.

States the payment of the subsidy, and observes that, after all provisions which have been furnished to the Spaniards shall have been paid, there will be a considerable balance due to them to clear the subsidy to the 1st August, when it ceases—laments observations made in newspapers as reflections made on the King, and used by our enemies to our disadvantage—shows that the people of Spain were against the Liberales and the new Constitution, and in favour of the King. The only sum of money advanced to the King while at Valencia was 4,000 dollars for his table, at the particular request of Monsieur Luzendo, Secretary of State to the Regency.

Madrid, December 23, 1814.

Recapitulates his former despatches—at Valencia a Paper signed by sixty-nine deputies from the Cortes, one third of the whole, implored the King not to swear to the Constitution—this party fully equal in number to the Liberales.

If Lord Castlereagh will take the trouble to read the despatches Nos. 104 and 105 and 108 of 1814, he will find a recapitulation of all the proceedings, from the first intelligence being received of the King's departure from Valençay, up to the end of the month of December.

Madrid, March 30, 1815.

Relates a conversation which he had with one of the persons most in the confidence of the King, upon its being reported that it was his Majesty's intention to put to death some of the persons in confinement for their political opinions—expresses

his intention of demanding an audience of the King; and states that, if any of these persons were put to death, it would not surprise him if the Prince Regent were to recall his embassy. This conversation reported to the King.

Madrid, April 23.

Relates the substance of a conversation with M. de Cevallos, upon the state of Spain: by his desire has an interview with M. Escoiquiz, who at that time was most in the confidence of the King—states to M. Escoiquiz his opinion respecting the King's conduct since his return—dwells particularly upon the cruelty and injustice of his conduct towards the persons arrested for their political opinions—adverts to the reports of their being to be put to death—and states what the consequences will be—the conversation reported to the King, and Sir Henry receives assurances from his Majesty, through M. Escoiquiz, that no blood shall be shed, and that the Liberales shall be treated with as much lenity as shall be consistent with the safety of the kingdom.

Madrid, August 1.

Sir Henry's last public act at Madrid was to intercede personally with the King, in behalf of the Liberales. The King, in reply, said that he felt every disposition to put an end to their confinement; and that Sir Henry might assure the Prince Regent that this was a subject which constantly occupied his thoughts.

Lord Castlereagh's instructions to Mr. Vaughan, from Paris, afford a strong proof of the interest which was taken by the Allies in the fate of these unfortunate persons.

Inquisition.

Repeated remonstrances were made upon this subject to the Spanish Government, as appears by despatches Nos. 62, 64, and 66, of the month of July, 1814. It was endeavoured, through the Duke of San Carlos and through other channels, to make the King sensible of the contempt which the re-

establishment of this odious tribunal would bring upon his Government and upon the Spanish nation among all foreign States.

Sir Henry addressed a private letter to the Duke of San Carlos, urging him, in the strongest terms, to prevent the establishment of the Inquisition. At last, it was established without the knowledge of the Duke of San Carlos, who was then Prime Minister.

Slave Trade.

Lord Castlereagh is acquainted with all the proceedings upon this subject. Every possible effort was made to induce the Government of Spain to meet the wishes of the British Government with respect to this traffic, as appears by despatches Nos. 50, 60, 71, 72, 77, 83, 92, 97, of the year 1814, and Nos. 7, 11, 15, 25, 67, 88, of the year 1815. Lord Castlereagh knows that pecuniary aid was offered to them at the time when they were in the greatest distress, upon condition of their abolishing the Slave Trade, but without effect. At the departure of Sir Henry from Madrid, a disposition more favourable to the views of Great Britain upon this subject seemed to be making a gradual progress.

Four persons delivered over to the Spanish authorities by the Governor of Gibraltar, together with Dr. Diego de Correa. —After repeated representations, the Spanish Government have consented to release the four persons above alluded to.

But they have not yet consented to the release of Dr. Diego de Correa, who was one of the individuals who betrayed the greatest hostility to the King's authority, and who was connected in some way or other with all the mischievous publications at Cadiz.

END OF VOL. X.